London Fire Brigade firefighter Glenn Williams testimony on his role managing fire survival guidance (FSG) calls at Grenfell Tower, including writing FSG information on the wall.
00:00:00 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing we're going to hear from another of the firefighters and just interrupt Isaac yes good morning mr. chairman yes we're going to hear from watch manager Glenn Williams now if the witness can
00:00:11 Glenn Williams now if the witness can please be called
00:00:39 I swear by Almighty God but the end of it so I shall give shall be the truth the whole truth nothing but the truth
00:00:49 the truth thank you very much with Williams good morning sit down make yourself comfortable thank you yes Thank You mr. William is this thank you
00:01:02 Thank You mr. William is this thank you very much mr. Williams I wonder if I can ask you to give the inquiry or full name please
00:01:12 please it's Glen Williams right now thank you very much for attending today I should say is that troubling to that extent it's quite Alvis is it my go to control
00:01:23 it's quite Alvis is it my go to control we can turn it off if you go all right it's just quite no well you need to hear all the questions you're quite right could one of the actors help with the fat amusing if you find it gets too warm
00:01:36 fat amusing if you find it gets too warm because yeah I just moved a family
00:01:54 I won't need it more than me you know that was
00:02:02 that's better better yeah I've said okay can I start by saying thank you very much sorry mr. million I keep stopping it those rights No are you comfortable all right the moment you're
00:02:20 comfortable all right the moment you're content with the way things are it's right thank you and what I wanted to do is to thank you to start with for coming here today and assisting us with our inquiries we are very grateful to you
00:02:31 inquiries we are very grateful to you can I start by asking you to go to your statement please which is dated the 14th of December 2017 now you should have it in a file in front of you and the
00:02:43 in a file in front of you and the reference to it is M et quadruple zero eight zero four five can I ask you first have you read it recently mr. I have yes can you confirm that its contents are
00:02:55 can you confirm that its contents are true the contents is true how everyone reading it recently our notice of this and typos in it yeah so if it comes up we can certainly correct it certainly and have you discussed your statement or
00:03:08 and have you discussed your statement or the evidence that you're going to give to us today with anybody else before coming here no right now you should have a contemporaneous note as well which is at the next tab in the little file which
00:03:21 at the next tab in the little file which is M et triple zero 1 3 0 9 5 can you confirm that that is yours I can yes and
00:03:33 confirm that that is yours I can yes and what can you can you tell us when you wrote that please believe away to the day after my birthday right
00:03:45 I think I've stated in it somewhere when I wrote it okay but not on not immediately after the night no okay now you also exhibited I think three
00:03:56 now you also exhibited I think three exhibits GM two three and four GMT and I won't ask you to look at those now but I'm gonna read them into the record GM two is a hand-drawn map of Grenfell tower or the area which is M et triple
00:04:09 tower or the area which is M et triple zero 1 3 0 9 6 GM 3 is another map M et triple 0 1 5 6 1 3 and GM 4 is a hand-drawn diagram of the bridgehead M
00:04:21 hand-drawn diagram of the bridgehead M et triple 0 1 3 0 9 3 and those are now in the record and the reason I do that mr. Williams is say that you can you can identify those and that the public and
00:04:33 identify those and that the public and then see them you contend that those are your documents yeah I am thank you
00:04:50 your documents yeah I am thank you can I start that by asking you some questions about your career with the LMB and your and some questions about training you join the lfp and I think January 2000 as you say in your statement
00:05:01 statement I joined into I joined in September 2000 and I was posted to land a fire station yeah in January 2001 yes and cutting a long story short you were promoted to
00:05:12 long story short you were promoted to read watch manager I think in January 2016 at Fulham I was and was that your role on the night of the fire or your steel position on the night of if it was
00:05:24 steel position on the night of if it was since then I think you say that you've been further promoted is that right it is in the fire brigade this promotion of responsibility more than anything so
00:05:36 responsibility more than anything so Fulham fire station is on one appliance fire station yes which is our watch manager a is the rank that he's in charge of that I'm now at so home green watch which is a multi appliance station
00:05:48 watch which is a multi appliance station so it's a watch manager beat right and how long have you been in Soho greenwash since February sure since February this year now at the top of
00:06:00 February this year now at the top of page two of your statement you just turn to that please you you say that in the summer of 2017 you attended back to basic training sessions provided by the
00:06:12 basic training sessions provided by the local authority on how to respond to a high-rise and I should just say when I take it to your statement or any document it may be helpful for you to use the screen on the desk on your right rather than your own written statement
00:06:25 rather than your own written statement in paper form it's up to you how you want to do that yes but just looking at the sentence you put in your statement there first of all when in the summer of 2017 did you receive that back to basic
00:06:36 2017 did you receive that back to basic training
00:06:36 training do you remember so the type I that I refer to the beginning was this these are there's two here so it's the summer of 2016
00:06:43 of 2016 2060 and - the training was provided by the authority not the local authority is in the nice fire brigade okay can you
00:06:54 in the nice fire brigade okay can you tell us what that training consisted of it was a lfb organized training event where they organized from recollection
00:07:07 where they organized from recollection it was a combined comm session which also included a training for the firefighters in establishing a bridgehead so as a simulated exercise I
00:07:18 bridgehead so as a simulated exercise I attended Hammersmith Fire Station and the firefighters went off to establish a simulated bridgehead and the watch officers would participate in
00:07:30 officers would participate in essentially a comms exercise managing incident from a removed from the actual bridgehead area right they say so it's
00:07:42 bridgehead area right they say so it's over the watch office is it was more comms from for the firefighters it was practical establishing it with Richard when you say more comms can you can be a bit more specific and try and break it down first of all did you let me just see if I can get at this this way did
00:07:54 see if I can get at this this way did you have communicate training on communications between the control room and the bridgehead
00:08:02 it's vague it's a vague memory and I don't want to say something I didn't do it it was along the lines of communicating with
00:08:16 along the lines of communicating with the bridgehead right and as a removed watch office as as I moved watch office yes so the scenario might be that you are based on the ground floor and you're
00:08:27 are based on the ground floor and you're communicating as an incident commander and you'll communicate within it watch officer and the bridgehead so it says so it was a it was a what you called it
00:08:38 it was a it was a what you called it like a dialogue that you go through like series of scenarios in okay so what some radio equipment have were you trained on
00:08:49 radio equipment have were you trained on did any part of that training in that back to basics set of sessions involve training on communicating far survival
00:09:00 training on communicating far survival diagnosed calls no okay now in your statement you continue in the second paragraph on that page to say throughout my career I have received training for
00:09:12 my career I have received training for pre-prepared planning should compartment ation fail that's since 2001 is it yes
00:09:24 did that training ever include anything about cladding fires no did it include anything about how to go about full or partial evacuation of a high-rise block
00:09:36 partial evacuation of a high-rise block no did it include anything about how to communicate or manage fire survival guidance calls well that came later when did that come I couldn't give you a
00:09:49 did that come I couldn't give you a specific date but it wasn't soon my career of learning about my reference to this is when fire breaches the
00:10:00 this is when fire breaches the compartment internally yes so the effects of secondary gases admit former compartment through open doors through firefight actions into say
00:10:11 doors through firefight actions into say a lift lobby for example and how to respond to a fire that is spreading internally because of second.you gas ignition it's not it wasn't so this was
00:10:23 ignition it's not it wasn't so this was very practical this is at the fire service college this was real fire training with using combustible products and it's where we would it's where we historically carried out on real fire
00:10:34 historically carried out on real fire training we don't have that facility anymore so it's not training it takes place now I'm just breaking that down a bit
00:10:42 bit when was this training do you remember but it would have been for as long as the authority we use in the fire service college so it would be from the beginning of my career through to about
00:10:57 2012 ish maybe I can't be specific right after 2012 did you have any training on
00:11:08 after 2012 did you have any training on how to manage fire survival guidance calls I had a computer-based training package where was that delivered it was
00:11:19 package where was that delivered it was through the London Fire Brigades online training and it would we well we do a lot of training a lot of it is scenario
00:11:33 lot of training a lot of it is scenario based a lot of its theoretical it's very difficult to practically you know train for fire survival guidance because it
00:11:44 for fire survival guidance because it takes a lot of resources and a lot of planning to get hold of a block and the people to evacuate or to work along so it's a computer-based package it's
00:11:56 it's a computer-based package it's played some recordings about the types of calls that you would hear on it on fire survivor violence right now control will respond to it and the initial actions of I
00:12:09 and the initial actions of I commanders and what what actions should be taken once that informations passed over to BS the commander do you remember what the most recent point in time that
00:12:21 what the most recent point in time that you had that training was prior to the fire at Granville tower I mean you'd have to refer to my individual training record but I'm fairly sure that I provided that training to my watch
00:12:34 provided that training to my watch although I didn't use that package I used the training note because the package wouldn't load up due to technical error I'm so fairly sure that I would have provided that training to my watch certainly within the period the
00:12:49 my watch certainly within the period the year of 27th the beginning of 2017 2017 3078 we regularly with trainer high wise fly survivor violence based medicine
00:13:01 fly survivor violence based medicine right have you I'm assuming tell me if this is wrong you've heard of the fire at latinum house yes yes did any part of that computer-based training
00:13:13 that computer-based training train on lessons learned from the lack and all house fire so far as far survival guidance is concerned no that package didn't focus at all on the lack of my house from recollection lack a new
00:13:25 of my house from recollection lack a new house we had our we had a separate in the independent case study on post lack in the house but I haven't that was a
00:13:38 in the house but I haven't that was a very long time ago calm I can barely remember that that's right didn't from what you do remember of the latter house case study on which you had training do you remember who
00:13:51 you had training do you remember who delivered that training to you do you remember any what do you remember it ever getting any training on multiples FSGS no
00:14:05 FSGS no are you familiar with lfb policy number 790 var survival guidance okay have you
00:14:16 790 var survival guidance okay have you ever received or given training on that policy yes you have do you remember when the most recent time before the ground feel tired after the first mines of Indochina record if you then just go to
00:14:29 Indochina record if you then just go to page 16 of your statement please you you say there and you deal with the question
00:14:40 say there and you deal with the question of FSG calls and your experience and to four lines up from the bottom of the page page 16 you say I have undergone and presented the training when dealing
00:14:52 and presented the training when dealing with FSG calls to my crews but this does not take into consideration the type of numbers experienced a Grenville tower the FSG training rereceive
00:15:03 the FSG training rereceive teaches how to coordinate a targeted rescue to people that are unable to evacuate we're trained to rescue that person and bring them into a safe environment we do not receive any
00:15:15 environment we do not receive any training that involves taking a person through a toxic environment 20-plus floors high and bringing them to a safe environment on ground level now can I just explore on our two things about
00:15:27 just explore on our two things about that evidence that you've given do you get or did you have a as at the night of the fire in June 17 any FSG training on bringing people through smoke blog
00:15:40 bringing people through smoke blog escape routes we do not receive training on how to evacuate people through a toxic environment okay
00:15:51 toxic environment okay does that include in a high-rise building full stop right
00:16:00 can you explain then what the training is that you refer to in the first sentence that I read out I have undergone and presented the training when dealing with FSG calls to my crews
00:16:13 when dealing with FSG calls to my crews what is that training that you've undergone and presented so as I just refer to the computer-based training what's that yeah okay
00:16:26 and when you say in the in the sentence at the top of or bottom of page 16 top of page 17 we are trained to rescue that person and bring them to a safe environment what is that training well
00:16:39 environment what is that training well that that forms part of the faster the response to fire survival violence being implemented is that the purpose of it first of all the violence is to have been identified someone who's unable to
00:16:51 been identified someone who's unable to leave as the effects of the fire whether we smoke flame we are then informed of their location their condition their floor number flat and we then have a
00:17:02 floor number flat and we then have a procedure in which we set into place where we will catch try to successfully rescue that person I bring them to ground bring them to a safe area and
00:17:14 ground bring them to a safe area and does that include the high-rise building that doesn't kill right so when you in the last sentence you say we do not receive any training that involves taking a person through a toxic environment 20-plus floors high and
00:17:26 environment 20-plus floors high and bring them to a safe environment on ground level what do you what point are you making there what is I think I was just I think that during the interview with the detective was being asked some
00:17:37 with the detective was being asked some pertinent questions about specifically to high why so I was emphasizing that we're not trained and highlight we're not trying to do it that's all
00:17:48 not trying to do it that's all full stop this but particularly not in high light environment right what do you say we're not trying to do it at all and it may be my fault I'm just not sure I'm understanding even you say because you say we're trained to rescue that person and bring them into a safe environment
00:18:00 and bring them into a safe environment and you've explained what that is but then you say you're not trained to do it 20-plus floors high is that does that mean that you get training to rescue people who are trapped but not high up
00:18:13 people who are trapped but not high up in a high-rise no no no it doesn't it means that it means that if you are an incident and fire survival guidance is
00:18:25 incident and fire survival guidance is implemented there isn't we don't do any training that would mean that we would take
00:18:32 take a conscious and breathing casualty into a toxic environment right the point about the high-rise was just something that was being made clear to the detective it wouldn't matter if it was a
00:18:44 detective it wouldn't matter if it was a maisonette it wouldn't matter well you wouldn't necessarily have a first year in that situation but it wouldn't matter if it was a low-rise block or a high-rise block or if it was maisonette
00:18:55 high-rise block or if it was maisonette flat scissor flats and isn't it the point I was making is that I don't receive we haven't received training from it to take a conscious and breathing casualty to a highly toxic environment that's all right we would in
00:19:11 environment that's all right we would in life-saving situations of course we go into fires and we rescue people from fires and that is a toxic and dangerous life-threatening situation listen but
00:19:22 life-threatening situation listen but that's not formed that that's different to the advice of our guidance policy yeah a different situation yeah I follow so so it's not so much 20-plus floors high it's the fact that
00:19:34 20-plus floors high it's the fact that you don't get you don't train get trained to bring a pre conscious and breathing person through any kind of toxic or in a smoke blogged escape route no I see now can I then turn to the
00:19:47 no I see now can I then turn to the night of the fire on the night of the fire you I think we can take this quickly you were posted to appliance g35 one was and you were mobilized at 1:30 33 was we can get that from the short
00:20:01 33 was we can get that from the short incident on it page 8 and from that document also it says that you arrived on scene at 14527 does that sound about right to you it sounded ok on enroute
00:20:17 right to you it sounded ok on enroute and you say on page 4 if I can just quickly show you that but this is paragraph 3 and paragraph 5
00:20:31 you refer to a second make up and a further make up do you remember what the makeups were to in terms of pump numbers I think I was I struggle to remember
00:20:51 I think I was I struggle to remember this I think I was ordered on the ain't right and I think the next make up I can't remember accurately yeah well you say at the top of page four that the
00:21:04 you say at the top of page four that the MDT showed you is mobilized to an eighth pump fire so that's that's what's in your statement that was at oh nine 201 nineteen do you remember
00:21:15 nineteen do you remember still being on route when it went to make pumps 20 and make pumps 25 I don't know you don't do you remember whether you could hear any any radio messages
00:21:26 you could hear any any radio messages coming from control to the fire ground about fast survival guidance while you were on route I don't know you don't
00:21:36 okay now on page five of your statement halfway down the page in the fourth paragraph you say I walk to Mike and
00:21:49 paragraph you say I walk to Mike and this is after you arrived obviously I walk to my key safely and I don't know what the [ __ ] happened Mike had a look of shock on his face I told him it was going to be alright and that we were all here to help and how soon after you
00:22:01 here to help and how soon after you arrived do you think you spoke to my doubtin
00:22:15 within five minutes right [ __ ] okay between five and eight minutes right because remember gals are in equipment between five and eight minutes okay
00:22:25 okay did you know when you spoke to him but he was incident commander yes okay how did you find that out
00:22:39 because I'd heard the initial messages from watch 20,000 at Lake pops right so
00:22:51 from watch 20,000 at Lake pops right so I would have and I and then circumstantially I know Mike is the watch manager of North Kansas and close to work with your madness can certain so kind of it didn't take it it wasn't
00:23:03 kind of it didn't take it it wasn't verbally confirmed but I had a good knowledge that he probably was in charge okay all right did you know that he'd been incident commander right from the start I didn't know but I would
00:23:15 start I didn't know but I would accurately assume he had been young did you know that he was still incident commander when he went to speak to him yes you did did he did he did he's how could you
00:23:26 did he did he did he's how could you tell he was the only watch manager he was the only officer I could say right okay
00:23:31 okay was he wearing an icy Tabard I think he was yeah right did you take any kind of briefing from
00:23:42 did you take any kind of briefing from him do you think no did you have a discussion about FSGS no did you have a discussion about evacuation of residents no could you see any when you had the
00:23:56 no could you see any when you had the discussion with him where were you standing to remember I when we passed those words yes he was about from recollection he was about 20 meters away
00:24:08 recollection he was about 20 meters away from the front of the front of the entrance 20 meters of in which direct okay head in the direction of the covered area right okay so immediately
00:24:19 covered area right okay so immediately opposite the entrance kind of ten o'clock ten o'clock from the action yeah right so if the entrance is noon ten o'clock is where you are standing
00:24:32 have you gone mad if you were standing we give back to the ancients yes he writes about it was about ten o'clock but it say back to the end of ten o'clock they sat towards the southeast
00:24:43 o'clock they sat towards the southeast of the tower okay we can look at them a few up but I just wanted to make sure the onion could you did you look up at the tower yes could you see the fire yes
00:24:54 the tower yes could you see the fire yes and what do you remember how far do you remember that spread as I said in my state I'd have to refer to my statement
00:25:05 state I'd have to refer to my statement so they I'm not inaccurate yeah okay by paid I had a good look at the fire right did you see your happen to see any
00:25:16 did you see your happen to see any residence in fact self evacuating coming down the stairs now to the building no that stage right okay they may have they may have passed me but I wasn't paying
00:25:27 may have passed me but I wasn't paying particular attention to the people evacuating always paying attention to it to the fire right and at the bottom of page five of your statement you say my crew and I made our way to the main
00:25:39 crew and I made our way to the main entrance of the tower before walking into the tower I stopped just short of the canopy and had a good look at the fire I had had a diagonal upward view of the front and right side of the tower peering round and then he say I could
00:25:52 peering round and then he say I could see flames sweeping around to the back almost wrapping around the tower like a whirlwind of fire the flames were aggressively climbing upwards which was an unusual fire reaction to see it
00:26:03 an unusual fire reaction to see it looked as if gases were emitting from the building due to the heat I've seen fire reacting to gases under pressure before but not to this scale I read all that to you because I have a number of number of questions about what you saw
00:26:15 number of questions about what you saw could you do you think you actually saw any gas like substances or or gastric gaseous reactions do you think you saw gas gas combustion what I mean by gases
00:26:29 gas gas combustion what I mean by gases is that when you burn a product irrespective of whether it's a combustible I whatever the combustible product is but particularly man-made fibers that
00:26:41 but particularly man-made fibers that they emit gases that become flammable that are flammable when heated to a certain temperature there will have different ignition rights my reference
00:26:53 different ignition rights my reference to the gases is that the aggressive flame seem to be slightly set back so it's obvious that there's something alight but the anger in the fire the the
00:27:06 alight but the anger in the fire the the way it's responding the way it's under pressure was similar to the way that fires responds that where the gases are igniting right exactly
00:27:18 igniting right exactly yes what did you think it was well I had a knowledge of the ground because I've been stationed at North Kensington for five years prior to going to Fulham and
00:27:29 five years prior to going to Fulham and locally there's two blocks that have got solar panels up one face of the building up so initially I was looking at it and ice I was trying to see if it might be solar panels because I couldn't work out
00:27:42 solar panels because I couldn't work out what on earth it could be alone it was very quite unusual the color of the flame was unusual the the whole way it was responding was unusual I know it
00:27:53 was responding was unusual I know it sounds a bit daft but no we we pay particular attention to how fire is acting and the the way that the fires responding and the way that the smoke is
00:28:04 responding and the way that the smoke is igniting and plume in and on this night it was very unusual nothing I've ever seen what was the color of the flame so obviously the further away from the
00:28:15 obviously the further away from the building you got the more oxygenated it got so you know why orangey red flame but I did pay I did notice that closer to the building as you were as I was looking up at it it was less oxygenated
00:28:30 looking up at it it was less oxygenated so it was more
00:28:35 there's a lot nothing I had to describe yet it was it was not under pressure it
00:28:47 yet it was it was not under pressure it was under pressure so it was like a little Bunsen burner if you imagine this it wasn't if you turn a Bunsen burner so it's not on a jet at the bottom it
00:29:01 it's not on a jet at the bottom it doesn't look so close to the arch of Bunsen does it but then the further out it gets nice orange flame similar to that I can't that the flame color was
00:29:12 that I can't that the flame color was was difficult to identify the color of the flame closer to the building because of the amount of fragments that were falling off and the smoke there's heavy heavy smoke coming off of it so which of
00:29:25 heavy smoke coming off of it so which of the gases and then it was the gases that were igniting after right and that's what created this kind of blanket a fire going around it okay and can you say the
00:29:38 going around it okay and can you say the smoke was although that the flames were sweeping around to them to the back does that mean another face of the building
00:29:49 that mean another face of the building or I can't something else well I was at the front yes to my right was the side and it looked like the flames were lapping around around the corner yeah
00:30:00 lapping around around the corner yeah right whereabouts on the building did you see the flames lapping around at the top or the bottom or the middle or well when initially when I first arrived it
00:30:11 when initially when I first arrived it was
00:30:14 the right hand
00:30:19 it was kind of it had a kind of going in a diagonal direction it's gone up they've gone up in like a straight line yes then it was kind of like the wind
00:30:32 yes then it was kind of like the wind was taking it in a diagonal direction now can't be sure there was the wind but metaphorically a bit bucket I'm not bad and you were standing ten o'clock to the
00:30:43 and you were standing ten o'clock to the tower with Mike Darden and the diagonal was coming in which direction relative to you so going away from me away from so going towards that summer road station yes not that it's a Superman
00:30:55 station yes not that it's a Superman right and did you notice what was happening at the top of the building no okay I can you I couldn't I've been saving something well you could see where you can right now you told us
00:31:06 where you can right now you told us early you haven't had any training on cladding fires were you aware that that what all did you have any thoughts at the time that this might be a cladding fire in other words the external
00:31:18 fire in other words the external envelope for the building igniting the answer is no because I would have
00:31:29 answer is no because I would have thought that an external part of the fire would not ignite to that severity so no it wasn't in my cell process right how do you how do you out of interest
00:31:40 how do you how do you out of interest have you had you heard of a far at Shepherd's court in the August I was there thousand sixteen you were there yeah what stage in the incident where
00:31:51 yeah what stage in the incident where you at Shepherds caught remember okay
00:32:02 you at Shepherds caught remember okay the commander control have been established so I must have got there right a bit a bit later when you arrived a grenfell and you could see what was happening did you have any thoughts that
00:32:14 happening did you have any thoughts that it might be not something like Shepherds caught no no did you ever get any training or ever hear any intelligence or even mess table gossip about about
00:32:25 or even mess table gossip about about Shepherds quarter the lessons learned from it
00:32:32 [Music] what you mean okay let's let me break that down a bit did you ever get any formal training about what had happened at Grant at Shepherd's court and the lessons to be
00:32:44 Shepherd's court and the lessons to be taken away from it no I don't recall getting any formal training it doesn't mean that they didn't provide it I just think we call this even if you'd have to check my individual training record I know okay well let me just check one thing because yeah please know that I
00:32:57 thing because yeah please know that I asked you to be shown the I won't be talking about the same incident chef yes
00:33:08 talking about the same incident chef yes sir Shepherd Shepherds Bush cream yes well the the appliance was a lie and it went out the window yes that's the one all right we are - yes good let me just let me just see if
00:33:19 yes good let me just let me just see if we can come to a full stop on this if you could be shown please tab ten of the documents bundle which is LFP three five two one the tall buildings facades
00:33:31 two one the tall buildings facades SlideShare does want to be sure this is dated 13th of July 2016 on its face that we ever told that in fact it's it was finalized in the October of that year
00:33:43 finalized in the October of that year which is not surprising because the file is in the August saying they can tap in shall I say ignore the date but is this a document just looking at the front you might have ever seen before
00:33:54 and then just turn this just turn the pages very quickly page two and page three page two is fire garage need your address D by a ten wheel tire tower these are all exterior fires no no okay
00:34:08 these are all exterior fires no no okay finally then because that doesn't ring a bell I suspect the conclusion won't but let me take you to it anyway if you could please turn to page 25 general
00:34:19 could please turn to page 25 general conclusion as a general principle the external envelope of the building should not contribute to the fire spread along the facade new construction material and
00:34:30 the facade new construction material and method of construction of being used in facades and with a limited understanding of their fire behavior or performance there is a need to understand what products
00:34:37 products used in the facade system in their fire behavior and if they're used to pray prepare and meet the relevant guidance these could affect the way fires developed and spread in a building that general conclusion the specific question
00:34:49 general conclusion the specific question is have you ever had training on those general conclusions after August 16 no okay now at the stage you're looking up
00:35:09 okay now at the stage you're looking up at the building and going back to where we were at your description of the fire did you have any thoughts about whether compartment ation had failed or not did
00:35:24 compartment ation had failed or not did you think the fire could still be fought yes how did you think that the fire could still be fought in what way
00:35:36 what the tail was already working cause of it and we don't we don't approach fires thinking we can't fight them we
00:35:48 fires thinking we can't fight them we approach fires thinking we can't fight them right so it's not a conscious thought of this is how we're going to fight the fire and this is how we're going to do it or it's if we approached
00:36:01 going to do it or it's if we approached every fire with the conscious thought that we may not put it out then we won't be doing our job it's an in this human
00:36:13 be doing our job it's an in this human it's an instinct this this a reaction or thing we we we fight fire we've got we're ten fires with the intention to fight that fire so I'd like to give you a conclusive answer as to how I thought
00:36:25 a conclusive answer as to how I thought we were going to fight it we were going to throw everything we've got it that's what we were gonna do right were you aware at that time of a specific strategy or plan for fighting
00:36:38 specific strategy or plan for fighting this fire no did you did you ask Mike Dowden what is the specific strategy or plan for fighting another is there a
00:36:49 plan for fighting another is there a reason why you didn't have that conversation with it keeps the incident commander and I was I could see through the glass that people were being
00:37:01 the glass that people were being committed as I understood it once I liked at the bridgehead I'd have a better idea what the plan was I thought
00:37:12 better idea what the plan was I thought that at the time my opinion was that Mike probably had being a watch officer myself there's a lot that you've got to do is a lot going on so I would be able
00:37:24 do is a lot going on so I would be able to ascertain that information at the Richard
00:37:35 you mentioned a turntable ladder fighting the fire just helped us where was that physically in relation to the tower so if we're looking at the tower I
00:37:48 tower so if we're looking at the tower I don't mind which way we do it looking at the tower looking at the entrance the turntable labor was to my whites yes and my recollection was it
00:38:00 whites yes and my recollection was it was on a fairly steep pitch right could you see it applying water to the the facade you were looking at I think it
00:38:14 facade you were looking at I think it was a pilot yeah she remember how high up the building the water was reaching
00:38:25 right what's effect could could you see what effect it was having on the fire on the exterior I wasn't looking at the
00:38:36 the exterior I wasn't looking at the tail to be honest I was looking at what the fire was doing so my focus of attention was on the fire not on the tail was there right so okay did you
00:38:49 tail was there right so okay did you have any thoughts in your own mind about how you're going to extinguish the fire on the exterior at the very top of the building
00:38:56 building No so when you say earlier as you do we were going to throw everything at it did you have any thoughts in your own mind about what what you would actually do to
00:39:09 about what what you would actually do to fight the fire when I say throw everything at it we've got a lot of resources in the armory of the London Fire Brigade so that's what I mean by that we're right nor for resources and my my thought was
00:39:25 nor for resources and my my thought was that I wanted to get in and start firefighting search rescue and assist him mmm saving life hmm
00:39:32 life hmm just I'm sorry to press this a little bit when you say you've got a lot of resources in the LF via armory did you have any thoughts at that time about what resources you would need to get out
00:39:43 what resources you would need to get out of the armory in order to extinguish the file on the exterior at the very top of the building at the time no because as I said to you it's a it's
00:39:55 no because as I said to you it's a it's an unconscious processes you've I'm fully aware of the ball sources we have so so my observation is not unconscious like we need to get this equipment
00:40:06 like we need to get this equipment because that's not my responsibility needless to say if you're asking me to clear it up for the inquiry we have aerial platforms we have we have an
00:40:20 aerial platforms we have we have an abundance of firefighters and fire appliances and so so the senior management coming on would riddles with obviously naturally be aware of all the
00:40:32 obviously naturally be aware of all the equipment that we've got you've got highly-trained control staff so so no it wasn't my conscious thought when I was looking at the building but the London
00:40:44 looking at the building but the London Fire Brigade has a lot of equipment that you're being used to fight fire historically we've used it to fight fire so I assumed that when I assume I expect that we'll be using that equipment to extinguish but can you identify for us
00:40:56 extinguish but can you identify for us what piece of equipment would have been able to fight a fire at the top of the upper reaches of Grenville tower so just so in in excess of 60 meters no I
00:41:12 now you say it is still in that paragraph my crew and I made our way to the main entrance of the tower how long after your conversation with my doubtin
00:41:24 after your conversation with my doubtin which you say was about five minutes after you arrived do you think you entered the tower Oh a minute right two minutes okay two minutes yeah obviously
00:41:36 minutes okay two minutes yeah obviously it's an estimate at this stage of time but the distance who traveled on the covered area stop look up look at the fire I mean in in the in in the cold light of day the descriptions that we're
00:41:47 light of day the descriptions that we're going through here seem quite prolonged but there's seconds yes can I ask you just to look at a CCTV image just to see if we can get the
00:42:00 image just to see if we can get the timing right this is inq two five six mister documents director now this is a CCTV image from camera four with a
00:42:13 CCTV image from camera four with a timestamp of oh one 55 57 which well adjusted gives a an adjusted time of Oh 155 21 now can you identify yourself in
00:42:26 155 21 now can you identify yourself in that picture I'm the firefighter in the white helmet right on the left yes do you thank you do you know who the others are yes who are they the crew manager on the right hand side is crew
00:42:38 manager on the right hand side is crew manager Christopher battered or right and the firefighter in the middle is firefighter new Saunders Saunders Neil Saunders Yeah right okay now I think as part of your crews
00:42:51 okay now I think as part of your crews you heard firefighter Hill as well I did and we don't I don't think we see him in that in that picture or do we
00:43:01 I don't think
00:43:04 [Music] I don't think you can know I was wondering it's a reflection on the left there huh I think isn't it but I'm not sure the tree I think I think it must be
00:43:17 sure the tree I think I think it must be it might not be then firefighters lining up the stairs so yeah I don't like I was going to ask you about that at that stage did you see a queue of firefighters in BA yeah
00:43:28 a queue of firefighters in BA yeah queuing to go to the bridgehead hmm right uh and I'll come back to this in a moment you I think then go to the
00:43:39 moment you I think then go to the bridgehead and it page six of your statement you say we then entered through the main entrance and into the ground floor for a there were a lot of firefighters in the foyer queued in a single-file against
00:43:51 foyer queued in a single-file against the glass wall up the stairs and across the raised platform of the mezzanine level leading to the single doorway so looking at that photographic that may well be the batter's the tail end of a queue or near it that is that about
00:44:02 queue or near it that is that about right yeah okay and then you say stood by this doorway was watch manager Paul Watson
00:44:13 g36 I believe the majority of the firefighters lined up with watch manager Watson were part of his crews from Hammersmith fire station now first of all did you know Paul Watson yes you on
00:44:26 all did you know Paul Watson yes you on the night of the fire you knew who he was
00:44:27 was yes okay have you worked with him before he's the watch manager at the neighboring station right so we work we work on instance regular yep I see okay
00:44:40 now to be clear where was what manager Watson but we say he was stood by the doorway
00:44:51 was that on the second floor or on the ground floor at that point the walkway
00:45:03 ground floor at that point the walkway that goes across the what as you went into the building there's a walk there's a staircase that goes up to the right and then there's a walkway that leads to a single door yeah
00:45:14 walkway that leads to a single door yeah he was like a single door on the walkway do you know what he was doing
00:45:20 not when I entered no okay did you did you greet him in any way yeah you did what he said what did you say I said what's happening right but he was up
00:45:31 what's happening right but he was up there and you were on you were with no no sorry when I entered yes looked up and I went up the stairs I walk past the file my crew followed me or walk past the stairs I told them stable on the side went up to the stairs
00:45:45 stable on the side went up to the stairs told him to wait with the crews standing on the mezzanine she recalled it the mezzanine is that what it was yes waited for what sir I said what's happening
00:45:55 happening wait the Bridget he said it's through the door right now if you go to your second paragraph that is pretty much what you say I led my crew passing the line of firefighters up the stairs and the mezzanine level where I spoke to
00:46:06 the mezzanine level where I spoke to watch manager Watson and asked where the bridgehead was but my question really was whether before you gone up there you haven't you had a conversation with him or greeted him from the ground floor no
00:46:17 or greeted him from the ground floor no I don't we've just acknowledged each other okay all right now continuing that with that paragraph you say he pointed and stated the bridgehead was through
00:46:29 and stated the bridgehead was through the single doorway and you go on to say and I summarized it that you saw that watch managers a Keith and des Silvo were managing the bridgehead and entry control and then you go on to say I saw
00:46:44 control and then you go on to say I saw watch manager Keith was busy talking to firefighters
00:46:50 can I just ask you why did you decide to go straight up to the bridgehead what rather than what why did anybody instruct you to go to
00:47:03 why did anybody instruct you to go to the bridgehead no right what were you planning to do at the bridgehead I said saying what the plan was right and they'd be committed to firefight so to Michigan okay is there any reason why
00:47:15 Michigan okay is there any reason why you didn't ask my dad and what the plan was as I said previously as an instant commander you've got a lot a lot on right and the person who's running the
00:47:29 right and the person who's running the bridgehead will have a plan as to what that the purpose behind their commitment FBI yes so I didn't need I was I was wearing the I I was leading my crew in
00:47:40 wearing the I I was leading my crew in ba so I was going to the bridgehead to be committed on our rival they'd asked for equipment as well of which we were but we had with us so it made it was
00:47:54 but we had with us so it made it was common sense more than anything I mean I'm an experienced fire fighter I don't tend to wait to I have enough experience to go and talk to the other officers and
00:48:06 to go and talk to the other officers and that's the same what a plan is and how it's going to be put into place okay and did you speak to watch managed to get there Keith no he was he was briefing a
00:48:17 there Keith no he was he was briefing a crew right do you know what did he could you observe whether he was briefing them to do search and rescue or briefing them to do firefighting no okay he was he was
00:48:29 firefighting no okay he was he was speaking directly to them did you see any crews being deployed with firefighting equipment hoses Halligan bars the crew that was being briefed did
00:48:41 bars the crew that was being briefed did have some braking in gear with them I think and then I yeah I think nonspecific people the the firefighter would be carrying that thermal image cameras right yes yeah we can commit
00:48:54 cameras right yes yeah we can commit with equipment right now in the third paragraph you say I approach watch manager DaSilva who said we've got a lot of errors and yet you go on to say I
00:49:07 of errors and yet you go on to say I quickly glanced to the ECB that had a number of FF tallies plugged in my eyes were drawn to the forward information board as this signified the number of fast survivable guidance calls being
00:49:19 fast survivable guidance calls being shared from the command unit to the bridgehead I was expecting the list of FS cheese to be longer do you remember how many roughly were on the forward
00:49:30 how many roughly were on the forward information board when you saw it I can't give you a number I could five could estimate there was a dis that big look what what would the witness is
00:49:41 look what what would the witness is holding up his fingers about a foot apart I think yeah yeah because that doesn't come out on the transcript but roughly how many would that signify
00:49:52 I can't give you an economic best guess would be maybe ten right okay but like I say that that is a best guess
00:50:06 say that that is a best guess now you say in the last sentence of that paragraph I was expecting the list of FS used to be longer why were you expecting the list to be longer because the right side of the building was alight right
00:50:23 at that point had you heard any FSG messages being transmitted are either over the main scheme radio or on your
00:50:35 over the main scheme radio or on your fire ground radios radio there was a lot of traffic on the fire ground radio so no I had I was I was concentrating on my
00:50:48 no I had I was I was concentrating on my current environment trying to ascertain what what the plan was right what was going on right so it was not concentrating on my hangout radio it's
00:51:00 concentrating on my hangout radio it's feasible there could have been information being passed but I wasn't listening to it now you say that you were expecting the list to be longer because the side of the building was
00:51:12 because the side of the building was alight so were you your expectation was was it that the list would actually be very much longer than 10 well same yeah
00:51:24 very much longer than 10 well same yeah I mean for the severity of the fire on the outside versus the number of FSG yeah I assumed it would be torn I'm
00:51:35 yeah I assumed it would be torn I'm assuming her anticipated it would be done ecology and would that mean that you thought that that many people lots of people in other words more than was
00:51:47 of people in other words more than was on the fib fib would be trapped in their flats in requiring FSG
00:51:55 I my conscious thought at that moment was the fire on the outside can't have been reaching the inside that's so that
00:52:08 been reaching the inside that's so that was my thought process right so it's not this severe fire huh and because of the low number then must not have it must
00:52:22 low number then must not have it must not have broken into the internal of the right of the building let me reiterate this is split-second thinking because it changes that that it was incredibly dynamic in insolence nothing I've ever
00:52:34 dynamic in insolence nothing I've ever experienced so as we decide for this today
00:52:39 today we're going through second by second thought processes yes but I can assure you that the dynamic of that incident was rapidly changing yes so we're just
00:52:50 was rapidly changing yes so we're just coming back to your answer a minute ago we say can't be breaching when you say I was expecting the list of FS used to be longer was that expectation based on the fact that actually you had expected for
00:53:04 fact that actually you had expected for fire to be breaching into the interior I I was expecting that a fire of that severity would burn a window out for example beyond the words be entering via
00:53:16 with would be breaching the internal aspect of that building more than what was represented on that board however that said I hadn't been given any information at this stage so within a
00:53:29 information at this stage so within a very short space of time it became apparent that you know we needed to we needed to continue working rapidly because the incident was changing
00:53:42 because the incident was changing rapidly did you have a discussion with watch manager des Sylvain about the number of FSGS she had on her MIB now in paragraph four
00:53:53 she had on her MIB now in paragraph four of your statement on the same page page six you say that you walk back out of the single doorway well manager Watson was accompanied by a station manager I do not made this
00:54:05 station manager I do not made this statement a station manager's name
00:54:09 the station manager asked what I was doing from which I informed him I was waiting to be tasked the station manager then said I've got a job for you you won't need that pointing at my BA set I took off my BA said and handed it to a
00:54:21 took off my BA said and handed it to a firefighter carrying a second set bag I then instructed my crew to remain and waiting to be committed just on the second set bag there what is that it's a bag this you that couldn't be used that
00:54:34 bag this you that couldn't be used that to safely transport an additional breathing apparatus set so it can be used right do you know how many second set bags there were at the bridgehead when you were there well there was this
00:54:48 when you were there well there was this the only one you saw do you think the only one I saw right okay that stage right okay and that that what particular part of my statement as I said amongst this Capone would probably
00:55:00 said amongst this Capone would probably be backed up by the CCTV footage because I'm not sure if I took my set off at that stage or just before I did the started the fire survival guidance but
00:55:11 started the fire survival guidance but you certainly would see it as policy TV right okay well we'll come to some CCTV shortly
00:55:25 do you remember how much time you spent at the bridgehead or on the second-floor balcony before you left I went downstairs with the station manager it
00:55:36 downstairs with the station manager it felt like a very short space it's okay do you remember what the stage manager wanted you to do no idea did you ask him yeah I said well what's my job
00:55:47 yeah I said well what's my job and he said follow me and you did and I did this is on some Radian now you say I do not know the station manager's name
00:55:58 do not know the station manager's name what was he wearing a white helmet he was is that how you knew he was a station manager yes was he wearing at a bard I can't
00:56:09 was he wearing at a bard I can't remember right does the name station manager Brett loft mean anything to you it wasn't it wasn't
00:56:20 mean anything to you it wasn't it wasn't Brett loft I know right laughs right it was not him does the name station manager Andy Wilson mean anything to you it could be I know a lot of officers
00:56:31 it could be I know a lot of officers have been been in the brigade are we well yeah I don't know anything Walter but it could have been him it could have been him right okay he's been described by other watch
00:56:43 he's been described by other watch managers physically and I'm not sure it's appropriate to do use that could you describe the watch manager that you were led by he was smaller than me right
00:56:55 were led by he was smaller than me right threat Loftus about the same height as right he was quite loud it's was he wearing his helmet on his head no
00:57:08 was he wearing his helmet on his head no I'm really hard to tell the difference between people you don't know in fire uniforms because we don't wear name back nothing other than rank markings no I'm really people introduce themselves
00:57:20 really people introduce themselves they're so rude yes okay do you think it would help if you had your name yeah knock on your to meet someone just yeah it would it would be a great help if you
00:57:31 it would it would be a great help if you could identify individuals even one number I know it's a bit archaic but or letter or something it's quite hard to distinguish firefighters yeah is there a
00:57:44 distinguish firefighters yeah is there a reason why lfp doesn't mark its firefighters I'm afraid I am NOT of the
00:57:55 firefighters I'm afraid I am NOT of the authority to answer that all right I don't know no Andy Walton has given us a statement which we'll have to explore with him but he says that when he was at the bridgehead he was asked by he says an Irish watch manager who we imagined
00:58:08 an Irish watch manager who we imagined to be much manager O'Keefe to be the be a resources officer and that you were to work with him although he says you were a crew manager it does not accord with
00:58:19 a crew manager it does not accord with your recollection in any way now okay um [Music]
00:58:25 [Music] he also says that he asked you to go and speak to who was running the balcony and confirm how many BA whereas you had at that time on standby again is that
00:58:36 that time on standby again is that something you recall yourself no right now if you please go to page seven of your statement
00:58:52 at the very top you say that you recall speaking with DAC O'Laughlin you say who said you go with him and
00:59:03 you say who said you go with him and support him he said you say I then took off my helmet and said Andy it's Glyn he looked at me and said oh god Glyn now
00:59:14 looked at me and said oh god Glyn now clearly you know docm I don't very well do you know well did you know whether he was incident commander by this point I
00:59:26 hadn't been given a verbal confirmation but I knew that there were clients is there he is a Deputy Assistant Commissioner my it it would make sense
00:59:40 Commissioner my it it would make sense that he was on the outside of the building running he would be the incident commander right it didn't I the fact that we had to report it that I'd followed the station manager to
00:59:52 I'd followed the station manager to report to him okay was he wearing a seat aboard the white tiger I'll remember do you know did you see him speaking to my dad at that point no okay um do you know
01:00:04 dad at that point no okay um do you know what he wanted you to do he said follow him right so you followed the station manager I didn't back into the town I did do you know did you hear a discussion about I couldn't hear what
01:00:16 discussion about I couldn't hear what they were discussing I was looking at the tower while they were talking right okay now in paragraph 3 on page 7 you say as we stood by the doorway that led
01:00:30 say as we stood by the doorway that led to the bridgehead we were met by group manager Richard Welch Welch turned to me and said I want you to set up FSG on that wall down there and he pointing at the wall on the foyer left as you enter
01:00:42 the wall on the foyer left as you enter the main entrance
01:00:46 but roughly how that soon after coming back down from the second floor do you
01:00:57 back down from the second floor do you think he went you did that he went back into the doorway I should imagine it was maybe would be less than less than
01:01:10 maybe would be less than less than between five and ten minutes all right and you've gone up back up to the second floor by this stage had so he was pointing down he was pointing down to the wall yeah now Gina did you know what
01:01:24 the wall yeah now Gina did you know what Richard Welch's role was at that stage I didn't know I was surprised to see him to be taught by a great manager as opposed to what well it was it's the
01:01:37 as opposed to what well it was it's the first time in like in my experience to have a group manager at the bridgehead tasking so right was surprised at the smoked manager Tosca means right given
01:01:49 smoked manager Tosca means right given that you've seen DSA a Lachlan there and we're now being tasked by a group manager did that give you any idea of what the command structure was at that point yeah it would give me a good idea
01:02:04 point yeah it would give me a good idea that that there there clearly was a command structure in place I wouldn't have known the specifics the Bell gave me that idea that there was a command structure in place okay now you say that
01:02:16 structure in place okay now you say that he wanted you to set up FSG on that wall down there what did you understand him to mean by that instruction
01:02:30 well I understood it to the event FST we had been implemented and we needed to start we needed to stop collating the
01:02:42 start we needed to stop collating the information to prioritize right spirit did he tell you about how FSG information had been collated up to that point
01:02:50 point no did you know how many FSG calls had actually been received by that point young roughly do you know how many crews had been committed at that point to
01:03:02 had been committed at that point to carry out rescues no I could only tell by the tallies that there was that a lot of the I had been committed right do you know what or did you know what system
01:03:14 know what or did you know what system existed by which FSG was being communicated to the bridgehead no did you ask
01:03:19 you ask did you ask her group manager Welch any of those questions I didn't know okay just standing back for a moment is setting up FSG something you'd ever done
01:03:30 setting up FSG something you'd ever done before I have done when you so you've done it before that what sort of incident right did that involve
01:03:44 incident right did that involve recording FSGS on a wall No it included using the Ford information board to collect information right and confirm when successful with rescuing particular
01:03:56 when successful with rescuing particular lights how many FS jeez did that involved you remember right how long ago before grenfell tower was that incident
01:04:07 before grenfell tower was that incident proximately three years row years okay calm the collation exercise at that incident you just as Mutis mention can you just describe that for us it was it
01:04:19 you just describe that for us it was it was a far simpler then wire smokers affected the common hallway peoplehood
01:04:31 affected the common hallway peoplehood run-up report reply survival guidance the they were told the place debate to stay on the line and we would be with
01:04:42 stay on the line and we would be with them shortly and it was just the smoke cleared the fire was extinguished to fail you quickly and a smoke wish we did some we ventilated the common hallway
01:04:56 some we ventilated the common hallway right very quickly but nevertheless because first of all brothers procedure have been implemented it a controllable we had to we had to run with the process
01:05:07 we had to we had to run with the process and then successfully bring them out right I might add we didn't bring them out into a smoke-filled environment we waited until the fire was out and then we had bi crews going to school was that
01:05:20 we had bi crews going to school was that a high-res incident it was I think his class that I was in about six floors but I think it was maybe about six months so it's class this is categorization even
01:05:33 it's class this is categorization even the fire brigade is this a high-rise but it wasn't I think it was on the fifth rule right and can you remember what the chain of communication was between the
01:05:46 chain of communication was between the control room and the bridgehead at that incident well we were running from the outside we went we didn't have we I don't think they'd set up a bridgehead because of the
01:05:58 because of the I've been on the fourth in the common hallway was on the fifth but they haven't sailed the Bridget they were running from the ground floor right so it was initially it was the communication between the driver of the
01:06:09 communication between the driver of the missing come on pump to the incident commander so we followed the protocol procedure to the letter and then once the command unit arrived they applied their resources to it right but in all
01:06:22 their resources to it right but in all honesty it was resolved very quickly okay did you say you were using a forward information board at that at
01:06:34 forward information board at that at that stage that incident yeah and I think I think it might have been quite close my recollection is that we I know
01:06:45 close my recollection is that we I know I wasn't using a forward information good actually don't know who is using it I think we were collecting information on a light pattern at that stage I don't think we had to forward information directly write a notepad if that the
01:07:00 directly write a notepad if that the fireman's notepad three by two or in control information for light the information was coming in on a controlled information form and I believe I was probably taking notes keeping the slips and take your notes
01:07:13 keeping the slips and take your notes are we talking about we're talking about the incident my previous experience yeah so I would have kept the slips and I would have been taking notes about the
01:07:25 that success which flex we've got to write so I'm sorry to keep on about this pretense here with my show not the so the the control information form yes
01:07:36 the the control information form yes it's what relays the information from the instant command pound petunias thing commander and tells us it's called for it first of all the guy back yes and then we commit our resources to
01:07:47 and then we commit our resources to attend to that yes and then as a result I believe I took notes on my note put book yes as I said earlier the incident was resolved very quickly so all at once
01:07:59 was resolved very quickly so all at once all of the residents were bought out at the same time right but I don't believe we had a forward information board at that stage group because I was coming I was based there North Kensington and I
01:08:11 was based there North Kensington and I don't from their collection I we did receive didn't take receipt of afford information board and said I was it full of right do you rather how the information was coming to you but that's
01:08:22 information was coming to you but that's in at that incident from the incident command pump or the command unit was it by radio or was it by control we were working quite closely to one okay you're out it was a completely different
01:08:33 out it was a completely different scenario and it it's fairly vague I don't want to I want to tell you something it's not a thank you it now
01:08:42 oh that links I think back to page seven of your witness statement because you say in the same paragraph this is the third one down FSG calls are normally
01:08:53 third one down FSG calls are normally reported on the forward information board but on this occasion due to the volume and an entire wall had to be used as the board was not big enough was
01:09:06 as the board was not big enough was using the wall something that group manager Welch told you to do yeah I see
01:09:17 did you have a conversation with him about how many FSG calls or the volume of FSG calls were coming in no did he was he the one who said to you you'll
01:09:31 was he the one who said to you you'll need the wall the entire wall because of the volume that are coming in no I think as that reads
01:09:45 as that means that normally would use the forward information board to collect the information yeah but when this statement was written obviously I had
01:09:56 statement was written obviously I had participated at great fell so I'm saying to you due to the volume in which we took the fire Survival violence calls we
01:10:07 took the fire Survival violence calls we used the inspire wall right Oh see I didn't know at the time that we would use the entire wall yes I see now it's my fault I I've asked you a question I think which assumes that you were
01:10:18 I think which assumes that you were given an instruction to use the entire wall but I think I'll say you weren't no okay you then say it became apparent
01:10:29 okay you then say it became apparent that the FSG had to be recorded in the foyer as they were running out of space upstairs how did you know that they were running out of space upstairs I've just
01:10:42 running out of space upstairs I've just been in the ceiling right so that's something you observed when I went into the bridgehead the my eyes were drawn to the forward information wood yes that was the area in which they were
01:10:53 was the area in which they were conducting their work yes and I didn't have a lot of space you said that in fact you were surprised that there were so few FSG court calls on the watch
01:11:06 so few FSG court calls on the watch management Silvio's forward information board so how does that square with knowing that they were running out of space well in terms of his direction for me to go downstairs and use the pot the
01:11:19 me to go downstairs and use the pot the wall they wouldn't they wouldn't have had that one they wouldn't had that space in that area that they work because they had behind control boards they had a staircase FBI whereas they
01:11:31 they had a staircase FBI whereas they wouldn't have had the space to record the information so when you say may you may be getting across purchases here when you talk about not having a displace do you mean physical physically they didn't have enough space to conduct
01:11:43 they didn't have enough space to conduct their work yeah okay so it's not space on the FIB it's space in its physical space generally generally and right did you when you were last at the bridgehead
01:11:55 you when you were last at the bridgehead did you see anybody writing FSG on the wall no can I just put one photograph to you before the break mm-hmm mr. Chairman
01:12:08 you before the break mm-hmm mr. Chairman I got there's one minute of questions on if I may before you comfortable giving your evidence at the moment yeah yeah well you might like to think about running on until our posture and then we
01:12:19 running on until our posture and then we could take a slightly longer break very good with that would that suit you right very good
01:12:24 very good in which case can I ask you to be shown a meaty triple zero one three zero seven four which is tab eighty one of our documents bungle it's Jo v8 now this is
01:12:38 documents bungle it's Jo v8 now this is an exhibit to a firefighter called Justin a burn whose witness statement and he recalls this being written on the wall of the bridgehead while it was on
01:12:50 wall of the bridgehead while it was on the second floor do you recall seeing this
01:12:57 No is that is that the lift lobby yes I think I know right now [Music]
01:13:11 on page 8 of your statement you will come back to seventh shortly but just on page eight you say in the second
01:13:22 page eight you say in the second paragraph
01:13:23 paragraph I asked watch manager Watson if the bridgehead was being moved down to the ground floor level from which he said no I don't think so I assumed the bridgehead would now be moving down to the foyer next to the
01:13:34 moving down to the foyer next to the wall but this was not the case can you just tell me what prompted you to ask that question you would normally run when fire survival guidance comes in
01:13:47 when fire survival guidance comes in especially at high rises then you would normally run the fastball guidance will it be close to the commitment of bakers yes so there's clear communication
01:14:00 yes so there's clear communication because you need to correlate you need to you need to not only be clear and concise about where we're committing our bi crews because naturally they're
01:14:12 bi crews because naturally they're risking their lives to save salable life also the winner of rescuers when we've successfully carried out a rescue we can identify where they've come from who
01:14:24 identify where they've come from who they are where they've come from because otherwise you just left with this at this first of all guidance there hasn't been you can either confirm or
01:14:35 hasn't been you can either confirm or deny that they've been rescued yes so you would normally keep it fairly close but by the nature of the incident and the space in which they work it with the single staying well it made sense that
01:14:49 single staying well it made sense that when he said no I wasn't just it just I occurred to me well okay I'll be working down here and you have to make sure that
01:15:01 down here and you have to make sure that we've got some good clear lines of communication yes internally between us yes well if you look at the third paragraph on page a you say normally FSG
01:15:12 paragraph on page a you say normally FSG and bridgehead run next to each other so information could correlate directly and that's that that's what you've been telling us I think this could not be done at a tower block as ba crews only have a limited amount of air committing
01:15:24 have a limited amount of air committing them on ground level would waste their air supply and then you go on to saying I had to be conversely I had to be
01:15:36 I had to be conversely I had to be positioned on the ground floor this was to minimize the distance the information had to travel from the command unit to me did you think at the time that there would be a problem if the FSG
01:15:48 would be a problem if the FSG correlation acylation exercise and the bridgehead were separated by two floors no that stage right now in the fourth
01:15:59 no that stage right now in the fourth paragraph
01:16:05 you say that you you will use that I thought how was I going to pass the FSG information to the bridgehead as I would only have one hard copy of the slip by
01:16:18 only have one hard copy of the slip by slip do you what what do you mean the slip is reference to the control information right and does that mean that you're at the time you were thinking that you would be getting FSG
01:16:30 thinking that you would be getting FSG information by CIF control information form
01:16:39 yeah because that's why I was that's how I was gonna do it right does that mean that you were not expecting to receive it by radio or any other method of communication no because
01:16:52 other method of communication no because I was going to implement how we were going to work how I was going to receive that information so I knew how I intended to implement my plan right now you're asking yourself the question how
01:17:03 you're asking yourself the question how am I going to pass the FSG information to the bridgehead cause he'd only have one hard copy of the slid did did did that present a problem to you do you think no just required a bit of a
01:17:15 think no just required a bit of a thought right ok did you share that thought or I'll have a discussion with group manager Welsh about that no right and turning back to page 7 of your
01:17:28 and turning back to page 7 of your statement you you say concluding your statement your conversation with group manager Welch you say that he told you
01:17:40 manager Welch you say that he told you to prioritize the calls this is the second
01:17:44 second this is the line above the last line in that paragraph you say group manager well told me to prioritize the calls he did not specify but I understood this to mean prioritize the calls in the order
01:17:55 mean prioritize the calls in the order in which it is given to me did group manager Welsh explained what he meant by prioritization no did you have any
01:18:06 prioritization no did you have any thoughts about prioritization for the elderly or for children or for people who have had difficulties with mobility yeah you did what did you think about
01:18:17 yeah you did what did you think about how you were going to prioritize them by the by the nature in which we implement fire survival guidance policy is prioritized at control but then on the
01:18:29 prioritized at control but then on the seat of information that incident you would also have to think about how you're going to fly outside it right naturally now I've been tasked with the job I'm thinking about how I'm going to
01:18:40 job I'm thinking about how I'm going to implement the best possible way to carry out that job right it looks from your statement as if group manager Welch as you say didn't tell you but you thought
01:18:52 you say didn't tell you but you thought he meant prioritize on a first-come first-served basis is that right yeah well yes but equally I don't know what's
01:19:05 well yes but equally I don't know what's going to come to I so the first control information form might arrive 20 seconds before the second control information for and the second one might have a lot
01:19:18 for and the second one might have a lot of casualties that require more attention than the first one when there's only a 20 second delay so you probably I could say white city the
01:19:30 probably I could say white city the vulnerability of this information form versus this information for is that I can commit resources to this one first and then I'll go for this one
01:19:41 and then I'll go for this one so that's part so although it's been prioritized by control additionally as I understand my job it would be to not
01:19:54 understand my job it would be to not just blindly give the forms over with no understanding or knowledge of the what the couple of the content of it before but actually understand and try and
01:20:05 but actually understand and try and prioritize based on vulnerability just based on mobility we then understand enough who eats the bird whether it's children so yeah it was a conscious
01:20:17 children so yeah it was a conscious thought okay just a couple of things following that up you said a minute ago in your evidence just now that although it's been prioritized by control was
01:20:29 it's been prioritized by control was that your expectation that control would be affecting the prioritization so we we have policies in place
01:20:41 because they create they form the foundation in which we can there's professional as we are and responding the way we do if somebody brings control
01:20:53 the way we do if somebody brings control with reports to smell of smoke in a block that with not being them far survive abundance they have to be trapped by the effects of fire so that
01:21:05 trapped by the effects of fire so that is control prioritizing the cause that they perceive they are deciding what is being disesteem what is not and within FSG lose your expectation all is as your
01:21:19 FSG lose your expectation all is as your understanding of the policy that when you've got a number of FSGS control would prioritize those one against the other
01:21:28 other no I think I've just explained what the prioritizing is if somebody rings up and they were pointing to smell of smoke in a community hallway versus someone
01:21:39 a community hallway versus someone ringing up and saying I cannot leave my flat because of the effects of fire one of them the latter would fear for survival Gardens the first one would be
01:21:50 survival Gardens the first one would be advice only where you've got let me just put the question again where you've got a number of calls which are rightly deemed by control to be far survival guidance within that group do you expect
01:22:04 guidance within that group do you expect no then control to prioritize them no I expect the information to be relayed to either via the command prompt order is
01:22:15 either via the command prompt order is command unit for us to implement action so who would okay so who of those people incident commander or anybody else at
01:22:28 incident commander or anybody else at the fire ground would do the prioritization on that night now there's no who would normally who would you expect to prioritize FSG calls as that as proper FSG calls who would you expect
01:22:40 as proper FSG calls who would you expect whoever is facilitating what the transfer of would on the night did you expect that to be you yes right
01:22:55 did you have any thoughts about approaching this on the basis of prioritizing people high up in the building
01:23:15 I would say that I was honored there was a lot of information missing for me to
01:23:26 a lot of information missing for me to have any conscious thoughts about exactly how I was gonna implement this and as I said too early this is not this is a second-by-second
01:23:39 this is not this is a second-by-second fast-moving incident incredibly fast moving I wanted to set up a clear line of communication between myself and the
01:23:53 of communication between myself and the command unit who had been who was dealing with fire survival guidance and on the seat of the bus of the control information form is when I would have a vague idea as to how that's going to be
01:24:06 vague idea as to how that's going to be prioritized so to put it in perspective if I didn't receive any FSGS at the very high parts of the block then
01:24:18 at the very high parts of the block then I wouldn't have been prioritizing but to people
01:24:20 people at the very high we will come to look at some of the area that's getting up zip slits you saw in due course and finally on the question of prioritization did anybody ask you to
01:24:32 of prioritization did anybody ask you to prioritize on the basis of smoke density no what about proximity of fire I wasn't I wasn't directed to prioritize in any
01:24:43 I wasn't directed to prioritize in any way I was just the words prioritized it was used but there was no detail - okay now coming on to a slightly different topic yes I was going to come on to
01:24:57 topic yes I was going to come on to implementation but that's take a break yeah I think it is time you had a great note miss Williams so we'll stop and resume at course 212 give us a
01:25:08 resume at course 212 give us a reasonable length of time to have a break and abs cup of coffee can I ask you please not to talk about your evidence or anything relating to drink and you'd like to go with the option now if you look after you will
01:25:19 option now if you look after you will start again of course - twice thank you very much
01:25:32 but thank you course 212
01:25:43 you
01:45:15 yes can we have the witness back yes he's on his way
01:45:34 simcha what ya - Williams everyone correct mr. Williams thank you for coming back you mentioned
01:45:45 thank you for coming back you mentioned before the break collating fire survival guidance calls at another incident an earlier incident I did do you know where that was best guess I could say 2014 he
01:46:04 that was best guess I could say 2014 he was he made a file I was going to ask you where I was on the white watch at North Kensington and we were attended incident with the white watch at Paddington right okay
01:46:17 Paddington right okay now coming on to what you did in terms of implementing the FSG system that you would are you are asked to start if you go to page seven of your statement
01:46:29 go to page seven of your statement please and look at the fourth paragraph down it says the radio's was so busy the communication between the command unit
01:46:40 communication between the command unit and I was not going to work and due to the sheer noise within the tower you were in danger of getting limited information or no information I mean I should say all first of all did you try
01:46:53 should say all first of all did you try making radio communication with the command unit at the point you set up by the wall on the ground floor no
01:47:06 the wall on the ground floor no is there a reason why you didn't do that because I could hear how congested the radio communications were right did you
01:47:17 radio communications were right did you know which command unit at that stage was the operative command unit handling FSG calls
01:47:25 FSG calls no okay the difficulty with communication you say you knew how
01:47:36 communication you say you knew how congested the radio communications were is that because you could hear them on your hat on your fire ground radio yeah have you covered how the handheld radios work it's a it's a real it's a real
01:47:49 work it's a it's a real it's a real polite discipline on the fire ground it respected to the channels that you go through that we have we have a handheld radio and it has several channels if I press the button to talk that requires
01:48:02 press the button to talk that requires no one else to be pressing than a plan so everyone listens and then people respond there's a real politeness to it if you press the button when I press the
01:48:14 if you press the button when I press the bone no one talks it interferes with the communication so he can imagine it then it's then a vast scale it was heavily congested and it was and it was very
01:48:26 congested and it was and it was very difficult to decide for who was who so having heard that having identified that I decided that I wasn't going to go down that route right
01:48:39 did you have an air wave radio I have a handheld firefighter radio not an airway I don't have an air wave idea so does
01:48:50 I don't have an air wave idea so does that mean that you had no means of being in contact with the control room directly no did you know about any
01:49:04 directly no did you know about any dedicated FSG channel that could be used I had not been informed of that did anybody tell you that you could use channel 3 for example I observed the channel 3 and the sigh I heard the same
01:49:17 channel 3 and the sigh I heard the same there seem to be a lot of radio traffic on channel 3 on channel 3 did you know who it was between no did it sound seemed where it wasn't for me so between other people
01:49:35 and did you try to use channel 3 no my priority was to set up an effective line of communication between the command unit and myself so we could start
01:49:47 unit and myself so we could start implement him first of all the guidance and committee I cruised to save life right so you then say at the bottom of
01:49:58 right so you then say at the bottom of page 7 that you you say firefighter his name I do not know was tasked to run the FSG slips from the command unit to me
01:50:10 FSG slips from the command unit to me and you then go on to say I informed him I was going to be the watch manager coordinating the fire survival guidance within the tower I instructed him that his job is to go to the command unit and
01:50:21 his job is to go to the command unit and return to me with the slips I made it clear that he was to come to me and me alone
01:50:25 alone so the FSG calls could be recorded I told him not to get distracted or lost now I've read that all to use it's quite a big chunk and but I've got a number of questions first of all do you know do
01:50:38 questions first of all do you know do you now know who that firefighter was ok where were you when you gave him the instruction you record there think I was
01:50:49 instruction you record there think I was we were making our way down the stairs right and that's where I sewed in a kind of a signet into the wall thus as
01:51:01 of a signet into the wall thus as wellthey did you select this firefighter at random or was he somebody who picked out
01:51:07 out do you maybe is there who's just there does that do you remember whether he had already worn or whether he was in the queue he didn't have the iron right so
01:51:19 queue he didn't have the iron right so my assumption was that he was available right whether he'd worn or not I was gonna use him because I was briefing in that shop and did you
01:51:30 I was briefing in that shop and did you see whether he had a crew managers helmet on or or not he wasn't the crew manager right if you look at the CCTV
01:51:41 manager right if you look at the CCTV you go oh I would more than likely be able to point him out okay well we'll come to do that shortly
01:51:52 did you know whether there was one command unit operating on the incident ground at that stage in other words when you started your collation exercise or
01:52:03 you started your collation exercise or whether there was more than one I didn't categorically know that there was more than one but as I said I've got
01:52:14 was more than one but as I said I've got quite a lot of experience of being on the fire ground him so it's not a verbal confirmation is an expectation that there probably would have been more than one at the point when you started or
01:52:27 one at the point when you started or when you gave him this instruction to run slips from the command unit to mean did you know how many pumps the makeup was no had you heard the makeup forty no
01:52:46 what makeup did you think it was at that stage I I didn't know I was in this half and right did you have any assumptions
01:52:57 and right did you have any assumptions or have any thoughts about how many see yous would be in attendance well I am bi knocking was in attendance yeah which means that there certainly was more than 12 appliances going to be there so the National assumption is if there's more
01:53:09 National assumption is if there's more than 10 appliances there's more than one CA exactly and we've got fire Survival Guide ants and as per policy I said command unit would be in attendance to deal solely with fastball
01:53:21 attendance to deal solely with fastball runs yes so given that there would be as you just explained more than one see you in attendance did you tell the firefighter which command unit to go to
01:53:32 firefighter which command unit to go to I think from that collection my words to him was find the command unit dealing with FST go there right collector be
01:53:43 with FST go there right collector be referred to the Miss lips lips lips come back to me don't get lost banking distracted come back to me and me alone right and I said and be as
01:53:54 me alone right and I said and be as quick as you can okay over the course of the process while you were doing the FSG calls on at the wall just looking forwards a little bit how many
01:54:06 forwards a little bit how many firefighters or crew managers all officers did you task to go to the command unit and bring back slips I only briefed him you know what became
01:54:17 I only briefed him you know what became apparent and was that the volume that came in was nothing I've ever seen the
01:54:28 came in was nothing I've ever seen the volumous of control information forms for the people that require rescuing and I had several runners of which I hadn't
01:54:39 I had several runners of which I hadn't briefed that they were they would come in with snips with so we've controlling tonight so why that's not anything that
01:54:54 tonight so why that's not anything that I wouldn't have expected if the command unit had spoken to the firefighter and the firefighter said this is what he's
01:55:05 the firefighter said this is what he's doing you know I'm collecting the slips and I'm running around and I so I would have expected them to say white here's more slips to the next fire fire you will go to give them a briefing to come to me with those slips so it wasn't I
01:55:20 to me with those slips so it wasn't I was the sheer volume of people that were called him for fire firefighters right was unprecedented so you just to summarize what you've just sold us it you brief one
01:55:32 just sold us it you brief one firefighter to find the command unit handling FSG calls take the slips and bring them to you and you alone but in fact more than one firefighter turned up with slips for you I think on the second
01:55:45 with slips for you I think on the second or third occasion there were more people to write do do you know sorry do you know who the firefighter was who came
01:55:57 know who the firefighter was who came with with the first batch of slips that's the firefighter I refer to in my state right of which I don't know his name okay and if you turn to page nine of your statement we've got will come
01:56:11 of your statement we've got will come back to cover eight later but looking at nine and the second paragraph you say the firefighter tasks of the runner returned very quickly with the first bundle of FSG slips how quickly do you
01:56:26 bundle of FSG slips how quickly do you know well if we were the best guess it it took me between five and eight minutes to get from the first command
01:56:39 minutes to get from the first command unit to the entrance so running if we retest the mate that it might have taken in between five and eight minutes right and he was and he came back bearing as I think you just said the first batch of
01:56:50 think you just said the first batch of our survival slips which you had do you know which command unit he went to no did he didn't tell you to do no and this
01:57:01 did he didn't tell you to do no and this was before was this before you started writing on the wall at 2:15 that he came back with the first batch of slips no once he returned at the slips was the time I commenced writing on the wall the
01:57:13 time I commenced writing on the wall the first thing I wrote in the war was 215 but can I add to that that 215 was not a time that I had I called out to and said what time is it
01:57:24 what time is it and somebody said 215 so I wrote 215 on the wall it's feasible that that time is inaccurate understand and at that moment
01:57:34 when you wrote 215 did you have the batch of slips in your hands that the runner you've tasks brought back from the command unit I think it is at the
01:57:46 the command unit I think it is at the same time I I can't remember okay now you go on and say in the second last line in the same paragraph in excess of
01:57:58 line in the same paragraph in excess of 20 slips were handed to me ranging from different floors prior to the incident I've never been to an incident where there are more than 500 G calls now the slips you're talking about are run
01:58:10 slips you're talking about are run control information forms do you remember what color the pieces of paper you received from that firefighter in that first batch were predominantly I was getting the white slips right you
01:58:24 was getting the white slips right you were getting the white slips okay in that first bench - did you get any other slips of paper such as three by two
01:58:35 slips of paper such as three by two slips of paper three by two no
01:58:48 No
01:58:55 did you know that by about 213 so to 1353 a 2.13 about that time there was a
01:59:08 1353 a 2.13 about that time there was a watch manager standing just outside the tower tower starting a system to collect FSG calls from cu7 by radio did you know
01:59:24 FSG calls from cu7 by radio did you know whether there was a watch manager standing outside collating FSG forms and sending the white top copy into the building via a runner I wasn't at any stage do you find that out no right can
01:59:39 stage do you find that out no right can I ask you to look please lfb 1922 and turn to page 33 we heard evidence last
01:59:55 turn to page 33 we heard evidence last week from a watch manager Sadler that he was tasked to set up a point outside the tower and collect FSG forms which and
02:00:10 tower and collect FSG forms which and I'm summarizing his evidence he got from cu7 on channel 3 by radio and then put on to control information forms and sent them into the tower he sent the white copy into the tower and sent the yellow
02:00:22 copy into the tower and sent the yellow copy back to the command unit that in general was his was what he told us looking at this one he marked this number 1 because this was the first one he did we marked the time at 2:13 so two
02:00:36 he did we marked the time at 2:13 so two minutes before you wrote 215 and this was for flat 205 on the a he marked 12th floor and just looking at that do you
02:00:48 floor and just looking at that do you recognize that as the a document or the sort of document that your runner brought back to you so that is that is stating the obvious control information for yes that is the
02:00:59 control information for yes that is the information that is the form that was being used to relay the information that I've requested from my runner yes have you as this been crossed as he's full
02:01:11 you as this been crossed as he's full control information forms being cross-referenced with the information that was on the forward information board prior to me starting to FSG in lives worth doing that the problem we
02:01:23 lives worth doing that the problem we have you asking me an evidential question which is interesting
02:01:29 the answer is we haven't got a photograph of the forward information board so I got way to your question okay so I can't comment on this particular
02:01:41 so I can't comment on this particular bit but respectfully I've got hundreds okay I've got an awful lot okay for what I would say is that there were numbers on there forward information board that night
02:01:50 night as I've mentioned yeah and and very close to be a very close time scale to starting the fire Survival Guide escalation on the wall I instructed a
02:02:02 escalation on the wall I instructed a crew manager I believe she'll emerge Battersby to go and get the food information board to make sure that there was no misunderstanding you know about the information that they had prior to my commencing of FSG versus the
02:02:17 prior to my commencing of FSG versus the information I was receiving so I would I would think if this has been written before I've even started my Runner
02:02:30 I think there might be cross paths sungmin I don't recall this I can't comment on this particular piece I did take information off the forward information board so that there was no
02:02:41 information board so that there was no misunderstanding I saw with the information I've collected right I can now just just talk me through this so you asked crew manager better be is this right to go to the bridgehead sorry they
02:02:52 right to go to the bridgehead sorry they start again where did he get the full information board that you looked at from so the information board that we've referred to earlier one in the when we spoke about the bridgehead and I've
02:03:04 spoke about the bridgehead and I've referred I mentioned I was surprised by the number of FSGS on there because they've didn't seem to be that many I
02:03:12 can't remember if it was I can't remember how soon after I started at the collation of information but Charlie
02:03:24 collation of information but Charlie turned up and I said to him charlie don't get forward information board so we're not duplicating information so it's feasible that what you've got here on these control information forms was
02:03:38 on these control information forms was information that had been passed to the bridgehead prior to me starting my first year right now I'm just interested in Charlie back to be getting the forward
02:03:50 Charlie back to be getting the forward information board did where did he get it from he got it up from the stairwell where I had that we my third to anyone in this place so he actually took the
02:04:01 in this place so he actually took the information forward information board from or tip back down to me right and I had it to the right of me so that I could so that I could correspond the information
02:04:17 and did that mean that there was a forward information board missing from the bridgehead after that well there there there perspex so it would mean
02:04:34 there there perspex so it would mean that one of the perspex seats had been bought down to me write it like the information if Ryan did did you send the forward information ball back up to them
02:04:45 forward information ball back up to them to the bridgehead after you'd used it it's a perspex eat so there's several perspecsys just one of the perspex sheets that they had collated information FSG information to me yes
02:04:58 information FSG information to me yes but the information I know I didn't return it to them right and what so would that mean that the bridgehead was then without that information it would mean that they were without the initial
02:05:10 mean that they were without the initial list that they write yeah did you think how they were going to work without that initial list if they hadn't already deployed crews and had crews back responding to those the tip to the FSG
02:05:21 responding to those the tip to the FSG calls on that initial list within the times that we're talking about if we were to say it was within 20 minutes the crews that they would have entered at the time in which they received that information would have been coming out
02:05:33 information would have been coming out because they would have used their air so no I was collecting the information so that we would have an accurate understanding of the FSG at lea incident at that time right what would happen
02:05:45 at that time right what would happen though if the bridgehead hadn't yet committed crews in response to an FSG called recorded on the forward information board when the information
02:05:57 information board when the information forward information board was brought down to you how they know well we move we seem to be moving a bit quickly so once that information was down I then
02:06:09 once that information was down I then started my communication with Paul Watson and we then went through the process so I had control information for he cross-checked them to the forward information board and anywhere where
02:06:24 information board and anywhere where there was a duplicate it was obvious that that was being that was they've been ticked I believe the ticks represented committing a VI on the Ford information would so it wasn't that they
02:06:36 information would so it wasn't that they hadn't been acted upon I knew they've been acted upon by the bridgehead so the information hadn't hadn't disappeared it was just we would create in a different communication because of this
02:06:47 communication because of this everything's been moved what I didn't want what was really important was to not have some information in a different location it was important I had the information so that I could clearly and
02:07:00 information so that I could clearly and concisely communicate that to the bridgehead when asked now did you notice any runners going past you to the bridgehead holding slits at any stage no
02:07:14 bridgehead holding slits at any stage no because by that by once within the few minutes of setting up everything Paul Watson was situated on the balcony I was situated on the ground floor we
02:07:27 I was situated on the ground floor we had a system in place so they wouldn't have got to the breach at the Chris Paul was there now you said that you got all they you tasked one the firefighter to go to the command unit and bring you
02:07:38 go to the command unit and bring you back slips in fact other firefighters also brought useless they did did you find out where they they've got their slips wrong
02:07:49 the the disaffected it's been written on a control information for signifies to me the purpose of me signifies to me
02:08:00 me the purpose of me signifies to me function the command unit the reason I implemented that form of communication is because I wanted to wait up the risk versus benefit of using hand-held
02:08:11 versus benefit of using hand-held communication and I was not happy that I would get back clear concise accurate information so hence the reason I used
02:08:24 information so hence the reason I used runners running and then more runners were involved that way I've got a hard copy that I can refer to and I've got
02:08:36 copy that I can refer to and I've got away that I know to the best of my knowledge that that is coming from a command unit that is speaking directly to control there's no misunderstanding
02:08:49 to control there's no misunderstanding there if you take if you say to me now that there was FSG being collated outside I didn't know that at the time does it surprise you to find that out I
02:09:00 does it surprise you to find that out I [Music]
02:09:02 [Music] would have to know that being the the fully in-depth briefing that they were providing I I'm sure that there was a sense to what they've been asked to do but my knowledge at the time at the
02:09:16 but my knowledge at the time at the incident was that it was under control information form that must have been written at command unit who must have been on the phone too much I'll listen to FST to the FHD called us so if I got
02:09:28 to FST to the FHD called us so if I got this right even though you were getting slips white slips from more than one runner more than the one running you tasked you is this right always thought
02:09:40 tasked you is this right always thought that those slits were coming direct to you from the command ian yes did you you never asked any of the runners apart from the road runner you tasked where
02:09:51 from the road runner you tasked where are you getting these slips from no because I asked him to go to the command D ever the other ones who were pretty returning up no we're slips but because the the training we've done admittedly not to
02:10:03 training we've done admittedly not to this level but I mean it's it says we trained to go to the command unit receive the information or use handheld
02:10:14 receive the information or use handheld radios and I've chosen not to use that form of communication so it's not an assumption it is a matter of fact that or that's how that's the old the way in
02:10:26 or that's how that's the old the way in which we received the information right is via a hard copy okay can I ask you to look at a document which is M et triple zero one six nine six seven
02:10:48 no no sorry that that's not it this is M et triple zero one six nine six seven that's it and now first of all
02:11:05 six seven that's it and now first of all I ask you do you think you've ever seen this document or something like it before
02:11:29 I haven't seen that document oh right let me see if I can help you and perhaps I can't but I'll tip I'll try to summarize for you what's been said about this document so far to us it's an
02:11:43 this document so far to us it's an envelope I think the front of an envelope with handwriting on it the watch manager Sadler says he got from a
02:11:55 watch manager Sadler says he got from a watch manager or station manager shortly after he started doing his exercise of collating FSG information outside the tower but he was getting from the
02:12:06 tower but he was getting from the command unit by radio and he also told us that he took a photograph of it and in fact that's his mobile he said there's the shadow of it you can see on the picture whereby he was taking the
02:12:17 the picture whereby he was taking the photograph and he said that he took the photograph at to 1902 and 19 and then sent the envelope the hard envelope to the bridgehead via a runner and that's
02:12:31 the bridgehead via a runner and that's what he says about it watch manager - Silvo told us that she never she didn't recall seeing it so with that background
02:12:43 recall seeing it so with that background my question is do you recollect seeing this at any point coming through your hands I recollect Charlie Battersby turning up with a list of numbers you do
02:12:55 turning up with a list of numbers you do i do wanna honest on a snippet of information form or not he turned up with the list of numbers and I remember him and I said - I've got these charlie
02:13:08 him and I said - I've got these charlie right
02:13:11 I think I think the reason I can recall it is because I've remember 2i5 we mentioned and I said I've got that one charlie
02:13:21 charlie so that's the only one remember because I wrote it on the wall if you've got a picture of the wall we have we're coming to that you got picture yeah but we are
02:13:33 to that you got picture yeah but we are filming to that but are we doing something it might be I remember Charlie can't turn it up with a list of numbers I don't recall what the list was on cuz it was in his hand right remember trying to cross check the
02:13:48 right remember trying to cross check the numbers yet a slips that I had and the information that come off the forward information board yeah okay yeah okay I can't I don't want to you I really want
02:13:59 can't I don't want to you I really want to make it clear that I have dealt with a lot of numbers that night I needed it so I need it and we're good we are going to come back to this yeah and compare this with the wall shortly I just want to I'm taking this in stages yeah so
02:14:12 to I'm taking this in stages yeah so don't want to suggest things to you which are necessarily correct that's why I'm asking you about your your recollection yeah unadorned do you recognize the handwriting
02:14:23 recognize the handwriting no do you know who Brett loft I see is I know do you remember that triggering a recollection as to his role now at that
02:14:34 recollection as to his role now at that time I don't recall seeing him okay do you remember at all what you or Charlie batter be did with this piece of paper
02:14:47 next referred to as a list of numbers or I'd rather than a piece of paper because I'm not sure if it was this piece of paper okay do you remember what he did with this list of numbers I seem to
02:14:58 with this list of numbers I seem to recall a cross-check in of the information I'd written on the wall and the information that some of the forward information would look and I seem to
02:15:09 information would look and I seem to recall he was the person he was looking at the forward information board I always by this point I already had a lot of slips that I was fara sized him
02:15:20 lot of slips that I was fara sized him okay the list of numbers is on a piece of paper do you remember what happened to the piece of paper on which the list
02:15:32 to the piece of paper on which the list of numbers was written no right as I say I'll come back to this in due course and I called it Sadler's envelope I status for shorthand can we just get back to
02:15:44 for shorthand can we just get back to your statement then and go to page 8 which I said I'd come back to and look at the fourth paragraph where you say I'd like to look at the whole whole of
02:15:58 I'd like to look at the whole whole of that paragraph it was agreed between watch manager Watson and I that he would be the middleman between me and entry control officer we decided that he would remain at the door way on the doorway on
02:16:09 remain at the door way on the doorway on the mezzanine level and I would shout up to him the flat number floor number and amount of people involved he would recall this information on note paper and repeat what he wrote back to me confirming it was correct the note paper
02:16:21 confirming it was correct the note paper would then be passed through to the entry control officer who would retain it and commit the be a cruise to rescue accordingly I would then indicate on my list which calls had been committed by writing ba next to them now a number of
02:16:37 writing ba next to them now a number of questions I have about that first of all physically where were you when you agreed that with with watch manager Watson where were you standing I think well I was down by the wall and
02:16:50 I think well I was down by the wall and I think
02:16:52 I think on reflection seem to recall I got the first bundle of slips and I was a bit
02:17:03 first bundle of slips and I was a bit kind of taken by the number I've got so I shouted up to him I said right you ready pull and and I think that he has he turned his back on me to do something
02:17:15 he turned his back on me to do something I think he might have been what attempting to write and down up and where he was as a as a lot and there between us we agreed that actually the
02:17:26 between us we agreed that actually the most effective way would be if he wrote he said wait wait I'll write them on my pad he took out his notepad to me broke the when his nope that's all over
02:17:37 broke the when his nope that's all over the shouts and and and this proved to be a good system clear concise he repeated it to me we were in eye contact I'd say to him the floor and flat number and
02:17:52 to him the floor and flat number and people involved repeat exactly the same and then I'm handing it through he went I put it I've sent it through Glynn and
02:18:03 I put it I've sent it through Glynn and then I'd like be I next night did he disappear when handing it through did you see
02:18:08 you see would he gives any of doors any of doorway right Jesus did you see a hand come out from the doorway and take the piece of paper I mean no because of the angle of like that I had a bit more my
02:18:20 angle of like that I had a bit more my attention was elsewhere being with the Everest okay and you actually saw him writing did you yes did you shut up and it's any information other than the flat number the floor number and number
02:18:32 flat number the floor number and number of persons such as smoke density or smoke logging writing it on occasions there might have been additional information that I added but that would be too specific right did you shut up all the
02:18:43 right did you shut up all the information you had in in relation to any given FSG shout out the partner yeah okay is there anything you were mitad you chose to omit that's too
02:18:58 mitad you chose to omit that's too specific
02:18:58 specific no I mean I would peace that's not how I communicate so now do you know roughly okay the answer the screen did you stop
02:19:09 okay the answer the screen did you stop did you make this agreement with watch manager Watson before you started writing on the wall now as I said the it kind of coincided with the first lot of
02:19:22 kind of coincided with the first lot of numbers right so the first not slips I think that I
02:19:29 although I speak loud and clear I can a bit on occasion speak of it quickly and I think and at which point I think his intention was to lobby on a wall and he
02:19:40 intention was to lobby on a wall and he said well I'm not gonna have to do that I think he wrote I think I got through the first two slips and he said well wait wait wait I'm gonna write on my pad right and we and I said yeah brilliant but write on your pad and then we can
02:19:52 but write on your pad and then we can make it did you see him writing on the wall if they're at very beginning I saw him turn his back on me so I I mean I'd like to think he's not so great not to
02:20:04 like to think he's not so great not to and say just though I'm clay you're by the front door to the the lobby area of the tower and he's on the mezzanine yes
02:20:15 the tower and he's on the mezzanine yes on the balcony okay
02:20:19 and was your communication affected in any way by the noise the ambient noise in the building no I spoke very loudly
02:20:30 in the building no I spoke very loudly and clearly and he repeated at the same time
02:20:42 you say in this paragraph as we've just read the note paper would then be passed through to the enter control officer who would retain it and commit the be a cruise to rescue accordingly when you
02:20:53 cruise to rescue accordingly when you say who would retain it and commit the be a cruise to rescue accordingly did you see that or observe that happening retention and committing no so was it
02:21:08 retention and committing no so was it are you saying that that was that part of the plan that you would assume that having had the piece of paper the bridgehead would act on it it's a process I'm handing them information to
02:21:20 process I'm handing them information to save so you like yeah that's going viable what sir they need to commit the a cruise right so just putting it down when you say who would retain it and commit the be a cruise rescue also the I'm referring to the bridgehead officers
02:21:33 I'm referring to the bridgehead officers yeah what's magicky friend what's magnet silver yeah but it's really the word would rich would but are you saying that that's something you observe for yourself that's what they would do or
02:21:44 yourself that's what they would do or are you saying that that was part of your plan that's what they would do I don't entirely understand what you're asking what I'm asking you is is is was
02:21:55 asking what I'm asking you is is is was it the plan that they would that these pieces of paper would be used to commit the be a cruise well it wasn't something you actually observe for yourself know that the intention was that they would
02:22:06 that the intention was that they would use the information off that piece of paper to to send the be a crew to that location yes so in the same way as one
02:22:19 location yes so in the same way as one might send a radio message you would be speaking directly to them all this was there's a communication by paper and we'll come to it in due course but
02:22:31 and we'll come to it in due course but did you yourself observe anybody at the bridgehead acting on the piece of pain oh that Paul was on a stage right later when it was
02:22:42 was on a stage right later when it was brought to the ground floor level yes obviously I would have line of sight then right now let's look at the wall we've been using so far a meaty triple
02:22:56 we've been using so far a meaty triple zero one five eight one five Joel just asked to be put up only because it's a it's the version we've been using and there it is and I'd like if we can
02:23:07 there it is and I'd like if we can though to work from a different version just like before we leave that it is that the wall you were writing on when you when you start it yes right and is
02:23:21 you when you start it yes right and is that the wall you wrote on all night the until you left yes okay now can we just
02:23:32 until you left yes okay now can we just look at some CCTV images to see if we can identify youth I think if we can minimize that or perhaps put it on the side of the screen is the documents
02:23:43 side of the screen is the documents director and go please next to inq two four four
02:24:05 can you identify yourself in that picture that's me against the wall right now the time mark for that adjusted is o2 15:53 now looking at the left hand
02:24:25 o2 15:53 now looking at the left hand picture
02:24:27 picture I'm just enlarging it a little bit for us you can see in the middle at the top of the middle list FSG Oh 2:15 there correct is that FSG at
02:24:43 FSG Oh 2:15 there correct is that FSG at 250 the first thing you wrote on the wall it's it it is now minimise that again and go back to the picture at that stage we see no sign of any forward
02:24:56 stage we see no sign of any forward information board next to you that's correct that is that that's in accordance with your recollections
02:25:09 that's right okay
02:25:16 now if you go to the next picture which is Oh two four five
02:25:27 this is timed two minutes later at o2 1706 that's the adjusted time and can you identify you in that picture I'm
02:25:42 you identify you in that picture I'm wearing a white hat next to someone with the right now we see a somebody from a
02:25:53 the right now we see a somebody from a what we're wearing a command unit Tabard immediately behind you - I don't know if you can identify him no I never seen him right and there there's a crew manager in the foreground
02:26:05 there's a crew manager in the foreground to the picture building look what looks like white pieces of paper well that's that's me but making an assumption can you help us with that
02:26:25 we know it's a crew manager because of the double black stripe on the hell it is no right at the stage you started
02:26:36 is no right at the stage you started writing Oh 215 did you already have the batch that the first runner had brought back to you in excess of 20 slips from the command unit right when you wrote
02:26:50 the command unit right when you wrote 215 on the wall did you have any any slips at all having seen this clearly not right well you think that and once you'll record it for me my recollection
02:27:02 you'll record it for me my recollection was that I did have sleep having as haven't seen the CCTV it seems not so I might have put the time up right as commencement my recollection was that I had some slips okay
02:27:17 do you recall whether the fact the person who brought back the first batch of slips to you let me put it this way do you remember whether the person who
02:27:28 do you remember whether the person who brought back the slips to you as a firefighter or an officer the person who I tossed as my runner was a firefighter yes and my recollection is that he was
02:27:41 yes and my recollection is that he was the first person that walked back to the lot the slips that's your recollection actually but as I say it's my recollection of this this CCTV would support a more accurate
02:27:52 CCTV would support a more accurate accurate picture right now there appears to be on the floor and we can look at both of the pictures actually - in fact we do it this way look at 2 5 6 go back
02:28:06 we do it this way look at 2 5 6 go back to 2 5 6 if we can if I'm interested in a little bit of white something on the floor if you go back to 2 5 6 which is
02:28:22 floor if you go back to 2 5 6 which is when you come into the building that is 2 4 that's 2 4 4 I do want to look at in a moment it's 2 5 6 right now that you
02:28:34 a moment it's 2 5 6 right now that you told us was you coming into the building was and that we got at 1:55 correct now if you look on the floor there are two
02:28:46 if you look on the floor there are two hoses and a white object do you know what that might be no do you remember seeing a white object possibly a piece
02:28:57 seeing a white object possibly a piece of paper that's my entry into the building yes exactly no ok then if we look at 2 4 4
02:29:10 you're writing there if you just have you enlarged it looks as if your left heel is standing on a white object do you like it does that help you on the
02:29:21 you like it does that help you on the identify what it might be no right okay
02:29:27 [Music] now
02:29:34 going back to your witness statement of page eight you say the bottom of the page and we could take both of those pictures off the off the screen get back
02:29:47 pictures off the off the screen get back to the witness statement at the very bottom of page 8 of your statement you say the station manager who had led me in and out of the tower
02:29:58 it was now managing the main entrance the foyer was clear and well lit but whenever the station manager opened the main entrance smoke from the fallen debris wafted in creating a light haze
02:30:11 debris wafted in creating a light haze have we seen the station manager in any of the photographs we've looked at so far I mean no I don't know who the chap
02:30:24 far I mean no I don't know who the chap was in the Tabard no so I don't think that was okay all right now can I just I'm so sorry to do this to get back to
02:30:36 I'm so sorry to do this to get back to the two pictures we looked at before so one five eight one five and the photograph at two four two four five
02:30:47 photograph at two four two four five which is time - OH - 17 May in the photograph at a 217 on the right hand side of the screen we have here you can see that on the left of the door is a sign on the wall which says Grenfell
02:30:58 sign on the wall which says Grenfell tower community-run yeah but when we look at the photograph on the left of our screen here today which is a photograph taken after the incident the
02:31:11 photograph taken after the incident the screen design has disappeared or it looks as if it's disappeared can you help us with that I can't do you remember whether anybody took the sign down at any stage during the night the
02:31:22 down at any stage during the night the vestibule it's not there no some point it was taken down by it I have no recollection of it being taken out so - your recollection that sign was there throughout throughout the time
02:31:33 throughout throughout the time yes okay oh I can yeah actually I can vouch for white was you see in this picture
02:31:43 picture yes left to the left of the screen yes yeah so if you just move your cursor much light as one five eight one five yes sorry if you did you see the grid there of the grid let's see this grid
02:31:55 there of the grid let's see this grid here yes that's the last thing that I was not I drew and I drew it there because the sign was above it okay I see so it would have been removed post for
02:32:09 so it would have been removed post for 30-ish right thank you now staying on or going back to the house image two four six if I can just ask you
02:32:21 image two four six if I can just ask you to look at two four six which is an adjusted time of Oh - 17 17 you're now writing on the wall so I put that to you because I think we've got that time out
02:32:33 because I think we've got that time out um do you know who is writing with who is but first of all who is on your right I've got a feeling that's Charlie battered be cremated but earthly did you
02:32:50 battered be cremated but earthly did you do any FSG work with any crew manager other than charlie better be it's very hard to the core okay you're right
02:33:01 okay you're right are you right-handed I am and is that you writing is that your hand and the other part of the photograph yeah
02:33:11 can you tell me what the crew manager has in his left hand looks low heard on a piece of paper and it looks like he might be cross-checking
02:33:23 might be cross-checking something off that piece of paper can I ask the documents director to magnify that image so we could focus in on the piece of paper and Charlie battle the
02:33:36 piece of paper and Charlie battle the two managers right hand was the crew manager writing on the wall as well as you oh I would not think I do not I do
02:33:52 you oh I would not think I do not I do not the call someone else writing next to me because that list that I started writing initially you can see from the picture this picture so this is the
02:34:04 picture this picture so this is the first this is the first list I right yes and then I went onto this list where we were comforted at and so in the bidding first that person to be here with me
02:34:16 first that person to be here with me that he was writing something here yes but this is my this this this is my writing I call that that's written about
02:34:28 writing I call that that's written about me and I don't recall we call anything that's my wife's and so that before whatever was missing here yeah
02:34:37 yeah so by the process of eliminating eliminating this information I would suggest these not writing right okay I'm not going to describe to the transcript
02:34:49 not going to describe to the transcript what you've just pointed out we'll have to look at the video I'm sorry that's quite all right thank you for helpful juice it's helping this is a semi visual experience I think for all of us to say it's me alive streamed with it is say we
02:35:01 it's me alive streamed with it is say we can't do that we can get it again exactly I'm gonna come to the order in which these lists went on to the wall shortly I'm just trying to get a trying to get an idea of who was helping you with with this in your statement you say
02:35:22 that
02:35:30 in this is page 9 this is the third paragraph in page 9 after you refer to the firefighter coming back with in excess of 20 slips you say we can just go back to your statement it's at page 9
02:35:42 go back to your statement it's at page 9 third paragraph you say I started to transfer the FSG information on the wall onto the wall and implement the system
02:35:53 onto the wall and implement the system watch manager Watson and I had agreed earlier yeah agreed on earlier now looking at the picture we've just seen it inq 40 to 46 is that what we see
02:36:06 it inq 40 to 46 is that what we see happening there the photograph we've just looked at yeah so the the image of me writing on the wall right so as I said to you my recollection was that the the
02:36:20 recollection was that the the information I've got this lips and I started transfer and I was calling up the informations for Watson and then I tried then I would take this for now just just picking up on that last answer
02:36:32 just just picking up on that last answer and going to a picture if we can look at two four seven inq two four seven
02:36:43 they're just enlarging you and person with you you must get a better better view you may actually able to identify
02:36:54 view you may actually able to identify yeah that's Charlie that's that's Charlie better be yeah and what are you doing so it looks like I've transferred it looks like we've had a relay of communication and it and I
02:37:10 a relay of communication and it and I would think that I was making sure that we had shared accurate information it happens throughout the night where I would want to make sure that the
02:37:23 would want to make sure that the information was precise there was no misunderstanding so I would do that by putting my finger on whichever number I'm pointing at and saying it is this
02:37:35 I'm pointing at and saying it is this number on this floor and it's this many people involved and he would yes cross-check that with me okay now if you're right then that's Charlie batter
02:37:47 you're right then that's Charlie batter B does that mean that Charlie batter B was the person who came to you first with the first batch of slips
02:38:00 I think it's feasible it looks like he's got a number of slips it looks like there's a number of slips in his hand
02:38:11 so yeah it's feasible it wasn't what I recollected that was not how I recall the the sequence of events but it was a long night right and did you know or did
02:38:22 long night right and did you know or did did you find out where Charlie better be if that's him she got those slips from that is Charlie better be right and I
02:38:35 that is Charlie better be right and I would expect that to have come from a command unit I stopped referred to earlier 1 right charlie did Charlie
02:38:46 earlier 1 right charlie did Charlie better be tell you that he mapped them from Paul Sadler standing outside no he didn't we didn't can we look at the next picture two four nine I just want to move this on a little bit ahead just to see whether that just looking at you
02:39:05 see whether that just looking at you yeah what are you doing there you know firefighter just come down the stairs with I didn't my recollection was not that is not that she was wearing breathing apparatus but I do recall
02:39:16 breathing apparatus but I do recall seeing her eyes widely really wide open right and I suspect that my the reason I would call that is because she had a face mask on and all I could see was her
02:39:28 face mask on and all I could see was her eyes right you remember seeing that do you I gave her my helmet okay and that's your helmet and it is is this the second
02:39:39 your helmet and it is is this the second or a second set bag she's well the contents of a second set bag do you think so is this these the contents of a second set bag do you think that's a
02:39:50 second set bag do you think that's a breathing I tried to set right I thought that a the contents of a second set bag were spared be egg I don't know whether a second set baggers but a second set bag is a Jewish
02:40:02 baggers but a second set bag is a Jewish skin bag that's used to wrap a breathing apparatus setup but to transport it safely when carrying out when we have been carried into an incident yeah
02:40:14 been carried into an incident yeah I I can't see a second set back there so I would suggest that it's just the spare breathing apparatus set that's been used to assist the young lady out of a toxic
02:40:25 to assist the young lady out of a toxic environment right now you said before that you had no training at all about how to take a person through a highly toxic environment but does that include just going back to that question does
02:40:36 just going back to that question does that include using a spare be a to give to a resident or occupant of a building to take them through a highly toxic
02:40:47 to take them through a highly toxic environment inherently the spare breathing apparatus that we use is for firefighter emergency so we're trained in how to rescue our own and whether that be in the form if
02:41:00 own and whether that be in the form if they have a malfunction of their breathing apparatus set which requires them to either have a transfer of facemask or connect into a spare
02:41:12 facemask or connect into a spare breathing apparatus set that's the primary purpose of that second set though it looks to me that if a young lady has been brought out with a spare be a set it looks like somebody has
02:41:24 be a set it looks like somebody has probably used their initiative to transport her through a toxic environment with safe air so when you say use their initiative does that mean that you actually get no training and there's no policy in the use of supply
02:41:36 there's no policy in the use of supply of casualties with PA systems did you or others consider repeating this example of providing ba sets to residents or sharing access to firefighter oxygen you
02:41:49 sharing access to firefighter oxygen you would have to speak to the watch officers that were doing that well you know I wasn't involved with that I was involved with us but when you were doing a prioritization as you told us that earlier
02:41:58 earlier did you think about using this methodology to assist residents out through the toxic environment when I referred to prioritization I was talking about the way in which I were to transfer and communicate the information
02:42:09 transfer and communicate the information I received by the control information form not how the rescue would be prioritized okay who would that who would have decided who would have decided whether or not to deploy a
02:42:21 decided whether or not to deploy a second set for the use of domain whether as senior ranking officers at the bridgehead but the bridgehead I would have yeah I think that's where they're carrying out the rescue operation now on
02:42:37 carrying out the rescue operation now on page
02:42:42 on page then it's caved up another photograph let's look at two five two five two inq two five two and I'll come back to page nine of your statement in a moment if
02:42:54 nine of your statement in a moment if you go to page two five two photograph - five - that has an adjusted time of two twenty twenty four seconds we see I
02:43:08 twenty twenty four seconds we see I think it's you can you confirm for us if that's you holding some pieces of paper yeah kanya we can you dissin large the pieces of paper first mr documents
02:43:19 pieces of paper first mr documents director we may be able to identify them what do you think those are control information forms right and there seems to be a smaller piece of piece of paper
02:43:30 to be a smaller piece of piece of paper as a little rectangle coming off that that the larger pieces of paper do you remember comparing a small piece of paper with a large pieces of paper he's
02:43:43 paper with a large pieces of paper he's sure that's not just those before folded up
02:43:45 up I don't know I would suggest that that is a slip of control information form fold it up and I'm going through the numbers okay
02:43:59 now let's look at the wall if we can and I'd like to use not the picture we've been using so far on the left but a clearer version which we have a term M
02:44:12 clearer version which we have a term M et triple zero five seven seven four and
02:44:21 that is all I'm going to use to ask you questions about is five seven seven four yeah
02:44:27 yeah [Music]
02:44:33 did you write all of the information that you received on to the wall and nowhere else so what was the last bit and no one else yeah nowhere else the
02:44:46 and no one else yeah nowhere else the information you see on the wall was the majority of it was written by me however station manager Pete whorfin didn't once he joined me also write information on the left hand list on the left hand and
02:44:58 the left hand list on the left hand and that I'm gonna come to that because I think that's later on we'll come to that didn't did you start with a list in your hand or did you put them up as they came to you did I did you did you start with
02:45:16 to you did I did you did you start with an existing list in other words writing a list from a list or did you write your list from numbers as they came to to you individually so as I mentioned in my
02:45:31 individually so as I mentioned in my statement
02:45:35 the idea would have been if I could have created a replicated what we've got Anna forward information board and that's a big grid so there's a says a pattern
02:45:46 big grid so there's a says a pattern there was no when I got the slips there was no pattern there was no I couldn't I couldn't decipher a way of prioritizing
02:45:59 couldn't decipher a way of prioritizing them right other than just doing them one by one as I received them now on this picture and tell me if this is wrong and it's just try and get this the scheme of the war first of all under FSG
02:46:14 scheme of the war first of all under FSG 215 I think you said before that you said that the list of not of flattened numbers and floors immediately under the words FSG is what you've started with correct that's right is it okay now on
02:46:26 correct that's right is it okay now on the very far left of that list you've got just take 205 for the moment you've got be a tick F is that part of the
02:46:38 got be a tick F is that part of the first list or is that part of the list on that on the left
02:46:47 see the vertical line that separates that the list to the right of that is the first list the list to the left of that is then that second list okay so
02:47:00 that is then that second list okay so where we see be a tick F that goes with 2:05 it doesn't go with 1 1 3 1 2 3 correct right so that's the first list and which is the next list that you do
02:47:11 and which is the next list that you do do to look at the wall generally
02:47:22 collation of information yes so the list directly under FSG goes vertically down yes and then the list of the left of it goes vertically down yes and then in the
02:47:36 goes vertically down yes and then in the latter part of my attendance that incident we started drawed we drew a grid I drew a grid and that was where I crushed we will cross checking information right in a good format can
02:47:49 information right in a good format can you tell me about the list on the very far right of this picture you see that there's a 94 in brackets I didn't write that when you say that do you mean the
02:48:00 that when you say that do you mean the 94 in brackets all the lists of an it to the left of it just to be clear can I be Greeks alien they see there's a 94 in brackets and then there's a list to the left of the 94 in brackets did you write
02:48:11 left of the 94 in brackets did you write that I didn't I did not like the 94 in brackets I did write 1980 I did like the nests that is yeah right
02:48:28 I did like the nests that is yeah right when when do you think you've written that the stages of the incident would have been between right okay maybe yeah I you would have to use some CCTV but it
02:48:42 I you would have to use some CCTV but it would have been roughly for between four hundred okay okay now going back to the center list or rather go back to the general picture so cap can we take it
02:48:53 general picture so cap can we take it then that the order in which you you wrote these myths up was the middle middle list correct list on the left and then the list on the right next to the
02:49:04 then the list on the right next to the 94 no so the middle yes yes yes sorry yeah middle net like right now that it is a grid if you go to that I'd like to
02:49:15 is a grid if you go to that I'd like to use seven I'd like to use a different photograph for this if there is a grid I just want to show you which is M et triple zero five seven seven six
02:49:27 triple zero five seven seven six we just look at that just clear this way
02:49:37 now that's the very far right of the same wall as I think is obvious and you've got the 94 there and the list to the left of it we've just been looking
02:49:48 the left of it we've just been looking at and to the right of the 94 in brackets there's a phizzer looks like someone's written there at our drawing rough a tower with floor
02:49:59 our drawing rough a tower with floor numbers up to 23 yeah did you write that I think I I begun join that right and I
02:50:11 I think I I begun join that right and I think that's the an accurate timestamp in which I left because you can see it's a tie for 30 okay it says a full 30 clear that's a floor 5 and then the
02:50:23 clear that's a floor 5 and then the floor for says Oh 402 cleared yeah do you think you wrote those I think that I didn't like that right but I think I left the incident at the time in which
02:50:35 left the incident at the time in which we were receiving that information okay all right but do you think you did write the theme I think I drew the vector town okay now let's go back then to five seven seven four
02:50:58 why not some other statement well that's a nice yes yes yes cause come
02:51:17 thank you okay at the point at which you started writing your first list and we can see you started with viet rhythm 205
02:51:29 can see you started with viet rhythm 205 did you know how the flat and floor numbering system worked no now on page 9 of your statement and ID anyone need to take you to it but I can't if you what you say that you
02:51:41 can't if you what you say that you looked around for a floor plan plaque but didn't find one I in viewpoint looked around right okay did not having a plaque hamper your efforts it would have been more helpful
02:51:55 efforts it would have been more helpful to have a plaque yeah did you ask for one I in an open request I said can anyone see a floor plan right okay and
02:52:09 anyone see a floor plan right okay and as you wrote were you shouting up when you told us you were shouting up to watch manager Watson did you shout each number individually up to him or did you shout in batches went through it
02:52:21 shout in batches went through it individually he write them down individually we confirmed them individually okay now can I just ask you about some mr. chair can I just say we can go to one o'clock
02:52:34 I just say we can go to one o'clock would that would be very helpful to me yeah this is happy with seven minutes yes you carry on nice okay now I just
02:52:46 yes you carry on nice okay now I just want to get an idea of this of the of the symbols that you've used yeah could you first of all tell us what ba means I'm looking to that I'm looking in the
02:52:57 I'm looking to that I'm looking in the middle list to the left-hand most part of that middle list well you've written ba what does that signify it means that means that B I have been committed to the allocation
02:53:10 have been committed to the allocation does that mean that you have been told that they'd be a crew had been deployed to flat 205 we're looking at the first one by way of example only
02:53:26 it means that the information that I passed through to the bridgehead the garden FSG on 205 had been passed through and I was told that a very crude
02:53:38 through and I was told that a very crude who had been committed to that flat oh I can I mean I can only confirm to you the information that I passed and the
02:53:49 information that I passed and the information I got back right so and I can't confirm to you if that is the brief that they were given because if the bridgehead commander decided that
02:54:01 the bridgehead commander decided that they didn't want to use the fire survival guidance information that I had provided then I cannot confirm to you that that was that they were committed to that level but as far as I was aware the information being passed from me via
02:54:15 the information being passed from me via Paul Watson to the bridgehead where it says ba-aby a crew were committed to that location who told you that a ba crew had been committed to any
02:54:26 a ba crew had been committed to any particular flat which led you to mark be a hoot who told you well the bi crew went through to the obviously I'm sure you're fully aware of the dimensions in
02:54:39 you're fully aware of the dimensions in which they will work in in this day well so the VA crew went through at the same time as the slip so the VA who were
02:54:50 time as the slip so the VA who were being committed with that information how did you decide whose so that information was coming back via Paul Watson right to say yeah they're committed next we might go through the
02:55:03 committed next we might go through the list
02:55:04 list um so justice I understand the sequence of events you would shouts up to Paul Watson I would flat 205 for example he would then is this right confirm to you got it
02:55:15 got it you like to slip yes and we then shout down to you deployed or something P word panna slipped to the bi crew he would tell them to go through to the bridge ed this is the FSG information I got David goes through to the bridgehead
02:55:28 goes through to the bridgehead and I were and he would say white they've gone they've gone through they don't suffer oh okay he wasn't committing them it's for the chicken child to commit them right so
02:55:40 chicken child to commit them right so there might really means then is he's told you he's dispatched to be a crew to the bridgehead come with you up with the slip of paper with a continuation damage absolutely right so to be clear when you
02:55:52 absolutely right so to be clear when you write be a that is not that that is not because you know that a crew has been committed to 205 is now because you've been told by Paul Watson that a crew has been sent to the bridge for my own records for that purpose
02:56:03 records for that purpose yeah yes turning to the tick what does that represent [Music]
02:56:14 the tick represent tick represents that according to the information I got back that they made it that a crew got to
02:56:29 that they made it that a crew got to where they believe the 23rd floor was however that said I assume we're going to move on to the correlation of
02:56:42 to move on to the correlation of casualties coming out what mine the information that I began to receive as
02:56:53 information that I began to receive as time went on was it became nigh on impossible to correlate where survivors were coming from versus where I was
02:57:05 were coming from versus where I was passing the information for various to be committed just going back to the tick
02:57:15 what information did you have that led you to put the tick on the wall as the BI crews were exiting I would ask them where they come from where did you get to where did you go
02:57:27 to where did you go so that wasn't coming from full Watson it was coming direct from crews was it it was it it would come from it would come from the crew they would it would
02:57:43 come from the crew they would it would come from the crew because it became apparent to me very quickly that if that the only way that we could I mean in my
02:57:54 the only way that we could I mean in my statement I jump in head it does jump will come will come - it came very clearly very clear very quickly that the
02:58:05 clearly very clear very quickly that the information going in was clear and concise but actually I wasn't fully aware of the confusion that was taking place in the tower yep so the
02:58:17 place in the tower yep so the information coming back was not accurate
02:58:24 but I think my question is simply what was the source of the information that led you to put the tick up there and you've said it's the pit was the returning crews returning Croesus they not Paul wits Watson or anybody at the
02:58:36 not Paul wits Watson or anybody at the bridgehead no but you might it might be it might be through third party I might I might have asked a firefighter where they come from where so and they're telling me so it's not i might have
02:58:49 telling me so it's not i might have spoken to one of the residents where have you come from wait which floor did you come from and at the time how
02:59:00 you come from and at the time how reliable did you think that information was given that it was coming from returning firefighters or or residents who come down the building became apparent very quickly that the
02:59:11 apparent very quickly that the information was enacted was not that accurate and did you continue after discovering that it wasn't that accurate to put ticks up
02:59:25 yeah because I made sure that I asked pertinent questions to the crews that would give me the best the best chance of identifying whether we did it where
02:59:37 of identifying whether we did it where whether we got there enough right did you observe are you familiar with the signs of of metabolic heat stress in
02:59:48 signs of of metabolic heat stress in crews yeah did you observe any science having observed signs on crews could you be sure what could it be reasonably sure that the information they were giving you back
03:00:00 you back but you still continue to put the ticks up I had to do something I had to actually it isn't just about I mean let's be very clear it is a priority to
03:00:14 let's be very clear it is a priority to rescue people who need our rescuing but we're asking our firefighters to ascend a tower to their potential death it's
03:00:27 a tower to their potential death it's really important that we don't do that needlessly so the collation of any information I can get I would do so the tick's was the best it was the best best
03:00:40 tick's was the best it was the best best case if they could tell me that that's where they've been then I have to I have to I have to acknowledge that was there a risk though that by putting up a tick
03:00:54 a risk though that by putting up a tick where the information wasn't reliable Acura's that that might mean that there would be no further deployment to that flat it became very it became apparent
03:01:05 flat it became very it became apparent to me very quickly there's something had to be done we had there we had to correlate where the survivors had come
03:01:16 correlate where the survivors had come from and I go into my statement I called for a marker pen so that I could mark on their head or their arm the floor number
03:01:27 their head or their arm the floor number or flat number so that we could so we could identify where people have come from so that we could correlate this information and they saw what happened very quickly very very quickly okay I
03:01:42 very quickly very very quickly okay I think it's probably time for a break mr. chairman that's beyond doing a lot it's a reasonably convenient point it well it doesn't matter I think this lunchtime I think it's time we had a break we're going to stop now
03:01:53 we had a break we're going to stop now than mr. Williams please don't talk to anyone over the break of at least about jewelry about all the citizen courses and we'll come back at 5:00 for two please okay
03:02:13 right five costume please thank you
03:02:23 you