London Fire Brigade firefighter Oliver Desforge gives evidence about his experience at Grenfell Tower, including rescues, conditions inside the building, and challenges faced by crews.
00:00:06 yes it's clear good afternoon sir with your permission Matt call Oliver desk Borge yes thank you
00:00:51 I do solemnly sincerely and truly declare and affirm the evidence I shall give shall be the truth
00:01:04 thank you very much this force it don't make yourself comfortable thank you first of all would you please confirm your name for the record it's all about John des Forge thank you first of all thank you very
00:01:15 thank you first of all thank you very much for attending inquiry state to give evidence it's very much appreciated now turning to procedural matters in front of you you'll see a blue folder and hopefully behind the first tab you'll find your statement dated the date of
00:01:28 find your statement dated the date of December 2017 the 8th of December yeah that's correct and behind the second tab hopefully you'll find your contemporaneous note yeah that's also correct
00:01:38 correct have you read both those documents recently I have yes and you confirm that the contents of those documents are true they are yes and you contend for those documents estándares your evidence the inquiry so are you content for those
00:01:50 inquiry so are you content for those documents to stand as your evidence of the inquiry yes I am yeah thank you now if any questions aren't clear please don't hesitate to shout and I'll rephrase them so they're clearer yeah
00:02:01 rephrase them so they're clearer yeah but also finally if at any time you would like a break please don't hesitate to say so and we can break okay thank you
00:02:08 you now as I've indicated to other witnesses I'm not going to go through your witness statement contemporaneous note line by line there are particular areas that I'd like to draw out and the first one of
00:02:19 like to draw out and the first one of those is of essentially basic information about you first of all is it right that you've been a firefighter since 2011 or there abouts yo is actually the course names 2011 but is
00:02:30 actually the course names 2011 but is actually January 2012 well that's that training school and at the time of the fire you were based of Soho fire station is that right that's correct you and you attached a red watch that's also correct now the first substantive topic I'd like
00:02:43 now the first substantive topic I'd like to talk to you about is your training and experience okay and if I could start first of all with the topic of section seven 2d visits okay um no in your statement you mentioned that you have many high-rise
00:02:54 mentioned that you have many high-rise flats on Soho's ground have you attended any of those high-rise buildings for the purposes of carrying out a section 7 2d visit yes and what is your understanding
00:03:05 visit yes and what is your understanding of the purpose of 7 2d visits and so what it is it's a building visits and it would be highlighted to the watch officer to attend and the main purpose
00:03:18 officer to attend and the main purpose is for us to go to that building and assess it for firefighting and rescue purposes which involves a substantial amount of things and first of all would be we'd be looking at the building
00:03:30 be we'd be looking at the building layout access to the building the height etc dimensions we'd be looking at wander viewpoints for appliances the siting of the initial appliances hydrant location
00:03:43 the initial appliances hydrant location fixed installations so sprinklers rising mains any fire engineered systems that were in the building we'd be looking at is there an information play on arrival
00:03:56 is there an information play on arrival we would be looking at where the outlets were located where the inlet was located what key might be used for the internet where it's in a secure it's a fire brigade key etc so it's essentially
00:04:07 brigade key etc so it's essentially anything for us that would help was in the in any kind of incident that there might be that location additionally it could be responsible people life risk at
00:04:20 could be responsible people life risk at day in night time and all that kind of thing where there's a concierge wherever it's a firefighting key in order to gain access
00:04:25 access 5 - all that kind of information thank you it helped us can I ask Paul to turn up a document lfb quadruple 0 1 2 5 6
00:04:40 are you familiar with policies 6:33 I am yes Paul could I ask you to turn to internal page 19 that's 1 9 it is this
00:04:51 internal page 19 that's 1 9 it is this the the document that was relevant at a time at the fire they're supposed to get that yes it is ok no this is appendix warm first of all have you seen appendix
00:05:02 warm first of all have you seen appendix warm before will it read it at some point yes and when you turn to section 72 D visit there are a number of a considerable number of items set out there under paragraph 1 would you go
00:05:13 there under paragraph 1 would you go through each and every one of those items or would the purpose of a section 70 deep visit be more limited than that it can be more limited and often the information is already there on the
00:05:25 information is already there on the operational risk database so it may be that it's and we're going back as a revisits which can't happen a lot of you've already been to the premises so it may be a case of seen what's changed a lot of that information may be the
00:05:36 a lot of that information may be the same and my experience is that those things do get tested however because I'm a firefighter officer you know me on the direction so I'm aware and that those
00:05:48 direction so I'm aware and that those things need to be done but on when you're actually doing a visit the office will be detailing your tasks which form part of of this process but this is all stuff that we do do yeah and what
00:05:59 stuff that we do do yeah and what training do you receive in respect of the carrying out of section 7 2d visits it's more on-the-job training so you would be you wouldn't be taught this at training school
00:06:10 training school you'd go through her eyes policy but it's more of an odd sort of resolving an operational incident whereas this is the things you would learn as development firefighter on a station and you would
00:06:21 firefighter on a station and you would go on these visits and the more senior people and the officers would say this is how it's done and this is what we're required to do and explain the reasons and things why and that would form part in your development book as a firefighter as well in an earlier on see
00:06:32 firefighter as well in an earlier on see you mentioned the responsible person in relation to a particular building would you expect the responsible person or representative to attend when you attended for each and every section 7 2 UD no it completely depends I thought no
00:06:45 UD no it completely depends I thought no Grenfell tower well enough so and as normally if there's no concierge in the building like that which is the norm for a Housing Association block and you wouldn't expect anybody to be in attendance and some locks do have those
00:06:57 attendance and some locks do have those this eye for example there's a huge amount of high-rise blocks of Pentonville Road for example remember being at Euston going to those and those
00:07:08 being at Euston going to those and those resemble our porters and things like that so you you would Lee age with those to get even more information but they're often not there or that either on the day or they might not have them at all so it just depends and commercial
00:07:20 so it just depends and commercial buildings on the other hands they normally would be somebody could ask you to turn to page three of your witness statement and the second paragraph on that page and the third line on words
00:07:31 that page and the third line on words and mr. test for widgets up on the screens which you may find easier to really you're right you might find near museum yeah this book so I thank you and third line on words reads I am competent
00:07:44 third line on words reads I am competent in dealing with instance in high-rise flats as we have many on our ground and regularly have training and how to deal with wires in these type of buildings when compartment ation fails and first of all could you set out for us what
00:07:56 of all could you set out for us what training you've received in relation to high-rise firefighter okay yeah I will I'll do that first I'll come back to that second part it's that sensitive don't worry we'll come back says okay okay so and yes so over the course of a
00:08:08 okay so and yes so over the course of a year
00:08:08 year we're detailed a huge amount of training that forms our operational response to all different kinds of incidents so obviously high-rise makes a part of that and some of that comes from the poorest
00:08:20 and some of that comes from the poorest training plan it's mandatory some of it is more ad hoc base station training it could be from incidents that we deem we had a learning point from a nest on a more of a watch level and high-rise for
00:08:32 more of a watch level and high-rise for us I couldn't talk for other boroughs for example but for as it comes up quite regularly and that comes in the form of practical land and theory based training so the practical sessions will be
00:08:45 so the practical sessions will be drill based sessions which could be on our tower which we can just we can simulate their Horus instincts we have a rising main and we have enough floors to do so we could we even use the actual
00:08:57 do so we could we even use the actual building of the fire station itself sometimes and to do that as well it could be a pre-planned training event when we're on strategic resource which is like a pre-planned training time another station and additionally on some
00:09:10 another station and additionally on some rare occasions we go to say a disused building and on one occasion it's been filled with false smoke and things like that and theory-based is more policy and going into the theory of what we would
00:09:21 going into the theory of what we would do set a bridgehead what in what might happen and then scenarios where if something doesn't go as planned what we might do so that's generally in terms of
00:09:32 might do so that's generally in terms of intervals of when that would happen I couldn't tell you to be honest because it's difficult we don't really it's not really in our mind to think all I did that on this date if that makes sense but if I had to guess it'd be around the
00:09:44 but if I had to guess it'd be around the sort of month monthly basis I would say high-rise comes up for us and that's you now if we could just look at each and every element of that and dealing first of all with the practical training you received yet hour you've got it Soho
00:09:55 received yet hour you've got it Soho fire station yes asking a basic question first how many stories does the tower of Soho have somebody asked me this earlier they think it's five it's five or six and are you able to simulate external as
00:10:09 and are you able to simulate external as well as internal fires on them yes yeah well you using your imagination but yes we've used covering jets before now in terms of those exercises using the tower
00:10:21 terms of those exercises using the tower are you able to simulate breach of compartment ation and what to do should that arise you can't really do that without a real fire because it's
00:10:32 without a real fire because it's impossible so you could talk about that that you couldn't really do that in a training scenario because you're still just imagining them in a fire but we are trained to deal with when compartments
00:10:43 trained to deal with when compartments ation fails and we're aware perfect spreading not on the catastrophic scale of grenfell Tower but it may be one two floors or a compartment a shin internally failing and we are trained to
00:10:55 internally failing and we are trained to deal with that and what's the trainee what's that what do you do when compartment the Train usage I mean some of it is it's actually internally it's common sense really you're dealing with a compartment fire if it breaks through to
00:11:06 compartment fire if it breaks through to an excellent partner then you're just dealing with one large compartment you treat it exactly the same symmetry for example if it breaks out of a kitchen goes into a corridor you've now got a
00:11:17 goes into a corridor you've now got a corridor in a kitchen is one large compartment so it's more dangerous but it's still you'd still treat it the same so you know that the corridors on fire so the door procedure the safe systems of work would just happen at the door
00:11:28 of work would just happen at the door that door instead of the following door and I mean do you want me to talk like externally yeah I was just coming onto that yes please what training do you have on how to deal with when breach of compact compartment ation has spread to
00:11:39 compact compartment ation has spread to the exterior so what you taught how to deal with that it's it's just something that we're aware of we don't have any specific training if it was a high-rise for example that spread say I'll put one
00:11:51 for example that spread say I'll put one floor for example and then it's a case of we have the bridge head as you already know and and we have a safe system of work from the bridge check they were just involved taking a
00:12:02 they were just involved taking a firefighting jet to the floor above and and fighting the fire exactly the same so we're able to deal with that but when it's when the fire is say 18 floors apart that system to simply cannot work
00:12:15 apart that system to simply cannot work and we're not trained to deal with that I mean even if you were trained to deal with that and you had enough hose and resources the dry rising main would it be it's flying affords by the jet so it would have work dealing with the
00:12:26 would have work dealing with the training on the tower itself what practical training have you been given as to how best to deal with exterior cladding fires and nothing to do exterior cladding one of the examples
00:12:37 exterior cladding one of the examples you gave about practical drills was in disused buildings you started in January 2012 yes
00:12:45 2012 yes how many drills have you carried out in disused buildings high-rise buildings a high-rise and I think Toob I can only remember one specifically there was high-rise and treated as a high-rise
00:12:56 high-rise and treated as a high-rise fire and persons employed were you able to I don't know whether you heard the evidence of mr. Aston O'Donovan he to a practical in a disused building where they were able to start it miss of
00:13:07 where they were able to start it miss of Li a small fire the two instances in which you use a disused building were you able to start a small contained fire in order to lend or for nasty to the other now here is false smoking one and
00:13:18 other now here is false smoking one and I can't actually remember the other high-rise innocent this because it's been over instant so we've had different types of fires disused tube stations etc so the only one I can say for 100% certain was the one in a building
00:13:30 certain was the one in a building somewhere like Heston or somewhere in that way and they had false smoke but no real fire that's working and what training practical sorry what theoretical training you give in a relation to stay put and when's
00:13:42 relation to stay put and when's appropriate to withdraw it my Oni training that I remember and for state book policies been something that I've learnt over the time that I've been in the fire brigade and in that it's
00:13:54 the fire brigade and in that it's generally the safe system of work on a high-rise where we're taught in the policy states that unless there's a specific reason and to go against what the building's policy states then we
00:14:05 the building's policy states then we should follow that until there's reason not to follow that and my experience is that stay put is absolutely the best policy in a high-rise fire normally in
00:14:17 policy in a high-rise fire normally in terms of specific training there's not really it's more been on-the-job training I would say you indicated there the state court was appropriate unless
00:14:28 the state court was appropriate unless there's a reason that no longer became appropriate yes paraphrase what would that reason be have you been given tuition or training on how to identify all how to identify what that reason would be no that that's
00:14:40 what that reason would be no that that's quite a difficult thing to answer because because firefighting by its nature is so dynamic it's you couldn't really give a reason but in the policy to state that an incident command that can make that decision by concepts in I
00:14:51 can make that decision by concepts in I believe it's the officer in charge of control and saying that the advice should be changed but that's not something that I would be making that decision on it's not it's above my pay grade and but I'm aware that that can
00:15:03 grade and but I'm aware that that can happen and however that's a very difficult decision some makers even at the fire like grin felt our it could be catastrophic to make that decision because
00:15:14 because as much as it was a web the fire spending so badly people were still safer until it became unsafe to be in their flats to stay until we got there so stay put was still relevant and but
00:15:25 so stay put was still relevant and but that's what my experience those dealing with evacuation what theoretical training have you been given as to error to partial or total total evacuation safely and when it's justified I don't
00:15:38 safely and when it's justified I don't remember any specific training for that but the only time I remember evacuating buildings and finish order to do so and large gas leaks I don't have senior high wise training on that so don't remember any theory or any practical training I
00:15:51 any theory or any practical training I don't remember anything could ask you to turn to page three of your statement and the second paragraph fifth line down I think says we do drills at our station
00:16:02 think says we do drills at our station all the time and use our on-site training tower as a high-rise okay so do you mind if I just into mine of course it's very quickly and just on that the types of business when complementation
00:16:13 types of business when complementation fails yes and I just not very happy with that wording and it's something that I missed out when I had the ability to amend my statement and please clarify were community juice because we as I
00:16:25 were community juice because we as I explained my experience of training for when compartment ation fails I don't see it just reads like you're wrong to me in a sense it's not a big part of the high-rise training and that that
00:16:36 high-rise training and that that sentence has come about by the police it's not their fault at all but by paraphrasing what I was saying it's just not read correctly in Aptos mister I just want to clarify no that's useful thank you you say we do drills the
00:16:49 thank you you say we do drills the session all the time I think you were indicating earlier on that you carry out high-rise training or drills monthly is
00:17:00 high-rise training or drills monthly is that the more Cara the correct way of describing I would say that I was probably referring to general drills that we do all the time so we do every day shift we would normally do it true of some descriptions and and there now
00:17:13 of some descriptions and and there now the second point I was using that we use the on-site training so as a high-rise so I think all the times for being excessive description of when we would do high-rise training but true that would be a correct description
00:17:24 that would be a correct description staying with that paragraph on page through our sentence I've also been to a number of high-rise fires on our ground in the past are you able to give us an idea
00:17:33 idea say for example over the past two years how many high-rise fires you've attended it's so difficult to know and I attended a high-rise fire recently for example I
00:17:44 a high-rise fire recently for example I would I would also change this to say high-rise fires on our ground and other stations grounds because we also border a number of other very busy stations and
00:17:55 a number of other very busy stations and Houston Paddington and Lambeth all with a high amount of high-rise so a lot of them attendances have been on their grounds Westminster for example when it was open Clark and well when it was opened also many high-rise fires
00:18:07 opened also many high-rise fires I specifically I've been to an FSG high-rise on a on accounts of town Westminster where I was an initial be a crew that was quite a few years ago we had a high-rise fire that started on the
00:18:19 had a high-rise fire that started on the balcony spread internally but didn't spread upwards recently on Houston's ground just off our fire stations grounds and so I've been to quite a high number for somebody who's been in the fire brigade for this just over six and
00:18:31 fire brigade for this just over six and half years I've been to quite a high number pilots how many of those photos you've attended involved exterior cladding fire no can ideal now going
00:18:42 cladding fire no can ideal now going back to page two and the third paragraph on that page lines one and two I'm also unaware of any pre-prepared plans for fighting fire specifically grim filter
00:18:53 fighting fire specifically grim filter but am aware of plans when dealing with these types of fires now looking at phrase these types of fires do you mean high-rise fires yes yeah what plans are there to deal with these types of fires
00:19:06 there to deal with these types of fires what were you referring to there so I was referring to our systems of work at a high-rise fire and so that would be on arrival the first troops in attendance would find out where the fire is of
00:19:18 would find out where the fire is of course
00:19:19 course there finds the any information gathering about the building whilst crews set up a water supply from a hydrant as then supply hose from the
00:19:31 hydrant as then supply hose from the trip to the rising main whilst the other crews that are in tendance would carry all the relevant equipment to a fire find lift if there's one there of course and start setting up a safe system of
00:19:44 and start setting up a safe system of work which is a bridgehead suit floors below the fire and all the other information should be cleared many times but that that's what I mean by the pre-prepared plants in that sense thank you now the next topic I'd like to talk
00:19:57 you now the next topic I'd like to talk to you about is the night itself and if we could deal with some basic details first is it right that you were riding in the back of alpha 2 for one that's correct and looking at page two the
00:20:09 correct and looking at page two the fourth paragraph on that page third line you say that the crew included watch manager bee or firefighter Adam Johnson and possibly firefighter Theresa orchard and firefighter Lauren Stavely can you
00:20:22 and firefighter Lauren Stavely can you now remember whether those two were with us or not it's slightly confusing just because an on arrival with detailed tasks immediately so we the trucks work
00:20:33 tasks immediately so we the trucks work together so we kind of merged as one so on the night I would of course known but when there by the time I'd been my statements I couldn't remember who was Ryan injured it was certainly what's running to Stuart feel and fire five and
00:20:44 running to Stuart feel and fire five and Johnson was definitely on the truck but I actually think that it might be that it was firefighter Saunders an orchard and not Staveley but I couldn't tell you that bunch of sense okay although it's a
00:20:56 that bunch of sense okay although it's a matter of record you were mobilized at zero 130 on the road at zero 132 does that sound about right to you it does sound about right yeah we have an arrival time for alpha
00:21:07 yeah we have an arrival time for alpha to forewarn from the GPS data which is zero 146 again does that sound about right
00:21:13 right that sounds around right here thank you going back to your statement page to the fifth paragraph line warm you say initially the MDT was not working first
00:21:27 initially the MDT was not working first of all how reliable in your experience is the MDT it's normally quite reliable it can't be slow to react at times normally is reliable to be the odd incident once in a while where it
00:21:38 odd incident once in a while where it won't show up and we'll have to contact and controlled by the main scheme radiative related details but generally it works yeah and for how long was the MDT not working can you remember now I don't know if it ever became working and
00:21:50 don't know if it ever became working and I was sat in the back that that evening so I don't know I just know that the officer in charge was trying to find out the details and that I wouldn't know any but what no apologies I interrupted you
00:22:02 but what no apologies I interrupted you oh no sorry what information can you remember what information your watch manager Stewart bill gave you on route to the tower I knew this I seem to
00:22:13 to the tower I knew this I seem to remember I say no I can't give you hundred cent but I seem to remember that he told us it was a 20 pump fire that we've been mobilized to which rang alarm bell straightaway keys and it's unusual
00:22:24 bell straightaway keys and it's unusual for a high-rise fire to require that many pumps because of the nature of the operation it wouldn't normally require that many pumps so we kind of knew that something serious was happening other than that information I believe I was
00:22:36 than that information I believe I was aware there was fire survival guidance in progress normally that would be listed as an annotation on the MDT so whether or that that was I don't know someone's could you hear anything on the
00:22:47 someone's could you hear anything on the radio as you were traveling speculating if I could part of migraine wants to say that I could remember hearing it don't speculate yeah no so I think that I think that I I feel like I was aware after she was in progress but how I was
00:22:59 after she was in progress but how I was made aware of that I don't know okay excuse me can you remember the substance of those calls no the next point I'd like to go to now is your a rifle at the tower okay now if we go to page three
00:23:12 tower okay now if we go to page three the first paragraph and the second line and you say midway through the second line my first thoughts were that it was just that it was scaffolding that had
00:23:23 just that it was scaffolding that had caught fire from looking at the building again I could see the nature the fire was not a normal one now first of all what was it that made you think the scaffolding was on fire and I've
00:23:34 scaffolding was on fire and I've attended incidents in the past that look incredibly dramatic on first glance and but it's it's been scaffolding with fabric hoarding alight and at first part
00:23:46 fabric hoarding alight and at first part of my brain sort of thought well maybe it's that but then as we start to walk towards the tower I could see that it wasn't that wasn't the case and I believe I can also see Windows that
00:23:57 believe I can also see Windows that appeared involved as well at that points and what was it about the fire that you thought it didn't present as a normal one and the fact that it seemed to be alight from what I now know is the fourth floor could have even been lower
00:24:08 fourth floor could have even been lower it may have spread even at that point lower I don't know but it from around that floor all the way to the top of the building it was on one facade at that point it seemed to me and given that what what thoughts did you have about
00:24:20 what what thoughts did you have about whether compartment ation continued or not I could see that there I didn't think about is such in that phrase I don't think but I could see that lots of
00:24:31 don't think but I could see that lots of my memory tells me that I could see lots of flats were involved and that that clearly this was not gonna be a normal incident and that people would require rescue turning now keeping on page three
00:24:44 rescue turning now keeping on page three going to the third paragraph third line you say we all went into the lobby area and knocked the stairs into the mezzanine where we met at we met our other pump crews as you arrived what system was there to direct crews to
00:24:56 system was there to direct crews to where they were needed and there wasn't so and as we arrived because of the nature of the incident the officer in charge of my appliance is very experienced officer and he knew
00:25:08 experienced officer and he knew immediately that be a resources would be required it was it was their sensible decisions to do and and and it was a good idea so he told us all to rig in grieving apparatus normally an instant
00:25:19 grieving apparatus normally an instant the option tried would go and get detailed from the command unit of the officer in charge this incident was a lot more dynamic than that and he realized that straight away so instructed us to go to be a to the maintaining of operations which of
00:25:30 maintaining of operations which of course was going to be the tower and while he then I assume went to the command unit and to hand in a nominal wall board and get further details and so then we went straight into the tower
00:25:41 so then we went straight into the tower at that point and it was there wasn't many people there but turning keeping again on page three looking at the fourth
00:25:49 fourth the second line you say we waited at this location to be committed to for survival guidance calls first of all to be clear this location are you referring to the Mets mean there yes who briefed
00:26:02 to the Mets mean there yes who briefed you
00:26:03 you regarding the FSGS Europe the FSG you were deployed to deal with and so we waited at that location of the stairs and there was a watch commander I believe was Hammersmith watch manager and man in the doorway so that the
00:26:15 and man in the doorway so that the bridgehead wasn't overwhelmed and then we were then committed through that area up some stairs I believe to where the bridgehead was and it was watch measured Silvo from chelsa fire station who
00:26:28 Silvo from chelsa fire station who detailed us the FSG and was the management of the line of fire fighters going into the turf was it orderly or not what was your impression it was orderly especially given the
00:26:39 orderly especially given the circumstances he must have been under an immense amount of professional and moral pressure at that point to just push people through but in order for it to work effectively he needed to hold his box it was only briefly and from memory
00:26:51 box it was only briefly and from memory but and it was to make sure things run smoothly and what briefing were you given regarding the number of FSGS and their location around the tower as you were waiting to be deployed and I don't
00:27:04 were waiting to be deployed and I don't remember being briefed on a quantity I think at that stage because it was a 20.5 but it was like turning up to a much smaller fire that makes sense in terms of resources I think we got there quite quickly compared to a lot of the
00:27:16 quite quickly compared to a lot of the avert appliances it was made up consecutively so it was the case of Vichy turning up at the bridgehead and it was like we've got this episode we've got this F is G and committing cruises fast but as efficiently as they could at
00:27:29 fast but as efficiently as they could at that stage so I've got it because I've come off on my own side today for a second what was the original question it was really the question was directed it you know what idea did you have as to
00:27:40 you know what idea did you have as to how F those G's were being handled so interim priority yeah I knew that they would come into the bridgehead through whatever way they were doing it at this point and I know the normal
00:27:51 at this point and I know the normal process of how FS DS come through but they were receiving them however they were receiving them at the bridgehead and then they were just detailing and the number I didn't know that point but to me it was obvious that there's going to be a high number
00:28:02 there's going to be a high number because of the way it was burning on the outside we were privy to information which other people weren't so did you have any sense of how the FSGS were being prioritized at all no could I ask Paul to turn up the telemetry sheet and
00:28:14 Paul to turn up the telemetry sheet and to go to box 54 and it's reading from left to right mr. disgorge box 54 s DB asa standard duration area that's not
00:28:26 asa standard duration area that's not that's not correct well if we can just take the stage by stage 54 your name Talia
00:28:34 Talia 2:03 yeah if we go down to box 58 and I think this is a point you are allowed to
00:28:45 think this is a point you are allowed to clarify that's correct you'll see they you are mentioned for the second time and you have tally out in the green column at zero two zero four first of all can you count as to
00:28:57 four first of all can you count as to why you appear twice with another concern so I saw this when this information was disclosed to the inquiry and obviously have professional interest in it so I read it and I then realize it
00:29:09 in it so I read it and I then realize it was to wearers I was certain that mine was the lower one and then it tallies up with my second ba wear as well so it made sense to be low and it made more sense when I read the details and then I
00:29:21 sense when I read the details and then I queried it with the team and they think that the upper Oliver des voyage which is not me was firefighter Lord Staveley from Soho's crew as well and who wore BA
00:29:33 from Soho's crew as well and who wore BA with Jonathan Saunders I believe is an updated version of this and because I queried this with the team I don't know if you've received this or not I see there's enough flurry of activity on the
00:29:44 there's enough flurry of activity on the lfb bench so maybe they can assist us without in due course now if we can go read across the telemetry sheet to the end of where time it's indicated they're
00:29:57 end of where time it's indicated they're at 0 to 30 somewhat unfair question does that seem about right for your end of where
00:30:03 where time probably if I guess so around so half an hour or so I would I would imagine it was but time becomes a bit of a blow in those circumstances so I
00:30:14 a blow in those circumstances so I understood could I ask you a few general questions before we deal with that the first appointment itself yeah in your professional experience how practical would it have been to have carried a spare mask for your BA or should the
00:30:26 spare mask for your BA or should the needs of need arise to give our to a casualty and if you're going to a specific person in a specific flat carrying a second set bag makes sense if you're deployed which many people were
00:30:37 you're deployed which many people were in Grain fell to a general search and rescue or off to number a number of casualties it becomes quite difficult and but in theory it works and what
00:30:49 and but in theory it works and what would be much more practical would be smaller maybe that contractors have the smaller breathing equipment where we could have multiple attached to our and our personal protective equipment and a
00:31:02 our personal protective equipment and a second mask because I saw you asked mark the question earlier and again it only works if you have an affair to to be able to do that same theory yes but
00:31:15 able to do that same theory yes but practicality I think it needs to be looked at further flowing from that whilst you're waiting to be deployed can you remember whether there were any calls from any firefighters for a
00:31:26 calls from any firefighters for a secondary set of BA so there was absolutely a core we everyone was asking them for more second set bags to be brought up and then I through member
00:31:37 brought up and then I through member when I was in the holding area and I'm sure there was a couple of firefighters that came down with children in in masks which must have been second steps I don't think they were linked to they were obviously they were supply so can
00:31:49 were obviously they were supply so can you remember how many of the requests for secondary sets were actually satisfied and people would definitely task to do it and but at that point I was committed so I don't know what happened
00:31:59 happened can we take it from that just to clarify matters you didn't neither you nor firefighter Mitchell accompany do you had a secondary set of no I didn't okay
00:32:10 whilst you at the bridgehead do you remember any residents leaving the tower going past you I remember the two
00:32:21 going past you I remember the two children being bought out with mats but they were rescued they weren't on their own I don't remember seeing at that point any residents and while from the holding area to the bridgehead and until
00:32:32 holding area to the bridgehead and until I was deployed upstairs I never member seen any residents at that point that's the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is your first FSG deployment and if I could ask you to turn to page three of
00:32:44 I could ask you to turn to page three of your witness statement and the final paragraph at the bottom of that page and you say this my crew was briefed to go to the third floor to a family who said they could not get out of their flat due
00:32:55 they could not get out of their flat due to the smoke doing the best you can now what was said to you when you were briefed and exact details and it was that there was a family I remember being
00:33:07 that there was a family I remember being told there's a disabled woman in flats and for whatever reason they couldn't get out of their flats I was not surprised because I know how to smoke and travel in a high-rise building but I
00:33:19 and travel in a high-rise building but I was aware at that point that was below the fire floor when we were detailed but in terms of the brief itself we were told that they couldn't get out there flat for whatever reason a cat member the reason that was given there's no
00:33:31 the reason that was given there's no flat number specified in your witness statement can you remember whether you were told the flat I was definitely told the flat and it obviously on the night I knew the flat number I couldn't recall it when I had to write my content Aranea snows what information what briefing
00:33:46 snows what information what briefing were you given regarding conditions on the third floor itself I don't remember any briefed on conditions I may have been given more by don't recall them okay were you given any brief regarding the reliability of radio comms within
00:33:58 the reliability of radio comms within the tower no were you given any information regarding the number of occupants within the flat you were disgusting and was that information
00:34:09 disgusting and was that information accurate
00:34:10 accurate you attended the flats I believe so I I'm a now looking back because I know how many people in the flat whether that was told to me i 100% remember being told there's a disabled person in the
00:34:21 told there's a disabled person in the flats and i can't remember the exact number of people in there but i pretty certain that they did tell us that it was one adult male three children and a disabled female can I ask you to turn over the page to page four and look at
00:34:33 over the page to page four and look at the second paragraph the first line you say we made our way up to the third floor to the door number we would give him although I don't remember the door numbers as you left the bridgehead and went up to the third floor
00:34:44 went up to the third floor I'm assuming you went up the stairs is that right yes can you describe for us the conditions in the stairwell leading from the second to the third floors and from memory the second to third floor
00:34:55 from memory the second to third floor were visibly as he was excellent I don't remember much smoke in the stairwell from the second to the third the third floor lobby was wispy lightish great
00:35:06 floor lobby was wispy lightish great smoke you wouldn't wanna it wasn't sir Aris fireable but you wouldn't want to be beaten in just for the sake of it and but it was it was okay could you see where it's coming from the smoke Nate
00:35:17 where it's coming from the smoke Nate yeah I'd imagine just from looking at that and knowing what's going on in the building that it was coming from through the flats and under the doors potential danger staying in this paragraph you go
00:35:28 danger staying in this paragraph you go on to say in the second to fourth lines the smoke wasn't too bad at this stage but as soon as we made entry bite in the flak door it was clear was a lot denser smoke in the flap which I can only assume was due to wind and other factors as the floor the flap was on was below
00:35:40 as the floor the flap was on was below the initial source of the fire first of all pina meant what the color of the smoke was within the flat my memory definitely for memory it seems it was dark smoke how bad it was I can't
00:35:52 was dark smoke how bad it was I can't remember II certainly wasn't comparable to moving further to the building later but it was conditions that you would not expect people to be staying in their flat how extensive just a drill don't how extensive was smoke spread within
00:36:04 how extensive was smoke spread within the flat itself it seemed again if it depends if my memory serves me right whether their lights Ron it's difficult to say but it was smoky I would say the flood it was covering the majority of the flats but visibility was meteor but it was black
00:36:18 visibility was meteor but it was black smoke and it was although it wasn't completely it was fun the floor to the ceiling but it was kind of a little bit wispy if that makes sense but can you remember whether the windows or first of all did you before didn't check for the windows
00:36:30 you before didn't check for the windows and my colleague went further into the flat than that I did I just wanted to get the the three children and the mail out my colleague walked in and picked up the disabled one we shouldn't walk was there a female firefighter with you at
00:36:41 there a female firefighter with you at any stage during the rescue and third floor
00:36:43 floor I believe so what happened is once we started making contact we both took our bo masks off at that point for two reasons to appear less intimidating because we knew we need to say there was become evident already at that point we
00:36:55 become evident already at that point we knew this wasn't gonna be the last thing we did so at this point without priorities and to get them out of the building so we moved them into the into the lobby area explain that we're going
00:37:06 the lobby area explain that we're going to get them safely out and at this point I believe there's some firefighters in Chelsea and the only one that I remember was a guy called Fergie but I don't know his actual name poses no miss Fergie from Chelsea and that could have been a
00:37:19 from Chelsea and that could have been a female Chelsea crew members August I seem to remember two or three people from Chelsea they hadn't been deployed passed a budget but maybe they've been set up to assist so at that point because we knew they hadn't been committed we handed the care of the the
00:37:32 committed we handed the care of the the male the children to them said can you get these guys out of the building and then firefighter Mitchell carried the disabled and I believe he passed her over and then also instructed one of the other firefighters to carry the manual
00:37:44 other firefighters to carry the manual wheelchair there was some electric ones as well I believe and down as well so that so that she had somewhere to sit et cetera just gave that cycling the evidence you've just given you say you explained to the residents what you were
00:37:56 explained to the residents what you were gonna do yes can you remember doing the best you can now what words you use to explain what was happening next I just said that we're gonna get them out of the tower that are needed to leave and there's nothing to worry about it's
00:38:07 there's nothing to worry about it's trying to reassure them because there was three I think it was three two young children and they were obviously scared which is the reason why I think they hadn't left worse conditions in their flat because they were worried for whatever reason and probably maybe
00:38:19 whatever reason and probably maybe couldn't lift the disabled female I'm not sure the reasons it was along those lines and then once we passed them over to Chelsea because we wanted this point because we've been deployed already we thought that these guys a better place
00:38:31 thought that these guys a better place to get them out and that we'd be better off going getting a second brief okay before you let the other crew take down the occupants of the flat did you rage a rage Oh down to the
00:38:42 did you rage a rage Oh down to the bridgehead the result of the FSG no because we knew we were going straight back to the bridgehead to involvement as you left the flat had conditions left markedly in the lobby no not really
00:38:54 markedly in the lobby no not really wasn't bad enough smoke even in the flats and it could because it was smoking it was dark it wasn't an rollin so you know as you've heard from other accounts at this
00:39:05 you've heard from other accounts at this point that flat wasn't rolling smoke it was almost like it had been pushed down and then it was congregating in the flat almost and we closed the door to make sure that didn't happen I was paralyzed yeah as I understand it
00:39:17 I was paralyzed yeah as I understand it you you led the residence down to the lobby as that writes it to the stairwell so there was kind of a member of ramp like I decided run for something and that floor and then because Chelsea and
00:39:28 that floor and then because Chelsea and took over we sort of followed them out and then went back to the bridgehead and did the bridgehead what briefing did you give to the officer in charge so we went back to the same officer so it was
00:39:41 went back to the same officer so it was we had continued it continuity and then from there we said we need another brief and I can't remember whether we put our masks back on at this point because of
00:39:52 masks back on at this point because of course that's procedure I don't know we were trying to play the game still a tiny bit at this point we may have got a must back on when we went back happening but we may not have done so we went back to the watch managed to do Silvo and
00:40:06 to the watch managed to do Silvo and that's been of a brief at this point we were told my statement reads 24th or 21st floor we can come on to that yeah obviously on the night again I knew what floor we'd been briefed to go to but
00:40:17 floor we'd been briefed to go to but when I was asked them like to write my constant peroneus notes myself a fiim it you couldn't remember exactly what flaw it was he'll of course I'm unlikely new employers look don't worry we'll come back on say if I can take you back
00:40:28 back on say if I can take you back slightly yeah the the update you gave to watch managed to solve it can you remember the words or the gist of the words you gave to her when explaining the result of the FSG mission you just
00:40:39 the result of the FSG mission you just I can't remember the exact words but we would have said we've just been to fly whatever it was though is the disabled female adult male and three children and they're out safely they've been assisted
00:40:50 they're out safely they've been assisted out the building I couldn't give any more information that's I don't know what then happens in by I assume that they would have probably had some kind of treatment by la s or smoke inhalation if you don't know don't ya can you
00:41:01 if you don't know don't ya can you remember how the information you gave to watch mantas Silva can you remember how it was recorded no I do have a fake memory at Fir though referring to something and recording it who tasked
00:41:13 something and recording it who tasked you to carry out your second FSG deployment that it wasn't an f SG deployment it was just we have reports and she stated that we didn't have an F s G at that point and the other officers
00:41:24 s G at that point and the other officers there may have done but they were detailing other people at that point and so it wasn't an FS g it was just that we have reports of people on a floor it couldn't be confirmed doing the best you can now can remember the precise words
00:41:35 can now can remember the precise words or the gist the words the briefing you were given that it what I'm M BER specifically there wasn't an FST call and just that there were reports of people and that thought right you
00:41:46 people and that thought right you mentioned earlier on you weren't too sure the floor to which you were dispatched yes and if we may be I suspect you've read this already but if we could turn to your contemporaneous notes and if we could turn to the second
00:41:58 notes and if we could turn to the second page of those notes and the fourth I think four line from the top you say this we were informed of people trapped
00:42:10 this we were informed of people trapped on the 21st floor you had to make our way there refreshing your memory of that contemporaneous note was it the 21st or the 24th floor you think you would dispatch to I'm not sure that's why on
00:42:22 dispatch to I'm not sure that's why on my police statements it reads both and I'm now advised that there isn't the 24th floor that has flat so in maybe it was 24 to the first floor
00:42:33 so in maybe it was 24 to the first floor on the night just to clarify I knew on the night walk floor I sense of course there but by the time I wrote my notes and it could have well been that's when he first book okay new flat number is specified in your
00:42:45 new flat number is specified in your witness state were you given details of any flat numbers just a flaw thank you were you given any number any idea of the number of residents who the subject of the mission no any information regarding
00:42:58 mission no any information regarding vulnerabilities no nothing okay were you given any information regarding conditions in the stairwell going up to the 21st floor I don't remember being
00:43:09 the 21st floor I don't remember being though any information regarding conditions on the lobby of the 21st floor no if we can turn back to page
00:43:26 floor no if we can turn back to page four of your witness statement and the penultimate paragraph on that page you
00:43:37 penultimate paragraph on that page you say I think at the third to fifth lines we began to climb up a stairwell and as we did we initially never used our master conserve there we soon realized that on standard SD ba we would never be
00:43:49 that on standard SD ba we would never be able to reach the 21st floor as we had used some air already as you began to go up the stairwell excuse me can you describe the conditions as you went up the TAF so we either kept a mass off or
00:44:02 the TAF so we either kept a mass off or we took them immediately off again as soon as we left the bridgehead which ever happens and because we knew we'd have to conserve air we had a conversation myself a firefighter Mitchell and we just thought can we get
00:44:14 Mitchell and we just thought can we get there were both very fit people we thought you know what we can we reckon we can get there little did we know about conditions and what we'd come across etc so at that point we backed
00:44:25 across etc so at that point we backed herself to get this so we started making our way up without grieving operators just around that next at this point with helmets on we've got two fourth floor and it was very smoky but we decided to
00:44:37 and it was very smoky but we decided to just persevere in smoke really until we could we were forced to buy a mask back on essentially which i think is about the fifth floor which was black smoke down to the floor with limited
00:44:48 down to the floor with limited visibility going back slightly did you tell anyone that the bridgehead before you deployed that you were going to try the initial stages without her no that's that's why
00:45:01 stages without her no that's that's why I think we may have fought a must son because we thought we might get in trouble not in trouble so wrong phrase but we we knew that we're doing something it was procedurally incorrect so we didn't want to highlight her selves at that point can you remember
00:45:18 selves at that point can you remember what how much air you had left when you made this decision around about the fifth floor to go on to go on further under er I would imagine rounds 250 bar
00:45:30 under er I would imagine rounds 250 bar pressure but as I guess once you realize I've made the decision that you weren't going to be able to make the 21st floor did you radio back that to say we did Brit head and can you remember what
00:45:42 Brit head and can you remember what words you use when you raised you know we tried and I didn't have comms and firefight and Mitchell had a bow reset and he just couldn't get through it all it was probably I would say we were
00:45:54 it was probably I would say we were around six or seventh floor we've begun to realize there was fire fighters casualties coming downstairs house we couldn't count the Flavin's almost immediately was very difficult to count
00:46:05 immediately was very difficult to count the floors because of everything that was going on not there was no visibility and that appeared to be no markings I'm sure there were some of we couldn't find them we didn't have the benefit of a thermal image camera because on my truck
00:46:18 thermal image camera because on my truck it was already taken to the VA who had that so it became evident which is why we then radios tried to radio down and then fire 5min chief told me couldn't
00:46:29 then fire 5min chief told me couldn't get through and so he'd be we made a decision probably around I reckon we carried on going up at that point around the seventh floor there was still hose at this point if I can stop you
00:46:40 hose at this point if I can stop you there mm you try to radio through to the bridgehead you couldn't get through yeah what do you do when there's been a change in task effectively which you
00:46:52 change in task effectively which you naturally made how do you report back when the radio you can't get through far the radios I'm gonna have to make based on a risk to benefit we knew that we didn't have a fire
00:47:03 we knew that we didn't have a fire survival guidance more specific one we knew that if we went downstairs and used even more again back down then we may be completely ineffective so it was a decision a risk based decision based
00:47:16 decision a risk based decision based against the benefit of what we could achieve by either going back down physically which would have been an option we didn't think that was viable option we haven't got a specific flat so it wasn't as if someone else couldn't
00:47:28 it wasn't as if someone else couldn't get detailed for the same task so we made a decision that we could be more effective by getting as high as we could assess in our air consumption and then finding the floor no one else had searched at that point and trying to
00:47:40 searched at that point and trying to affect rescue at that point as you were going up the stairwell going up the tower
00:47:44 tower can you remember to what extent the stairwells were lit or not and it was impossible to tell initially and on going up the stairwell because it was just completely black I don't remember
00:47:56 just completely black I don't remember any lighting at all and going back down the stair or later which I'm sure you'll come to on the lower floors I remember some kind of some kind of lighting lower down that was kind of visible through
00:48:07 down that was kind of visible through the smoke as we were descending but I don't on the way up I couldn't see any light at all can you can you help us what were the heat conditions like as you went up the tower hot incredibly
00:48:19 you went up the tower hot incredibly smoky visibility was probably this distance so maybe a foot or so maybe a tiny bit more on the stairwell from that was from about the 56th floor and it was
00:48:31 was from about the 56th floor and it was not it wasn't anything that I am the experience I've experienced hotter conditions at that point and then work once we made that decision there was hose at this point we realized that well we made a decision again it was due back
00:48:44 we made a decision again it was due back to risk-benefit that we would ditch the firefighting media that we had and we put that into the side of a lobby so it wasn't under stairwell and then we made a decision stat checking lobby floors what when I say checking I mean
00:48:56 what when I say checking I mean literally opening the lobby door was the fire fighting Jets going in what could be here be a team's communicating and if we could we was we were happy that our crews on that floor would move up to the
00:49:07 crews on that floor would move up to the next floor but as you were going up can you remember whether the doors leading from the stairwell to the lobby were open or closed I don't remember any doors open other than ones have been popped open by
00:49:18 other than ones have been popped open by fire fighting hose and how many were how many floors were so propped open three or four for memory but that's there's more of an educated guess than than the fact are you able to remember for what
00:49:30 fact are you able to remember for what purpose those doors or do you know for what purpose those doors were kept open you said it was just because I can only assume that people were on those operate in those Jets on certain floors or that
00:49:42 in those Jets on certain floors or that in Lund marks on those floors for other people to take over can I ask you to turn to page 5 of your statement the second paragraph second line which does we eventually reached a floor although
00:49:53 we eventually reached a floor although again I'm unsure of the floor level that had no firefighters on it we spoke to a fire crew on the stairwell and asked if the floor had been searched they informed us that the conditions were too bad on that floor and that had not been
00:50:04 bad on that floor and that had not been searched I think it may be in the 13th or 14th floor but after speaking to another crew cynthia's and believe it is probably between the 10th and the 14th looking back now are you able to be more
00:50:15 looking back now are you able to be more specific about the fraud upon which you met this other fire crew we now strongly believe it was the 10th floor we knew that it was somewhere between the 10th and 14th and sort of on the evening we
00:50:27 and 14th and sort of on the evening we decided to their chat a few other people and it turns out that the crew who assist is a which I'm sure you'll get onto assisted as with the rescues off that floor later on absolutely adamant
00:50:40 that floor later on absolutely adamant it was the 10th thought and some of our information that came to light just chain from up two other firefighters and we feel relatively confident it was the 10th floor now could I ask you to turn back to your contemporaneous note and
00:50:52 back to your contemporaneous note and again it's page 2 of that contemporaneous note and you say roughly a third of the way down the page [Applause]
00:51:03 we met a crew on aprox 13 14th floor
00:51:15 yes now that was written on the day but is your evidence now that you consider it was the 10th floor I I couldn't tell you
00:51:27 was the 10th floor I I couldn't tell you of any certain see the evidence from other crews and I don't know how the statements read because they haven't been read and so into the inquiry yet but they they suggest it was the 10th
00:51:39 but they they suggest it was the 10th floor and from other things I've heard it's difficult to say that it sounds like it could have been a central going back to page 5 the second power paragraph the last five lines of that
00:51:51 paragraph the last five lines of that paragraph start with these words I can honestly say I've never seen conditions like this in my time in the brigade the fire door on this Lobby had worked very well as the condition in stairwell
00:52:03 well as the condition in stairwell although very hot and smoky was much better than in the lobby after we opened that door where the smoke was much thicker and the pressure and heat was something I've never experienced in my entire career first of all where were
00:52:16 entire career first of all where were you standing so and we attempted to do a kind of is a good kind of door procedures you could without any firefighting media so at this point
00:52:29 firefighting media so at this point firefighter Mitchell was leading so he was positioned next to the door opened I believe Ward's us I can't remember where he did by this how I remember him opening the door I was behind him and however he opened that door that's when
00:52:42 however he opened that door that's when we saw that well felt the conditions originally on there was a shock to be honest and what color was the smoke you encounter it was thick black it was highly pressurized almost at the extent
00:52:53 highly pressurized almost at the extent it appeared to be bouncing off the floor and when we open the door difficult question I know but can you could you see where the smoke was coming from
00:53:01 from no absolutely not but it didn't it wasn't consistent with smoke spread through doorways if it seemed like it was fed it was it was rolling it was pushing it it seemed pressurized it wasn't like
00:53:12 it seemed pressurized it wasn't like normal smoke you would expect in a lobby area of a flat even if all the flats were on fire you wouldn't expect that kind of smoke again just for the sake of comprehensiveness
00:53:23 comprehensiveness what visibility if any did you have absolutely zero in that in that area from the doorway in the stairwell area almost zero but you could just about see
00:53:34 almost zero but you could just about see a helmet if it was close to you but in that area absolutely zero now in his statement firefighter Mitchell state of the heat was so intense it melted your helmet is that your memory and he I
00:53:46 helmet is that your memory and he I haven't put that in my statement and but they're my maybe what he means by that is after the incident that the badge on the front of my helmet was warped there little metal badge and it was incredibly
00:53:58 little metal badge and it was incredibly badly swipe damaged and I sent it off to get cleaned and they they decommissioned it gave me a brand new helmet so going back to page five of your witness statement the last paragraph you say I
00:54:10 statement the last paragraph you say I followed the left-hand walk conducting a search leaving firefighter Mitchell at the door was firefighter firefighter Mitchell holding the door as you went in he was and so what happened is
00:54:23 he was and so what happened is immediately on entry up some reason we changed position because we when we realize how bad the conditions where we had an say conversation it was very brief and we decided we had to make
00:54:34 brief and we decided we had to make access because we thought if it's bad bad for us there's no way anyone that's going to get out of those flats without assistance so we thought is important to make entry at that point immediately on entry I knew that it was incredibly
00:54:47 entry I knew that it was incredibly dangerous conditions and so I made the decision support him to hold the door I did this for various reasons would you like to explain why yes please and so I
00:54:59 like to explain why yes please and so I knew who's gonna further comprises stairwell and the stairwell however was already compromised and if we had a bad house it would have been the same situation and when I went into that they
00:55:11 situation and when I went into that they originally found a cat they almost immediately on entry passed it's a fire fire Mitchell in the door we just make how it's actually slightly moving which gave us further justification to make entry in case there was anybody else
00:55:23 entry in case there was anybody else there he then passed that immediately to a firefighter and going downstairs empty-handed I then made entry again at this point I truly realized that hot it was and just to give you some context of
00:55:35 was and just to give you some context of our thought it was and I had a thing a few years ago which the brigade of the first was in there miss and it was at a training event the conditions got out of hand for various reasons and it was so hot that we would just it was just in
00:55:47 hot that we would just it was just in insanely hot and we ended up having to sprint out this building that's for the safe measures in and things like that it was just that various things didn't go quite right and we had to sign a near-miss form and this room was far
00:55:59 near-miss form and this room was far hotter than that so I knew it was a very dangerous place to be so this is why you firm the cat what happened next so then so then the reason I have one is I keep the door open was because if I felt that it the
00:56:12 open was because if I felt that it the conditions were consistent with a potential flashover so I fight if that did happen I didn't want to be caught with a casualty or myself I thought had much higher chance of getting out of
00:56:24 much higher chance of getting out of that area if the door was open so that was my reasoning so then I forward the left-hand wall but was forced onto my belly because it was so hot and and I called along the left-hand wall at first
00:56:35 called along the left-hand wall at first by five Mitchell his hand on my foot to try and maintain contact and we then lost contact and and then I found a casualty the the I could feel that foot
00:56:48 casualty the the I could feel that foot at first and unfortunately I couldn't move him on my belly so I had to go onto my knees and at this point it was just incredibly uncomfortable I thought genuinely for I was getting burned at this point I managed to move him to the
00:56:59 this point I managed to move him to the doorway I couldn't save him I didn't know what timers at him but as we got him out just into the stairwell I could make out there it was a large black male and that I would say weighed
00:57:10 black male and that I would say weighed around 17 stone for this again is just to give you an idea of the size of the casualty and at that time another crew were coming down the stairs who are now believed as one's worth but I can't be
00:57:22 believed as one's worth but I can't be certain they then took this casualty and I believe begin started taking it down the stairs if I could stop you there yeah as the casualty was taken down did you or firefighter Mitchell radio down
00:57:34 you or firefighter Mitchell radio down to the bridge head that you've recovered shorty no we didn't know I don't know five but Mitchell tried my part is to get back in and search again you went back into the lobby and you
00:57:45 you went back into the lobby and you found a second casual second cavity again and further in this time and then I had the same issue with the heat it was very difficult to get off your belly because it was forcing you down
00:57:57 because it was forcing you down eventually got her to the doorway and at this point the there was one of the firefighters I believe appeared and then I was kind of torn about what forgetting the hearse that I could see now again in
00:58:09 the hearse that I could see now again in the stairwell that it just about make out as a female so that was talking about whether it's go by things I thought it might be a family at this point because it appeared to be a male and female so I've gone back in quickly
00:58:20 and female so I've gone back in quickly done the same thing got further and come back out at this point that's when I thought my low pressure was going off I don't think it was actually I think with somebody else is now having interrogated the VA because my low pressure was going
00:58:32 the VA because my low pressure was going off but it doesn't make sense that it was mine that makes sense and I came back out and at this point firefighter Mitchell then took it upon himself to have a look on his on his own as well as as a second look essentially
00:58:45 as well as as a second look essentially and if I thought it was he was going in to have that second look yet where were you and chat into this other firefighters and we need to get his casualty downstairs during your search
00:58:58 casualty downstairs during your search round the lobbying area what opportunity did you have for kicking banging on doors I came across one door and at this point originally my attention was to go
00:59:09 point originally my attention was to go to the door and of course I then came across the two casualties and my once I'd gone back in and I even when it though it wasn't my low pressure that I thought it was and I also knew that how
00:59:22 thought it was and I also knew that how long I've been in the building and the work intensity that I knew I wouldn't have much air no matter what so by that point my priorities changed from making entry to flats I believe I touched the door of the first foot on the left hand
00:59:34 door of the first foot on the left hand side at one point but my priority was thinking it was a family trying to search the rest of that area because I thought that would be the more likely place to find a casually and with
00:59:47 likely place to find a casually and with the the amount of ear even if it wasn't my low pressure I knew that I didn't have much left and still had all the floors to get down with a casually so I didn't think it made any sense at all to try and then force entry to a flat stopping there
00:59:58 stopping there can you remember whether the female casualty was she wearing her jab headscarf or any anything else I honestly Carmen ahead you were able to
01:00:11 I honestly Carmen ahead you were able to bring the second casualty to the stairwell just to be clear had the door between the stairwell and the lobby being kept open whilst the search has been carried out either by you or by
01:00:22 been carried out either by you or by firefighter Mitchell and the this said when I was searching for the second casualty the door was still open to an extent with fire fire Mitchell man in the door when firefighter Mitchell search the door closed on him
01:00:35 search the door closed on him unintentionally you recovered the 7th the second casualty yes did you bring her out onto the stairwell we brought it to the mezzanine I believe and before you came down the tower did you attempt
01:00:47 you came down the tower did you attempt to radio through to the bridge head that you'd recover the semi I didn't have comms and I'm not sure a fire fire Mitchell did you didn't hear him I didn't hear him though
01:01:02 could a steep descent page six of your statements and the penultimate paragraph that three lines up from the bottom by the stage you've gone down the tower and you say the bridgehead had also now
01:01:15 you say the bridgehead had also now moved to a different floor by this time which I think was due to the conditions within the building we explained everything we had done and the reasons for not reporting earlier due to radio communication issues first of all can
01:01:26 communication issues first of all can you remember what floor the bridge had it be being moved to I'm not sure that actually happened and I remember at the bottom we were exhausted and a little
01:01:37 bottom we were exhausted and a little bit confused because we've got the cars would be to the mezzanine level and then someone was I think I don't know if this is in my own head that I thought oh the mess it was just behind the mezzanine or whether somebody I just remember
01:01:48 whether somebody I just remember somebody saying something about it being moved but I'm not sure if it had been moved at that point or whether that was a mistake and so I couldn't be CERN when you did you give a debrief at the bridgehead yes yes were you able to give
01:02:01 bridgehead yes yes were you able to give that debrief the floor the number of the floor upon which you'd found the two casualties and we tried to but as you've heard I couldn't give any clarification on that unfortunately we attempted to
01:02:14 on that unfortunately we attempted to say what floor we thought it was on we probably said it was the 14 for 13th because that would be in line with why I said I'm over notes and so can you remember the person to whom you reported or you gave the deeper I believe we went
01:02:25 or you gave the deeper I believe we went back to what's managed to Silvo just because that had been a point of contact at that point could you see what she did with the information you provided did she record it anywhere for example I'm sure he did but we left at that point so
01:02:36 sure he did but we left at that point so you didn't see her do that
01:02:43 what debrief did you give regarding the radio communication issues you'd encountered going both up and down the time we did explain that we tried to to get communications but it there was so
01:02:57 get communications but it there was so much going on there I think they knew that there was an issue so it's going on the buyer wouldn't have really assisted anyone so it was a very brief conversation for memory but was there any response from watch managed to solve
01:03:08 any response from watch managed to solve Oh as to the radio comms issues you replied tonight I don't remember the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is your second time inside the tower and
01:03:20 is your second time inside the tower and again it may help you get a fix as to time as if we could go to the telemetry sheeple and box one for two
01:03:44 and mr. des Forge there's only one of you this time yes reading from left to right your tally out time is 0 for 14
01:03:58 right your tally out time is 0 for 14 yeah does that sound right to you that that sounds about right I think and if we go further along to the far right Paul if possible to the end of where time and as Oh for 34 sound about right
01:04:10 time and as Oh for 34 sound about right to you who's your end of where time it sounds about right I believe now if I could ask you to turn to page 7 of your statement the third paragraph first line
01:04:23 now you'd return to the tower by this stage and you say on entering we found the bridgehead and now change locations came above where the bridgehead was by this stage in the evening and it was on
01:04:34 this stage in the evening and it was on the ground floor staying within that paragraph the second line we are briefed by a person I cannot remember the name of to go to the fourth and fifth floors and a systematic sweep to force will
01:04:45 and a systematic sweep to force will make entry to the flats to check for casualties and put out fires now first of all what briefing were you given you remember the words use or the gist of the words yeah I'm pretty certain it was given by and group manager Golborne and
01:04:59 given by and group manager Golborne and we were informed that they were starting or in the process of doing a systematic sweep so as there was I'm sure there's people attending FSGS at this point but
01:05:10 people attending FSGS at this point but we were tasked to begin or carry on this systematic suite we were told to do the forth I seem to remember four to six but fourth to fifth there's a couple of floors at least that we were asked to go and make entry to the flats firefight
01:05:22 and make entry to the flats firefight and check for casualties if you were to define a systematic sweep how would you define it it would be going floor by floor flat by flats ensuring that every
01:05:33 floor flat by flats ensuring that every single flight is clear without leaving anything unturned how do you ensure that a flat is clear and by forcing entry if you can't gain entry in an evil way and searching it what information were you given as part
01:05:45 what information were you given as part of your brief regarding conditions on the fourth and fifth floors we were told that it was the firefighting Jets I believe on the third floor to take that up to the fourth floor and whatever other floor we needed to go to
01:05:57 other floor we needed to go to make entry and I don't remember any conditions other than being told to be careful because a lot of the flats with fully engulfed in fire by that point but will you give them any details of any FSGS that related to the fourth or fifth
01:06:09 FSGS that related to the fourth or fifth or another six floors now we've given any information regarding the state of radio comms within the tower as he went up no I don't remember being in order to
01:06:23 up no I don't remember being in order to force or make entry into a flat what kick did you need to take with you and from memory there was forced entry equipment on the floors so because we
01:06:34 equipment on the floors so because we ended up not splitting up but we were just kind of splitting up so we were the visibility was much better at this stage and it was still very very smoky in but you could probably see from here maybe
01:06:45 you could probably see from here maybe to the CV around that sort of visibility I seem to remember from the floors that we entered so it's a safe time because we wanted to get through as many fast as we could we were taking interns and
01:06:56 we could we were taking interns and sometimes I was just kicking doors in overtime as I was using enforce enforcer to hit hit doors some of the doors when it goes easy so it's a case of kicking panels and things like that and then
01:07:08 panels and things like that and then opening it internally and what what firefighting equipment if any did you take up with you we had a 45 millimeter jet with a standard internal firefighting branch can I ask you to
01:07:20 firefighting branch can I ask you to look back to page 7 of your statement the third paragraph and the last three lines we say we went to the fourth floor picked up a jet that was already plugged into the dry rise and fully charged and
01:07:32 into the dry rise and fully charged and searched the floor in a systematic manner as you went up from the bridgehead to the fourth floor but can you describe the conditions on the stairs and sorry your apologies you've
01:07:44 stairs and sorry your apologies you've already dealt with that can you describe the conditions you encountered on the fourth floor and at that I can't remember stairs too much I think it was and it was smoky dark smoke but it
01:07:55 and it was smoky dark smoke but it wasn't as thick and dense as it had been earlier and on the fourth floor visibility was probably a meter two maybe two meters I would say they're probably more like a meter so you could
01:08:06 probably more like a meter so you could see your be a part there quite comfortably and as in not when I say a Mito it's not clear not clear from the meter away that you can see them in the smoke something that makes sense you got to the fourth
01:08:17 that makes sense you got to the fourth floor stairwell who opened the door from the stairwell to the lobby I honestly can't remember myself a fire fire Mitchell there was also a crew from Lambeth who we know quite well and
01:08:29 Lambeth who we know quite well and including fire fight page and they assisted us and so we was a shared task essentially turned in soup and clearing the flats on those floors you described
01:08:43 the flats on those floors you described in an earlier answer going from flat to flat 2 flat yes have far into each flat were you able to go it completely depended so I can't remember which some flats 100% a light one of the flats for
01:08:56 flats 100% a light one of the flats for example I'm sure you asked making it in a bit anyway but the water pressure was so poor yes that and it became a pointless task to attempt to put any fire are in the ones of lights because it was doing nothing at all and and some
01:09:10 it was doing nothing at all and and some of those flats in order to check conditions the first flat we actually entered which might not be the most sensible thing we wanted to check that there's no potential for life which we knew anyway we just wanted to check and
01:09:22 knew anyway we just wanted to check and everything was burnt to complete dust in those including the front facade it was just a concrete shell and nothing was left at all so flats like that following that we didn't enter because there was
01:09:34 that we didn't enter because there was no snow safer for life and all they'd left the building of course did you carry it with did you shout and bang the doors before you tried to force entry or do you just get this point and no and not at this point
01:09:45 this point and no and not at this point and we probably didn't serve I can't remember whether we did or not but certainly not for long if we did I would imagine we probably did and the flat sites seem to remember from the left-hand side on that those levels they were just a hundred percent smoke logged
01:09:57 were just a hundred percent smoke logged so all those flats we searched 100% and they again not sure exactly which flats we went in because it was of a cruise going from I think Lambeth and some others so it was we were doing whatever
01:10:09 others so it was we were doing whatever flats hadn't been searched exactly you mentioned water pressure yes to give some context could I ask you to turn over the page to page 8 and the third paragraph on Paige and the second and third lines you
01:10:22 Paige and the second and third lines you say that the water pressure would normally be a 10 bar at the rising main but seemed much lower at about 10 bar at the advert first of all were you given any briefing regarding water pressure issues before
01:10:33 regarding water pressure issues before you were deployed we might have been I [Music]
01:10:39 [Music] looking back now what measures could have been deployed that would have improved water pressure for you on the 4th floor it's impossible to say because
01:10:50 4th floor it's impossible to say because I'm sure the standard things which is reducing liters per minute contacting the water operating companies etc all those things would have been done so
01:11:01 those things would have been done so it's very difficult to I would imagine there was probably so many jets in use this is all I again I'm guessing because I don't know what else was going on in the building it's rising mains only
01:11:14 the building it's rising mains only builds a service what minimum of 1,500 liters a minute which is six firefighting Jets at the normal operating pressure so if there was more than that going and if the anything else
01:11:25 than that going and if the anything else at this providing water was using the similar main it would have all been taken away from that so thank you could I tell us whose turn back to page seven and the fourth paragraph last last
01:11:36 seven and the fourth paragraph last last can I just ask you we're getting to the time in the afternoon when we'd normally have a break but you may not have too many more questions I don't have too many more questions and I was going to plow on until 25 past three if that's
01:11:49 plow on until 25 past three if that's all right with my next step to ask mr. just hope he's happy and just to keep going for another 10 minutes or so yeah that's absolutely fine yeah
01:12:03 well again thank you go back to page seven fourth paragraph last line you say we then followed this search procedure
01:12:15 we then followed this search procedure the one you've just outlined on the fifth floor and above but found no additional casualties on these floors as you went up from the fourth to fifth floors
01:12:23 floors what what what conditions like on the stairwell can you remember math similar from the fourth burn for memory again it was dark smoky not as dense as it was
01:12:34 was dark smoky not as dense as it was earlier and going up the stairs and there was a little bit better visibility and the lobby's from memory were all quite similar in terms of their smoke conditions and heat say it was hot but
01:12:49 conditions and heat say it was hot but it wasn't it was completely incomparable to the earlier floor that we ended up on did you and your crew mate search every flat on the fifth floor and not was personally and but as a team we did yes
01:13:03 personally and but as a team we did yes and then we moved up and a fun map now I again that is similar to the floors to the flat numbers on the night I knew exactly what I dogs I knew I'd be reporting it back to the pitcher but now
01:13:15 reporting it back to the pitcher but now it's difficult to remember you say you say you searched fifth floor and above it flows from an answer you gave earlier on do you think you may have gone to the sixth floor
01:13:26 sixth floor I think we did Matt my colleague seems to remember we even went to the seventh floor but why have we did we told the irrelevant offices when we went back downstairs if you went up to the sixth floor did you carry out exactly the same procedures you carried out in the FF
01:13:38 procedures you carried out in the FF yeah going back to the fifth floor can you remember how far into each flat you looked into how far you went into that flat it was a similar similar thing
01:13:49 that flat it was a similar similar thing as before if the conditions allows and we would go in and to be honest normal procedures on that night I see you aware just went out the window so it we were going unless it was only percent a light
01:14:00 going unless it was only percent a light and we knew there was zero percent chance of any any savable life we would and we would make entry and we'd search everything good you mentioned that in respect to the fourth floor the flats on the left-hand side
01:14:11 the left-hand side 100% smoke logged I think was thought memory yet was that replicated on the fifth and sixth floors to your memory it's difficult to say that's all I can really remember that from now and
01:14:22 really remember that from now and because it was such a long time ago I I seem to remember that was the case when you return back to the bridgehead you indicated earlier on that you debriefed an officer when you returned yes did you
01:14:36 an officer when you returned yes did you give a debrief as to the water pressure issues you've encountered I can't remember okay that would be standard practice though could ask you to turn over the page to page eight of your
01:14:47 over the page to page eight of your witness statement and there you described in the first larger paragraph at the top of that page the rescue using the Alfa 245 aerial you say the crew the
01:15:00 the Alfa 245 aerial you say the crew the aerial ladder improvised a hose reel from a new fire engine and because new hose reels were more powerful that can you explain the differences between the new and old hoses for yes so they're slightly wider in diameter and they can
01:15:13 slightly wider in diameter and they can provide a higher leader permanently so almost double in liters per minute and they're almost in some ways as good as a forty five millimeter jet for internal firefighting they were obviously not
01:15:24 firefighting they were obviously not this is quite the same weight of attack and the reason that was done and what they had done is they had lashed a this new hose reel and to a ceiling hook to
01:15:36 new hose reel and to a ceiling hook to get an angle to throw as much water as possible to protect the the person in that flat I also believe that and Paddington were using the monitor said
01:15:47 Paddington were using the monitor said the same location to stop the horizontal spread but to give you a bit of an insight insert the how bad the water was from the hydrogen that was supplying the
01:15:58 from the hydrogen that was supplying the truck that I was at it was getting around 300 litres a minute and that the alp is capable of providing 2,400 liters a minute and that's when it's at full extension with 11 bar
01:16:10 it's at full extension with 11 bar pressure and they were providing around 230 plus litres a minute so that hose well that was all I was able to provide if I opening the supply well you able to see whether the new
01:16:21 well you able to see whether the new hose made a difference the fighting operation yeah hey I think it certainly made a difference and that and the monitors together I think prevented the horizontal spread final question
01:16:33 the horizontal spread final question concerns ventilation we aware of the existence of a ventilation system within the tower and no I believe I've only heard that more recently thank you very much now that concludes my questions for
01:16:45 much now that concludes my questions for you so it may be an appropriate time yeah break when you can think about those anymore cuz I can't yeah I'll have a break now mister Dysport okay I can't
01:16:56 a break now mister Dysport okay I can't let you go quite now because there may be some further questions after the break but we'll resume at half-past three I can see if any more questions there oh thank you very much please don't talk - and what about your
01:17:07 don't talk - and what about your evidence okay
01:17:20 right half of Sweden jeez
01:17:31 you
01:29:49 yeah laughs I think yes thank you yes thanks mr. despereaux's just a few additional questions for you first of all in terms of the lift at the tower
01:30:01 all in terms of the lift at the tower what did you know as to whether it was under firefighting control or not I didn't and because we from where we were directed to and the bridgehead was such
01:30:12 directed to and the bridgehead was such a short travel distance say it didn't come up for me personally at my time the driver after you completed your first mission within the tower what briefing did you give at the
01:30:24 what briefing did you give at the bridgehead regarding the possibility of reaching the upper floors on just using standard duration breathing apparatus before attempting to go upstairs after
01:30:35 before attempting to go upstairs after after you come back after completing your first mission updates up the tower to the top rather to higher up the town coming back down what briefing did you give at the bridgehead regarding the ability of
01:30:47 bridgehead regarding the ability of going to the top or to the upper reaches of the tower using standard duration breathing apparatus we would have explained our reasoning and for not going to the floor that we were detailed
01:30:58 going to the floor that we were detailed which would have included the fact that this it was simply because of the amount of air in our cylinders but also and because of the conditions on the stairwell the congestion the casualties accenture so that would have been
01:31:10 accenture so that would have been included in the debrief did you raise the questions whether extended duration VA ought to have been used or not and we didn't know I don't think anyway finally
01:31:22 didn't know I don't think anyway finally in terms of equipment that you had on the night an emergency mobile lighting and did you see that used at any time during the night so the ability itself
01:31:35 during the night so the ability itself the lighting and the emergency mobile lighting as I understand it that's kit that's carried on the FSA oh right I don't remember seeing lights on the where's that I had and I know there was
01:31:46 where's that I had and I know there was a lot more equipment a later stage that was carried up when the visitors he was clearer and some of some of the lighting equipment has to effect when the smoke to be thin and where you've got a system where
01:31:58 where you've got a system where ventilation smoke extraction system isn't working is there any equipment that the lfb has which can be potentially deployed to improve the situation to clear smoke no
01:32:09 improve the situation to clear smoke no this there's something that you can request from other brigades cuz some brigades use positive ventilation systems fans etc but to do so during a fire of that nature you would without
01:32:21 fire of that nature you would without knowing how the building construction wasn't stuff it could be even essentially worse and make the conditions worse mr. des Forge those are all the questions I have for you and thank you very much for coming to the choir to
01:32:33 very much for coming to the choir to give evidence today thank you yes thank you very much indeed your rhythms will be very helpful particularly or evidence of conditions within the building at different times when you were down so thank you very much for coming right well now you're
01:32:45 much for coming right well now you're free to go you go with the ashes thank you
01:33:00 thank you very much mister can you hear anything else we need to do with well sir via the ether mr. millet has the usual application to make for the usual reasons I don't think there's any
01:33:11 reasons I don't think there's any further amplification I can give you sent you down again to do the necessary work I'm afraid he has we're expecting some lengthy witnesses always we are I
01:33:23 some lengthy witnesses always we are I think there's there's some issues to cover with mr. Mulholland but I think Sharon Darby for obvious reasons will there be a number of issues for her to be dealt with well if it turns out as it has today that we save time at the end
01:33:34 has today that we save time at the end of the afternoon we can congratulate ourselves but I think I'm afraid and though it's not very congenial but we better start again at half-past nine tomorrow to give ourselves the best chance of finishing the witnesses we're
01:33:46 chance of finishing the witnesses we're going to see you tomorrow I'm grateful thanks right so thank you very much of course 9:00 again tomorrow please thank you
01:34:00 you