LFB Watch Manager Glenn Williams gives evidence about managing Fire Survival Guidance information on the ground floor, including critical communication breakdowns and being told crews were not being committed above the 10th floor.
00:00:13 good morning everyone and welcome to today's hearing we're going to resume the evidence of mr. Williams mr. Williams yes Thank You Jacqueline mr. chairman
00:00:39 good morning miss really Mona and make yourself comfortable thank you for coming in mr. Williams morning and can I start by revisiting
00:00:50 morning and can I start by revisiting something that we discussed yesterday certainly which is the bringing down your recollection of the bringing down of a forward information board from the bridgehead the start of your exercise of putting up
00:01:03 the start of your exercise of putting up FSG on the wall at 2:15 certainly now can I start by showing you some pictures from the CCTV footage because I asked
00:01:15 from the CCTV footage because I asked the first one to be put up on the screen which is inq to 6:1 now this is timed but at an adjusted time of Oh to 1512 so
00:01:32 but at an adjusted time of Oh to 1512 so and this is clearly you in the lobby of Grenville tower at that time it says yeah can you identify first of all yourself yep second I'm the firefighter
00:01:43 yourself yep second I'm the firefighter in the middle de Peter and secondly can you identify what is in your left hand looks like there's a piece of paper yes you can just focus on that do you remember what piece of paper you
00:01:55 do you remember what piece of paper you will be brought down or you had in your hand at that stage I do not remember what that piece of paper was nice is it is it possible that you were given a
00:02:07 is it possible that you were given a piece of paper when coming down from the second floor having looked at the bridgehead it's possible yeah right now
00:02:18 bridgehead it's possible yeah right now you can see at that stage that there's note that you didn't bring down but can you see yourself bringing down anything else no no and if you then go to the next picture which is 2 4 4
00:02:34 I think we looked at this yesterday yep plus I think you identified you as writing on the wall yeah at that stage at the time then is 202 1629 yeah
00:02:46 at the time then is 202 1629 yeah adjusted it gives o to 15:53 so that would be more or less about the time when you marked oh 215 FSG on the wall absolutely we then go forward a minute or two and
00:02:59 we then go forward a minute or two and again we looked at these yesterday I am Q two four five we looked at that again we I think it's obvious I can put it to you there's no forward information board
00:03:11 you there's no forward information board that we can see in that picture gray and then take this from me we've reviewed the CCTV footage from o to 17 through that to the time when the bridge had
00:03:23 that to the time when the bridge had moved down to the ground floor and we see no forward information ball or anything like a forward information board next to you by that wall at that stage okay okay we then move on and we
00:03:36 stage okay okay we then move on and we go to three 1705 which is pictured to five to four to five three and adjusted
00:03:47 five to four to five three and adjusted that gives oh three 1629 in the morning and we looked at this yesterday as well and there's you pointing at the wall I don't know whether you can see there a
00:03:58 don't know whether you can see there a forward information board anywhere in the picture either next to you or on the Left leaning against the wall if the picture it's the forward information board my recollection of it was just
00:04:12 board my recollection of it was just below the sign where it says Grenfell right community room it's feasible the my recollection of that detail is cloudy
00:04:23 my recollection of that detail is cloudy it was a it was a very busy night the evidence is quite clear that very forward information boards not there right so I do take it from you it wasn't
00:04:34 right so I do take it from you it wasn't brought down at the time in which I thought it wasn't okay well I don't want to put a false memory in your in your mind let me just see if I can finish off the
00:04:41 the the line yet sent my pictures if you go to the next one which is inq two five seven which is the time to both oh three oh seven 58 adjusted we can see no board
00:05:01 oh seven 58 adjusted we can see no board of any kind underneath the sign that's you clearly I mean we can see that there are a couple of what look like boards leaning up against the window there but they don't forward information boards
00:05:14 they don't forward information boards are they that way we think they're tables actually but do you remember tables coming down to the bridgehead or being in the bridgehead no okay and in the next picture which is two three five
00:05:26 the next picture which is two three five showing an adjusted time of oh three oh nine there is there is where the firefights are without a hat on it's got a four word information board Ryan do
00:05:37 a four word information board Ryan do his arm right does that help you with your recollection as to when it came down
00:05:41 down so what's that through I see 12 that is oh three oh nine 55 as a choice 309 55 so that's the forward information well that looks like wine okay yeah and I'm
00:05:52 that looks like wine okay yeah and I'm talking to what I would do I think that's probably Paul Watson because of the height of him right I'm sorry I've missing I've misled you actually that is
00:06:03 missing I've misled you actually that is oh three 1006 yeah so when did the bridgehead come down yes well about then we think so there's the foresight be precise there's a
00:06:14 the foresight be precise there's a photograph taken of the bridgehead on the third floor or the pictures on a FSG on the wall on the third floor by station manager cook at 308 yes and he said it was just before the bridgehead
00:06:26 said it was just before the bridgehead was moved down from the third floor to the ground floor I would agree that the that that is the forward information board and if when if 308 is the approximate time that they relocated the
00:06:39 approximate time that they relocated the bridgehead I think it's quite feasible that that is my recollection okay well that's very helpful thank you can I just check for one more picture to you which is inq 259
00:06:55 and this is time to oh three eleven so near only a minute or so later a three eleven fifty I suggested yeah does that help you it does here right and wait do we see the forward
00:07:08 and wait do we see the forward information board in that picture yeah I'm in terrible trouble with my white left it might in my memory are not you're not alone but we can see you and if you're facing us it would is it to
00:07:21 if you're facing us it would is it to your left leaning against the wall it is to my left with the red top it is you right thank you so looking at all of those I think you've already agreed that in fact your recollection of working from a forward
00:07:33 recollection of working from a forward information board early in the evening is hazy and it came down to you judge or sorry can I just your reference to the part of my statement there's a point my statement was where I asked the crew to
00:07:47 statement was where I asked the crew to set up in the foyer the venture control officers just a burn and accident all burn yeah and I instructed them to set the boards up
00:07:58 instructed them to set the boards up leaning against the glass wall so that we could correlate information right it gave us an opportunity to clearly communicate between the fire survival guidance information and the commitment
00:08:12 guidance information and the commitment of breathing apparatuses in fact that is the stage in my statement like that that was that took place right okay that's very helpful kind just pin you down to the statement it's page 13 in the middle
00:08:25 the statement it's page 13 in the middle forth like fourth paragraph ground is where you say two firefighters Justin Oberlin Alex and Eldon I think as annex decent organ from G 27-month Ken came
00:08:36 decent organ from G 27-month Ken came down carrying four inch of control boards I said to the guys set up here pointing at the glass wall opposite is that what you're referring to exactly what I'm referring to it okay that's very helpful so would that mean then that before the bridgehead came
00:08:49 then that before the bridgehead came down to the ground floor at shortly after 308 and the the FSG information that you were getting was coming to you fire control information forms or
00:09:02 fire control information forms or perhaps other pieces of paper yeah yes so does that mean that prior to the
00:09:14 so does that mean that prior to the bridgehead moving down to the ground floor
00:09:16 floor very shortly after 308 am the FSG information that you were writing on the wall in the lobby was coming to you by control information forms or perhaps
00:09:28 control information forms or perhaps other pieces of paper it does mean that however the first picture you showed me so somehow I haven't holding a piece of paper yes I believe I I have a strong
00:09:45 paper yes I believe I I have a strong recollection yes of obtaining the information that existed on the on the forward information board at the beginning of me commencing fsj so that
00:09:57 beginning of me commencing fsj so that there would be no come there would be so we would have a clear and concise understanding of the FSG we were dealing with so if that is by means of a piece of paper but my memory suggests
00:10:11 of paper but my memory suggests something either I struggle to remember but what I am certain on and I'm certain that I collated that information first right exactly
00:10:23 right exactly yes I disagree thank you going there leads to a question let me just try to follow it up if you could just then go
00:10:35 follow it up if you could just then go back to the white version of the wall which is MIT triple zero five seven seven four
00:10:49 you you see that the first flat number that you write on the middle list which you told us yesterday was your first list it was yeah appears to be 2:05 followed by 95 and
00:11:06 appears to be 2:05 followed by 95 and then 74 yeah and you told us that you wrote them in downwards order do you have a recollection of whether 205 was actually the first flat you rate up
00:11:19 actually the first flat you rate up there or or did that come later slightly later than the very first inscription
00:11:40 I believe that they were the first my recollection is that I started at the top right but my what I would but I
00:11:55 top right but my what I would but I don't know if I had received some slips or some numbers prior to Clayton the information off the edge you can of the forward information board meal so it's
00:12:07 forward information board meal so it's feasible that I might have received some numbers and I've written them up and then yeah okay so I do I do and then
00:12:18 then yeah okay so I do I do and then I've written up what has been written on the board information but yeah my memory from memory I thought I asked Charlie crewmates better be to go and get the
00:12:30 crewmates better be to go and get the information from the board information board but it you would have to ask crew had your best if he did that okay what
00:12:45 had your best if he did that okay what I'm really trying to drive out is just for whether to Oh flat 205 that information came from the piece of paper you brought down from the bridgehead you say or whether it came from up control information for being brought to you
00:12:56 information for being brought to you from outside it maybe can't remember but but I seem to recall the numbers on the forward information board I thought
00:13:07 forward information board I thought there was lower numbers for memory I thought they were lower numbers on the forward information board and looking through this list I can see that slightly later but number nines there
00:13:21 slightly later but number nines there yes just a further down yes and that's that's kind of bringing back a memory that actually I must have maybe I received some slips first maybe obviously some numbers first and then
00:13:33 obviously some numbers first and then the information that I collected from the forward information board then went on after that right right okay that's
00:13:44 on after that right right okay that's very helpful sorry I can't shed more light I know and it would be I think I'm fair of me to to keep pressing you but thank you that's very helpful just one more question
00:13:57 very helpful just one more question let's have one more question I put you an envelope I put to your list of numbers I called it an overlay you called it a list hmm if those numbers weren't on an
00:14:11 hmm if those numbers weren't on an envelope or on a piece of a4 paper but not on a control information form yeah we just posit that to you is that something that triggers a recollection
00:14:22 something that triggers a recollection what has triggered a recollection obviously I've I go away and don't sleep very much when you attended an inquiry is the I do recall being narrated
00:14:34 is the I do recall being narrated numbers but I couldn't tell you what the numbers were so I do recall someone saying telling me a list of numbers right but I can't I can't give you a
00:14:45 right but I can't I can't give you a specific on it so it's feasible that somebody read out and say and and who may have told me some a list of numbers and I've written them up and then made
00:14:56 and I've written them up and then made sure that that is communicated to the bridgehead but I I can't I can't recall a specific all the pieces of paper you
00:15:07 a specific all the pieces of paper you used as evidence yesterday no and I don't recall no identifying the sadness stuff no okay all right I know it's feasibly someone
00:15:19 all right I know it's feasibly someone verbally trying gave me some numbers and I wrote it up it's all of my handwriting nobody so up until people from dinner arrived
00:15:30 until people from dinner arrived it's my writing so if the kick if the information that you have on evidence relates to the wall then it's feasible that that might have been trying to vote
00:15:41 that that might have been trying to vote verbally as well yes I see and do you remember whether the person who was giving you little reading up a list of numbers he was a crew manager or I mean
00:15:52 numbers he was a crew manager or I mean this is a very fresh memory okay okay who says a fresh memory well it's having discussed it yesterday and go away and you think about it and so I know I can't add any great specific
00:16:06 so I know I can't add any great specific on it but at least just something that has come to me okay well came to you overnight you did it yeah did anything else come to you overnight
00:16:17 overnight no like you know that's the thing that I was racking my brain for yeah okay that's something how I was receiving information is I was quite surprised by the whole recollection of the forward
00:16:29 the whole recollection of the forward information board to be honest I thought that was very clear on my mind and it's not until you see a picture and it's not so yes okay okay well that's very helpful thank you can I then turn to a
00:16:42 helpful thank you can I then turn to a different topic which is the bridgehead moving to the ground floor we discussed a bit about but you you say in your statement on page 13 we can just look at
00:16:53 statement on page 13 we can just look at it
00:16:53 it in the fourth paragraph that at approximately 3:45 a.m. the bridgehead was moved down to the ground floor
00:17:04 was moved down to the ground floor because there was a concern about the structure of the building now
00:17:12 did somebody tell you that there was a concern about the structure of the building I don't know I think we it's fair to say that the time that I've
00:17:24 fair to say that the time that I've attached to my statement is not that accurate now so there was a point in which we were informed by an amazing
00:17:39 which we were informed by an amazing before this it may have been around the same time but there had been a concern that the structure of the building was in question and I recall them telling
00:17:51 in question and I recall them telling all of the BI wearers in the foyer to move back and I believe they were being moved back to the community room and I recalled it because I have a distinct
00:18:02 recalled it because I have a distinct memory of not having my helmet thinking given my arm it's a little go and now the question of the building the structure the villains come into question yes did you hear this from this
00:18:14 question yes did you hear this from this question of the structure of the building it would be inaccurate for me it would be a guess it was just somebody within it was an officer within the foyer right and you think that was about
00:18:25 foyer right and you think that was about the same same time as the bridgehead has moved down regardless of the action time
00:18:34 I think it might have been before that I'm very skewed on Oh as this is as we progressed yesterday my timings have become more skewed
00:18:45 become more skewed now going back to something you drew our attention to the small name which is the next paragraph in your statement where you told Justin a burn and Alex decent all been to set up the entry control
00:18:57 all been to set up the entry control boards the glass wall opposite you go on to say by this point there were a lot of F s G's written on my wall but I thought it would be a good place to position the bridgehead so we could communicate
00:19:09 bridgehead so we could communicate directly and you go on then to say that in the next paragraph and I'm summarizing it that Gareth Cooke and Richard Welsh impact gold gold bond or
00:19:21 Richard Welsh impact gold gold bond or Goulbourne came down and instructed the bridgehead to position by the glass wall but on the stairway side does that mean that that would be on the other side of
00:19:33 that that would be on the other side of the glass wall okay as you go on to say this made a sense to me as again has created another barrier between the FSG and the bridgehead um my question is
00:19:44 and the bridgehead um my question is were you with your concern that FSG information wouldn't get through if the bridgehead was on the other side of the glass from you know my concern is that
00:19:56 glass from you know my concern is that my concern was that we create in another physical obstacle for clear communication in in our line of business
00:20:08 communication in in our line of business communications key so you do everything you can to have clear lines communication and we'd already been faced a lot of challenges throughout the evening with the dynamic of the incident
00:20:19 evening with the dynamic of the incident and the speed in which it was progressing and the number of personnel that we were using and deciphering information from those people from
00:20:31 information from those people from casualties it didn't make any sense to create another obstacle did you express your concerns or your thoughts to any of those officers yeah so I said why are you setting up
00:20:42 so I said why are you setting up underneath the staircase do you remember who said that - I said it I stood in the doorway next to Garrity cook and I called it - in adviced voice why are you
00:20:53 called it - in adviced voice why are you setting up front of underneath this Decker night what does he say I think an ulcer right what do you think he heard you
00:21:03 you I've got a pretty clear voice okay do you know why he decided to but he didn't didn't answer you do you know why he did
00:21:15 didn't answer you do you know why he did not see who whoever it was he's bait - I believe that the officers within the bridgehead would have a reasoning for
00:21:27 bridgehead would have a reasoning for their action you'd have to ask the Bridget the officer in charge of the pigeon what now in the next paragraph you say watch manager Watson and I carry on as we did before but with him now
00:21:38 on as we did before but with him now positioned in the foyer he continued to transfer information from me to the bridgehead just saying I've got a picture in mind by where is he located when you carried on as before was he
00:21:51 when you carried on as before was he busy your side of the glass wall or the other side of the block correct and what did he do did he go in and out of the door coming back and forth from recollection might my task became busier
00:22:04 recollection might my task became busier and busier so with the cross checking on the wall so he would come he would come essentially as a run between me and the
00:22:15 essentially as a run between me and the and the door yes so it was a small distance it just meant I could focus all of my attention on the information against the wall okay and were you shouting to him as you had been before I didn't I mean we had clear lines of
00:22:28 didn't I mean we had clear lines of communication he was coming directly to me to my side I would talk to him about the numbers that we were we were now getting we were getting duplicate we were getting duplicates and we were
00:22:39 were getting duplicates and we were getting a lot of a lot of confusing information as I mentioned yesterday it was it wasn't it wasn't making we've become
00:22:49 become been more of a challenge to understand the information we were getting in was he still writing the information you were giving him on pieces of paper and they was yes Cruz he was yes they came
00:23:00 they was yes Cruz he was yes they came with say he where would he write it where was he standing when he wrote versus what where was he standing when he wrote down the pieces of paper I mean generally here right and what would he
00:23:12 generally here right and what would he do what he goat through the door to the waiting crews or or something different don't believe he went through the door but you I mean I assume you've spoken to
00:23:23 but you I mean I assume you've spoken to for Watson so he'd have a more accurate description as to what he did at that point right I'm just want to get your recollection that my recollection is that he didn't that he went from me at the wall to the
00:23:35 that he went from me at the wall to the direction of the door I never saw him go through that door right okay did you see him give the information to anybody on the other side of the door by the stair in the same way as I answered yesterday
00:23:47 in the same way as I answered yesterday he took the information he went to the point in which the bridgehead was situated I didn't see a physical transaction of information okay it may help just to refer to an exhibit
00:23:58 it may help just to refer to an exhibit of yours just said we've got a plan of the ground floor in mind so we own exactly what we're talking about if you could please be sharing your forth exhibit which is a meaty triple zero one three zero nine three
00:24:16 now we it's a very full or information-rich diagram you are putting
00:24:27 information-rich diagram you are putting up your FSG on the wall on the left of the main entrance there and then you have second phase you put in the middle much manager Watson towards the top of
00:24:40 much manager Watson towards the top of the towards the top of the picture near but I think underneath the mezzanine is that where he was standing during the second phase when the bridge head came down to the ground floor I mean that is
00:24:54 down to the ground floor I mean that is the area that he located himself he was standing in various places okay and can you just point out for us where the glass the door through the glass wall is where you can see if you just move
00:25:09 where you can see if you just move that's it yeah there okay
00:25:15 so you say and then you put the stairs there yes so as you went as you went through the glass door I mean I appreciate you might not be to scale but
00:25:28 appreciate you might not be to scale but as you go through this the glass door immediately to your right there was a little there was a little walkway virtu or not a walkway there was a space between the stairs and the glass wall
00:25:39 between the stairs and the glass wall yes
00:25:40 yes parallel to the stairs and then you had a staircase that went up and then it double backed on itself and then it kind of dogleg around to the left and then that was the mezzanine and then the door
00:25:52 that was the mezzanine and then the door where I've written doors top left-hand corner that was the door that went through to what I believed to be the original bridgehead okay did you see how
00:26:03 original bridgehead okay did you see how the information about FSG was getting to be a where's as being put in the hands of BA where's my understanding wants to pull Watson and I continued in the same
00:26:16 pull Watson and I continued in the same same method that we've been using when he had been situated on the mezzanine level so I would I would give him and the the number the floor and the number
00:26:29 the the number the floor and the number of people involved he would wipe that down and he would hand that to the bridgehead yeah yeah um now we've had some evidence and I'll share to you and
00:26:41 some evidence and I'll share to you and that FSG information had been recorded on the wall hmm when the bridgehead was on the third floor from about 220 to about 308 a.m. and that information was
00:26:57 about 308 a.m. and that information was then brought down to the ground floor let me start by just showing you a picture can I ask you to be showing em et triple zero one five six to five
00:27:15 now that's a photograph of the FSG that Louisa the silver watch manager to silver had recorded as she was getting it on the third floor when the bridge
00:27:30 it on the third floor when the bridge head was there as I said okay and that photograph was taken when the bridge head was moving or about to move down to the ground floor and you can see an officer coming down from the third floor there on the right of the picture my
00:27:42 there on the right of the picture my question is were you aware that FSG information had been recorded at the bridgehead on the third floor and then brought down to the ground floor by a
00:27:53 brought down to the ground floor by a photograph in order to be written up
00:28:04 so from the moment I transferred we were transferred myself and bought some a transferee advice of our guidance information but there's a lot of numbers
00:28:16 information but there's a lot of numbers there and that picture is that the lights are the information I transferred so obviously of course you would have to have asked the reason to silver but do
00:28:28 have asked the reason to silver but do the numbers that are written on the wall there correlates do they correlate with the numbers that I've written on the wall downstairs in if my FSG because if
00:28:39 wall downstairs in if my FSG because if something that would suggest to me that that's information got back from crews the fact that is used it's feasible that
00:28:51 the fact that is used it's feasible that that's the information I had been transferring originally well let me ask you did anybody come to you while you were writing or continuing to write
00:29:04 were writing or continuing to write whether before or after Pete Wolfington arrived whether or not and showed you a photograph on our phone of FSG information that they brought down from
00:29:15 information that they brought down from this that we call a photograph now right do you recall seeing any other kind of document which recorded the information captured on the wall on the third floor
00:29:27 captured on the wall on the third floor being brought to you to inscribe on the wall on the ground floor when the bridge had moved down
00:29:36 don't know no I don't know okay but the as I've just well hopefully made clear the numbers that are listed the circled numbers that are on there it look
00:29:49 numbers that are on there it look familiar to the numbers that were on my wall but the FSG wall okay did do you remember well let's put them let's let's see if we can I don't spend hours doing an oral audit to know
00:30:02 spend hours doing an oral audit to know with you there's no Rob for obvious reasons but let's see putting them together we're there any particular numbers on to a third floor wall correlate or reconcile with anything you
00:30:14 correlate or reconcile with anything you wrote on your yeah I'm not gonna go through the list one by one but there's no anything that stands out to you well 205 and 204 205 to the first one it's the highest point that I we can assume
00:30:26 the highest point that I we can assume was reached because it's got Houston attached to it and that's the first number on the FSG wall the fact that there was a crew at 205 I would you'd
00:30:38 there was a crew at 205 I would you'd have to ask the crew but I would imagine they probably went to two I four at the same time well that may be but from they all recollection and your knowledge
00:30:49 all recollection and your knowledge looking at the information that was recorded on the third floor does that trigger a recollection as to anything you wrote on the wall on the ground floor I think you'd agree we can see the
00:31:00 floor I think you'd agree we can see the numbers that have been transferred from the FSG wall and the numbers that have been recorded on the third floor I think we can agree that the circled numbers are on the FSG wall so two oh five two
00:31:13 are on the FSG wall so two oh five two oh four one eight two one is that 6 2 or 5 2 1 3 3 1 2 2 there's a 95 there which
00:31:26 5 2 1 3 3 1 2 2 there's a 95 there which is my second number I think you'd agree that all the circled numbers are actually on the fire Survival Guide Talk yes and we can see that and we clear that exercise what I'm really asking you is whether looking at them and anything
00:31:39 is whether looking at them and anything actually triggers a recollection mind up from the night itself as to how as to any of the information you wrote up on the wall yourself with the
00:31:52 up on the wall yourself with the recollection I have is that I transferred information of numbers for their fire survival guidance and looking at this evidence it clearly has been
00:32:04 at this evidence it clearly has been recorded on the third floor that okay now
00:32:12 can I just ask you something moving ahead to your contemporaneous note an on page two of contemporaneous note you say
00:32:24 page two of contemporaneous note you say in the paragraph about halfway down which starts myself and the other watch manager you send the second sentence that we continue to operate the system
00:32:35 that we continue to operate the system where the FOIA had become heavily congested with firefighters waiting to be committed and the communication of FSG information was not getting used in the same way as it had been come let us
00:32:50 the same way as it had been come let us ask you about what you mean there when you say it wasn't getting used in the same way as it had been what do you what do you mean so I was providing the
00:33:02 do you mean so I was providing the numbers to watch manager what sir
00:33:11 and he and continued to write up ba as I spoke about yesterday but then he he instructed me to stop right in ba
00:33:23 instructed me to stop right in ba because the be a crude what the be a right fire fight weren't being committed on receipt of that information right I raised this myself and Pete wolf and and
00:33:42 raised this myself and Pete wolf and and had a discussion about this at that point okay that was it sorry that was that was at the same time yesterday we referenced control information forms going directly
00:33:54 control information forms going directly through to the yes to the bridgehead under the mezzanine yes it was the same same flavor it's the same coincides at the same time okay well we're going to come back to that in the moment you go on to say that the information that we were providing the bridgehead did not
00:34:06 were providing the bridgehead did not appear to be acted on by a judge head and the borough commanders their filters are the communication between myself and FSG as FSG and the free trade was breaking down who would the borough
00:34:17 breaking down who would the borough commanders you're referring to their group manager Richard Welch and he also had another bar commander with him and I don't know what his task was but that was group manager Pat Golborne right and
00:34:31 what was this breakdown that you refer to evident to you as soon as the bridge had moved down to the ground floor or did it develop at a later point
00:34:45 so just breakdown in communication did you see it as soon as the bridge had moved down to the ground floor or did it become evident to you as a later point
00:34:56 become evident to you as a later point it became evident once once the crew I
00:35:03 suggested the crew set up as I've mentioned and then they were instructed by the the officers at the bridgehead to move the entry control board through the door and under the mezzanine stairs that
00:35:15 door and under the mezzanine stairs that communication started to bite down then right did you raise your concerns about that breakdown in communication with anybody yes who who's that I raised it
00:35:26 anybody yes who who's that I raised it with Pete wolf endur'd myself and Paul Watson had a discussion about it and I raised it with very soon after amazingly
00:35:39 raised it with very soon after amazingly the group manager watch right did you have a conversation with watch manager O'Keefe when the bridgehead came down to the ground floor I did what would be on
00:35:51 the ground floor I did what would be on over to the core content of the conversation okay didn't did he express any surprise to you that you were operating an FSG system of collation that he didn't know
00:36:03 system of collation that he didn't know anything about no okay he has a recollection that you indicated to him
00:36:15 recollection that you indicated to him that there would be mass casualties and that in his words of what you said the whole thing is gone that's what he remembers you saying to him can you
00:36:27 remembers you saying to him can you comment I don't recall saying that okay I would have made reference to the number of casualties and that would have been based on the information I was gathering rights but I wouldn't have I
00:36:38 gathering rights but I wouldn't have I don't recall saying the whole thing he's gone
00:36:42 can I then take you to page 14 of your statement in the second paragraph where you say at some point well this was going on and that's a reference to a
00:36:53 going on and that's a reference to a steady flow of of casualties but and when the bridgehead was on the ground floor you say I was joined by station manager Pete Wolfe endure and he was sent in to assist he asked me how are
00:37:05 sent in to assist he asked me how are you doing this Glenn that's right then and I explained the system we had in place to which he replied well let's stick with it acknowledging if it's working we'll keep using it again
00:37:20 working we'll keep using it again roughly do you know what time this was
00:37:26 my recollection is it was roughly the same time it was around about the same time as the bridge had been brought down to the ground okay maybe slightly before slightly before York CCTV would say okay now we
00:37:40 before York CCTV would say okay now we know from the short incident log that Pete Walter didn't actually arrived at the scene at 2 1202 1258 and just for our references I want to show to you it's page 13 of the short incident log
00:37:52 it's page 13 of the short incident log and and and he says in his statement that when he entered the building and spoke to you and and watch manager Watson the bridge head had been moved
00:38:03 Watson the bridge head had been moved down from the third floor because the atrium was the only area not full of smoke now do you remember that do you remember that the reason for the move down was that that was the only area not
00:38:15 down was that that was the only area not full of smoke I I don't know the reasoning for the moving down of course I was in that I was in the ancient for the entire entirety of the incident the idea when
00:38:26 entirety of the incident the idea when people from done turned up and you had the discussion for he asks you how you doing this Glynn and you explain the system did you ask him to do anything
00:38:39 it doesn't generally work like that he's a senior can officer it doesn't generally work by direct him no he he's there to assist me and part
00:38:50 no he he's there to assist me and part of his role would be to oversee that I'm I'm working to his highest and as I can so it wouldn't be for me to tell him what to do it would be for him to make a
00:39:01 what to do it would be for him to make a decision and as to the effectiveness of the work I'm doing okay and what did he do what did he what job did he start to do he asked me what I was doing how I
00:39:13 do he asked me what I was doing how I was doing it how I was transferring the placated the information where I was getting the information from and we had a discussion around I used the word pattern but it wasn't
00:39:27 I used the word pattern but it wasn't patterned he was saying is there any you know is there any any sense to it is there any system and to which point I said no I'm just doing it as they come
00:39:38 said no I'm just doing it as they come but he said okay let's keep going best you say let's sit with it yeah and what did he do so he he he did like a couple
00:39:52 did he do so he he he did like a couple of times on the wall and transfer information but then he went he said use you stay on the wall but working with Paul and then he was Lee I believe he
00:40:06 Paul and then he was Lee I believe he was the icing with the Bridgette so he wasn't by the wall next to you constantly after here I know certainly no idea and I believe he had a clear line of communication with the command
00:40:17 line of communication with the command unit but you would have to ask him down well I was going to ask you okay he says in his statement they and I'll just put
00:40:29 in his statement they and I'll just put to you what he says in his statement and obviously would have to explore that with with him when he comes if he comes and that is that he said that you told him that you had a process in place in
00:40:42 him that you had a process in place in which you
00:40:44 which you would receive information by radio from the command unit and that would then be written on a piece of paper and handed to watch manager Watson so he his
00:40:56 to watch manager Watson so he his recollection is that the information in you were getting when he arrived was coming to you by radio from the command unit that may be his recollection but that's not what I was doing right so is
00:41:09 that's not what I was doing right so is your recollection that at no stage did you get FSG information by radio we were receiving FSG information by radio but that was later underneath and as I mentioned yesterday that was when we
00:41:21 mentioned yesterday that was when we that was once point pete wolfe ndon had joined me yes it seemed that he had a clear line of communication with the command unit there was facilitating fire
00:41:32 command unit there was facilitating fire Survival Guide and as you said yesterday and again this morning it wasn't you speaking to the command unit but whenever there was radio communication it was people some of them yes that's right is it correct ok and when he got
00:41:44 right is it correct ok and when he got information when he arrived and got information by radio from the command unit how did he communicate that how did that information get onto the wall he verbally told me and I write it on the
00:41:55 verbally told me and I write it on the wall right did he sometimes write when he wrote on the wall was he getting that information for the command unit or from from me from pieces of paper when he first joined me we were still receiving
00:42:09 first joined me we were still receiving out the information on information control forms he was using the information from the information control form by the point in which I was scribing on the wall from radio
00:42:22 scribing on the wall from radio communication that was when and Pete whorfin was speaking on the radio and I was transferring that information onto the wall right okay
00:42:32 and at that time when he was getting information by radio and you ascribing it onto the wall we were you also getting information continuing to get information of our control information forms all had that flow stopped I do
00:42:47 forms all had that flow stopped I do recall that flow slowing I would would be inaccurate to say stopped but certainly wasn't as much yes I see do you recall speaking to a station
00:42:58 do you recall speaking to a station manager Eagan at that point I spoke to a station manager of which I don't know his name
00:43:04 his name and I may have in my statement I refer to Mick my Holland but it may not have been Mick Mulholland I spoke to our most
00:43:15 been Mick Mulholland I spoke to our most mistaken him for someone else as feasible I could have spoken to a station officer even though she made you do now do you remember anybody taking or a station manager taking a photograph of your wall at this stage once the bridge
00:43:28 your wall at this stage once the bridge had come down do you recall being asked by a station manager what your tick meant the wall tick
00:43:44 [Music] I do yeah I do recall being asked what the tick meant do you remember the root the rank of the person who asked you
00:43:56 the rank of the person who asked you know what did you tell them
00:44:06 I think I can't recall the exact words but it would have been it would have been that exactly as I explained to you yesterday okay initially it was that I was trying to
00:44:19 initially it was that I was trying to correlate the be iku reaching that floor flat said but a pipe and I would him I would have sold him it's inaccurate
00:44:33 would have sold him it's inaccurate didn't work right do you have a recollection of telling of him telling you that he was on channel 3
00:44:45 you that he was on channel 3
00:44:45 an impending contact with the command unit through that channel I don't have a recollection he may have if if he'd come from the command unit it's feasible you
00:44:57 from the command unit it's feasible you would have told me that can I turn to a slightly different topic on page 14 of your statement you say in the forth and
00:45:08 your statement you say in the forth and paragraph down that a station manager from the ort who I do not know came in from the corridor and stated firefighters are not being committed past the 10th floor and that we were
00:45:20 past the 10th floor and that we were facing a significant loss you go on to say this was difficult for me to hear and I expressed my dissatisfaction on hearing this I asked him what am I meant to do
00:45:30 to do he replied keep recording keep recording all of it I did not question this as I just wanted to carry on doing my job and I know it's difficult but have you had recollection of what time this was oh
00:45:45 yes the recollection is that it was the bridgehead was on the ground floor the breach had have been moved underneath the stairs on the mezzanine the
00:45:56 the stairs on the mezzanine the reference to the LRT is maybe inaccurate because it was with reference to the tab arts that as I said to the detective
00:46:09 arts that as I said to the detective when this was being written we were different color tab arts for different roles and I seem to recall the person I was speaking to which way in at a bar
00:46:20 was speaking to which way in at a bar which is why I thought it was making my own debates feasibly it wasn't okay well we may find that happen but what is the ort tab art what color is it
00:46:32 ort tab art what color is it they spread is it completely rather a Zagat checkers think it Scott okay all right
00:46:47 just to try to fix it in terms of timing in the paragraph before you say that approximately 20 minutes 15 to 20 minutes after the bridgehead was moved down I spoke to a woman who had severe
00:46:59 down I spoke to a woman who had severe burns to both her feet she stated she walked out herself from the sixteenth floor before being taken out of the tower and then you say shortly after you had this discussion with the ort
00:47:10 had this discussion with the ort now if the bridgehead was moved down at about three ten and twenty fifteen to twenty minutes after that you had if you had the discussion with the woman from the sixteenth floor so three thirty or
00:47:24 the sixteenth floor so three thirty or so would that help you with the timing of your discussion with the station manager unfortunately it wouldn't because as this process has gone on as I said beginning today the times are
00:47:36 said beginning today the times are becoming more and more skewed so no roads help me okay
00:47:45 when you were told firefighters are not being committed past the 10th floor did you ask the station manager why crews weren't being committed above the 10th floor yes and what were you told there
00:48:00 floor yes and what were you told there was some confusion as to this around this information myself and people often that had a conversation there was some confusion big Wolfington went to inquire us to the how accurate this information
00:48:15 us to the how accurate this information was right but did you speak to the station manager did you ask the station manager why crews weren't be committed above the 10th floor yourself oh no I
00:48:28 above the 10th floor yourself oh no I spoke to people from the right okay say you heard him say that firefighters aren't been committed past the 10th floor people from that had the discussion with him as to why and reported that back to you is is that how
00:48:40 reported that back to you is is that how it went
00:48:41 it went I believe Pete Wolfington spoke to him yeah okay and what was the reason given to Pete Wolfington do you know about why crews weren't being committed above the
00:48:52 crews weren't being committed above the 10th floor I wasn't given a reason right did you know what the conditions were like inside the tower when this decision was made not to commit crews above the 10th floor only for my own personal
00:49:06 collation of information from va crews coming out I was trying to paint a clearer picture in my own mind because
00:49:17 clearer picture in my own mind because of course that's that's what we do as officers we they would have already briefed the bridgehead I was remote from the bridgehead so the only way I could ascertain what the what the conditions
00:49:31 ascertain what the what the conditions were within the building was if I asked them myself yes it's not information that I was yeah it was I had no requirement to share that it was my own personal information from the information you were getting
00:49:42 from the information you were getting from those people you spoke to did that conflict with or agree with what the station manager had said about crews not being committed above the 10th floor I have now
00:49:52 have now the accuracy of the 10th law was unclear to me but it can it but the information I've been getting from firefighters referencing the congestion the
00:50:05 referencing the congestion the deteriorating conditions the heat and the and the challenges that they faced I think there was a fair assumption that things were getting quite difficult in
00:50:16 things were getting quite difficult in there
00:50:16 there right okay did you have any thoughts at that time about what advice was being given to residents still in the building in the light of that was what you heard
00:50:27 in the light of that was what you heard about crews not being committed above the 10th floor
00:50:37 this information stumped me stopped me in my tracks I struggled for a split second with this information hence the reason I shared it with people from them
00:50:49 reason I shared it with people from them so a lot of things passed through my mind I'm sure that that was one of the right things it's not as I as I mentioned to you yesterday the thoughts that pass through our mind are not
00:51:00 that pass through our mind are not conscious thoughts though instinct this thoughts and how we initiative how we instinctively respond to stuff so I'm sure that that was one of the thoughts that may have passed in my mind right
00:51:11 that may have passed in my mind right but it's not conscious thought that I would seek an answer for
00:51:20 Pete wolf ndon in his witness statement and again as I say we'll need to explore this says that during the discussion he had with Gravano Joe Welch he thought
00:51:33 had with Gravano Joe Welch he thought that there was some miscommunication the bridgehead because the bridgehead were telling crews to fight the fire whereas the FSG information was concentrated on
00:51:44 the FSG information was concentrated on finding people now can you comment on on that so can you repeat that yes he says Kurt during his discussion with group manager Welch which he describes he took
00:51:58 manager Welch which he describes he took he took away the idea that there was a miscommunication because the BCB were telling crews to fight the fire whereas the FSG watch managers which would include you were trying to find people
00:52:10 include you were trying to find people does that make sense to you it does make sense but I'm not sure that's in a very clear context I think that what had some
00:52:23 clear context I think that what had some clarity in our mindset having been remote for such a long time we we were still of the opinion that we were carrying out search and rescue yes and
00:52:36 carrying out search and rescue yes and there was briefings taking place to fight fire which didn't marry up to what we thought the aim was right so do you
00:52:47 we thought the aim was right so do you remember a conflict or miss comedic discovering that there was a miscommunication about what the strategy was I do yes how was that was was that resolved that conflict all that
00:52:58 resolved that conflict all that miscommunication I can't answer for the communication that took place between Pete war thunder and Google a to Welch right he'll only speak for myself now
00:53:10 right he'll only speak for myself now turning onto page 15 of your statement in the third paragraph you describe there a a verbal conflict and you say between the hours of 4:00 a.m. and 4:30
00:53:21 between the hours of 4:00 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. a verbal conflict took place between group manager Welch and group manager Watson I don't know what was said that it was enough to upset watch manager Watson it transpired that there was FSG information
00:53:32 was FSG information being shared directly to the group manager without my knowledge I approach group manager Welsh to try to ascertain what was going on and where this information was coming from he did not acknowledge me so I assertively asked him to come to the FSG wall to have a
00:53:44 him to come to the FSG wall to have a look to see if our information corresponded
00:53:48 just pausing there when you say that there was a verbal conflict and it transpired that there was FSG information being shared directly to the
00:53:59 information being shared directly to the group manager without your knowledge what did you yourself hear about those things the information via FS cheap the
00:54:12 things the information via FS cheap the information be shared with the bridgehead that refers to me seeing the control information forms being handed directly to the bridgehead when you say
00:54:25 directly to the bridgehead when you say a verbal conflict took place and you don't know what was said how do you know a verbal conflict took place between group manager war Welch and group manager Watson and station watch manager
00:54:36 manager Watson and station watch manager Watson how do you know because that was discussed that was discussed by watch manager what's in them station manager whorfin done in my presence right I can't give you the
00:54:48 presence right I can't give you the detail of that information
00:54:53 and do you know what the conflict was you would have to ask what's major what sir I think that when I write this statement I think conflicts probably a
00:55:06 statement I think conflicts probably a bit of a strong language right disagreement or delight healthy discussion healthy discussions in right way okay and you say as I've read to you
00:55:17 way okay and you say as I've read to you that you went to group manager Welch to try to ascertain what was going on and where the and where this information was coming from did you find out how this
00:55:29 coming from did you find out how this system of direct and FSG information going to group manager Welch had to have had come about I didn't know okay dude group manager well to say anything to
00:55:40 group manager well to say anything to you about this system FSG information going directly to him and bypassing you right
00:55:47 right and as I've shown you you asked him to look at your wall and the list you were working from and you say in the third
00:56:01 working from and you say in the third sentence from the end I cannot remember which floor but he only asked at all the FSG calls going up to this floor that's
00:56:13 FSG calls going up to this floor that's correct
00:56:13 correct do you mean by that that there was there was a particular floor he pointed out and said I only want FSG information up to that floor mmm no during the verbal
00:56:24 to that floor mmm no during the verbal discussion with my cell phone for Watson it became apparent and I've seen it written on the wall yesterday yes and I took note of it this says nothing about 15th okay should we look at that that's
00:56:37 15th okay should we look at that that's five seven seven four again see if we can find nothing above the 15th
00:56:45 now we can get a fuller picture of the wall by looking at a different document but what what are you referring to it's
00:56:56 but what what are you referring to it's there somewhere you think nothing about the 15th this is a bigger wall there is the goal yeah I'm in the bigger if we can go to any T one five eight one five
00:57:09 that's the that's the complete photograph of the wall oh that's not as legislate can you see anything on that
00:57:37 I definitely saw that well what we have on this wall is if you pan out above ten you d be able a turn s DBA ya trying to ask you about in a moment but termcat
00:57:50 ask you about in a moment but termcat you mentioned nothing about you mentioned and writing some but you mentioned there being something on this wall about nothing hanging above the 15th I'm not sure I can see that no
00:58:01 15th I'm not sure I can see that no nevertheless I definitely saw it never done just there because I've written it here right so in the evidence that you provided me yesterday there will be something that says nothing about 2:15
00:58:18 do you remember getting information that crews were not what all crews was struggling to get above the 15th floor as you mentioned 15th just now
00:58:29 as you mentioned 15th just now so I remember crews struggling yes but to get above the 15th floor no there was no specifics there was that they were
00:58:41 no specifics there was that they were right nobody came down and said that they were particularly struggling to get about the 15th they were coming down and they were exhausted some of them could
00:58:53 they were exhausted some of them could barely articulate themselves they push themselves too far far beyond what we expect from human beings so there were
00:59:05 expect from human beings so there were no specific points about the 15th they were struggling they were struggling . right
00:59:16 can I just put something to you that
00:59:21 senior operations manager Joe Smith who was in the control room from about to 15 or so said in her evidence and and that wasn't I'm summarizing it that she had
00:59:35 wasn't I'm summarizing it that she had heard at around that time and up to say 342 to 45 to 50 that crews were having
00:59:46 342 to 45 to 50 that crews were having difficulties getting above the 15th floor I would be able to confirm anything about that da say Fenton says in his statement that crews were
00:59:57 in his statement that crews were struggling to get above the 15th floor at that point in time is that something you heard at that point in time throughout the evening the crews were
01:00:08 throughout the evening the crews were reporting of their challenges can I get back then to the be the white wall as it were that five seven seven four it
01:00:21 were that five seven seven four it doesn't actually matter which we use but this is the clearer one do you know who wrote above ten a DBA below 10s DBA now you don't know who wrote that no wasn't you know a kid right do you know roughly
01:00:35 you know a kid right do you know roughly when that was written do you know rough do you know why that was written it
01:00:46 do you know why that was written it would suggest to me that above the tenth door they're gonna use a DBA and below the tenth floor they're gonna use STP yeah well I think that's what it says but when you left yeah at 4:30 or so
01:00:58 but when you left yeah at 4:30 or so yeah do you remember whether those words and numbers were on the wall or not I don't recall that being there right
01:01:13 now on page 15 going back to it you say the end of this the paragraph we've been looking at when you say that what welch
01:01:28 looking at when you say that what welch only asked for the FSG call all the FSG calls going up to this floor i then said but what about the floors above there are still people out there that are self rescuing he did not answer just walked off you then say I informed station
01:01:41 off you then say I informed station manager Wolfe under this issue who radio the command unit to confirm what FSG calls we had floor by floor and then you go on to say in the third line I
01:01:53 go on to say in the third line I transcribe the information onto the wall a station manager will fund and transmitted using this information I made another list on the wall next to my original list drawing a grid table that we went through systematically now is
01:02:10 we went through systematically now is that the list on the left or the list on the right yes we should have the white wall the heavy yellow wall back up again that's some one five eight one five
01:02:25 we've covered a little bit of this yesterday but I just want to nail it down by reference to your statement so if we can have that up
01:02:42 we looked yesterday at the three lists and the grid on the very far right can you tell us which list you're referring
01:02:54 you tell us which list you're referring to in that paragraph of your statement I've just read to you when you say you made another list next to my original list so can we zoom in to the right-hand
01:03:05 list so can we zoom in to the right-hand side of this person
01:03:14 so
01:03:17 from their collection we had started writing the numbers you see in brackets were said 94 yes it started writing the
01:03:29 were said 94 yes it started writing the numbers there and then I it it occurred to me that actually this would be far clearer if we were to draw a grid so I drew a grid which is there good on the
01:03:41 drew a grid which is there good on the right-hand side right actually says that so when we go back to the lift on the left hand side that's not that list that's a that's a list that you started
01:03:55 that's a that's a list that you started I think you told us yesterday when you moved down to the ground floor the bridgehead move down to the ground floor just continued that was a continuation of receiving the slip yes I see once
01:04:07 of receiving the slip yes I see once once once Pete Wolfen done started receiving information by handheld radio we were on this side underneath ok stim
01:04:21 we were on this side underneath ok stim flak so summarizing it first list is the middle list which you do the second list is the one on the left which is a continuation list which you do with one
01:04:32 continuation list which you do with one or two entries from Pete Wolfram dan taken from slips at bacteria and the third list is the one on the right taken from what people from have got over the radio from cu7 and then shrimp
01:04:43 radio from cu7 and then shrimp transmitted to you and you wrote up correct right [Music]
01:04:52 you you say in your statement at that point I realize my original FSG list was
01:05:03 point I realize my original FSG list was incorrect as there were far more numbers on the second list this clearly show there was a breakdown in communication between the management within the Phi a so are you comparing the right hand list
01:05:14 so are you comparing the right hand list which was small with the left hand list which is longer no the information that was being transmitted there was a lot of information that the command you the
01:05:26 information that the command you the command unit was going floor by floor the ought somebody at the command unit was going floor by floor or an information that was being transmitted it felt like there was more information coming in than what had been listed
01:05:38 coming in than what had been listed initially okay so I was doing my best describe the information that Pete was had passing to me verbally but just it felt like there was a lot more information coming in okay can I get
01:05:51 information coming in okay can I get back to five seven seven six or rather to five seven seven six and just go back to this question of the 15th floor I had not put to you this
01:06:03 15th floor I had not put to you this this document which is actually a better copy of the right hand list as well on the very far right underneath the yellow wires next to the door jamb oh yeah you
01:06:15 wires next to the door jamb oh yeah you can see well can you read that out for us says I 4:30 nothing above the 15th right does it hmm I knew I'd seen it yes is that your
01:06:31 hmm I knew I'd seen it yes is that your writing no
01:06:41 it's hard to tell it it may be big if that was he that was the exact time that
01:06:54 that was he that was the exact time that I had to leave the incident so I can I don't want to say is my writing it looks similar right
01:07:09 do you have a recollection of being of of writing that information on a wall I have a recollection of the information
01:07:20 have a recollection of the information right okay it would be in my nature to make a log of something like that right
01:07:37 [Applause]
01:07:47 now I think I may have asked you this yesterday but can I really forgive me if I just go back to it if you can keep the picture up we've just been looking at
01:07:58 picture up we've just been looking at you told us by way of clarification and I'm very grateful but the right hand list you wrote down as having heard that
01:08:09 list you wrote down as having heard that information transmitted to you by Pete Wilson don't you got it by radio now looking at one of those numbers in that list it says 161 in the middle yeah with
01:08:21 list it says 161 in the middle yeah with 19 on the left and 10 on the right correct would that signify floor 1910 persons it would are you sure you got
01:08:32 persons it would are you sure you got that by radio or was it possible that you might have got that by a control information slip that list that you see there yes you can see the flat numbers
01:08:44 there yes you can see the flat numbers going up in yes in numerical order yes the floor denote the not 18 and 19 denotes the floor yeah and the information that have been transmitted
01:08:56 information that have been transmitted would have been the number of persons right on the line okay that said this information was coming from the command
01:09:07 information was coming from the command unit that was dealing with fsj right and we were going through numerical order we were going through the floor by floor and I ground floor by floor and it may
01:09:22 and I ground floor by floor and it may not have necessarily been fresh information it was just it was just but it was the information that they had at that moment I understand I understand can I just then show you a document that
01:09:33 can I just then show you a document that I I'm sure I did show you yesterday and we made therefore be covering the same ground but if you go to lfb quadruple zero one nine two to page one
01:09:49 this is a yellow version or yellow copy of a control information slip that watch manager Sadler did and we know that
01:10:03 manager Sadler did and we know that because you aren't it with an eleven at the top and it says 161 19th floor ten people yeah and he told us that he
01:10:14 ten people yeah and he told us that he was sending the white versions into the tower via a runner and sending the yellow versions back to the command unit
01:10:25 does that is it possible that the command unit was giving you this information for a second time later in
01:10:39 information for a second time later in the night they'd had earlier in the night I think that if we were to look back at the wall you would see that I've I've detailed this information on the wall which means
01:10:52 this information on the wall which means that I did receive it yeah by the fall of a white controller information form right well if we can just have a look at 7-5 774 again just to finish this point off the full version okay five seven
01:11:08 off the full version okay five seven seven four please
01:11:21 now we have 161 halfway down your first list but no 10p next to it so I'm just
01:11:32 list but no 10p next to it so I'm just wondering whether in light of that you had
01:11:40 you've got the city when you rate 10 P next to 161 on the third list on the right you had that information by radio whether in fact you had it sent to you by control by it by by slip as I said
01:11:53 by control by it by by slip as I said yesterday we did receive duplicates yeah and I think so my first my first receipt of fire survival guidance at 161 may
01:12:04 of fire survival guidance at 161 may have been a control information form that didn't denote the number of people in that boat and maybe the second time it was received it denoted the number of people or maybe the third time it was
01:12:16 people or maybe the third time it was communicated it was via their command unit right okay you say maybe I mean is that your recollection even if a vague one or are you or are you just trying to
01:12:27 one or are you or are you just trying to work out what happened I think that well I can categorically tell you if the numbers are written on the wall then it come then I receive the control information for ya and that has been
01:12:40 information for ya and that has been communicated yeah in the system in which I've repeated if I've mentioned if that information is now listed in the list of the right-hand side that has been
01:12:52 the right-hand side that has been received at the time in which we were correlating the numbers and it looks as if we're creating a list from 15th floor
01:13:03 if we're creating a list from 15th floor upwards to identify the numbers the the people there 15 quarters if you look at the right hand list you'll see it starts at 15 yes I see
01:13:27 and does that relate in any way to the evidence you gave early on your recollection earlier about Cruz not being committed above the 15th floor summon something is something of which we've seen on the wall at 4:30 in line
01:13:45 we've seen on the wall at 4:30 in line today and therefore can you remember even roughly when you started this right-hand list I left the incident ground that the the
01:13:57 I left the incident ground that the the time locking which I left the incident that left this area was I 4:30 it was a short time between that before that yes
01:14:09 short time between that before that yes thank you
01:14:09 thank you I've got one or two more questions for you you can do ask it was to me lieutenant one or two then we must have a break two
01:14:20 one or two then we must have a break two minutes two minutes two minutes we say no I may even try and beat that mr. Williams we know that you left the incident ground at about 4:30 okay
01:14:33 incident ground at about 4:30 okay did you do a handover
01:14:39 I had a brief conversation with people from done
01:14:46 and it was so that it was not necessary to do a handover because we've been working so closely with one other one another so far as your concern is this
01:15:00 another so far as your concern is this right that you left the incident ground there was a physical handover of the control information forms yes for me to him he he had joined me at the point in
01:15:12 him he he had joined me at the point in which we were completing the second list which was on the left of the wall we have been working together in a system that he had decided upon so almost relinquished my plan we went
01:15:28 so almost relinquished my plan we went on to use his idea which was to go through it in Florida yes so the handover we had was a physical handover
01:15:39 handover we had was a physical handover information thank you very much and so far as you're concerned did he continue the work the idea was that he would continue the work that you've been doing up to that point he would he would continue him himself
01:15:50 he would he would continue him himself and Paul Watson would continue from where life where from where I had left mr. Williams thank you very much I've got no further questions we should have
01:16:01 got no further questions we should have a break now mr. chairman it may be sensible just to have a break and not release the witness quite yet just in case there may be things that occur to me yes well this does happen mr. Williams when counsels blocked the
01:16:12 mr. Williams when counsels blocked the end of his questions it's surprising how sometimes more emerge yeah so we will take a break now until 11 o'clock okay and if you'd like to come back at 11
01:16:23 and if you'd like to come back at 11 o'clock we'll see if there any further questions thank you thank you very much please don't talk to her [Music]
01:16:34 good 11 o'clock please
01:16:45 you
01:33:30 but I think mr. Williams is Tony's way thank you
01:33:39 [Music]
01:33:56 we're a pretty to go on certainly necessary absolutely thank you it is necessary mr. chairman mr. Williams thank you for coming back I'd only have a few more questions um first of all can
01:34:08 a few more questions um first of all can I show you a document which is a meaty triple zero one five seven three one now
01:34:20 triple zero one five seven three one now I'll tell you what this is this is an extract from a crew manager battery's notebook and what he says is that he was instructed by watch manager Sadler to go
01:34:33 instructed by watch manager Sadler to go from the carbonic where they were collating FSGS early on to to the bridgehead collect the information from the bridgehead and bring it straight back to him at the carbonic outside the tower I'm
01:34:45 carbonic outside the tower I'm summarizing his evidence but that is what he says and for those who are interested in it it's day 12 at pages 136 to 139 of the transcript now what
01:34:57 136 to 139 of the transcript now what I'm showing you this and because what I want to ask you is whether you have any recollection of seeing a firemen's notebook if I fight as a notebook with a
01:35:08 notebook if I fight as a notebook with a list of numbers on it with ticks on it like like that
01:35:15 I don't recall seeing the notebook but having been looking at the wall over the last day or so I do recognize those numbers in that
01:35:28 I do recognize those numbers in that sequence yes and we can no doubt tie up the numbers to the wall but they all try to that now we can do that but I my simple question is do you does this trigger a recollection in your mind
01:35:42 trigger a recollection in your mind whereby numbers from the bridgehead came to you at an early stage when you started writing you're missed as I said earlier and I do I ever
01:35:54 earlier and I do I ever I have a recollection of someone narrated verbally okay a list of numbers right I think that if this was cross-referenced with the wall in which I was working is feasible that that
01:36:11 I was working is feasible that that could be the list of numbers I'm a firefighter notebook that was transcribed onto the wall okay all right thank you now can I just do one more
01:36:22 thank you now can I just do one more very small exercise could you please first of all at MIT triple zero one five
01:36:33 first of all at MIT triple zero one five eight one five which is the beige version or yellow version of the full picture of the wall which we were looking at yesterday and this morning one five eight one five there it is and
01:36:45 one five eight one five there it is and you can see that in the middle column we just have that blown up three up from the bottom you can see 193 with 22 next
01:36:56 the bottom you can see 193 with 22 next to it 10 P do you see that I don't so that that we're not you wrote what you wrote that there I'm assuming it on the basis of the evidence you give them so far
01:37:12 yes so did you write that up on the wall did you if it's on the wall and it's in that list yet we've received it by a control information now if we go to another picture we can keep that on the left-hand side mr. documents directly if
01:37:24 left-hand side mr. documents directly if we could and go please now 2m et triple zero one five six to five you can scan
01:37:35 zero one five six to five you can scan the list there but you can see this is the list that loser the Silvo right up on the wall on the third floor when the bridgehead was there between about 220 and about 310 308 310 this photograph
01:37:49 and about 310 308 310 this photograph was taken at about 308 so if you look at that list one can scan it in vain does
01:38:00 that list one can scan it in vain does not see we have we haven't been able to see any inscription on that wall for flat 193 I may be wrong but we this
01:38:14 flat 193 I may be wrong but we this isn't your writing so you would be in no better position than we would if we're right and there is no 193 on that wall on the third floor does that does that
01:38:28 on the third floor does that does that tell us and can you help with this that that you had information about 193 which you wrote up which did not make it up to the bridgehead so could you zoom in on
01:38:44 the bridgehead so could you zoom in on on the second line where it says 22 could you zoom in on the 1/9 something there well yes correct me if I'm wrong but doesn't that look like a 193 well we
01:38:55 but doesn't that look like a 193 well we can debate that I mean that's a this isn't your writing no and it's easy to Silver's writing I don't have a one-nine-five do I
01:39:11 so you think that's one-nine-five by reason of the fact that you know I think I can't see one-nine-five written on the FSG wall that I was working from well
01:39:23 FSG wall that I was working from well that but I do see a 193 and 22 and the evidence that you would provide you're presenting me says 22 1:9 and there's a
01:39:34 presenting me says 22 1:9 and there's a question around whether that's a 3 or a 5 I would argue that there's it's feasible that could be a 5 yo that's that that's a 3 site in which case how do you explain that Luise the syllabus got 1 9 3 but you
01:39:48 Luise the syllabus got 1 9 3 but you don't
01:39:48 don't sorry 195 but but you don't so we were arguing about the way in which a numbers been written you know I think waiting the correct way to understand that
01:39:59 the correct way to understand that evidence which perhaps this witness can't yes I could point his point is that what looks like one night all we have assumed is one nine five in the right hand picture exactly one nine
01:40:10 right hand picture exactly one nine three which would then correlate with his award I think that's what you're saying
01:40:15 saying I think that in a dynamic situation sir it's feasible that somebody may have not been in the clearest of handwriting yeah and then since I don't have a 1 9 5 but I do have a 193 and if the reason is the
01:40:29 I do have a 193 and if the reason is the silver could be forgiven of miss reading at 5 and a 3 they're very close and similar looking numbers things are easy to answer yes it's not okay well I've
01:40:42 to answer yes it's not okay well I've done my best with we're trying to trace it through I'm doing but you take that any further this Williams can I just say thank you very much I have no further questions for you thank you I just want to say that we're very grateful to you for coming to the inquiry after helping
01:40:53 for coming to the inquiry after helping us with our investigations and and thank you very much thank you yes I'd like to add my thanks as well as you probably realize from the various questions has been put to you understanding the
01:41:04 been put to you understanding the communication of file fire survival guidance information has not been entirely straightforward has been quite challenging for us your evidence has been very helpful I'm very grateful she's ever going to
01:41:15 I'm very grateful she's ever going to give it thank you very much [Music]
01:41:30 yes Wow what's max now mr. chairman what is next or who is next our two firefighters whom mr. Kenya is going to ask some questions I'm going to turn
01:41:41 ask some questions I'm going to turn over the podium to all the lectin such as it is to him in a moment I don't think it's wise to have any more than another any longer than a five-minute
01:41:52 another any longer than a five-minute break
01:41:52 break well it's usually useful to have a very short break yes rearrange the furniture staff are necessary and so yes let's do that before I do can I just say
01:42:03 that before I do can I just say something without a forthcoming witness tomorrow tomorrow being Wednesday we've got programmed in station manager Mulholland yes and then Sharon Darby and they are in
01:42:16 and then Sharon Darby and they are in the afternoon I just want to say something about mr. Mulholland we have his statement but we also have just had disclosed to us on Friday last
01:42:29 just had disclosed to us on Friday last week some 39 exhibits to his statement those cannot be disclosed immediately in readiness for tomorrow because they need to be they need to go through our disclosure process so what I was going
01:42:43 disclosure process so what I was going to propose was that we keep the timetable as it is that I examined him on the material we have and that if there are any questions which arise as a result of the inevitably later
01:42:55 result of the inevitably later disclosure of the exhibits then core participants who have questions from them can put those submit those to the inquiry in writing and we will pursue
01:43:06 inquiry in writing and we will pursue those and get a further statement from him in an organized way yes well it would certainly be a good thing to hear mr. Mulholland evidence tomorrow yes because he's obviously being programmed
01:43:17 because he's obviously being programmed to come and taken off other duties that have you raised this with counsel for the claimant husband's which is why I'm raising it through here with them now in this rather indirect way this is
01:43:29 this rather indirect way this is something that emerged overnight last night and I'm afraid they haven't had time to know you can be in any other forum think you can be criticized for that because the materials comes through yes quite late in the day yes the course you've
01:43:41 in the day yes the course you've proposed sounds to me at first blush to be a sensible value but maybe it would be a good thing if you could just speak to the other two counsel for the court
01:43:52 to the other two counsel for the court participants who are particularly interested in his evidence yes check whether they're content with that yes and if not well we'll see where we go yes over there difficulty will I suppose
01:44:03 yes over there difficulty will I suppose be that they won't know how important or unimportant the thirty nine exhibits are we've taken a preliminary view any advance printed in review about them yeah but they won't know until they see them and say they all they all they'll
01:44:14 them and say they all they all they'll be able to do is reserve that position here suspect but and I'm commending the idea of keeping all the other programs no suggestion C's keep him keep him in the list for tomorrow take his evidence and see whether any further questions
01:44:26 and see whether any further questions can be dealt with in writing exactly if they can say much the better if they can't we'll consider another way of resolving it yes all right I'm gonna leave it with you I'll leave it like that then thank you very much thank you
01:44:39 that then thank you very much thank you so well I'll rise five minutes or least until 20 past 11:00 just for the changes yes thank you very much
01:44:56 you
01:50:45 and please repeat after me I swear by Almighty God I swear by Almighty God that the evidence I shall give shall be the truth the whole truth
01:50:57 give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth good morning yes thank you Mark Astin Oh Donovan
01:51:23 just
01:51:29 my cousin here I'm on I'm on green
01:51:46 [Music] can you hear that Oh No yes we're all live good for better or worse you can now hear me first of all hopefully in
01:51:58 now hear me first of all hopefully in front of you have a blue folder and if you turn if you open that and turn to the first tab hopefully you'll find the statement you provided to the police is that right yes that's correct and behind
01:52:11 that right yes that's correct and behind that hopefully you'll find two exhibits that support that statement is that right correct and finally hopefully as a copy of your contemporaneous note is that right yes and have you read all of
01:52:26 that right yes and have you read all of those documents recently yes and you confirm that the contents of those documents are true yes they were true to my belief at the time of writing there
01:52:38 my belief at the time of writing there is some translation issues from the detective who described it but yeah we'll deal with those have to go through yeah thank you and do you content for those documents
01:52:49 and do you content for those documents to stand as your evidence the inquiry yes I am now I'm not going to go through every line of your statement or contemporaneous note I'm just going to draw out certain topics from your
01:53:00 draw out certain topics from your evidence is that okay that's fine and if my questions aren't clear please say so and I'll rephrase them absolutely now if I could start first of all with basics is it right that you've been a
01:53:11 is it right that you've been a firefighter since October 2003 that's correct yes and what what was your rank in June 2017 I was a temporary watch
01:53:22 in June 2017 I was a temporary watch manager and at the time of the fire you were based at Ealing is that right correct
01:53:27 correct now the first substantive topic I'd like to discuss with you today is training and practical experience and could I ask you for these purposes to turn to page 13 of your statement though you can
01:53:40 13 of your statement though you can either use the hard copy and file or as you'll see they'll come up from the story I write and the screen symposium because highlight it for me yeah okay thank you sir um top paragraph the first
01:53:54 thank you sir um top paragraph the first line you say this following the Lakmal house fire we do have regular training on high-rise buildings first of all what particular training regarding the lessons from lack
01:54:05 training regarding the lessons from lack nor did you receive right so following this incident a publication was released operational news which then links to
01:54:18 operational news which then links to case studies and information and training that we can do is computer-based training this filtered through at the station and then I cascade that information to my watch in
01:54:31 cascade that information to my watch in a training environment so that will then be linked to the brigades high-rise firefighting policy and we are also we've got available to us PowerPoint
01:54:42 we've got available to us PowerPoint presentations which detail high-rise firefighting and facilities in high-rise buildings from your own review of those materials and the training you received
01:54:53 materials and the training you received via the lfp what particular learning points did you take from the lfts experience at lateral house so the the main point they came from latin all house was the possibility of the
01:55:05 house was the possibility of the colander effect and how fire can spread on the external face of the building and have you heard of the fire at Shepherds Court I haven't before this inquiry
01:55:17 Court I haven't before this inquiry this is something I've just picked up from watching other people's evidence can we take from that that you haven't received any training and respect to the particular learning points arising from Shepherds court yes you can that starts
01:55:30 Shepherds court yes you can that starts an outer turning back to your statement you say we do have regular training on high-rise buildings how regular is regular right so we have a borough
01:55:41 regular right so we have a borough training plan or I operate in the borough of ealing there's four fire stations in evening and we have a a training plan which will make sure that we cover relevant topics throughout
01:55:54 that we cover relevant topics throughout the year so within that training plan then high-rise firefighting will come up in the borough training plan I'll put an estimation in as once a month for a theory based and then once a
01:56:07 month for a theory based and then once a month for a practical based session and then we I'll deliver that training in my own way whether I'll use the policy know
01:56:18 own way whether I'll use the policy know a white board to detail what training we're going to give or the computer-based training package as the theory side of it and then on the practical side of it we'll train in the
01:56:31 practical side of it we'll train in the yard or another station or we might do a familiarization on a high-rise within our ground to talk about what facilities are available to us that's useful
01:56:43 are available to us that's useful looking at the particular phenomena the Calandra effect what training do you receive about this the most effective firefighting techniques to apply to deal with that effect so if the training is
01:56:58 with that effect so if the training is very limited I understand that that's your question but to to broaden that what we would be aware of and what's cascaded throughout the watch is covering jets use of aerial appliances
01:57:12 covering jets use of aerial appliances being aware of wind direction being aware of certain dangers on the incident ground light sighting of appliances things like that but the but an answer
01:57:24 things like that but the but an answer to your question the actual training is very limited on and did you get any training that covered the particular risks posed by cladding in the context of high-rise fires answer no what
01:57:38 of high-rise fires answer no what training do you receive in respect of what to do if there's been a breach of compartment ation
01:57:46 again this is limited and it will come down to there's an overview of training where you're taught about how to
01:57:58 where you're taught about how to dynamically risk assess and how to safe systems work but you'll have in place like high-rise firefights in your basement procedures which will have a broad spectrum of what to do if
01:58:10 broad spectrum of what to do if compartment ations breached but there's no particular package or particular training given for breach of compartment Asia and would training cover such
01:58:21 Asia and would training cover such topics as when and how to carry out a partial or total evacuation of a high-rise building no we there is a policy on firefighter emergency and
01:58:33 policy on firefighter emergency and tactical withdrawal which encroaches on the subject evacuating stopping that is tactical withdrawal does that tactical withdrawal of firefighters as opposed to
01:58:45 withdrawal of firefighters as opposed to withdrawal of residents of a building for example that's correct would the training cover the concept of stay put and the circumstances in which is right
01:58:57 and the circumstances in which is right to withdraw stay put no we are all aware of the stapler policy but there's no training as the decision when to change
01:59:08 training as the decision when to change that policy from stay-put to evacuation thank you could we go back to page 13 if your statement and that top paragraph and the second line onwards which reads I organized a for pump fire exercise at
01:59:21 I organized a for pump fire exercise at Acton within the last six months specifically around high-rise buildings it started with a lecture and an update of FS policy around high-rise buildings together with a training package and a
01:59:33 together with a training package and a practical drill the drill was run like a real live incident and took place in Acton's tower first of all dealing with the lecture element of that who provided it that
01:59:44 element of that who provided it that would be myself and did did you prepare the subject matter of that lecture no that was done using the computer-based training package is a PowerPoint presentation that's
01:59:55 is a PowerPoint presentation that's available to us did that computer-based presentation package didn't refer to documents such as GRA 3.2 did it refer to policy 633 do you provide any bespoke
02:00:13 to policy 633 do you provide any bespoke training yourself by prepared by yourself for your watch separate and distinct to the training that's provided from the LFP centrally yes we so if we've had an incident in a
02:00:27 yes we so if we've had an incident in a high-rise building or we've been to a high-rise building where we can foresee that there might be some issues or some kind of tactical complications then the
02:00:39 kind of tactical complications then the bespoke training would be using whiteboard as a watch we'll talk about how we're going to best approach that incident if the appliance can only be
02:00:52 incident if the appliance can only be sited a long way from the joyrides in mine for example we will talk about how we're going to overcome that if there is a complicated layout on the floors we'll talk about how we're going to do that so it's bespoke in that sense that it be a
02:01:05 it's bespoke in that sense that it be a group discussion and a whiteboard to overcome certain scenarios thank you in the bit of the state which I quoted you referred to an update of F's policy around high-rise buildings can you
02:01:16 around high-rise buildings can you remember now what that update covered
02:01:24 I'm afraid I can't I it may be I'm not sure if this is before or after Graham fell we were a new piece of equipment was introduced there's a list of
02:01:37 was introduced there's a list of equipment that we have to take to a bridgehead a minimum list and that's now self-contained in in a bag it is the fire I'm not entirely sure if that was
02:01:49 fire I'm not entirely sure if that was before or after that could have a relevance to the China and I was given thank you and you mentioned that the drill was run like a real-life incident took place in Acton's tower first of all how high is Acton's tower yeah that's I
02:02:02 how high is Acton's tower yeah that's I said little bit generous to say a real-life incident Acton's tower is a full floor Tower so you you make the best of what you've got the reason that
02:02:14 best of what you've got the reason that we chose to do it Acton's Tower rather than my own stations ground at eelain's tower is Acton's tower has a room that comes off I believe it's the first floor which would give you an area to set up a
02:02:27 which would give you an area to set up a bridgehead and and to try and have some little extra bit of reality to it but it's still a Jacob's Ladder tower so there's no stairs that go up and so the
02:02:40 there's no stairs that go up and so the reason we're saying it's a real-life incident were practicing what equipment to take to a bridgehead setting up a bridgehead making sure the bridgehead set up in the right place and then a little bit of communication type stuff
02:02:53 little bit of communication type stuff after that and there's a message that you send once everything's implemented and that's high-rise procedures implemented so we speak about when can that message be sent when is a safe
02:03:06 that message be sent when is a safe system of work declared and presumably the drill you simulates the fight was an internal as opposed to an external fire is that right correct how practical is it to drilled on the column the basis of
02:03:19 it to drilled on the column the basis of an external fire whether Acton or Ealing or anywhere
02:03:25 not really because all our towers there's no towers that Wembley's got a tower that's seven or eight floors high with some stairs so you can see how far a jet might reach on
02:03:37 you can see how far a jet might reach on that type but there's no towers really above eight floors so when we talk about it it's just what have we got available in the fire brigade how high can that go and have you been able to carry out a
02:03:49 and have you been able to carry out a drill in a real-live occupied building or not and not occupied now I've attended a drill also on Acton's ground which was in a tower block which was
02:04:00 which was in a tower block which was about to be demolished and we had a again a limited rule there but with a little bit of real fire and setting up a bridgehead in common and when you say
02:04:12 bridgehead in common and when you say limited did it involve any consideration of what to do should there be in a breach of compartment ation for example no that wasn't brought in neither was any external I was there any sub dealing
02:04:24 any external I was there any sub dealing covering of partial or total evacuation her best to carried out and her safeties carriers no it wasn't spoken about during that drill what were the principle lessons that your watch
02:04:36 principle lessons that your watch learned from the Acton drill from the drill that we eat us a lot of that was around setting up a bridgehead messages from incidents but it must be stressed
02:04:48 from incidents but it must be stressed that this is a small fire in in one flat one part of one flat and what messages we're gonna send from that incident Thank You mr. Astor no Donovan against
02:05:00 Thank You mr. Astor no Donovan against turn to the night itself ok enough I can ask you some basic questions about basic details there am i right that you were riding in golf 2 5 1 correct and your crew members where
02:05:12 correct and your crew members where firefighters Barker Green Quan and Max or that mask or others that right asked erectus and you were mobilized at zero 130 on the road at zero 133 does that
02:05:23 130 on the road at zero 133 does that sound right those the toyman's for me I wouldn't be able to clarify exactly but I'm sure the computer technology that we have on the et will be better placed than I am to
02:05:35 et will be better placed than I am to give you that data okay and we have an arrival time for golf two five one from the GPS data is 0-1 57 does that sound about right subjects that caveat you've
02:05:46 about right subjects that caveat you've just given yep that sounds reasonable can I ask you next about the MDT itself and could I ask you to turn to page two of your statement and the second paragraph line four and you say on this
02:06:03 paragraph line four and you say on this occasion we were getting very little information coming through on the MDT and then you go on to say the MDT had no information but it was the same for all appliances and first of all do you know
02:06:15 appliances and first of all do you know why you are getting very little information via the MDT Anton I generally how reliable is the MDT in your experience from my personal
02:06:27 your experience from my personal experience I'd say 90% and in the 10% when it isn't reliable how easy is it to remedy the problem and get the
02:06:38 remedy the problem and get the information you need to respond to the fire you're responding to up until a rough guess 2010 we didn't have MDT's so
02:06:49 rough guess 2010 we didn't have MDT's so most people are aware what to do if that technology is not available we've got geografía x' on the appliances we have root cards in the washer and to be able to get us places and a lot of the
02:07:02 to get us places and a lot of the information that we get on the MDT is also on a course lip what isn't available is the information from our operational risk database and following
02:07:13 operational risk database and following on from that point at the end of this quotation you say the MDT had no information but it was the same for all appliances to be clear when you say the MDT had no information what do you mean by that
02:07:24 by that okay so the MDT links to an incident when we are assigned to an incident the MDT on the appliance is then linked to all the information on that incident on
02:07:35 all the information on that incident on this particular occasion it wasn't linked to any incident we were only mobilized via the station and the slip that came through on our teleprinter so just to understand you
02:07:46 teleprinter so just to understand you immobilized what information did you have was your on Route two grand for about the nature of the instant you were going to be dealing with once you got there a call slip that said we are muck
02:07:58 there a call slip that said we are muck we've been mobilized as part of the twenty pub fire attendance I know what other appliances are part of that attendance I believe it would have said
02:08:10 attendance I believe it would have said high-rise fire there would have been no information about how many floors or where the fire was or anything like that and then the only other information on
02:08:22 and then the only other information on gathering men is from radio traffic so other appliances asking Control for information and I believe that any radio
02:08:33 information and I believe that any radio traffic was coming from the incident ground itself at that stage okay if I could stop there let's take it stage by stage yeah you say later on in the next paragraph on this page on this occasion I didn't search the MDT for for
02:08:45 I didn't search the MDT for for information floors flats etc why didn't you search it for that information this is one of these translation issues from from the police officer so basically if it's not linked to the incident for me
02:08:58 it's not linked to the incident for me to be able to if if there is information on the operational risk database for grenfell tower for me to find that information I have to find grenfell
02:09:09 information I have to find grenfell tower on the map on a fire ground that I'm unfamiliar with and then work out how to action the icon to be able to pull up the operational risk database
02:09:22 pull up the operational risk database with everything that's going on that's a long process when you're driving on the Bell and it's pretty much unfeasible for what when we're attached to an incident we get a red dot over the incident and we've got the MDT point straight at it
02:09:35 we've got the MDT point straight at it and as simple as pressing a button and there's everything you need if you're not assigned it's a lot scrolling how long does that process take when you're when you're not assigned just to give us an idea
02:09:46 an idea as to that's a length of time involved I would say for me from start to finish to get the operation which database up on the MDT would be five minutes dealing
02:10:00 the MDT would be five minutes dealing now with the radio traffic you heard whilst you're on route you mentioned in the statement that you became aware of the seriousness of the incident because the amount of information being requested from the control room can you member what type of information
02:10:12 can you member what type of information first of all was being requested from the control room the majority all of that was other oh I see other appliance commanders state in
02:10:24 see other appliance commanders state in what I've stated that there's nothing shown on there MDT can they have some information on the incident and do you recall hearing any FSG information being passed over the radio arsenide now the
02:10:38 passed over the radio arsenide now the next topic I'd like to discuss with you is your arrival at the tower and if we turn again to page two of your statement the fourth paragraph and line five and you which starts it seemed to
02:10:50 five and you which starts it seemed to be one or maybe two sides of the tower and that were a hundred percent a light the flames were traveling up it didn't take long but once we got there the flames were moving round the tap I again spoke to the crew and reiterated what I
02:11:02 spoke to the crew and reiterated what I had said earlier to them to remain safe and stay close to me until we were given a task given what you saw what professional assessment did you form as to whether complementation had been
02:11:14 to whether complementation had been breached or not so we approached the incident from the a40 onto the elevated section and the visual indications from
02:11:25 section and the visual indications from that far away from the fire is is that it was very serious we you could see a whole face in the building that was alight so our first thoughts when
02:11:36 alight so our first thoughts when looking at the building was there must be scaffolding and netting on the outside you wouldn't expect the side of the building severe life so that that's your first thought but as far as where the compartment ations been breached or
02:11:47 the compartment ations been breached or not at that stage I didn't really have a thought process but I would say I'm looking at it thinking the external skins alike but I wouldn't say I won't be
02:11:59 but I wouldn't say I won't be necessarily thinking that that's gone into all the floors when you say the external skin is alight had you previously attended any fires involving external cladding no experience and so
02:12:10 external cladding no experience and so that was a working assumption you cancel oleanna and that's that's not a professional assumption that's the same assumption that you instructed the crew to stay close to me until we were given a task this phrase appears to anticipate
02:12:24 a task this phrase appears to anticipate being given orders on arrival by responsible officer is that a fair observation on that evidence yes yeah and you go on to say in that paragraph that as we got closer it became quite
02:12:35 that as we got closer it became quite apparent that what I had asked my crew to do is to stick close to me it was never going to happen because of the dynamics of the incident so I said to my crew do what you have to do and I'll get hold of you and so they went off and did
02:12:46 hold of you and so they went off and did whatever roles they were tasked to do again does this phrase mean that you anticipated the crew would be split up but a responsible officer would be giving them direction on arrival as here
02:12:58 giving them direction on arrival as here on arrival at a large instance what what or who would you expect to meet who would give you the initial direction as to who to see them what to do okay so
02:13:11 when you arrive at an incident as the officer in charge my role would be to go to either the incident commander or the commands unit the incident commander may
02:13:25 commands unit the incident commander may detail me with a job and then I'd have my roll call board to the incident command pump and detail my crew to do the tasks that I've been asked to do if it's a more dynamic incident and larger
02:13:37 it's a more dynamic incident and larger it'd be to the control unit I'd hand my roll call board in the control unit and there not be detailed a task from there to continue just please yeah so on this
02:13:50 to continue just please yeah so on this particular occasion when I arrived it wasn't like a normal incident where there's definite jobs to do whether you're in charge of obtaining a water
02:14:02 you're in charge of obtaining a water supply or in charge of pump operating or water relay or Bream a pareo there was so much to do and so many people asked him for help that it was
02:14:14 people asked him for help that it was apparent that my crew as we were walking over the hill from the leisure center would have to go in different directions as I walked over up to to watch managers
02:14:26 as I walked over up to to watch managers did say they need in particular things and I split my crew in that kind of sense and I went to the command unit okay turns page three of your statement
02:14:37 okay turns page three of your statement the third paragraph and the final two lines and you say in terms of discussing aerial appliances but it was never going to reach the height of the building due to the size of the building the
02:14:48 to the size of the building the equipment we as the LFP have do you know the maximum height that the lfp SLPs can reach apologies that's a bit like a promotion exam questions a station
02:15:00 promotion exam questions a station manager sitting over there I'm sorry to test you though remember I believe is around 27 meters do you know whether any fire and rescue services and the areas surrounding London have a LPS that can
02:15:11 surrounding London have a LPS that can reach higher than that I don't believe so I know there is some in the UK but
02:15:20 could I ask you to stay with page three go down to the last paragraph on that page on the second line where you are the first and second line I should say
02:15:32 the first and second line I should say on this particular occasion the officer in charge of the command unit had a stack of nominal role boards would not be able to allocate a specific task first
02:15:41 first why was the officer in command of the comparing sorry in command of the control unit command unit not able to allocate tasks because of the speed and the dynamics that in incident was
02:15:52 the dynamics that in incident was developing if he wasn't in a position to allocate specific tasks and give direction who would be this is a difficult question to answer obviously
02:16:03 difficult question to answer obviously the responsibility for that would fall on the incident commander of the incident
02:16:10 incident but you must appreciate that with the best part of 20 appliances and 20 crews arriving at once he's not gonna be able to make those decisions very quickly
02:16:22 to make those decisions very quickly did you ask who the incident commander was when you arrived I didn't know what you told who the incident commander was I wasn't I was aware because I know the local stations and I know who's in
02:16:33 local stations and I know who's in charge of that fire ground that evening so did anyone specifically tell you who the incident commander was on data but when you arrived nothing on sir absent
02:16:47 when you arrived nothing on sir absent the officer in command of the command unit being able to give you direction absent contact with the incident commander how do you go about
02:16:58 commander how do you go about identifying the right task for you to do that forms part of a coordinated firefighting response okay so some of this for my particular crew some of this was done already before I got to the
02:17:09 was done already before I got to the commands unit as I said we came over the brow of the hill and one watch manager said we need to get a water supply for this aerial so I detail to my crew to do that and around the same time another
02:17:22 that and around the same time another watch manager like I remember who this particular one was we need support for the command unit we need runners for the command unit so the other two went there so I detail two to go to the command
02:17:34 so I detail two to go to the command unit two to help with the aerial and I went to thee and then it was just about me finding a role for myself after that on arrival what sense did you have of an overall direction to coordinating the
02:17:46 overall direction to coordinating the firefighting response what was there so my only experience coming over on arrival what was those two tasks I gave you where where I'll split my boot and
02:17:57 you where where I'll split my boot and that seemed to be direct in the purpose board could I talk with you about the attendance at the bridgehead yes and that I think I'm right in saying that you attended the bridgehead and it's at
02:18:08 you attended the bridgehead and it's at the third floor at that stage is that right correct as far as I'm aware and if I could ask you to turn to page four of your witness statement and the second paragraph and the eighth line which I
02:18:21 paragraph and the eighth line which I think contains the words senior officer Richard Welsh was in charge but he didn't give us the briefing this was done by another officer first of all do you know the officer who gave you that briefing I'm guessing watch manager
02:18:36 briefing I'm guessing watch manager Louisa the silver but I couldn't be a hundred percent could we limit it down to say the officer was female no I'm gonna retract that it was watch manager Brian O'Keefe whilst you're waiting to
02:18:53 Brian O'Keefe whilst you're waiting to get better did you understand what FSGS were passing and what prioritization was being given to those FSGS answer now on arrival at the bridgehead I was first
02:19:06 arrival at the bridgehead I was first met by a crew manager from North Kensington who had a diagram of the floor layout China graphed on on the wall and if I could stop you there just
02:19:19 wall and if I could stop you there just to help clarify the evidence Paul would you mind turning up ma d2 which is met triple zero one three zero three 5-1
02:19:30 triple zero one three zero three 5-1 now is that your memory of the sketch plan that was shown to you by the crew murder from North Carroll bit more
02:19:41 murder from North Carroll bit more detailed and a little bit closer than the the actual floor plan that I've got in this folder so that's your rough that that's my rough outline as I was just describing
02:19:52 rough outline as I was just describing something to the police officers who interviewed me as you were waiting to go up the tower did you see any returning crews did you ever hear any debriefing they gave to either the crew now from
02:20:03 they gave to either the crew now from North Carolina no Keith arsenide you
02:20:08 commend in your statement the briefing you had given can you remember the precise words or the gist of the words that the briefing contained my briefing work was probably slightly different
02:20:22 work was probably slightly different because
02:20:24 because my crew member firefighter Green has highlighted that we were in the process this is something that's escaped my memory which I found
02:20:35 that's escaped my memory which I found out about later we were in the process of receiving a briefing for a fire survival guidance core and during the start of that brief in a call for fire fire emergency came in if I can stop you
02:20:49 fire emergency came in if I can stop you this the fun the FSG that you're initially briefed on can you remember the flat or the floor it related him I he did tell me a few days ago and unfortunately that's escaped my memory
02:21:01 unfortunately that's escaped my memory now in your statement you refer to the lives what information were you given regarding the operation of the lifts as part of your briefing he's as simple as
02:21:12 part of your briefing he's as simple as the lifts aren't working were you given an explanation as to why they won't work on tonight and looking at the end of the second paragraph on page four thinks
02:21:23 second paragraph on page four thinks three lines from the end of that paragraph you say that in the briefing we were told that certain equipment was in certain areas and it became apparent that wasn't the case now first of all
02:21:34 that wasn't the case now first of all what equipment were you told as part of the briefing would be available and we're so we were told that there be outside the lobby door there'll be some
02:21:47 outside the lobby door there'll be some hose and we were given a branch I believe we were
02:21:59 we were given a branch I believe we were given a branch at the bridgehead during the briefing so then we were told to go to the floor the hoses they're available for us to set up for the dry riser and
02:22:10 for us to set up for the dry riser and was was mr. green carrying the branch then this escapes my memory I can't remember it cuz yeah I had to breathing apparatus where's and I don't know if it
02:22:22 apparatus where's and I don't know if it was the first way or the second way that we had the branch but what I do know is when we got to the 12th floor we didn't have the right equipment to have fire
02:22:34 have the right equipment to have fire fire media to enter the floor were you told how many hoses were plugged into the dry rising main in the tower no what information were you given regarding the
02:22:45 information were you given regarding the reliability of radio communications as you went up the tower as part of the briefing no comms information are just apart from what our call sign was going to be which is healing pum ladder 3 so
02:22:58 to be which is healing pum ladder 3 so you were given no information for example regarding conditions on the stairwell that he went up yes from during the initial briefing as you as
02:23:10 during the initial briefing as you as you enter the bridgehead before you're given a role believe it was crew manager Matt Sephardim who was detailing us quite comprehensively on the floor layout and what the current conditions
02:23:23 layout and what the current conditions on the stairs were I believe he might have had a breathing apparatus we're already and then he was helping with coordinating the bridgehead but so we were fully aware of the floor
02:23:35 but so we were fully aware of the floor layout and that was available to us he was saying where the smoke level was cut down to all the stairs okay can we now turn to your first deployment and if we go to the telemetry sheet Paul if it's
02:23:48 go to the telemetry sheet Paul if it's possible to put that up on the screen and then box 95 just to it from the bottom you'll see working from left to
02:24:03 bottom you'll see working from left to right s DB ASIS standard duration breathing equipment healing then your name and then in the green column tally at 256 50 does that sound about right to
02:24:16 at 256 50 does that sound about right to youth again I had absolutely no idea of the time but that's what it says that sounds like it just for the sake of completeness if Paul we could scroll
02:24:28 completeness if Paul we could scroll further towards the right to secure the end of where column and there you have your underwear as three 11 26 certainly sounds feasible yes now if you'd arrived
02:24:42 sounds feasible yes now if you'd arrived at the scene at 0 157 can you remember how long you've been waiting at the bridgehead before being deployed on that particular occasion on the first where I
02:24:54 particular occasion on the first where I wasn't long at the bridgehead I'm gonna give you an estimation of 6 or 7 minutes from entering the third floor lobby to
02:25:05 from entering the third floor lobby to be an under ed now you and firefighter green would deploy to rescue a missing firefighter on the 12th floor is that right that's correct and page 5 at the top paragraph 7 lines
02:25:17 and page 5 at the top paragraph 7 lines down from the top you describe the briefing we've dealt with smoke conditions in your previous answer and what information we've given regarding the conditions on the lobby of floor 12
02:25:28 the conditions on the lobby of floor 12 itself can you remember no I don't believe they had that information available as you went up the stairs to the 12th floor I'm you describe conditions as okay until the fifth floor
02:25:40 conditions as okay until the fifth floor but heavily smoke logged from the fifth floor onwards first of all what color was the smoke you encountered on the fifth floor onwards it's black smoke could you say
02:25:51 onwards it's black smoke could you say could you see where it was coming from No
02:25:53 No can you remember whether there was any firefighting equipment left on the staircase or not as per my statement night I I've got no recollection of the actual stairs I remember equipment in
02:26:06 actual stairs I remember equipment in the lobby areas and the these would be rolled up hose I can't remember any hose laid out actually on the stairs itself when you say the lobby areas just to be clear sorry the landings outside the
02:26:19 clear sorry the landings outside the lobby area thank you as you went up but what Lobby doors are the doors leading from the stove to the lobbies themselves were open and closed can you remember can't give you any no recollection sorry
02:26:32 going back to page 5 the first paragraph and five lines from the end of that paragraph you describe conditions on the stairwell as organized chaos what was
02:26:44 stairwell as organized chaos what was organized about it when I say organized organized chaos what why meant was there didn't seem to be anybody standing around not knowing what they're gonna do
02:26:55 around not knowing what they're gonna do next all the firefighters I encountered had a purpose and they seem to be proactively doing something as she went
02:27:06 proactively doing something as she went up to the 12th floor we were able to hear a monitor radio comms yes you might be coming to the part of my statement
02:27:17 be coming to the part of my statement where I receive communications when we got to the 12th floor yeah and my question is as you're going up to the 12th floor not that you kind of switch off a little bit because you're trying
02:27:29 off a little bit because you're trying to communicate with your breathing apparatus partner you're trying to work out where you'll go and you'll confirm and what you're gonna do when you get there so you need to because there's a lot radio traffic and I can't tell you
02:27:40 lot radio traffic and I can't tell you if I did or did not hear any but I kind of switched my mind off from listening to radio
02:27:45 to radio okay as you enter the 12th floor lobby can you describe the conditions you encountered yet I don't believe it was majorly hot but this could be because of
02:28:01 majorly hot but this could be because of I've come up the stairs I'm expecting to be hot or the fire gear I'm wearing it was smoky and visibility was low [Music]
02:28:11 [Music] stopping that are you able to give us an idea of how low versus I'm trying guys for now but my recollection is that the visibility inside the 12th floor lobby
02:28:22 visibility inside the 12th floor lobby was better than that on the staircase so I would say I'm talking maybe a meter and a half and in the lobby itself we
02:28:33 and a half and in the lobby itself we able to see where the smoke was coming from as you crossed from the stairwell to the lobby did you keep the stairwell lobby door open or closed closed we we
02:28:45 lobby door open or closed closed we we had no firefighter media as I said we didn't have what we needed available to set into the riser and bring into the lobby area so that made that task of protecting the lobby easier because we
02:28:57 protecting the lobby easier because we had nothing to hold the door open turning to page five from the second paragraph on that page you describe how you and another two-person crew you met search the lobby area of a 12th floor
02:29:08 search the lobby area of a 12th floor it's right that you followed the right call the right hand wall and the other crew followed the left hand wall is that right correct one question which has been asked is if you keep if both crews
02:29:20 been asked is if you keep if both crews were keeping to the outer edges of the lobby how are you able to search the middle of the lobby area okay this is a time when I'd like to get you over to a
02:29:31 time when I'd like to get you over to a demonstration so one crew member would hold the right-hand wall as a point of reference in situations like that that the darker it is the more disorientated
02:29:42 the darker it is the more disorientated you can become so if you lose the wall that's kind of your lifeline so one firefighter will hold the right wall and the other firefight will then search off that firefighter so as your
02:29:54 search off that firefighter so as your your complete in safe movement you can go around three meters in personal contact out into the middle of the lobby area and in a lobby like that by the time you've come all the way around
02:30:05 time you've come all the way around you'd be--you'd hope to have searched 100% of the floor area understood could I ask you to turn over the page to page six of your statements and the top paragraph and in particular the top
02:30:16 paragraph and in particular the top three lines there which say this a short while after both crews had entered the lobby area and split up I received a message on my radio said that the firefighter had been found we're no longer tasked with the firefighter
02:30:27 longer tasked with the firefighter emergency and our briefing now changed to search and rescue on the 12th floor first of all can you remember what channel your radio was set to know why I can say is my colleague firefighter
02:30:38 can say is my colleague firefighter green can't recall receiving that message so I'm under the assumption and it is an assumption that my fire ground radio is still on channel 1 and I think that may be why I received the message
02:30:51 that may be why I received the message how clear was the message in terms of its audibility when it came through certainly clear enough to be absolutely sure that fire fire Hill had been accounted for did you were you given the
02:31:04 accounted for did you were you given the impression that they'd been trying to get through to you but without success previously no
02:31:15 and are you able to assist us on what your previous experience has been of the reliability of radio comes with in high-rise concrete buildings there I'm
02:31:32 high-rise concrete buildings there I'm gonna say the reliability of our of our comms isn't excellent I've got no real experience or examples that I can give you of high-rise concrete buildings but what I can say is there's ongoing issues
02:31:44 what I can say is there's ongoing issues with with communications and what would you from from your perspective what are the principal issues that you have with reliability of the radio comms so the
02:31:58 reliability of the radio comms so the very set and the Barry set is the one that's integrated into your breathing apparatus set which is an earpiece and a bone microphone that regularly files
02:32:10 bone microphone that regularly files whether it's not connected or some some stages if there's a lot of radio traffic it will start just making a loud continuous noise and that's irrespective
02:32:21 continuous noise and that's irrespective of whether it's low medium or high rise the building which you're fighting the fire that's correct yeah and the handheld radios I was at an incident recently which was a very minor incident
02:32:33 recently which was a very minor incident it was just a flooding in a in a block of flats and I believe I was on the I'm gonna say the 8th floor and I couldn't communicate with my driver who was outside the appliance and that that
02:32:46 outside the appliance and that that would be the best example that suits grenfell Tower was I couldn't get communications there um when you can't get communications whether it's with your driver or with the bridgehead
02:32:57 your driver or with the bridgehead how do you cope with that how do you respond to it are you actually apologies in those circumstances are you able to find a workaround that allows you to communicate with the bridgehead of your
02:33:08 communicate with the bridgehead of your driver depends on the seriousness and the dynamics of the incident like going back to that particular occasion I resort it's used in my own personal our phone which I shouldn't be carrying
02:33:20 our phone which I shouldn't be carrying on me but it needs must at some times the other possibility is to have a runner so you're taking a fire fire it takes a longer period of time and you're using up a vital resource to run up and
02:33:33 using up a vital resource to run up and down to relay messages did you have reason to use your own personal mobile phone on the night of the 14th of June our tonight did you see anyone else using their personal mobile phones I saw a lot of
02:33:45 personal mobile phones I saw a lot of people with phones I believe there was firefighters outside on phones of members of the public I couldn't tell you whether they would their own
02:33:56 you whether they would their own personal fights or not and do you see any firefighters within the tower itself using their phones try to get through to people I on the bridge header outside Council area again staying within this top paragraph on page six eight lines
02:34:08 top paragraph on page six eight lines down you say the 12th floor at this stage wasn't fully compromised by smoke it was fairly protected this at this stage what were conditions like in the lobby so on the 12th floor lobby I lost
02:34:27 lobby so on the 12th floor lobby I lost my train of thought there apologize you're at you you're on the 12th floor you describing here that the 12th row at that stage wasn't fully
02:34:38 12th row at that stage wasn't fully compromised by smoke it was fairly protected so that we can understand what you encountered can you just give us a detailed idea of the conditions that you encountered on the tour so beginning he is black smoke and there and that's the
02:34:49 is black smoke and there and that's the statement probably reads in a massive under estimation of the conditions that my statement there in the way it's been translating is suggesting that it was okay it was far from okay and dizzy
02:35:00 okay it was far from okay and dizzy first of all with how do you finish no image I was just going to say it's black smoke and we're looking at our meter can you give us assistance with the
02:35:11 can you give us assistance with the nature intensity of the heat you encountered on the 12th floor as I said the heat I've got no recollection or memory of it being over hot at that stage either another breathing apparatus
02:35:23 stage either another breathing apparatus where later in the evening on the sixth floor and that was physically unbearable heat wise it was nowhere near that on the 12th floor at that time in your
02:35:34 the 12th floor at that time in your statement when you described the fact when you say that the lobby was fairly protected what do you mean by that what I meant was as I said earlier the conditions in might my recollection is
02:35:45 conditions in might my recollection is the conditions on the twelfth floor lobby was slightly better than the conditions of the stairs I think I I suppose what I'm getting at is what do you mean by what he intending to convey by use of the word protected there what
02:35:58 by use of the word protected there what was protected okay so whether it's all the flat doors at that stage were closed so there was no fire coming externally into the lobby that would probably be
02:36:10 into the lobby that would probably be what I meant by protected at that stage thank you again still on page six but that's what paragraph 11 lines down it starts we got to the first flat on our
02:36:21 starts we got to the first flat on our right I think it was flat six it was a hundred percent alight unfortunate because we had opened the door at compromised the visibility in the lobby area and the visibility dropped so he closed the door straightaway it may be
02:36:33 closed the door straightaway it may be useful mr. Aston Donovan if we look at M ad three Paul if that could be drawn up onto the screens good group
02:36:43 is the flat six you're referring to in your statement that numbered six on the plan yeah so the police officer who interviewed me provided me with this and for ease of description he labeled these
02:36:55 for ease of description he labeled these flat numbers there they're not the flat numbers off the twelfth floor they're just for me to be able to describe it but yes flat six is where we believe there was a fire inside that
02:37:08 believe there was a fire inside that flat and the door that you were referring to in that quotation from your statement it just to get things clear that's the door from the stairwell to the lobby is that right sorry the door that we opened yet you said we got to
02:37:20 that we opened yet you said we got to the first flat on our right I think it was flat six it was a hunter centre like a fortune because we'd opened the door it compromised the visibility in the lobby area so is that the flat door or the lamp door thank you you said you
02:37:35 the lamp door thank you you said you were describing conditions on the twelfth floor lobby visibility of one meter you say visibility dropped can you give us an idea as to how far visibility dropped as a result of the door open quickly we're going it would be useful
02:37:51 quickly we're going it would be useful if you could just talk us through it and you couldn't see any further then your hand in front of you correct so it would be useful mr. Astor
02:38:02 be useful mr. Astor I hope Donovan if you could take us step by step through the process by which you've gained entry to the flat just that we have an idea of the steps you take okay I think it's important to to
02:38:16 take okay I think it's important to to clear up what happened outside and the council of fire fire emergency so when we got to the 12th floor lobby there was a firefighter's helmet on the floor which suggested that there was a
02:38:27 which suggested that there was a firefighter in trouble because the helmets outside there it was shortly then after that I received comms to save no fire fire emergency we were given
02:38:38 no fire fire emergency we were given another brief this was something we're now on the twelfth floor so we've come up with a brief ourselves that we're going to search and rescue and see what we can clear from the 12th floor at that
02:38:49 we can clear from the 12th floor at that stage I gathered the other crew together who
02:38:54 who I'm completely unaware of who they are but I said you stick to the left-hand wall we'll go right and we'll search and rescue and then we'll go from there so myself from my colleague firefighter green have entered the 12th floor lobby
02:39:08 green have entered the 12th floor lobby on the right-hand wall he had a thermal-imaging camera we had no firefighting media we've carried on along the left-hand wall search in the lobby areas were going in the method
02:39:20 lobby areas were going in the method that I described earlier the first door we've come to is flat 6 so at flat 6 were following procedures and checking if the door handles hot and it is we've opened the door at that
02:39:33 it is we've opened the door at that stage and crew manager Green has looked in with a thermal-imaging camera and said that that's that's where the night the lobby area at this stage was was
02:39:44 the lobby area at this stage was was taking a lot of smoke and a lot of heat and the conditions became a lot worse so we closed the door and we moved on to the next flat and in the same paragraph you say we decide that if anyone was
02:39:56 you say we decide that if anyone was still in there they weren't our priority right they think this is a translation thing as well I feel as Li would you be able to zero on his priority so at that stage we're making a decision that I've
02:40:09 stage we're making a decision that I've got no firefighting media and there's not a lot that we can do to go inside a flat that's under them conditions there's other doors there let's try them
02:40:21 there's other doors there let's try them if there's nobody there and then we'll come back to that flat and do what we can do in that flat to make sure that there's nobody there but without any firefighting media you're trying to find
02:40:32 firefighting media you're trying to find a phrase which is something I can say in a room like this but you're not able to achieve much thank you I interrupted your apologies you went on to the next
02:40:43 your apologies you went on to the next flat guys flat 5 I think that's correct yeah Hank again can you describe the process you undertook going as you went to flat 5 no problem so we've closed the door and we made a decision to go on to the next flat and and the door to this
02:40:56 the next flat and and the door to this flat is locked so your minds going and you're trying to think of why is it locked the most likely scenario is somebody's a evacuated locked in gone but that you
02:41:09 evacuated locked in gone but that you can't assume that at any stage it could be that they've locked the door from the inside and they decided they're staying there or they've locked the door before bed and gods bed so we made the decision
02:41:20 bed and gods bed so we made the decision that we need to gain entry into that flat we have no forceful entry equipment with us so it's just your size nine boots at that stage so we started trying to boot the door in other witnesses have
02:41:33 to boot the door in other witnesses have talked about shouting banging on doors kicking on doors were you and the other crew doing that as you went round ourself we'll lobby it get apologies if
02:41:45 ourself we'll lobby it get apologies if this is an obvious question what were you shouting I is anybody there is anybody in this flat also trying to communicate with the other crew if you've got anything over there my last communication with the
02:41:58 there my last communication with the other crew on the left hand was when we detailed our brief I didn't speak to them or debrief I still don't know who they are to be honest now what as I understand it you were so as you put it
02:42:10 understand it you were so as you put it using your size nines how far did you go in basically kicking the door in a flat five how did you get I'm gonna estimate that we had between us we had five or
02:42:21 that we had between us we had five or six goes at the door and now that stage two ladies came out of the next flat which is flat four okay and boys you've been you'd have five or six goes up
02:42:33 been you'd have five or six goes up trying to break in the door of flat five how successful were you at pushing that door through so you gain entry very unsuccessful thank you now you mentioned
02:42:44 unsuccessful thank you now you mentioned that two women came out of flat four and if I could ask you to turn to page six of your statement and the second paragraph you say make second line onwards I told them both to go back into
02:42:55 onwards I told them both to go back into their flat into the bathroom just inside their door on the left is it wasn't compromised and there wasn't a lot of smoke in there I went into their flat one Mike
02:43:03 one Mike stood by the front door now Paul could I ask you to turn up ma III again mr. Astor no Donovan if you
02:43:14 ma III again mr. Astor no Donovan if you could help us just indicate on the screen that's by you the larger one where you were when you told the women to go back into right from here just for
02:43:51 to go back into right from here just for the sake of the transcript we're looking at the top left-hand corner which is marked flat five you were trying to break in the door of that flat and then slightly further to the left the two
02:44:02 slightly further to the left the two women were standing in her horrid off yeah and I bet they're taking some smoking about stage and had they anything covering their face I had head scarfs or towels or something I'm not entirely sure and how far into flat four
02:44:19 entirely sure and how far into flat four did you go with them you say you can see
02:44:34 did you go with them you say you can see the smoke coming into their flat you see where the smoke was coming into and you said that they told you that the flat is on fire did you see anything on the only
02:44:46 on fire did you see anything on the only evidence is verbal from just a bit of clarify this looking at page six the second paragraph the first line it says the fire by now was spreading inside
02:44:58 the fire by now was spreading inside their flat is that right or not the only evidence of God that is what the the ladies were telling me at the bottom
02:45:11 the ladies were telling me at the bottom of page six and the top of page seven of your statement you described the briefing you gave to the two women doing the best you can are you able to give us an idea of the precise words or the gist the words you use next and explaining the route you
02:45:23 use next and explaining the route you were going to take out pretty much remember that word for word yeah so I spoke to the ladies they were obviously distressed and panicked between crew
02:45:36 distressed and panicked between crew manager Greene and I it was it was very apparent that we had to get them out with there's no way we were leaving them there and on a stay put basis so to speak so at that stage I've said to him
02:45:48 speak so at that stage I've said to him this is what we're gonna do is gonna take about 90 seconds to get through this smoke I said we're gonna leave your flap what I don't want you to do is take your normal route to the lobby stairs because you'll get lost I need you to
02:46:00 because you'll get lost I need you to hold my arm we're gonna leave the flat and we're gonna follow the left-hand wall we're gonna go past the first door pass the second door pass the bean cupboard and out into the stairs then we're gonna carry on going downstairs
02:46:11 we're gonna carry on going downstairs and when you get to the fifth floor we should be able to breathe and how do you ascertain that the the two women have understood that how do you double-check that confirmed and asked them to tell me
02:46:22 that confirmed and asked them to tell me exactly what we're doing and that stage did the two women have anything protecting their face yeah we date they add scarfs and we've instructed them to hold them over their mouth did you radio
02:46:35 hold them over their mouth did you radio down to the bridgehead who you'd located where you'd locate them and you were coming down yeah both my colleague and I both tried comms from the 12th floor unsuccessfully as you
02:46:48 the 12th floor unsuccessfully as you went down can you describe the smoke conditions as you went down from the 12th to the fifth floor it was pretty much the same as when we came up at that stage and breathable from just below the
02:47:04 stage and breathable from just below the fifth as you were coming down from the 12th of the fifth floor did you or mr. green try and radio through so the bridge had again to update them what once we were moving with the ladies with there was no it
02:47:16 there was no it to communications as you went down can you remember now whether the stairwell was less or not no I have memories of lighting I don't know if it's emergency
02:47:28 lighting I don't know if it's emergency lighting I don't and I couldn't tell you where I'm where my memory is it wasn't pitch pitch black you could see little spots of light but the smoke makes it pitch black anyway so and can you
02:47:41 pitch black anyway so and can you remember as you went down whether the doors between the stairwells and the lobbies were open or closed I'm rushing a lady who's holding her breath down the stairs I'm not looking at Lobby doors can you remember again maybe a question
02:47:55 can you remember again maybe a question you can't able to assist a song with an answer but can remember the nature and density of the traffic going up and coming down as you were going down I know we I certainly had a clear run just
02:48:10 know we I certainly had a clear run just so to be clear was it on the fifth floor that you handed the woman you're escorting down two colleagues slightly lower it's now I believe in might have been around the bridgehead area or maybe
02:48:21 been around the bridgehead area or maybe a little bit below the bridge head can you remember whether the colleagues you encountered when you handed over the woman had been specifically tasked to assist taking casualties down to the
02:48:33 assist taking casualties down to the bridge heading out of the town got no evidence that that was exactly their task but there seemed to be a system of it's called them casualty runners that Breeden operates crew were taking them
02:48:46 Breeden operates crew were taking them from a respire ball level of the tower to the base of the tower and then maybe handing them over or carrying or not carrying on to a triage area after you
02:48:57 carrying on to a triage area after you handed over the woman to colleagues be taken out did you try and radio through to the bridgehead what you've done on the state of play in terms of the FSG you were seeking to carry out I reported
02:49:08 you were seeking to carry out I reported back to the bridgehead Thank You member now what you said to the bridgehead yes there was an incident where my partner and I got split up we regrouped fairly
02:49:20 and I got split up we regrouped fairly quickly around the fourth or fifth floor my statement says it was higher and that I'm assured that it's not and that must be true because I wouldn't have seen him so we regrouped and we went to the
02:49:33 so we regrouped and we went to the bridgehead together and because I wasn't given a fire survival guidance briefed by anyone I knew it was important to get as much information across as to where
02:49:46 as much information across as to where these ladies came from during my conversation with them I said what flat is this what flat are we in the information I got was flat 84 I've since
02:49:59 information I got was flat 84 I've since found out that that's incorrect I believe it's 94 now so the information that I gave back to the bridgehead is we've taken two adult females from flat
02:50:11 we've taken two adult females from flat 84 on the 12th floor and I detailed exactly where that was I said we've entered it's the third door on a right hand wall search were you able to update
02:50:24 hand wall search were you able to update the bridgehead on the full extent of the search you've been able to carry out on the 12th floor now obviously I explained that my initial brief was fire fire
02:50:35 that my initial brief was fire fire emergency this is what then we decided to do so I didn't I don't think I said it but I think they would have assumed that the lobby area was clear in your
02:50:47 that the lobby area was clear in your professional experience how practical would it have been for you or mr. green to have carried a second ba set to assist bringing down a casualty should they need a possible this is a hindsight
02:51:04 they need a possible this is a hindsight thing obviously and nobody's been in that situation before if I was to do it again tomorrow I take a prenup rate set with me how practical would it have been to attach for say for example a second
02:51:15 to attach for say for example a second to spare mask to your own be a set that would be the way to go we have a as long as you've got enough air in your cylinder of which on this occasion I did
02:51:26 cylinder of which on this occasion I did have so if I had a mask with a command valve I've got an auxiliary port on my brain that price I could've worked out and thank you very much to me just disorient are you
02:51:38 much to me just disorient are you comfortable giving evidence till you don't need a break for two nice hours right no then we're probably better to keep going but if you get to the point when you do think you need to break this let me know thank you so much can I know
02:51:49 let me know thank you so much can I know about the resting period after you've completed your first task and if I could ask you to turn to page 8 of your statement and the third paragraph and
02:52:00 statement and the third paragraph and you describe here resting after your first rescue task oh and you were resting outside the tower now midway down that paragraph you say there was a bit of a mix-up here as there were two
02:52:13 bit of a mix-up here as there were two queues of firefighters with BA in holding zones outside one was for the north side of the tower by the a14 the other queues for the firefighters who had previously been into the tower already the marshaling officer in charge then called for ten
02:52:25 officer in charge then called for ten officers would be a it was an unknown reason we've taken past the queue of waiting firefighters in the holding area into the tower looking at each element of that can you remember who the
02:52:36 of that can you remember who the marshaling officer was it was a watch manager male or female male I believe we have a Scottish accent
02:52:50 what's that Matt watch manager the marshalling officer for both Q's or just one just the Q which was forming around the main entrance to the town underneath
02:53:03 the main entrance to the town underneath the mezzanine level that goes above me so the Q for those who haven't already gone into the tower is that right not necessarily a cube from either
02:53:16 not necessarily a cube from either people going in for their first where from that side all people like myself and fire five Green who were going in for our second we're okay now what's that marshalling officers supported by any other men or women
02:53:28 supported by any other men or women assisting him discharges role my memory is there was a lot of radio contact between him and bridgehead I can't
02:53:39 between him and bridgehead I can't remember anybody physically near him just communication over the radio no you're quite clear in your statement as to the purpose of the two cubes was the clarity of purpose of those two cues
02:53:51 clarity of purpose of those two cues clear at the time sorry you say in your statement here there were two cues right of firefighters one on the northern side
02:54:02 of firefighters one on the northern side and the other cues for firefighters who've previously been into the tower right okay if it says that then that's that's a misinterpretation again there's no there's no separate cue for people of
02:54:14 there's no separate cue for people of warm once and people who haven't worn at all there seem to be two breathing apparatus marshalling areas by marshalling area I mean an area where
02:54:25 marshalling area I mean an area where people are gathering in breathing apparatus ready to be brought into the tower to the bridgehead to be tasked with morale make sense it does flowing on from that just does give you context
02:54:36 on from that just does give you context in in that same paragraph at the end I think three lines from the end of that paragraph you say there's a confusion on the radio between the two marshalling areas right that's so that's again a
02:54:47 areas right that's so that's again a translation the confusion is my is my own thoughts Eisenstein yeah there was no no confusion or any common on the radio I just I found it so we
02:55:01 on the radio I just I found it so we were gathered I don't know if you've got an overview of the tower and I can explain where the two marshaling areas are I don't know if that's important but it may be something we'll probably take a break and it may be useful we'll try and get a plan that sort of more easily
02:55:13 and get a plan that sort of more easily assists you explain that right but in basically I found it confusing that we were brought up the alleyway next at a railway past I'm talking maybe 30 or 40
02:55:26 railway past I'm talking maybe 30 or 40 firefighters waiting and breathing operators and then straight into the town I see does that make it clear it does thank you now what we'll do we'll try and find us a clearer depiction of
02:55:38 try and find us a clearer depiction of the tower so we can come back to this in due course after the break but now can I ask about when you return to the bridgehead yes now when you went back
02:55:49 bridgehead yes now when you went back into the tower the bridgehead as I understand it was then on the ground floor is that right yeah but I believe the bridgehead has actually been moved to the ground floor towards the end of my first where it was in that process
02:56:01 my first where it was in that process it was and what information were you given if they're near about the deterioration and conditions which had necessitated the need to change the bridgehead the location of the bridgehead just that the third floor
02:56:12 bridgehead just that the third floor being compromised and they had had to move low could ask you to turn to page 8 of your statement in the last paragraph second line you was you say there that
02:56:24 second line you was you say there that you were held at the bridgehead for 90 minutes before being given another task were you given an explanation for the delay at the time no basis quite is quite obvious there's a lot of where
02:56:38 quite obvious there's a lot of where there have been committed to the building there's limited resources limited water supply so there I expect
02:56:49 limited water supply so there I expect and this is a guess that people coordinating the bridgehead and and the firefighting actions within the building making best use of the resources and they've got available and what briefing
02:57:02 they've got available and what briefing were you given regarding your next task [Music]
02:57:06 [Music] floor six no search and rescue all people account and fall on that floor it was purely and extinguishing the fire brief I was told that there was two
02:57:20 brief I was told that there was two branches and two lines of hose available to us from the riser outside the sixth floor lobby door and we were to go up
02:57:32 floor lobby door and we were to go up there as a crew of five and extinguished the fire on the sixth floor who gave you the briefing can you remember now I can't a male or female officer believe
02:57:46 I can't a male or female officer believe it was Maya I know crew manager Jason hunter was running one of the boards but I don't believe it was him that gave me the briefing we've
02:57:59 was him that gave me the briefing we've given any information regarding conditions within the tower and stairwells for example or particular lobbies no but they were aware that it was my second where so they knew I died have an idea of what the conditions were
02:58:10 have an idea of what the conditions were so can we take from that you were given no specific idea of the conditions on the lobby of floor six is that right safe thought you were directed to extinguish fire no no specific details
02:58:21 extinguish fire no no specific details but obviously we know it's on fire 'this that was my grief can ask you to turn to the top paragraph of page nine and you say there was a bit of confusion about
02:58:32 say there was a bit of confusion about the equipment we've told would be available to us so once we reached the floor we were tasked with there wasn't a lot of equipment available for us to use is the confusion the content of the
02:58:44 is the confusion the content of the briefing or its accuracy as to what equipment was waiting for you once you got to the sixth floor no confusion with the accuracy the briefing the confusion was that we only had one line of hose and branch
02:58:57 had one line of hose and branch available and not to thank you if I could ask Paul to turn up the telemetry sheet at this point and hopefully box two to nine
02:59:12 again that's DBA your name identified there interestingly you're not identified as a second whereas say mr. Tilson has immediately above you do you
02:59:23 Tilson has immediately above you do you know why that would be no thank you and again just for the sake of completeness
02:59:35 again just for the sake of completeness if we read to the left you'll see in the green column tally out at 6:18 and they're going on to the far right extremes 646 again sounds reasonable thank you it was certainly daylight when
02:59:47 thank you it was certainly daylight when we came out from the second way as you went up to the sixth floor from the bridgehead on the ground floor can you describe the smoke conditions for us as you ascend at the tower I can't remember
03:00:01 you ascend at the tower I can't remember but I expect I can't remember because it wasn't as black as the first way I'm gonna get and it is only a guess that
03:00:12 gonna get and it is only a guess that the visibility was a lot more at that stage and can you describe heat as you went up awesome certainly a lot hotter than the first time and again can you
03:00:25 than the first time and again can you give us an idea as to how much the radio comms you were able to hear as you went up the tower no comms I believe my brain
03:00:36 up the tower no comms I believe my brain that rates partner firefighter green it was on the second where that he had the audible noise which I described earlier in the berry set and detached that from
03:00:47 in the berry set and detached that from his ear to be able to concentrate as you went up do you remember whether the doors leading from the stairwell to the lobbies were open or closed sorry do you remember what firefighting kit was in
03:00:59 remember what firefighting kit was in the stair in the stair case if any again a certain amount of littered hose I can't remember any charge name suppose actually on on the stairwell itself off
03:01:10 actually on on the stairwell itself off the stairs itself when you reach the sixth floor lobby what firefighting kit did you find so we
03:01:21 what firefighting kit did you find so we had I believe it was already made up and I think it might have been charged as well one line of hose and one branch there was spare hose rolled up but no
03:01:34 there was spare hose rolled up but no branch looking at page 9 of your statement the second paragraph you
03:01:47 statement the second paragraph you describe the sixth floor lobby as hot and unbearable are you able to help us had fire actually penetrated the sixth floor lobby by that stage no there was
03:01:59 floor lobby by that stage no there was no fire in the lobby it was in the flats as you did last time it would be very helpful if you describe for us step by step the process you you adopted or
03:02:11 step the process you you adopted or directed to be adopted the firefighters should adopt went going on to the sixth floor lobby and into the flat ok so on that particular occasion we had a formulate the plan between us you don't
03:02:26 formulate the plan between us you don't normally work in in a an odd number crew in a task like this in a crew of four would have been more common but we had
03:02:37 would have been more common but we had five for the makeup of the people who were waiting in the lobby at that stage so we made a decision that with the two lines of hose and branches that we were told was going to be available for us one crew of two was going to go by the
03:02:50 one crew of two was going to go by the left-hand wall make access to a flat extinguish the fire carry on to the next flat on the left-hand wall count on to the next flat while the other the crew of two with the other line of hose and
03:03:01 of two with the other line of hose and branch which didn't actually exist we're going to take the right are more than do the same thing so systematically work through the flats putting out the fire until we meet in the middle off all fire
03:03:12 until we meet in the middle off all fire on that floor then we can go the spare person would coordinate what was happening I'm great taking that step by step if we look at page 9 of your statements and the final paragraph you say the water present
03:03:25 paragraph you say the water present pressure wasn't very good we were connected to a dry riser main and we were using a bigger branch hose and it was the larger the two options that we were using and not usually used in a compartment fire now are you able to
03:03:37 compartment fire now are you able to give us a rough idea whether in terms of bar or otherwise of the water pressure you encountered compared to say 10 bar yeah so if normally we try and operate
03:03:50 yeah so if normally we try and operate around 7 bar this was no more than 2 you mentioned in that quotation that there were two options available to you all
03:04:01 were two options available to you all right so this is where I'm describing the the equipment that we have on a fire appliance so the default branch that we would go to is one that's called an RB 101 and that's a that's a maneuver or
03:04:17 101 and that's a that's a maneuver or branch with certain amounts of settings we have a default setting on there of 230 liters per minute that is set to the branch that we had on this day testing
03:04:29 branch that we had on this day testing my technical knowledge here again now I believe it's a project to branch which is which is a bigger branch which is more water capacity that comes through it so that that's going to minimize if
03:04:42 it so that that's going to minimize if there's if there's a problem with the water pressure it's going to use more water
03:04:46 water and take some of the pressure available away from you okay and again for the sake of completeness and it may be an obvious question why did you go for that
03:04:57 obvious question why did you go for that option that was all you had all that was available now going back to page 9 and
03:05:10 available now going back to page 9 and the first paragraph there and you described extinguishing the fire in flat warm and it may be useful at this stage if we could turn up all m ad 3 and does
03:05:24 if we could turn up all m ad 3 and does the flat numbered warned is that the flat you're referring to where the fire was extinguished correct and just for the avoidance of dirt is it right that
03:05:35 the avoidance of dirt is it right that you extinguish the fire using the available water you had currently available pressure not not me personally I was kind of coordinating from the inside the lobby area it was fire fire
03:05:47 inside the lobby area it was fire fire green and I believe is crew manager Tillotson from Paddington who was in our crew you say your crew was about to fight the fire and flat 2 but you notice your air levels have diminished and you
03:05:59 your air levels have diminished and you decided to withdraw can you remember now what levels your air had reached by that stage I can't because it wasn't my own set I had plenty of air left
03:06:11 plenty of air left it was a member of the crew and policy dictates that when one member of the crew gets low on air we all exit together as a team and just so that
03:06:22 together as a team and just so that members of the public who are listening to the evidence what's the underlying reason for that policy do you know what why is it the way it is I can obvious question this so you're not sucking on a
03:06:33 question this so you're not sucking on a face mask but no air basically as you went down back well was that the question you wanted no I was kind as can
03:06:44 question you wanted no I was kind as can think of another way in a minute way thinking of another way around it well I mean I think really what mr. Keeney would like to know is for the benefit of all of us perhaps is why is it policy
03:06:56 all of us perhaps is why is it policy that you go back as on unit it's just you never split up so it seems like if you're in a crew of five and certainly
03:07:08 you're in a crew of five and certainly on that night in hindsight is something that I if I was to do it again tomorrow we'd split the chrome work out who had enough air to stay together but with no life risk and with plenty of reading
03:07:20 life risk and with plenty of reading operators whereas ready to go as I told you before what we will wait in 90 minutes to get there the most feasible and and correct option was let's all go together let's let a crew with enough
03:07:31 together let's let a crew with enough air to get the next flat done can come down and do that is that if I cleared that I feel like that's very useful thankfully like I'm down around the place when you return to the bridgehead
03:07:42 place when you return to the bridgehead is it right that you briefed mr. Welsh as to what had gone on and what you'd encountered yeah I've read that in my statement when I when I was a I can't remember if it was Richard Welsh at that stage but we certainly reported back to
03:07:53 stage but we certainly reported back to the bridgehead with our exact actions of what happened on the floor it could I ask you to turn to page 11 of your statement and the second paragraph second line you stake there that most of
03:08:09 second line you stake there that most of the equipment was part up outside doors the stairs so it was like an equipment dump for our own use so we knew what we have to take onto each floor following I think our briefings did this placing of
03:08:24 think our briefings did this placing of equipment did this present an obstacle to people as they came up and down the stairwells or try to get in and out of the lobbies my recollection I can't
03:08:35 the lobbies my recollection I can't remember he ever hindering my own movement around the stairwell my recollection of it is there's role glimpse of hose or equipment and it's stacked close to the wall as you're
03:08:48 stacked close to the wall as you're coming up the stairs you have a wall in front of you so it's um it's up against that wall to leave the the area clear and the lobby door clear as well thank you now I think earlier on we were talking about the queue or queues
03:09:01 talking about the queue or queues outside the tower and you asked whether though it's possible to have a plan or a photograph that showed an overview of the tower I think we have one it's a met triple zero one six eight five four and
03:09:15 triple zero one six eight five four and apologies we just wait whilst there and if we could amplify the tower okay now
03:09:28 if we could amplify the tower okay now it'd probably be most useful mr. Asuna Donovan if you could identify for us we're pinpointing it on the screens above us where the queues were first of all this is just what I can think so in
03:09:49 all this is just what I can think so in the southeast to the southeast of the term correct
03:09:58 so northeast yeah that's where that's where we were changing our cylinders and we test in our state's yeah and waiting before you get caught
03:10:13 we're underneath so I believe and you
03:10:46 we're underneath so I believe and you seem to indicate in your earlier that you had some reservations about the efficiency of that setup is that a first summary of what you were saying I can only imagine that this this is just an
03:10:57 only imagine that this this is just an assumption that I've got which is wrong because I can only imagine that those two marshalling inland areas were communicating but I don't know why we were taking pass them the reason I know
03:11:08 were taking pass them the reason I know this is as a colleague of mine who works out of Gulf 29 Park Royal who was frustrated that on my second where I was
03:11:23 frustrated that on my second where I was jumping the queue so to speak because he was ready he had been waiting and he wanted to go in so he was in the red squared area we would take and pass that and the police riot police helped us
03:11:35 and the police riot police helped us enter the building through a side entrance and it seemed to me like I was jumping the queue which obviously I didn't want to do ahead of anyone else but that's why it kind of stuck in my
03:11:47 but that's why it kind of stuck in my head that there may be confusion between the two marshalling areas and when the marshalling officer called for ten officers I think you say in your statement did you volunteer to him or to someone else that you'd already been in the tower under be a mr. Aston O'Donovan
03:12:03 the tower under be a mr. Aston O'Donovan those are all the questions I've got so it might be appropriate to have a brief ten minute break to see whether or any other outstanding that is to allow us to conclude hopefully before one yes well this does happen
03:12:14 before one yes well this does happen from time to time capsule needs to take stock and other people may have suggestions so we'll have a break now if I said you're gonna tend to tend to what would that be long enough well if not
03:12:27 would that be long enough well if not you can send a message right we'll break until ten to one or whenever we're told the council already thanked so we'd like to go with the usher and I have to ask you not to talk to anyone about your
03:12:38 you not to talk to anyone about your evidence well you're out of the room well there we are good thank you right I'll rise as I'm
03:12:53 good thank you right I'll rise as I'm sitting in it ten to one thanks effort if that doesn't give you enough time send a message by the usher how do you say thanks
03:13:10 you