Outbreak of fire (26 June 2018 Pt 1 of 2)

Full transcript

00:10:08 morning everyone we're welcome to the hearing we're going to hear some more evidence today yes miss to it

00:10:20 [Music]

00:11:06 now mr. Dodd no no this is quite a difficult exercise and I think in view of that and the benefit of all of us they're gonna have a few more breaks perhaps slightly shorter but roughly

00:11:18 perhaps slightly shorter but roughly once now mr. millet would that be convenient yes mr. chairman what I was going to suggest it was that we break once an hour for five minutes if that's acceptable to you once an hour for five

00:11:30 acceptable to you once an hour for five minutes with it with a putt slightly longer break mid-morning to say 15 minutes yes you you choose a convenient point in focus very well it'll be convenient to me and convenient to mr.

00:11:41 convenient to me and convenient to mr. Dodd my hope yes thank you mr. chairman Thank You mr. Dunn before I start and may I say how grateful we are as the enquiry team to you for coming along

00:11:52 enquiry team to you for coming along yesterday and spending the entire day answering different questions from from me and I want you to know that you are doing a public service and we are extremely thankful to you for it can I

00:12:07 extremely thankful to you for it can I start by asking you to get back to policy 633 which is the high-rise firefighting policy which is a tab for of the policy bundle

00:12:27 and if you return in that bundle and tacky to Appendix 1 which is at page 19 internally we looked at that a little

00:12:42 internally we looked at that a little bit yesterday in relation to the shopping list of matters to be addressed on section 7 2d visits to premises and

00:12:56 on section 7 2d visits to premises and just looking at the list as a whole would like my first question is would you expect to address all of these issues in a single 7 2d visit

00:13:17 I will say in a single 72d visit because

00:13:22 the 70d project is a process that okay me the system was set up the the information was already out there in different systems usually on a paper

00:13:33 different systems usually on a paper system as far away at stations we have the Rd system that was born and a lot of the information from that was populated already from existing systems we had a

00:13:44 already from existing systems we had a with another fire brigade so the assumption and the expectation is a lot of that information would all be ready readily available within the OID process so if it was a premise that was

00:14:00 process so if it was a premise that was of a new build or that was came to light that we had no record of that premise then yes I would the expectation would that we would have to do a very robust and thorough 72 72 d visits

00:14:13 and thorough 72 72 d visits however when conducting premises that already existing to us and known to us then there may well be amendments and we can refer back to the appendix one and

00:14:24 can refer back to the appendix one and also policy no 800 to make those amendments so there is the expectation that every single 72 DB that we do and you have to follow a real robust and

00:14:40 you have to follow a real robust and process following that because expectation is there is should be some existing information there but that may well need amending right and when a building went underwent a substantial

00:14:52 building went underwent a substantial refurbishment what would your approach be to a to this shopping list when call it that when you went to visit that building when it was at the end of the refurbishment

00:15:19 if it means sort of looking at points if there was any amendment to that to that premise so any additional fire safety measures additions in terms of our

00:15:33 measures additions in terms of our resourcing from my sort of recollection remember that that would be where we would be looking at to amend the 70d process so just so I'm clear you would

00:15:45 process so just so I'm clear you would look at the details of the refurbishment and then check and see whether those details were things you have to check off on the on the list but obviously only the two to the information that was

00:15:57 only the two to the information that was surrendered to us so you know if there's something with that building we weren't aware of or we didn't literally understand because that information hasn't been surrendered to us or we won't know the risk was identified to us

00:16:09 won't know the risk was identified to us then that's something that we met by as an interview or watch officers wouldn't necessarily understand or record and who would you rely on to provide you with the information that you say would be

00:16:20 the information that you say would be surrendered - that would be the responsible person for whoever owns or is responsible for that block so if it's a Housing Association a local authority or a private landlord and in respect of

00:16:32 or a private landlord and in respect of your visits to grenfell tower do you remember who the responsible person was

00:16:40 no the only people are the organization's I know in terms of relation to responsible persons for graphical tower would be for my understanding ridings who the building

00:16:51 understanding ridings who the building contractor and Casey TMO which is cases in Chelsea Toni tenant management organization who I understand are the managing agents of grenfell Tower and how would it work would you rely on them

00:17:04 how would it work would you rely on them to volunteer relevant information about the matters on the shopping list or would you interrogate them are some questions about matters on the shopping list

00:17:20 it probably a to aid traffic but I would hope I would be hopeful that if if there was a certain risk within that building that wasn't expected then that should be

00:17:32 that wasn't expected then that should be surrendered from that responsible part of your person

00:17:42 the only way can I would sort of refer and it you know put high-rises Southside if I was going to another premise I had particular processes then you know that

00:17:53 particular processes then you know that were apparently less understand what we can put that into our hazards and risks if there was storage of certain products you know certain signage did not so yes I'm pretty good for but also there they

00:18:04 I'm pretty good for but also there they should have a responsible person who is under takes that responsibility to lay us and crews inform crews of that risk yes now you can see from the list that

00:18:18 yes now you can see from the list that one of the items on the list it's six bullet points up from the bottom evacuation arrangements which may

00:18:29 evacuation arrangements which may include phased evacuation do you see that on the screen you've already said I think that you didn't know what the

00:18:41 think that you didn't know what the evacuation plan was for Grenfell tower for the purposes of your 17d visit my question is were you aware at the time of that visit that it was a high-rise

00:18:52 of that visit that it was a high-rise building with a stay-put strategy in place

00:19:04 I wouldn't say that time to visit I was aware but my assumption is and from previous knowledge that majority of high-rise residential blocks will employ

00:19:15 high-rise residential blocks will employ a staple policy thank you now I'm going to ask you some questions about the night and to start with your arrival at Granville Tower which is I think where

00:19:27 Granville Tower which is I think where we left off yesterday afternoon mr. Darden before we get to the detail can I just ask you to give me a general summary of the basic points from your

00:19:38 summary of the basic points from your high-rise training based on the policy six three three that you told us about about how you would go about tackling a fire in a high-rise block so as per

00:19:53 fire in a high-rise block so as per policy 63 which is love and firemen goes high-rise policy so we sort of look at in stages so beyond route initially and

00:20:05 in stages so beyond route initially and that be accessing any information sources that are available to us whether that why the MDT which we spoke about and some detail which will give us some information about the premise any risks

00:20:17 information about the premise any risks that are posed further traffic from control if there's makeups which that means any additional resources will be required further information in terms of

00:20:28 required further information in terms of multiple calls if it's identified if it's a person reported incident and that's all information is the commander we need to see put into our plan to

00:20:42 we need to see put into our plan to moving forward in terms of when we're on scene as per policy 633 good practices what we need to do is come up confirm

00:20:55 what we need to do is come up confirm our water supplies now be from a local hydrant source into our fire engine and then we have to automate water supplies and what that means is we have to supply water to the building if it's a dry

00:21:06 water to the building if it's a dry rising mate so we supply water to that that pipe live in the building that allows us to firefight internally if it's a wet rising main and that's already fully charged with water expectation is at

00:21:20 charged with water expectation is at ground level we do as a mr. commander some information gathering so that'll be from responsible people the block residents and also to have a visual on the building itself can we see any signs and symptoms of fire once we've

00:21:33 and symptoms of fire once we've established that from the information gathering the crews the first in attendance will be gathering a certain certain out equipment but we need as a minimum to help us tackle high-rise fire

00:21:46 minimum to help us tackle high-rise fire this will include the ice sets to be worn by firefighters the natural control board forward information board as a

00:21:57 board forward information board as a minimum for lengths of hose or more unless and that should be identified at familiarisation visits can I just pause there for lengths of hose beginning so four lengths of 45 millimeter hose right

00:22:08 four lengths of 45 millimeter hose right and that's in each level 23 metres in length and that's to go said I'm clear that's to go from the dry rising main outlet that's the pump to the Internet no that's to go from the dry rising outlet within the building right the

00:22:19 outlet within the building right the hose we use from the pumping appliance so from the hydrant to the first pumping appliance will be 17 millimeter hose again that is 23 meters in length from pre-planning will identify how much the

00:22:31 pre-planning will identify how much the hose for that all needs and in terms of sighting appliances and again from the pumping appliance that's dedicated the water machine you'll have 70 millimeter hose which again is set 23 metres in

00:22:42 hose which again is set 23 metres in length which will be supplying the Dreiser

00:22:44 Dreiser inlet okay and that's how we augment or supply water to that property and how long roughly would it take to charge these 70 millimeter hose which runs from the pump to the dry rising main would

00:22:56 the pump to the dry rising main would you expect it's very difficult to put time on there there is a number of factors that can can change that now obviously we rely on hydrant surprise it all depends about the hydro supplies at

00:23:08 all depends about the hydro supplies at that time of operable it they're obstructed by vehicles sometimes parked over them so we have to move that access to them personnel resources in

00:23:19 access to them personnel resources in terms of if we have sometimes you know we can have five or six on a fire engine sometimes we can have four so there are a number of factors in determining how

00:23:31 a number of factors in determining how long that would take so it should be a matter of hopefully minutes if everything works for you and how long would it normally take to charge the 45 millimeter hose from the dry rising

00:23:44 millimeter hose from the dry rising inlet to the be a crew who's about to make entry again that does have some factors in terms of timescales it depends on where we are internally in

00:23:55 depends on where we are internally in the building how high up we have to go and again if things within that building are working correctly far Eliphaz etc if we have to use the stairs if the lifts

00:24:07 we have to use the stairs if the lifts compromised so if it's on the lower floors again you know you can have a quick attack on that but if it's on the upper floors that can take some time it's not a quick process in terms of tackling fires within a high-rise

00:24:18 tackling fires within a high-rise building it's not we turn up we go we've got our water supply we've got equipment you have to have things in place before we can make an entry into compartment yes and what about the bridgehead could

00:24:30 yes and what about the bridgehead could you just give us a an idea of what happens at the bridgehead the bridgehead is is a place where we commit commit from committing a safe place we've been building that we cannot our be a cruise

00:24:41 building that we cannot our be a cruise from this is this will be set up two floors below the fire floor this allows for a bit of contingency in case you

00:24:52 for a bit of contingency in case you know the floors above become compromised so we always set operator up two floors below if the building allows us to do that because some of the cars buildings within London will not allow you to do that and the one particular concern when

00:25:04 that and the one particular concern when North Kensington where I can refer that to is it is treading Tower because of the way the construction of that building is is a maintenance is a style construction high-rise so you only have entrance from a protected stairwell into

00:25:17 entrance from a protected stairwell into the into the flats every three floors so some electronic tower from local knowledge and pre-planning our bridgehead laterally on the fire floor because there was an there is the the main residential block you have a

00:25:29 main residential block you have a protected walkway and then a separate protected stairwell so it's not always two floors below but that's only you own identification pre-planning and we'll come on to some

00:25:42 pre-planning and we'll come on to some details about but precisely what happened in relation to the bridgehead later on is there anything else you want to add by way of a summary of what you know about high-rise firefighting based

00:25:53 know about high-rise firefighting based on policy 63

00:26:02 not really just a couple of small points we can't make a compartment entry and that means obviously the compartment we refer to another five gauges is the is the room or flat on fire that's the

00:26:13 the room or flat on fire that's the compartment we have to have a confirmed water supply before we do that the way we do that in under fire brigade is that again to make sure our crews are safe we plug in all men power hose into the

00:26:26 plug in all men power hose into the dryer riser from the floor below the fire floor and that allows crews that they've got a firefighting media or water supply to progress up to the fire floor into unknown conditions because

00:26:38 floor into unknown conditions because higher office firefighting is challenging once that initial crew has made entry into the compartment we need to secure their access and egress and have a second crew to back them up and

00:26:49 have a second crew to back them up and Jerry what what happen is the the second crew will fight plug in if it's available on the fire floor they'll plug their hose it into the fire floor and they will back up and protect that first

00:27:01 they will back up and protect that first crew the only change to that if for certain conditions or signs are symptoms in that compartment are evident and that is a flashover or backdraft we are not

00:27:12 is a flashover or backdraft we are not we should not be putting crews into that risk area if those certain conditions apply because I'll see the crew safety is very paramount from for an organizational organizational point of view but from the next and commanders

00:27:23 view but from the next and commanders point of view if that happens the backup crew has to be in place before we make a compartment entry for firefighter safety news help just give me an idea of how hard and fast the rule or principle is

00:27:37 hard and fast the rule or principle is about not putting firefighters into the compartment without a water supply it's it's the number one wall we number one there is no point putting a firefighter

00:27:49 there is no point putting a firefighter into a compartment on fire without firefighting media having said that it is difficult place for a firefighter to be because we're here to help we want to

00:28:02 be because we're here to help we want to help people and if there if there's a person reported fire we know there's someone in there and that's why things have to happen quickly to

00:28:13 why things have to happen quickly to allow us to to get there as quickly as we can but professionally as well we have to act professionally thank you very much

00:28:19 very much now I'm going to ask you some detailed questions about the rifle at the very beginning I think we know from the records that G 272 golf 272 and golf 271

00:28:32 records that G 272 golf 272 and golf 271 arrived from North Kensington in that order at 59 24 and 59 28 I did testing you and your precise memory of those but take it from me that that's what the log

00:28:44 take it from me that that's what the log shows so they were you would call status three let's go at that point were they the first appliances to arrive on scene in response to a call to a fire at

00:28:56 in response to a call to a fire at Grenville tower that night yes they were they were there was no appliance there before you no no I think you tell us you parked Golf 271 under the covered part

00:29:07 parked Golf 271 under the covered part of Grenfell walk why did you park there that's for pre-planning of a previous visit at CERN a perfect location for us to be able to get our hose at the quickest opportunity into our riser so

00:29:19 quickest opportunity into our riser so that was from pre-planning it was a minimum of one length away from the dry Weiser Inlet that allowed us to put water into that building okay and so you say pre-planning did in

00:29:30 okay and so you say pre-planning did in the pre-planning did you know where the dry rising main outlet was yes right where was it it was main entrance on the south side of the tower to the left hand side this ground floor level very good

00:29:42 side this ground floor level very good and did G to go through 72 I call it G 270 to arrive and behind jz7 one where did G 72 72 Park

00:29:55 did G 72 72 Park initially it was just a position just behind it from my memory I've got two or g27 one can you remember what you saw

00:30:07 g27 one can you remember what you saw immediately you arrived you personally my first recollection when I dismounted the appliance is that I walked round from

00:30:19 appliance is that I walked round from where we were position under Grenfell walk to the east side and I glanced up to the East elevation of Grand Hotel and around the full floor level I could see an orange glow at a window of

00:30:32 an orange glow at a window of compartment at the full floor level now in your statement on page 3 mr. Da'Ville if you can just be shown that in the middle of the page I'm afraid there are no paragraph numbers that we can work

00:30:44 no paragraph numbers that we can work from so bear with me but about half way down the page you see it says I've dismounted the appliance and could see that there was a fire on the fourth floor level of the tower and could see a

00:30:55 floor level of the tower and could see a glow within the flat on the inside of the building many say this it seemed contained within the compartment was that your thought at the time yes and standing there and

00:31:09 the time yes and standing there and seeing the fire did you make any assumptions about whether the building complied with the rules and regulations about buildings so far as compartment a

00:31:20 about buildings so far as compartment a tional is concerned

00:31:25 not at that moment I mean that's not a thought

00:31:29 thought dynamic stages of an incident as an insta commando that is not a full process it will go through your mind no not okay

00:31:36 not okay now what they'll ask you this could you see from your initial look at the building that the exterior of the building was covered in a cladding

00:31:49 building was covered in a cladding envelope

00:31:56 at that point I wasn't aware that it was cladding at that point I just thought it was the external part of Grand Hotel did you look at the outside uh I would have

00:32:08 you look at the outside uh I would have looked to the outside but I didn't app don't make any conscious no or thought of what was the external that building no but which pump was to be attached to the hydrant to obtain the water supply

00:32:24 at that point it was Golf two seven one at that point it was 271 and who took charge of that that process yet from

00:32:35 charge of that that process yet from memory my two drivers of the appliances so five like damn bills who is the driver of the public of 271 and also firefighter Tom Abel there was the

00:32:46 firefighter Tom Abel there was the driver of the pump which has got 272 that would be their role that is part of their role as a driver to facilitate the water supplies right

00:32:58 water supplies right did you at at that point think of speaking to the responsible person

00:33:11 the person responsible for Grandville town

00:33:18 again not at that point from my understanding of it you know some high-rise blocks we've been London and particularly we do have this one of granite of Kensington have a 24-hour concierge I wasn't aware that grounds

00:33:32 concierge I wasn't aware that grounds hotel had a responsible person available at that point for me isn't it's a command are the best information source we can have at that point would be residents yes in general terms when

00:33:45 residents yes in general terms when you're fighting a high-rise fire would you normally at some point speak to the person responsible for the building

00:33:59 that could be a consideration if that person is on the scene a dynamic stage of incident I know there would be emergency or a contact for that block

00:34:10 emergency or a contact for that block but that's not something necessarily you have time or necessary the time to contact at that point if that responsible person was on scene at moment in time absolutely yes right but

00:34:23 moment in time absolutely yes right but might there come a point during the development of the fire or the firefighting or search-and-rescue that you would need to contact the person responsible for the building yep there

00:34:40 responsible for the building yep there is good I would say good practice to liaise with a responsible person for that block but that's not just allowing too high lies queer things that's in any building we have that so good

00:34:52 building we have that so good information source yep and in your experience as an incident commander mister darden have you ever have you ever had cause to contact the person responsible for the building during the course of firefighting

00:35:08 not like not remotely I buy phone contact usually model my contact or conversation with a responsive person that's an incident would be on scene

00:35:20 that's an incident would be on scene right okay well we'll come back to that question as we go through some of the facts now you I think you told us that you were the initial incident commander

00:35:32 you were the initial incident commander at the at the incident on the night and we can see I think from your training records that you had had training in the role of incident command on a number of

00:35:43 role of incident command on a number of occasions before the 14th of June 2017 is that right yes yes I'm just going to show you two policies first but first of all policy

00:35:55 policies first but first of all policy lfb 4 3 1 which is at tab 11 I'm not sure we'd be to its lfb 6 0 is 48

00:36:11 and this is current as at the 18th of November 2014 just looking at the first page do you think you're familiar we'll were familiar on the night with that

00:36:24 were familiar on the night with that policy yes three one and the other one is in policy bundle one which is lfb policy two three eight which is at lfv

00:36:38 policy two three eight which is at lfv five zeroes one six for incident command procedures current as of April 2014

00:36:49 procedures current as of April 2014 again as at the 14th of June 2017 do you remember being familiar with that policy I would be fairly yes right

00:37:02 and

00:37:11 wouldn't that we know that you had training from your records in incident command decision-making but would that have included training on these policies

00:37:31 the initial input I think we spoke about it yesterday was particularly go from a firefighter to crew manager you have your initial input and that's when you

00:37:42 your initial input and that's when you sort would really get it all new instant commands procedures how it's set up and then of these refresher training there's supervisor manager and managers in

00:37:54 supervisor manager and managers in refresher courses to command refresher course and also a more local level at station base that's something I would facilitate as well but you know I don't

00:38:06 facilitate as well but you know I don't outside of the instant command refresher courses that I believe that in every two years that then the train that I receive will be dancer myself right can I just

00:38:19 will be dancer myself right can I just can I just explore that a little bit a little bit more could you please take or be shown on the screen tab nine which is your training records it's tap nine of the bundle bundle that's it and can I

00:38:31 the bundle bundle that's it and can I ask you to go to page 25 which is the entry for the 12th of May 2017

00:38:49 and if mr. Trotter okay you could just highlight the 12th of May there should be clear truth therefore 12th of May 2017 mr. Daniel is bare with me

00:39:11 it's towards the bottom of the pitch about two-thirds of the way down the page 12th of May yes there just got it right so on the

00:39:24 yes there just got it right so on the 12th of May you'll see there are three entries at the annual training record all theoretical station based training

00:39:36 all theoretical station based training and the left-hand column shows decision-making model three for one and then training supervisor incident management incident command decision

00:39:47 management incident command decision making decision making model three for one and then below it dynamic risk assessment health and safety and then underneath that training supervisor training notes training dynamic risk

00:39:58 training notes training dynamic risk assessment training note that's a chunk of training on the 12th of May 2017 do you remember whether on that occasion

00:40:11 do you remember whether on that occasion you had training in incident command decision-making not facilitated for the brigade over that we as a station base level that so it could be from for myself familiarizing decision-making

00:40:23 myself familiarizing decision-making what do we spoke about yesterday which helps us through that flowchart process you know resource gabbro information relating to an instance so that would be a policy based Theory session right so

00:40:35 a policy based Theory session right so not the two policies we've just been looking at for three one or two three eight know that it's base what the lose to interventions to command to that decision-making model sits under sort of an umbrella of Anniston command training

00:40:48 an umbrella of Anniston command training i think it's that yeah so that's not that's not referring to those policies no okay could you then turn will beat could we go to page 24 very bottom same

00:40:59 could we go to page 24 very bottom same document that backer page very last entry we're on the 16th of March 2017 we can see the very last entry is

00:41:10 can see the very last entry is management role sorry I think I'm say so you don't have to show them document mister trial directly a little bit more widely said we can see was the left as well you should go across

00:41:23 the left as well you should go across the page you going

00:41:29 yeah yes so there's your name and then if you go back across to the right training supervisor 16th of March 17 and an above it incident commander management role incident commander

00:41:40 management role incident commander incident commander on that occasion would you have been trained in policy 431 or policy 2 3 8 you think I wouldn't have been trained at that again is a

00:41:51 have been trained at that again is a station based level and as you can see trained supervisor so I would have a local level station that will refer to the policies we're talking about instant

00:42:02 the policies we're talking about instant commander it would yeah but that's not a that's not a century trained thing that's at a local level station okay but but that local level you would be receiving is this right receiving or

00:42:14 receiving is this right receiving or giving training on policy any for Halloween I'll be looking at getting that training it who's giving training on four three one and two three eight yes yes that local level yes yes and that's trainings when you say you're

00:42:28 and that's trainings when you say you're giving it is that in reference to training supervisor or both entries trainings I believe trains the training supervisor is a role so that's not from my understanding of how it works that's

00:42:39 my understanding of how it works that's not the policy it's a role because obviously the what being enough what a watch officer the training supervisor is when I check a certain box within that training record it will say who is a

00:42:51 training record it will say who is a lecturer or the training supervisor and that's where that would be kind of that's why that records is shown there I understand and and the one above it I should I should have taken this a little bit more slowly incident commander which

00:43:03 bit more slowly incident commander which is the second last entry there you see is that you receiving training you know that they will go they should be that same with the same entry so because I

00:43:16 same with the same entry so because I was the training supervisor and the the fit of the subject matter and the theory based session would have been about interesting command okay and then if we look a little bit higher up the page for the entries on the 19th of February 2017

00:43:29 the entries on the 19th of February 2017 we see again against your name incident commando management role in commander into the commander and then underneath that training supervisor management world training supervisor

00:43:41 management world training supervisor training supervisor both entries for the 19th of February 2017 again that's is that the same as that's the same service if whether the officer is delivering

00:43:53 if whether the officer is delivering that training session or what the theory base sessional practical session if they are allocators as delivering the training they will be the supervisor it's not a specific policy or session

00:44:05 it's not a specific policy or session it's just a role right so can we assume that you were as incident commander in the early part of 2017 very familiar

00:44:18 the early part of 2017 very familiar with those two policies for three one and two three eight and heard both had training on them and we give it was giving training on them at a local level at least yes yes thank you now can I then ask you to look at the

00:44:31 now can I then ask you to look at the first of those policies policy 431 in tab 11 of the policy bundle I've given them a letter theme relativity reference

00:44:42 them a letter theme relativity reference for that six zeroes forty-eight and can I ask you please to turn first of all to page three internal

00:45:00 and can we look

00:45:06 in fact there's a quicker way of doing this I think page two mr. cha direct if you could please get back a page key point summary and just in terms of this

00:45:18 point summary and just in terms of this policy

00:45:19 policy the key point summary is that just so we know that that's a that's a a summary of the entire contents of the policy is it it gives us snapshot of that sort of the

00:45:30 it gives us snapshot of that sort of the main points within a policy yes and in the middle you can see role the primary purposes of the operational incident command is to save life that it's the first bullet point you go - the middle

00:45:43 first bullet point you go - the middle of the page I'm sorry in the middle of the page

00:45:49 that road primary purposes of operational incident commanders to save life and then there's a list of other things below that prevent further spread loss a risk of injury mitigate damage

00:46:02 loss a risk of injury mitigate damage mitigate environmental damage and minimize disruption to the community are those listed in orders of priority absolutely and then responsibilities on arrival at an incident the IC will wear the white

00:46:13 an incident the IC will wear the white incident command Tabard and then you have to assess the incident establish priorities and decide upon an overall operational plan using the DMA my question is you were were you aware on

00:46:28 question is you were were you aware on arrival at Granville tower as incident commander on the 14th June of that responsibility as incident commander yes

00:46:42 and say you were aware that the primary purpose of your roles instead of commander was the saving of life yes and then the other things below that yes and

00:47:00 you then if you look at the third bullet point down it says you'll see it says undertake an initial dynamic risk risk assessment and subsequent reviews of that dynamic risk assessment with DRA

00:47:13 that dynamic risk assessment with DRA following a DRA a tactical mode must be declared this process will be continuous throughout the incident just so that I understand it is the dynamic risk

00:47:24 understand it is the dynamic risk assessment or the DRA a reference to policy 341 the decision-making model is it something else separate policy is a separate policy yeah all right we may

00:47:35 separate policy yeah all right we may need to come back to that I can explain if you want me to yes please do snapshot that policy darling course assessment what allows us it does work alongside decision-making model and what basic that does is it analysis its commanders

00:47:47 that does is it analysis its commanders not just commanders everyone has that responsibility on fire for up to you know don't risk assessment for themselves and others but particularly for instant commander that allows us to

00:47:59 for instant commander that allows us to basically a policy or our safe systems of work choose and formulate a plan to help us move forward into the hazard area and the tactical mode is so if I

00:48:14 area and the tactical mode is so if I have burnout reverse assess it working from a decision-making model I've chose whether it's a safe system welcome we're in this Pacifica relates high-rise with the high-rise procedure and then upon

00:48:26 the high-rise procedure and then upon come commit personnel to a hazard zone I make a compartment or into the fire the tactical mode is to tactical modes one is Oscar one is Delta the relation says Oscars offense if it means we're

00:48:37 says Oscars offense if it means we're committing personnel to a hazard zone because I have the right resources I've chosen my safe systems of work I'm happy that my firefighters our safe is convened to make a an entry and as it said the priority is to save life

00:48:49 as it said the priority is to save life or extinguish fire and the Delta is defensive I don't think it's safe I don't have the right resources in place to to commit personal

00:49:00 to to commit personal at a time thank you very much it's very clear so on arrival at grenfell tower on the night of the 14th morning of the 14th of June 2017

00:49:11 14th of June 2017 did you undertake an initial dynamic risk assessment it it's something it's an instinctive thing it's not even given

00:49:22 an instinctive thing it's not even given Chinese I don't turn up and think I've got to do a dynamic assessment I know it sounds strange but as in squad that's something that you are trying to do you we all do that as a as individuals members of the public don't dine out

00:49:34 members of the public don't dine out which it has been every single day or so of course at Logan I won't you know we do that assessment anyway if we as an organization we have to have a process behind and a policy behind out to refer to and to give training from as incident

00:49:45 to and to give training from as incident commander turn up an incident from experience from training remember that is something that is is is is done as a natural do we do that as a duck yes so I won't say I constantly I must make a

00:49:57 won't say I constantly I must make a dynamic system I look for my experiences from policy from training from my situational ways on that incident ground at that moment in time I will do a dynamic risk assessment and that will

00:50:08 dynamic risk assessment and that will allow me to make my decision in terms okay have I got enough resources is it safe to put personnel within that has its own and having Donna it's an

00:50:20 has its own and having Donna it's an instinctive I think dynamic risk assessment you've been describing can you tell us what that was what was the assessment of you initially performed it's it's you have to have a certain

00:50:33 it's it's you have to have a certain information first okay and what I spoke about yesterday you think you look looking at his life fire and hazard because I've seen a number one priority London Fire Brigades to

00:50:44 one priority London Fire Brigades to save life as against a commander you have to gather some information first before you can make that Dynamis which risk assessment so on that night I was approached by the

00:50:58 so on that night I was approached by the resident of flat 16 and we have to ask a certain number a certain amount of questions that will lead us to allow us to make that dynamic assessment those questions will be along the lines okay

00:51:10 questions will be along the lines okay find out that is the responsible resident of that block or building of premise that I have information if the where is the file located what is on fire

00:51:19 fire how long was the fighting burning for is anyone involved or any persons if I that's that's a really important part does that really change your thought process of it as a used to commander are there any hazard within that

00:51:30 are there any hazard within that property that building depending on what answers are surrendered and that allows you to formulate your planners instant commander so on the night of the fire

00:51:41 commander so on the night of the fire whole tower I initially when I turned up and I did have that dialogue with the resident of flat 16 confirmed that the fire is in flag 16 is on the fourth

00:51:52 fire is in flag 16 is on the fourth floor

00:51:54 floor the fire was in the kitchen everything he believed it was his fridge that was on fire

00:52:00 on fire and I also questioned once is there anyone inside the building they confirm no like I reiterated that just confirm my understanding you can guarantee me that there's no one in flat

00:52:12 guarantee me that there's no one in flat 16 everyone else is out interpret the reply of snow right that's very helpful mr. Daniel I'm going to come back just to explore that a little bit more in a moment because we've got some evidence

00:52:24 moment because we've got some evidence to look at before we do can I just ask you to keep on this page and go down a couple of bullet points this is page 2 mammography policy 431 and just look at

00:52:36 mammography policy 431 and just look at the bullet point that says develop an effective organizational incident command structure and communications network did you do that on arrival of

00:52:47 network did you do that on arrival of Grenfell tower

00:52:53 yes I said would what can you do in the reasons for that so use the command structure is instant command we're going back to the policy we look we look at things called spans of control so expands bands of control so that mean

00:53:05 expands bands of control so that mean your lines of communication roof notional source is coming to you as an instant commander comfortable mount is three lines of sponsor control lines of communication coming to you so that may well be your information gathering into

00:53:17 well be your information gathering into the initial sources of a resident occupier owner different agencies we want to limit that's a three but the optimum that you should be operating out as an insider is five spans of control

00:53:29 as an insider is five spans of control anything beyond that it gets really really difficult to try and process that information so mines the command structure based on that and referring to high-rise policy was that I would remain

00:53:42 high-rise policy was that I would remain at the real initial point of that incident Bionic stage that incident I would remain a ground floor level the outside of grandfather hour because I need to have situational awareness of

00:53:54 need to have situational awareness of what's going on outside and around and be able to liaise with oncoming agencies further resources in terms of how that would have worked i briefed my crew

00:54:05 would have worked i briefed my crew manager at the time Chris secret he was to be in charge of operations at the bridgehead so he's based on my eyes and ears on the bridgehead and he'll be committing resources from there to the

00:54:17 committing resources from there to the fire compartment in terms of communications network the incident command channel which I was on was ten of one and that's how i liaise with crew major secret up at the bridgehead all be

00:54:30 major secret up at the bridgehead all be a teams would observe channel six which is our breathing apparatus communications channel

00:54:40 and what about communications back to brigade control that will be facilitated via the main scheme radio so on every

00:54:53 via the main scheme radio so on every front line pumping appliances we have our main skiing radio and that's how we on the fire ground we'll be able to communicate back to control and I'm sorry to go right away into a question

00:55:05 sorry to go right away into a question I'm totally going to ask you this afternoon

00:55:07 afternoon never mind you've got the main scheme really radio linking control to pump 271 which is the command unit no no no caucus everyone is a command unit has

00:55:19 caucus everyone is a command unit has totally separate as a separate function that is a specific specific vehicle so golf two seven one is a pumpkin applies pump ladder in a dynamic stage of the

00:55:30 pump ladder in a dynamic stage of the incident we can identify or a pumping appliance as an instant command pump and I believe that function weights of golf to 72 that night for 72 right the only

00:55:41 to 72 that night for 72 right the only reason why that happened you can't confuse it so we have to have a machine supplying water through a however it's a high-rise block a commercial premise or

00:55:52 high-rise block a commercial premise or even if it's the firefighting pump supplying water you can understand that the diesel pump is revving there's a lot of work a lot of noise around that machine okay so that the theory behind it is we have have a separate machine

00:56:04 it is we have have a separate machine those that would that will be allocated as these command pump and that will be facilitating message via the main scheme radio to the fire ground that's in theory how it should work I see so main screen main scheme radio

00:56:17 I see so main screen main scheme radio links control to the command unit whatever it is and then is there somebody in the command unit who is on

00:56:29 somebody in the command unit who is on the other end of the radio so you just repeat that question yes who is it let me put it this way who is in who stays within the command unit on the incident ground to receive radio messages coming

00:56:40 ground to receive radio messages coming on the main scheme radio from control so if it's not so for talking that means to come on vehicle or pump at that time the ICP as we call it on the fire ground then

00:56:52 then a theory is that a driver will facilitate taking those messages from control via the designated machine right

00:57:03 control via the designated machine right it does happen very very early stages of a dynamic incident which Grand Hotel was extremely dynamic that sometimes it's difficult to facilitate because of how

00:57:14 difficult to facilitate because of how quickly your resources can be consumed on the fire ground and apart from having a driver or a person on that vehicle we

00:57:25 a driver or a person on that vehicle we have no way of communicating with control so you're standing outside with a radio on the ground floor they do you communicate directly with brigade

00:57:39 communicate directly with brigade control or do you communicate with the command unit who then communicates with brigade control I think we need to be clear it's not a command GI that we need to be assisted at a separate function as

00:57:51 to be assisted at a separate function as a separate vehicle so the ICP we prefer to the ICP it's a command pump because that is a that the initial stage of an incident that is a pumping appliance that will be dedicated in a role of the

00:58:02 that will be dedicated in a role of the instant command vehicle when a command unit which is a vehicle which comes on a later point or a resourcing point that's the commands unit there are two separate vehicles and functions but you're right

00:58:13 vehicles and functions but you're right the only way I as an officer in charge at a watch manager based level have a fire ground radio so I don't have the up the function to communicate directly to

00:58:24 the function to communicate directly to control from the fire ground the only way that we can do that through frontline pumping appliances is via the main scheme radio which is all on the all frontline pumping appliances that's very clear thank you now can I just ask you to look

00:58:42 now can I just ask you to look at policy two three eight just one or two questions on that which is bundled tear policy bundles have one incident command procedures

00:59:05 and just picking up your point about ICP just so I've got it in my head in policy terms if you look at page two internally

00:59:17 terms if you look at page two internally of policy two three eight this is the key point summary and if you look at halfway down that bullet point list just under the bold letters I'm taking over

00:59:29 under the bold letters I'm taking over can you see it says an initial command pump ICP will be established as soon as possible you guys want to say whenever more than one pumping appliance is in attendance headlights and blue beacons should remain on to identify it but just

00:59:41 should remain on to identify it but just say that we're all absolutely clear on arrival at groennfell tower on the night which was the initial command pump I think you said it was 272 from wildin

00:59:53 think you said it was 272 from wildin standing and referring back to my statement the decision was taken for God or chief 272 to be the ICP right and so would it follow from that that but let

01:00:04 would it follow from that that but let me ask you in a neutral way who would have been the main scheme radio operator communicating with brigade control mig-27 - ideally it would be the driver

01:00:18 mig-27 - ideally it would be the driver of that appliance but that's not always the case that you know we all have a responsibility I resent some commander it could be role of a firefighter depending on what resource was available at that time would one of your crew be

01:00:32 at that time would one of your crew be assigned to be the radio operator unless he's taken office in speak so he'd stay there until he got some other order not necessarily no yeah anyone how

01:00:44 order not necessarily no yeah anyone how resourcing goes a real dynamic stages of an incident because I've seen that we have to weigh up okay we need water to get into that building so at that moment

01:00:56 get into that building so at that moment in time both the drivers were exhausted in terms of facilitating the hydrant and the do I riser supply so it's not a case of what that if we had the luxury of you know

01:01:09 that if we had the luxury of you know having sex or liniment maximum right levels on on the fire appliances then yes that maybe won't be the case but generally divided ship tables aren't at the maximum which every wide a minimum

01:01:22 the maximum which every wide a minimum mm-hmm that night we write in five and five but so it's not as if though if we have the resource to not personally unless there is a good practice to adopt

01:01:34 unless there is a good practice to adopt but what I'd like to know is when you get to the fire and you designate 272 as the ICP there's one of the crew nerves

01:01:46 the ICP there's one of the crew nerves that he is the radio operator something to being cold to do other cities or is it just a case of who happens to be close enough to hear the radio no no no so it should be generally be the driver

01:01:58 so it should be generally be the driver that takes that that role but you know everyone on the fire ground has someone standing with that that's that's how that theory works if needed be that they

01:02:10 that theory works if needed be that they could take the radio message and traffic isn't if it is required yup thank you and just one more question on this question on this communications point now if you go on in this same policy to

01:02:22 now if you go on in this same policy to page five you can see there is a heading under Section seven functions of initial command pumped by CP and this covers

01:02:33 command pumped by CP and this covers that and if you look at paragraph seven point four it says the ICP will provide the communications link which went between Brigade control and the IC have remained the incident focal point until

01:02:44 remained the incident focal point until relieved by the Cu is that what you were referring to earlier when you said that the initial pump is the ICP

01:02:55 said that the initial pump is the ICP that's correct and then what is that what is the difference then between so far as the communications link is concerned between the ICP and the CEO so

01:03:10 concerned between the ICP and the CEO so just repeat the question again what's the difference between the ICP and the Cu the command unit is purely for

01:03:21 Cu the command unit is purely for instant command it's not a firefighting appliance it doesn't carry any water wasn't carrying a firefighting equipment is purely to facilitate better command and control structure and assisting the

01:03:32 and control structure and assisting the commander and at any incident and just a couple of questions on the main scheme radio where abouts is that situated in in a pump is it on the vehicle it's

01:03:44 in a pump is it on the vehicle it's correct it's in the front cab where the often child sits and the driver sits it's located roughly sort of at head height you've got a radio display and

01:03:58 height you've got a radio display and then you've got a handheld press to talk transfer receiver and transfer receiver that you'll get to it send you regular

01:04:09 that you'll get to it send you regular traffic to control and receive traffic as well and can I can it be removed from the vehicle can use it portably no you can't you can't so someone needs to be physically sitting in the ICP at all

01:04:22 physically sitting in the ICP at all times in order to monitor and receive those radio messages that's the theory yes that's the theory

01:04:31 and just going back a page in the same policy to paragraph five the incident commander I see and look at paragraph

01:04:42 commander I see and look at paragraph five point five that that says that it is essential that action in the very early stages of the incident supports

01:04:53 early stages of the incident supports the overall plan the IC will therefore need to make a positive decision as to the purpose of manner in which to commit initial resources the IC will through reference to the decision making model

01:05:04 reference to the decision making model DMM establish the situation assess the situation establish priorities and decide upon an operational over an overall operational plan like my question is did you do that

01:05:17 question is did you do that did you assess the situation establish priorities and decide upon an operational plan on arrival at Grand Vitara yes and what was your overall

01:05:28 Vitara yes and what was your overall operational plan can you remember from the month we turned up in the early stages of that incident my operational plan was to commit crews once we have

01:05:39 plan was to commit crews once we have established the safe system the work as a high-rise policy commits crews from the bridgehead and to make a compartment we put that fire out

01:05:51 at that stage did you consider the risk of failure of compartment ation

01:06:07 remember I would say yes because my recollection is we had a covering jet on the external ready as I said you know compartment ation does fail and that's

01:06:19 compartment ation does fail and that's not something that's uncommon in fires weak points windows doors moving away from just high-rise premises a good practice to have a covering jet out particularly to protect firefighters

01:06:31 particularly to protect firefighters access and egress into a premise and for my understanding that and that was facilitated by one of my drivers down Bill's we had a cover in jet out because it was on the fourth floor you know if

01:06:42 it was on the fourth floor you know if it was higher up building that we were more difficult to facilitate because you know we are the limitations about fire fighting Jets don't necessarily reach certain amount of flaws but because of of where the fire wasn't full thought I

01:06:55 of where the fire wasn't full thought I do believe that quite early on we had a covering jet out laid out ready to encase a compartment ation failed on the external of the building now this was a

01:07:07 external of the building now this was a a full pump fire because the predetermined attendance for high rises is four pumps is that correct that's correct and and although initially the peak the makeup was three it was very

01:07:20 peak the makeup was three it was very quickly corrected by brigade control as a matter of record it does that does that accord with your recollection that's correct I received further traffic on Route two Grenville tower

01:07:31 traffic on Route two Grenville tower that the PDF made may been made up to the correct amount of appliances because it would been identified as a high-rise block there now under the LF B's make up policy then mobilization policy as it

01:07:44 policy then mobilization policy as it stood

01:07:46 stood at the time of the fire did you did you know what the personnel requirements for a four pump fire were personally yeah the personnel requirements did you

01:07:58 yeah the personnel requirements did you know what level of officer was required to attend at a full pump fire so as a walks range of B that's my sort of

01:08:09 walks range of B that's my sort of there's two levels of we're trained to have a level one or level two as to command so for me out to watch men at B level I'm trained to instil command level one and that's generally I operate

01:08:20 level one and that's generally I operate to anything up to four pumping appliances with that you'll get a station manager that would be it will be not necessary at end who will be

01:08:31 not necessary at end who will be notified by pager as a monitoring officer to monitor that incident did at the time of arrival at Grenville tower on the night do you know whether you had

01:08:44 on the night do you know whether you had a station manager paged to attend as a monitoring officer that information would have been available via the tip sheet we spoke about yesterday that we

01:08:56 sheet we spoke about yesterday that we have comes through the watch room so I would have been aware at that point overs and what it's worth more than officer on there and do you remember who the station manager was

01:09:10 I don't remember at that point in time but obviously since that I do know who that monster officer was yes who was there it was a station manager Andy Wharton Andy Walton and

01:09:25 do you remember what time he arrived on scene no doubt mr. Chanin I'm going to turn to a different topic yes and it may

01:09:36 turn to a different topic yes and it may be convenient again yes thank you you're probably quite like a Brit now and you thank you

01:09:44 thank you quite well we'll break I'm going to stay for five minutes say until twenty five to eleven and I shall want to be back in promptly at 25

01:10:02 you [Music]

01:17:44 all right yep good fine thank you yes look mr. Darby can I just go back to something to do with to do with communications at the initial command

01:17:56 communications at the initial command pump and the radio is there a speaker which is contained on the outside of the an unordinary pump lateral pump which

01:18:09 an unordinary pump lateral pump which would allow people around the pump to hear what messages are coming in to the ICP from the gate control that's correct there is a in the pump bay there is a loudspeaker we can turn on that will

01:18:22 loudspeaker we can turn on that will allow us to do that yes right so it's in the pump day is it yes whereabouts on the vehicles degree of the at the rear of the appliance right do you remember whether you had those turned on on the

01:18:34 whether you had those turned on on the night I can't know would it be normal to have those turned on

01:18:47 that sum is a practical a good practice to a doctor yeah but I can't confirm if that was on the night right what why would you not have the speaker's turned

01:18:59 would you not have the speaker's turned on

01:19:04 the only reason for that would be that an individual hasn't has forgotten to activate the bit button to turn that on and who would that normally be

01:19:20 that would generally be down to the designated driver of that vehicle yep now getting back to your statement page

01:19:31 now getting back to your statement page three just below halfway down you say I was wearing my high visibility incident

01:19:42 was wearing my high visibility incident commander tab art the bat point of mail came up to me in stating the fathers in his flat on the fourth floor can we just have a look at some

01:19:54 can we just have a look at some photographs if you turn please in the post in the documents buttons have 18 have 18 this

01:20:06 documents buttons have 18 have 18 this is a photograph taken at just after 1:00 a.m. have 18 and it's sorry it's I n

01:20:19 a.m. have 18 and it's sorry it's I n cubed seven zeros and then nine there it is the one that can be blown up for you this is a still taken from the CCTV

01:20:34 cameras in the entrance hall entrance lobby to Granville Tower as I say just after 1:00 a.m. can you identify yourself that's myself

01:20:48 can you identify yourself that's myself with the high visibility jerking on and the on the back is the red incident commander

01:20:55 commander in assert right today's myself with a white helmet and the high-visibility jacket

01:21:01 jacket yeah that's me very good and are you able to identify who else we see in that picture the firefighter directly in front of me is firefighter dog ooh the

01:21:13 front of me is firefighter dog ooh the firefighter entering by the main entrance is firefighter Danny Brown not 100% sure I think the firefighter she

01:21:24 100% sure I think the firefighter she can see with the hose the enter Control Board and the fort information board I've think is firefighter Badillo do that right and in his left hand got two things is he's got the entry control

01:21:35 things is he's got the entry control board and then afforded information board oh and could you please turn to bundle not tab 19 next which it should be another picture which is inq six

01:21:49 be another picture which is inq six zeros 26 that is the picture of a male walking into the building can you

01:22:00 walking into the building can you identify from that picture perhaps whether this was the male that you say you spoke to

01:22:09 I have a best picture in case you can't

01:22:28 whenever trying if it's difficult yes so identify them from nothing that angle perhaps we can go to the next one which is tab 20 inq six zeros forty for those

01:22:43 is tab 20 inq six zeros forty for those of there's a picture of his face and whole whole person do you think that was the mail that you spoke to when you arrived

01:23:00 oh I would say it bears a resemblance yes do you remember where he came up to you and spoke to you was it inside the building or outside from my memory

01:23:13 building or outside from my memory america lecture that night it was outside i spoke to him as well as you can remember what would the man's exact was again from more in response to the

01:23:34 was again from more in response to the questions that I was asking the gentleman in terms of the fire confirmed was on the fourth floor the gentleman's flat was in the kitchen

01:23:46 the gentleman's flat was in the kitchen it was his fridge it was on fire and confirmed he confirmed him twice that there was no one else within that property all that compartment or flat

01:23:57 property all that compartment or flat sixteen

01:24:03 now I'm going to play if I I can an audio of a call that he made to the London Fire Brigade at 1 a.m. and 22nd

01:24:15 London Fire Brigade at 1 a.m. and 22nd 21 seconds and it's a meaty triple 0 1 4 8 8 5 mr. Trant director and I would play it and I'd just like you to listen

01:24:27 play it and I'd just like you to listen very carefully if you can to this very start of the call we may have to play it twice but I just want to ask you some questions about what we can hear in that call could it be could it please be

01:24:39 call could it be could it please be played I know you could 999 if you need

01:24:53 played I know you could 999 if you need complete could you you can start hello if you could just play that once more because it's a commits of quite a confusing audio track and I'll ask you the question before we play it again my

01:25:05 the question before we play it again my question is do you know to whom the the caller who we've identified as mr. Keveza the occupant of 2016 but do you

01:25:16 Keveza the occupant of 2016 but do you know who he might have been speaking to because that's the question so we'll play it again and see if you can identically God just cooked us are you talking about the actual background who was talking to the French at the instant

01:25:28 was talking to the French at the instant ground or Indians remotely to that control no Indian in the background while sounds as if he's speaking to somebody who is there present with him at the same time as speaking to somebody

01:25:39 at the same time as speaking to somebody in control and I just want to know whether we can identify the person is speaking to you could just play that again please

01:25:54 okay that's that's what we need do you think you can identify the person who mr. Coupet a were speaking to you don't think so

01:26:03 think so that's different did he say it did the man you spoke to say anything that made you think that this was more than an ordinary kitchen fire there was no

01:26:15 ordinary kitchen fire there was no information surrender to think apart from the information I gathered of suggest anything other than a compartment fire in a tower block no and

01:26:26 compartment fire in a tower block no and if you go back to your statement you go on after having described this discussion to implementing the high-rise

01:26:39 discussion to implementing the high-rise procedure and then you say the firefighters were taking the necessary equipment from the appliances well I was speaking to the male and they were establishing a water supply in order to charge the dry riser could you just

01:26:51 charge the dry riser could you just describe for us the process which was going on at that time in terms of charging the dry riser what was happening so again this is something that would generally be facilitated by

01:27:03 that would generally be facilitated by and it was that night by two drivers of the the fire appliances so first we have to obtain a water supply into our fire engine and that's from a hydrant source

01:27:16 engine and that's from a hydrant source so we have to take a certain piece of equipment on a fire engine locate the hydrant connect our piece of equipment to the opening at ground level on this hydrant and then plug our hoses

01:27:30 on this hydrant and then plug our hoses into the hydrant bar Q Bar and outlet which then we run the hose into the back of the fire engine and then at the same

01:27:41 of the fire engine and then at the same time soon hope there should be a simultaneous activity if we have two people doing it from the back of the fire engine we were then run the hose or augment the hose into the dry Weiser

01:27:53 augment the hose into the dry Weiser outlet a gravel Tower was on the South set South elevation of the building two left-hand side the main entrance once we've done that connected the hoses up we turn on the

01:28:04 connected the hoses up we turn on the hydrant then we get a water supply to the fire engine one sack is confirmed we can then charge the supply to the dry riser and that allows us then to put

01:28:15 riser and that allows us then to put water into the building so it's not depending on we spoke about only there are number of integrative factors in terms of the quickness and the repartee rapidity of that if we if the hydrant is

01:28:26 rapidity of that if we if the hydrant is in easy access it's not structured if it's operable and that's something that we facilitated Jimmy by the drivers of the fire engines do you remember the

01:28:37 the fire engines do you remember the dabbling where the hydrant was located that you plugged into not from memory no do you remember anything about any difficulties with access to it no do you

01:28:54 difficulties with access to it no do you remember any difficulties initially with water pressure no slightly different topic um mr. O'Keefe who is from

01:29:07 topic um mr. O'Keefe who is from Kensington 331 he has provided us with a statement that says that you contacted him on the radio while he was status to so mobile to

01:29:18 while he was status to so mobile to incident do you remember a conversation with mr. O'Keefe at an early stage yeah I do refer to at my statement and because also I had a confirmed fire full

01:29:31 because also I had a confirmed fire full floor

01:29:33 floor I remember I believed to both Brian O'Keefe who was the officer in charge of golf three three one and also to chromatic Dave Davis who was the officer in charge of golf 362 through my

01:29:47 in charge of golf 362 through my handheld radio to those on to to oncoming appliances I gave them some traffic in terms of I would request a pair of bi wearers I set of behaviors

01:29:59 pair of bi wearers I set of behaviors from both trucks to report to su- Instagram to report to the quit chef in the second floor yes thank you now it's

01:30:11 the second floor yes thank you now it's a matter of record that Kensington golf three three one arrived at 108 a.m. so it does that does that tally with your recollection of when in the incident you

01:30:23 recollection of when in the incident you speak to mr. O'Keefe it would have been prior to their arrival because that was when I was enroute to the incident what had you seen at that point that prompted

01:30:35 had you seen at that point that prompted you to make the request to have the crews in be a breathing apparatus

01:30:54 I can't leave any significant visual or event that that made me make a decision it was more of a case of you know I know from input and training that high-rises

01:31:05 from input and training that high-rises can be quite challenging incidents a particularly firefighters resource resource heavier in terms of personnel some thinking it was more of a contingency than there was a particular

01:31:17 contingency than there was a particular event or you know a visual that I saw but many make that decision now in your statement a little bit lower down page three four lines up from the bottom you

01:31:29 three four lines up from the bottom you say I breathe crew manager secret who was in charge of G 272 but the information I had obtained from the mail from flat 16 and requested that he go to the second floor and established the

01:31:40 the second floor and established the bridgehead can you just explain the command structure at that moment

01:32:00 so the command structure is that I was into commander and I would remain at ground level to facilitate you know all coming appliances offices to give them a brief and then Chris secret who was to

01:32:13 brief and then Chris secret who was to be in charge of a the bridgehead and that would be committed be a cruise today's myself at channel one making short be a career on Channel six and if

01:32:25 short be a career on Channel six and if he would need in resources that would have to come for himself and I could further resource the incident they did you then send in to be a wearers to the

01:32:36 you then send in to be a wearers to the bar compartment once we had the bridge had set up and that was confirmed and we had confirmed water supply which I did get traffic back from chrome and a

01:32:48 get traffic back from chrome and a sticker that was a case then I was happy for compartment entrance every night yes and it's a matter of record that you've sent in Charlie battle II the crew manager from G 271 and Danny Brown firefighter Danny Brown a firefighter

01:33:01 firefighter Danny Brown a firefighter from g2 civil one as well to flat sixteen that's correct that's right do you remember how did they get into the tower how do they get up into the tower

01:33:17 from memory it would have been via the main entrance and south-south elevation of the building were you aware that the internal door needed a an electronic key

01:33:28 internal door needed a an electronic key to get through the security system if I'm not from the realization visit I believe that information was to any but

01:33:39 believe that information was to any but that moment time when I was dynamic stages innocent I thank think I'd better call that needing it now so did nobody in your crew radio - you'll tell you

01:33:51 in your crew radio - you'll tell you that they couldn't get through from the main entrance into the lift lobby because the door was electronically secured I don't recall that now okay

01:34:05 secured I don't recall that now okay once you've just sent fire fighters batter being Brown into the tower where did you go where did you stand from my

01:34:16 did you go where did you stand from my recollection that the majority of the only parts that incident and throughout when I was in - commander I was on the outside of the tower particularly looking up at the east elevation of the

01:34:27 looking up at the east elevation of the Granville Tower

01:34:30 but now it's a matter of record that 331 Kensington 331 gt3 one I should call it arrived at 108 do you remember who the

01:34:42 arrived at 108 do you remember who the crew manager was on g-33 one believe at that time it's crew manager master Jamar stone do you remember being asked to check by anybody from g-33 one

01:34:55 to check by anybody from g-33 one whether the fire was spreading I can't recall that night

01:35:09 at the top of page four of your statement you say once they had entered the building crew manager secret

01:35:20 the building crew manager secret informed me via the radio that the fire lift was not working I just want to ask you about that how did they in how did

01:35:32 you about that how did they in how did mr. secret inform you was it by radio that's my recollection yes and that's a radio communication between the bridgehead and you as the incident

01:35:43 bridgehead and you as the incident commander is it I don't know if he would have been at the bridge at that point I was at that point he might after trying to secure the file if which would've been a ground floor level you're quite right

01:35:52 right your part was my fault but the radio that mr. secret had was a radio that he would have used it was intended to use as this right from the bridgehead once he'd established it that's correct right okay and those communications between

01:36:05 okay and those communications between you and him by radio were working were they at that point at that point yes and disgusting your mind back and looking at

01:36:16 disgusting your mind back and looking at your statement can you remember exactly what mr. secret said about the file if not working from my recollection referred to a statement the traffic I

01:36:27 referred to a statement the traffic I received from cremator secret was that he had tried to command the fire lift and he was unable to do that did he explain to you what it was about the

01:36:40 explain to you what it was about the lift that wasn't working that should have been

01:36:47 can't recording further explanation but my assumption would have been that how a firefighting lift works is that we can we take control we overwrite that by

01:37:00 we take control we overwrite that by using the lift keep so we can utilize equipment personnel and also the rescue of casualties particularly if it's on the upper floors within a high-rise block yeah and I'll come I'm going to

01:37:15 block yeah and I'll come I'm going to come back to that at some point as I'm interested in it but just at the moment I just want to know what you were thinking and what you knew about what the lift could and couldn't do so my question is did did mr. secret or

01:37:29 question is did did mr. secret or firefighter see could explain to you what it was about the lift that wasn't working as it should have been me tell you what was wrong with it not for mine

01:37:40 you what was wrong with it not for mine every night

01:37:47 did it occur to you at a time that the lift wasn't in fact a full firefighting lift to give you all the functionality

01:37:58 lift to give you all the functionality of a firefighting lift wasn't aware that time though what did you what assumptions did you make at the time about what the fire about what the lift

01:38:10 about what the fire about what the lift could do in terms of attacking the fire and carrying out search and rescue at that point if the fire you know provide

01:38:23 that point if the fire you know provide us the opportunity to not have to carry equipment and personnel by the staircase it gives us a cooker access to five floors in a case of Greenfield tower that the fire was on the fourth floor so

01:38:37 that the fire was on the fourth floor so the distance between the ground and where we set the bridge it was only two floors

01:38:42 floors you know if the five floor was further up the building it would be more very super honest and in terms of functionality where you can take over

01:38:55 functionality where you can take over take control as you say of the lift using the lift key in terms of that functionality what benefits would that bring you as a fire crew in terms of

01:39:10 bring you as a fire crew in terms of firefighting and search-and-rescue initially it's a speed of access to get to the bridgehead because obviously time is very very key in ticking high-rise fires also we can

01:39:24 in ticking high-rise fires also we can leave we we have we can leave the lift at the bridgehead level so if we rescue any casualties again we have these and quick rapidly - you're getting no casualty out of the building and to a

01:39:35 casualty out of the building and to a point of care and what about later on what are the benefits with having control over the lift give you in terms of rescue

01:39:52 you just repeat that question what that's one other better what benefits worth having complete control over the lift give you in terms of rescue it refer back to thank we'll be two points

01:40:04 refer back to thank we'll be two points in terms of be able to get our personnel into the building and out to the five floors quicker in relation to near credible tower it was difficult because

01:40:15 credible tower it was difficult because the the files in the full floor so we we should really it's difficult don't go and beyond the five floor in a in a in any lift you know in a fire in a

01:40:26 any lift you know in a fire in a high-rise block and I'm sorry only really big to transport personnel equipment up to the bridgehead level not beyond in your experience are there any risks to the occupants of the building

01:40:40 risks to the occupants of the building during a fire in allowing leaving the lift to be completely uncontrolled by the fire brigade yes what are they if

01:40:51 the fire brigade yes what are they if it's completely uncontrolled by the fire brigade than that could lead to potentially residents using the lift in a fire and potentially that's compromised and then where the residents

01:41:04 compromised and then where the residents or occupants of that block may open the doors onto a fire floor or an air is compromised so that's why we generally will take command of it so we can have control over that so the consequences of

01:41:16 control over that so the consequences of the fire brigade not having control of the lift are off seriously they can be yes something do you know why the firefighting lift was out of order no what was the immediate impact on your

01:41:29 no what was the immediate impact on your firefighting plans of the firefighting lift not working

01:41:36 [Music] initially there could have been a small delay and getting equipment up to the bridgehead but as I said because it was on the second floor there was only a minimal travel distance from ground to

01:41:47 minimal travel distance from ground to second floor is there was there a lfb plan or strategy for what should happen if the firefighting lift is out of order

01:42:04 it's one of two things you can either have to utilize a stairwell or as in the case of bleed on that night the the crews I believe still actually use a lift to go up to the bridge head and

01:42:18 lift to go up to the bridge head and what if the lift was out of water and not being capable of brought under control of the fire brigade what would you do to minimize the risks to occupants using it

01:42:38 looking at it now the only thing we potentially could do is isolate the power supply to me I don't think that one's done it on that night would that be a normal thing to do not normal no

01:42:51 be a normal thing to do not normal no and can I ask you this how normal in your experience is it when you arrive at a fire and a high-rise block to find that the lifts are either out of order or not being capable of being brought

01:43:03 or not being capable of being brought under LFP control

01:43:12 in my own experience I've not come across that before any operational incident no right

01:43:29 if the firefighting lift was out of order how would that affect firefighting operations in the event that the fire didn't remain in its compartment of origin

01:43:48 you know the potential there is to for resident residents still to use that in the obviously devices not to use lifts you know and I and any fire rich that sitting in a high-rise blocks but um you

01:44:02 sitting in a high-rise blocks but um you know as a residence react differently in those situations it's stressful it's disorientating and potentially though if they use it if that could expose them to real risk yeah so if things turned out

01:44:19 real risk yeah so if things turned out that the fire had spread beyond the compartment of origin in this case flat 16 Howard your plan of action or sort of would your plan of action then take account of the fact that the

01:44:30 account of the fact that the firefighting lift had failed

01:44:40 could you just repeat upsetness if if things turned out that the fire had spread beyond the compartment of origin flat 16 in this case would your plan of

01:44:51 flat 16 in this case would your plan of action then seek to take account of the fact that you no longer or you didn't have a firefighting lift that worked at

01:45:04 have a firefighting lift that worked at the night of Granville tower fire when I received that information from the promoter Chris secret it was very early on the incident and from one release that the virus was still contended compartment so I hadn't at that point in

01:45:16 compartment so I hadn't at that point in time I haven't made a plan hadn't coming to my thought process no

01:45:24 now you going back to your statement but you say after the reference to the lift not working that in high-rise incidents

01:45:37 not working that in high-rise incidents you set up the bridgehead two floors below the fire and you plug into the dry riser on the floor below you've explained already this morning and some of that practice in the first main

01:45:52 of that practice in the first main paragraph of page four of your statement we can just go to that they were on it you say that you receive radio traffic from CM secret that the crew had plugged

01:46:05 from CM secret that the crew had plugged their hose in on the fire floor as the fire floor was not compromised at that point is that in a court was that in

01:46:16 point is that in a court was that in accordance with normal firefighting strategy in a high-rise building [Music]

01:46:25 that's not as it is in policy 633 however for me to change that decision

01:46:36 however for me to change that decision would have meant that we'd have had to bring the crews back down another floor so there have been a further delay or I delay in making a compartment entry so as an intern come on well receive that

01:46:47 as an intern come on well receive that information from Chris secret if the trafficker come back to me to say that actually know that the fire for always compromised there is you know it's carbonaceous they're smoking for the environment then you're sort of I don't want my firefighters put any undue risks

01:47:00 want my firefighters put any undue risks or I would have given the direction to to make sure that they came to full blow but because that area was not compromised I was happy I was I would make that decision to continue with firefighting operations from the fire

01:47:12 firefighting operations from the fire floor but is it right that mr. secret would not have known whether the lobby on the fourth floor was compromised with

01:47:23 on the fourth floor was compromised with smoke until he got there

01:47:28 yes correct but he was going there without water at that point yes correct yeah so did how did it work did he go up

01:47:40 yeah so did how did it work did he go up to the fourth floor and then make the decision himself to plug into the dry riser there and they tell you afterwards or did he brief you first as to the conditions on the fourth floor before he

01:47:51 conditions on the fourth floor before he plugged into the dry riser on that floor

01:47:56 that can't record a new information I was members receiving back was that they they were plugging it on the five floor already right see it looks as if from what you're saying is that he gone up

01:48:07 what you're saying is that he gone up looked at it saw it was clear of smoke and made his own decision to plug into the dry riser there and then told you about it that's correct and is that a fair sum yeah he's a competent officer yes and sometimes we have to do look you

01:48:23 yes and sometimes we have to do look you know we're a wreck you want preventive work says to get a bit more situational awareness within that building you know what the conditions are like and you know Chris being a responsible and

01:48:34 know Chris being a responsible and competent of a southern you know who made that decision or stand by that yes and in the next sentence of your statement in the same paragraph you say

01:48:46 statement in the same paragraph you say I was happy for Cruz to be committed from the fire floor as I felt that we had to be aggressive in tackling this fire what why did you feel you had to be aggressive in tackling this fire

01:49:01 I think referring back to we the six which probably hadn't used to attract our and we had the water failure I think it was an eye-opener that for me

01:49:13 it was an eye-opener that for me particular commander wants it to be to be on the you know to not to have those potential issues at this fire want to be on the on the ball for one of a better word and I know that within you know

01:49:27 word and I know that within you know high-rise blocks you know you have to to trine you know time is of the essence you have to make a compartment quite quickly but safely I did was conscious I

01:49:38 quickly but safely I did was conscious I didn't want a further delay if I was to bring the crews back down that were your favor the lines making a compartment or into flat sixteen so was there anything about this fire that would mean that you

01:49:49 about this fire that would mean that you would adopt a more aggressive strategy in attacking it the new would normally not necessarily no not at that point now in the next sentence of your witness

01:50:02 in the next sentence of your witness statement you say I requested that a support crew were to go to the third floor to secure their water supply and progress to the fourth floor to support the initial firefighting crew does that

01:50:15 the initial firefighting crew does that mean that you asked the support crew to plug into the dry riser on the third floor as well no so that was still within the the traffic radio traffic to

01:50:27 within the the traffic radio traffic to me and Chris secret because that's as a policy six three three states that's generally where the will should the first initial crews should go a plug in

01:50:38 first initial crews should go a plug in one floor below the fire floor but obviously cuz they plugged in onto the fire floor where the backup crew so that the roles are almost swapped that so I was very conscious that we needs it obviously to secure a safe access and

01:50:49 obviously to secure a safe access and egress for cruising into that compartment that they were to plug in on the floor below the fire floor the third floor I thought it thank you you say that that would mean that they would be effectively for firefighters to teams of

01:51:01 effectively for firefighters to teams of two is this right using two poses from two dry risers one on the third floor the fourth-floor that's correct and would that be normal for a apparently

01:51:12 would that be normal for a apparently ordinary kitchen fire in a compartment in a high-rise building that's the expectation yeah yes now just focusing a little bit more if we can all the use of dry risers on two

01:51:24 we can all the use of dry risers on two floors I just want to ask you a few questions about that um the first question is what would simultaneous use of two dry risers well let me ask in a

01:51:37 of two dry risers well let me ask in a different way what was effective ailable in each hose with the simultaneous use of two dry risers have

01:51:54 that it shouldn't have any effect what the the minimum requirement what I Drive wise I should allow us that there was provide 1500 liters of water per minute what we do is we challenge that at

01:52:05 what we do is we challenge that at ground level from the pumping appliance and that should be a 10 bar and that allows for frictional loss between that within the dry riser so the firefighting Jets we had working on the third and

01:52:16 Jets we had working on the third and fourth floor they should be set for firefighting operations at 230 litres per minute so that's 460 liters per minute so that shouldn't exhaust the requirements are

01:52:28 shouldn't exhaust the requirements are at 1500 liters per minute you're right that's very clear my next question is would would the use of the dry riser and a hose plugged into it on the third

01:52:40 a hose plugged into it on the third floor mean that you then had to pull the hose or your crew had to pull the hose up two flights of stairs in the protected staircase that's correct so

01:52:51 protected staircase that's correct so sufficient hose would have hacks have been laid out and then the firefighting crew would have made their way up to the fourth floor with a Charles length that's correct with that result in the

01:53:03 that's correct with that result in the door on both the third and the fourth floor from the staircase into the lobbies on each floor being propped open by the hose that's correct

01:53:17 by the hose that's correct would that mean that any smoke from the fourth floor lobby would leak into the staircase

01:53:28 that's correct

01:53:31 sayo general terms how would the practice of setting a hose into a dry riser on the third floor and then running it up to the fourth floor lobby keep the protected staircase protected

01:53:44 keep the protected staircase protected from the ingress of smoke because of the way grenfell tower was set up the draw wise outlets where we know that we're in the flat lobby areas generally the

01:53:57 the flat lobby areas generally the principal the driveways and outlets should be no protected stairwell yes there is going to be some compromise of that because we have to get water onto into a compartment and it may well come

01:54:13 into a compartment and it may well come into a stairwell but so if you for the initial crew plug in the floor below if it was in a protective step I'm not in a lobby area of the flats they would go

01:54:26 lobby area of the flats they would go with plugging in this protective stairwell

01:54:29 stairwell go to the floor above and then into into the fly fire floor

01:54:39 so what would you say about the position of the dry riser applets are in Grantville tower in the lobbies would

01:54:52 Grantville tower in the lobbies would they be something with the position of those outlets be something that would affect your firefighting operations

01:54:59 potentially and with the position of those outlets potentially affect the integrity of the single protected staircase in terms of whether it remain

01:55:11 staircase in terms of whether it remain protected yes can I ask you to look at policy six three three again which is in the policy bundle it's at four

01:55:30 and I've just got a couple more questions on this before I go to ask the Chairman to break mister darden so if you look at policy 633 I'd like you to go please to page paragraph 7.2

01:55:44 you to go please to page paragraph 7.2 on page 9 and this is under the heading operational procedure securing water

01:55:55 operational procedure securing water supplies for firefighting and you can see paragraph seven point two which is about a DRN a dry rising main and I just

01:56:06 about a DRN a dry rising main and I just want to ask you about the second part of that paragraph it says when laid on stairways hose should be positioned in such a way that it minimizes obstruction [Music]

01:56:19 [Music] where you aware when you attend your Granville Tower of that requirement in policy 633

01:56:30 I will opinion

01:56:35 and looking the same policy back a little bit at paragraph 2.4 3 is on page

01:56:46 little bit at paragraph 2.4 3 is on page far as 6 I'm sorry page 6 2 point 4 3 firefighting operations may breach firefighting lobbies increasing risks to optic occupants and impacting on

01:56:57 optic occupants and impacting on personnel at the bridgehead and then in the last sentence it says it will be necessary to run hose lines onto protected routes and stairways to

01:57:08 protected routes and stairways to undertake the firefighting and this will allow smoke to spread into previously unaffected areas of the building

01:57:16 were you aware of that risk identified in policy 633 when you attended Grenfell on the night of the fire I would have

01:57:27 on the night of the fire I would have been aware yes yes did you take any steps to ensure that the obstruction that's identified in that policy could be minimized

01:57:42 it it's different work with what we're given on the line in terms of what that bill represents to us we have to have a water supply we

01:57:53 us we have to have a water supply we have to put warrants that fire we can only work with the facilities that are given to us at that moment in time it's it's good practice in terms of obstruction as well they also referring to try not to light

01:58:05 they also referring to try not to light hose in the middle of stairwells twine tuck it against the wall say clearly in a wall so if we do have residents or firefighters exiting and entering that staircase there's less of a trip hazard for them that's a good practice but

01:58:20 for them that's a good practice but depending on the location of the Dreiser outlets we have to have a confirm water supply so we have to work with what we're given how feasible would it ever be to plug a set a hose into the dry

01:58:35 be to plug a set a hose into the dry rising dry riser applet on every floor or a lot of floors in Grantville Tower and not use the dry riser from the floor below now feasible without ever of B

01:58:49 it's a feasible would it ever have been to set into the dry rising outlets on every floor in grenfell tower or in every floor where there was a fire

01:59:01 that's almost an impossible task it's something that's not designed der Yzerman is not designed to do that it's the expectation is back to compartment ation that it should you know we've only

01:59:12 ation that it should you know we've only really firefighting on one floor okay may go up we could firefighting the internal to extent of one or two floors but not to plug hose in and every single

01:59:23 but not to plug hose in and every single out there on the highways block now it's it can be done basic stuff it would be extremely difficult and the further you've got the building the water pressure would lessen the output going

01:59:34 pressure would lessen the output going back the only provides us 1500 liters per water per minute the more Jets you put in that's gonna affect water supply and I can't resist on the water what would happen after you've got about 50 meters if the water's probably almost be

01:59:48 meters if the water's probably almost be non-existent non-existent I would say so yes mister darden thank you very much mr. Chavez it's now a convenient moment for a break and get it sent yes we'll have a break I think perhaps on this

02:00:00 have a break I think perhaps on this occasion we'll take 15 minutes and I'd like to be back by 25 to 12 by that clock not all the tops of the same so I'm gonna get back that way right mr. Donham I have a break I should

02:00:13 right mr. Donham I have a break I should have reminded you earlier and please don't discuss your evidence or this aspect that the inquiries work why still give a bit yes and we'll come back in 15

02:00:24 give a bit yes and we'll come back in 15 thank you thank you very much

02:00:35 you

02:17:29 right forget mister darden back

02:18:02 moreover Sedona how does it carry on just thank you good thank you very much yes mr. darling can I ask you please to note that page four of your statement and together

02:18:13 four of your statement and together let's look at paragraph three which starts I contacted g3 31 and I want to look with you the sentence that says at

02:18:30 look with you the sentence that says at 113 hours and you say at 113 hours I made the decision to further the resource the incident by making it pump six and aerials one first question what

02:18:45 six and aerials one first question what did you when you did this statement wanted you base your timing on the Atari was I've got the timings from our mobilization system vision I didn't have any understanding or recollection of the

02:18:57 any understanding or recollection of the actual timing so the only reference I had to that in within my statement was from a later point when I refer back to our mobilizing system

02:19:12 where were you physically when you made that decision

02:19:22 the recollection I believe I was still in the extent outside the building ground for level and on the East elevation what information was your

02:19:36 elevation what information was your decision to make pump six based on

02:19:52 I don't remember any significant event or any think that triggered it was more of a contingency plan if I'm honest having been out of a high-rise incidents

02:20:03 having been out of a high-rise incidents to have an additional resource for up for BA and an error appliances of good practice

02:20:19 who are you with when you made that decision perhaps I should ask you a slightly different way were you with anybody when you made that decision

02:20:33 for me I think the only person that I was around at that time was my driver firefight Dan deals but I can't that's not hundreds a crew but I say

02:20:45 that's not hundreds a crew but I say like you know account now yeah do you remember speaking to anybody about the decision to make pump six before you made it

02:21:00 I don't have any recollection of that now now mr. O'Keefe has provided a witness statement which we're going to

02:21:11 witness statement which we're going to be looking at with him but to be fair to you I should just tell you what he says and that's that he went up to you when he arrived in front of the tower and asked if you'd made up the incident and

02:21:23 asked if you'd made up the incident and he said that you said no and he said you should make it six do you remember that I don't know I don't now in the next

02:21:34 I don't know I don't now in the next sentence in your witness statements you say at this point if hadn't taken hold and I felt comfortable with what we were dealing with as the fire was still

02:21:45 dealing with as the fire was still contained within the compartment and there were no persons within the flat

02:21:53 when you say at this point it hasn't taken hold could you explain please what you mean by that so from my point of

02:22:04 you mean by that so from my point of view as its commander the resource of Neville was okay I was my understanding I was still doing with a compartment fiber in within the tower block the flat 16 and from my understanding my

02:22:17 16 and from my understanding my reflection it was still it was still contained within flat 16 could you see the exterior of flat 16 at that point

02:22:32 I believe I could yes what could you see you remember

02:22:44 it's difficult is that there was a lot of information I wouldn't ascitic we had to give you in terms of what my actual visual was on that man it means hard no it's difficult now mr. Douglas this as

02:22:55 it's difficult now mr. Douglas this as you might imagine is not a memory test for you so I'm going to show you and some video evidence which might help your recollection and we can look at it

02:23:06 your recollection and we can look at it together and then you can help me with some questions I've got before I show it to you I do have to make a warming before people in the room and who know who are watching live streamed and we

02:23:17 who are watching live streamed and we call that a trigger warning so I'm going to repeat the trigger warning in relation to the Luke Bisbee fire spread video we are about to look at that video

02:23:30 video we are about to look at that video again not the whole of it just a small portion of it but it does show fire on the exterior of grenfell tower and so anybody who feels uncomfortable about

02:23:42 anybody who feels uncomfortable about that should should take steps to leave the room now or or protect themselves so mister darden will you forgive me if I wait a minute to allow people to do that

02:24:00 and in the meantime can I ask mr. trial director to queue up the Bisbee fire spread video at one 1204 one 1204 or

02:24:13 spread video at one 1204 one 1204 or perhaps as close to 112 as you can accurately get

02:24:24 I'll just wait another 30 seconds if I may mr. chairman just to make sure that the trigger warning has been understood yes and also you have to remember there are people working in the other

02:24:35 are people working in the other locations

02:24:35 locations exactly right beneath me and that that's right

02:24:45 now before we start looking at the other video mister darden I'm on the screen there we've got a that there's a still effectively taken from

02:24:56 there's a still effectively taken from the video and this was taken by a member of the public mr. kabedon I think at this point who and this shows the I think the east side

02:25:09 and this shows the I think the east side of the tower and you can see the fire there at that point can you just on this still identify who the firefighters are on the ground in

02:25:20 the firefighters are on the ground in the foreground there and this is at oh one 1204

02:25:30 I can only presume that the firefight when the jet we call covering jet was a fire fighter Murphy buy.com I got 100 every accurate on that what about the other fire fighter it could be a fire

02:25:46 other fire fighter it could be a fire fighter charlie Cornelius who was as part of the crew from the Gulf 331 Kensington again that I cannot confirm that and on the ground there and this is

02:26:00 that and on the ground there and this is a point I've had for later but we can pick it up now on the ground there or in front of the east side of the tower you can see what looks like a liquid water perhaps can you help with what that

02:26:11 perhaps can you help with what that might be

02:26:17 I can't presume use water from the cover and jet

02:26:26 when when one sets into a hydrant or sets into a pump with a covering jet is it is it normal to give a test first so you'd do a spray before you apply the

02:26:38 you'd do a spray before you apply the jet to the exterior of a building it is prickers obviously there is bubier in the hose line so we have to also drain that out and make a sound and once we get water the end point of the branch also had to test the branch to make sure

02:26:50 also had to test the branch to make sure it's working go through the sort of set of procedures flow rates and different settings to make sure we actually that branch is operable yes that is something that's not not a usual practice that's correct

02:27:03 not not a usual practice that's correct looking at the quantity of water that you can see on the ground there would that be consistent with such a test

02:27:15 as difficult to say depends how how long that test was for it it's like one or two things it's either from the covering jet was working or it was from a test I

02:27:26 jet was working or it was from a test I can't I'm a better confirm I'm very good I'm now going to ask for the video be played but not the entirety of it and I'll give a signal when I want it to stop

02:27:46 now that's the video and you'll have heard that there's a there's an audio in the background what I'm going to do is ask for that to be played again but if you could listen out for the

02:27:57 but if you could listen out for the audio and the voices that you hear which if they could be made louder would be would be better and we know ask you some questions about who's saying what so

02:28:08 questions about who's saying what so mister trial director could we play that again please

02:28:18 you can stop but could you hear someone shouting okay here's something yeah now

02:28:29 shouting okay here's something yeah now people may disagree about this to to to to to us it sounds like Mike Mike make it six now can you comment on that ah from that audio I could not tell that

02:28:42 ah from that audio I could not tell that that was that was what said no does this prompt any recollection about someone shouting to you to make pump six I can't recall that though alright can we run

02:28:57 recall that though alright can we run the video again and before we do I just want to ask you to look out for what you can see in terms of the fire and the material coming from the fire could repair that again please

02:29:23 could you see material falling from the window where the fire was could you painful researchers to prove that again please

02:29:41 I've got a little bit farther you can see bit more

02:29:49 could you see the solution say maybe an ember or something hit the floor yeah yes do you remember at that point well

02:30:01 yes do you remember at that point well let me ask you do you remember that point in the development of the fire at around 112 when embers started to come out of the window I can't be Thomas if

02:30:12 out of the window I can't be Thomas if there was a point in my statement when I said I did still I started to feel uncomfortable because it seems like that the fire was behaving like I've not seen

02:30:23 the fire was behaving like I've not seen how it was behaving before in terms of the way it was reacting and you know I referred to my statement it was like magnesium was burning it was almost like sparking and spitting and that's not generally something I've seen on a

02:30:36 generally something I've seen on a external building before we're going to come back to that in some detail later on but can I at this point can I just ask you at this point in the fire when pumps were being made six had anything

02:30:47 pumps were being made six had anything changed so that you now thought you needed to make pump six as opposed to leaving them at the original four at my recollection of the event and at that

02:30:58 recollection of the event and at that time was that when at the point of our made it pump six I was still quite comfort with more of a continuously thing like that was my point that's how I remember it Arnim on that

02:31:10 that's how I remember it Arnim on that night and what about the addition of an aerial and an aerial ladder was it anything changed in the development of the fire to prompt you to ask for an aerial ladder not from my recollection

02:31:22 aerial ladder not from my recollection at that point not now at that point 112 or 113 either way the point at which pumps were made six plus an aerial

02:31:33 pumps were made six plus an aerial ladder given that you were preparing to fight a high-rise fire at a height up to the height that could be reached

02:31:46 up to the height that could be reached by an aerial ladder did you have any thoughts about whether the stapler policy in place a Greenville tower remained appropriate at that point of that VT yes but wouldn't as an insta

02:32:01 that VT yes but wouldn't as an insta Connor at that moment in time thought I would need to change that home will you at the point that you made which you made point pumps cigs were you concerned

02:32:13 made point pumps cigs were you concerned about what you had in front of you for my recollection referring to my statement and not at that point note now

02:32:24 statement and not at that point note now in the light of what we've seen in the video which is material falling down to the ground can I just take you to your

02:32:38 the ground can I just take you to your statement and you say I said I think I've shown you in the seventh line down and the third paragraph on page four at that point it hadn't taken hold sorry at

02:32:51 that point it hadn't taken hold sorry at this point it hadn't taken hold and I felt comfortable with what we were dealing with as the fire was still contained within the compartment in

02:33:02 contained within the compartment in light of what I've now shown you and the what you call embers falling down to the ground can you just explain why you say in your statement that the fire hadn't taken hold and that it was still contained in the compartment

02:33:18 I could I was reacting and to what I thought was happening at that moment in time of everything that went on that ain't said and and everything that I had

02:33:30 ain't said and and everything that I had to deal with everything I saw teachers I made the sensory overload my recollection that time that statement was dust that was my feeling understand

02:33:41 was dust that was my feeling understand at that point how do you had any information from any residents regarding the state of the fire or the smoke within the building from my

02:33:54 smoke within the building from my recollection not at that point no at that point and just to be clear we're talking about the point at which you made pump six did you make any assessment regarding the number and frequency of any residents leaving

02:34:06 frequency of any residents leaving Grenville tower that's not something I can recall let me ask you a slightly simpler question do you remember at that point seeing any presidents or occupants

02:34:19 point seeing any presidents or occupants leaving Granville town it may have been but I can't remember taking no no

02:34:32 according to mr. O'Keefe's contemporaneous notes he had been told and will explore this with him he had been told by firefighters Stern and

02:34:44 been told by firefighters Stern and Hipple that there was heavy smoke logging on the 6th floor and that he O'Keefe reported that to you and advised you to make pumps 6 that's what he's

02:34:57 you to make pumps 6 that's what he's recorded in his contemporaneous notes can you comment on that I don't have any recollection of that why do you say that he's wrong or do you say these you know right that may have been the case that

02:35:10 right that may have been the case that may be misunderstanding but I don't have any recollection of that event no can you explain the process whereby you made pump 6

02:35:28 it from my understanding would have been believed that I've asked my driver firefight and girls to send that message

02:35:42 do you know what appliance the message was sent from [Music]

02:35:55 do you remember not at that moment of time though

02:36:10 can I ask you Kings to look I think at a document for the first time in your evidence which is tab 23 of the bundle which is the short incident log

02:36:22 which is the short incident log disclosed to us by the London Fog level which is met triple zero one three eight three zero

02:36:34 and this is to see to be fair to you you know what it is it is a there's a short version of a much longer document which identifies a number of messages in

02:36:49 identifies a number of messages in chronological order through the incident and if you go please to page 17 you can

02:37:00 and if you go please to page 17 you can see of a quarter of the way down underneath or next to the time stamp of 113 39s ad make up IUP G 331 make pump

02:37:19 113 39s ad make up IUP G 331 make pump six and one HP and then that was amended a minute or so later forty seconds or so later to amend it to one aerial what I wanted to ask you about this was looking

02:37:31 wanted to ask you about this was looking at the entry up on this document which we call the short incident log or the s il can you explain the message IUP g-33 one make pump six and one HP so that

02:37:47 one make pump six and one HP so that that's denotes that the initial make pump six and the equestrian area was sent via golf free--free one which was Kensington pop that up yeah and do you

02:37:58 Kensington pop that up yeah and do you know

02:37:59 know why that would be the

02:38:09 knocking so today we're in attendance at the time and we Vermeil so I my perceptions of where that message when is incorrect and it went from God three three one right what why would it go

02:38:20 three one right what why would it go from G three three one and not from the ICP you know because my explanation for that would be that I'll see the dynamic

02:38:33 that would be that I'll see the dynamic stage of the incident resourcing levels personnel or a minimum and that was facilitated maybe by the driver of Godfrey three one

02:38:50 but you remember what type of aerial was requested

02:38:58 it is an amendment from 1hp which i think is hot is this right high platform I draw it platform me up yes hydraulic platform quite an amended to one aerial do you remember what

02:39:09 to one aerial do you remember what aerial you asked for I don't faint Pacific's whether it was a TL or an ALP air will let a platform okay we make small that other other people you can

02:39:23 small that other other people you can put that away is it normal procedure for a watch manager to be in charge at a far more than four pumps as as policy states no

02:39:42 than four pumps as as policy states no watch men to be should be up to four pumping appliances with a modern officer of a station manager rank once it goes beyond that to Six Sigma pumping

02:39:54 beyond that to Six Sigma pumping appliances the monitoring officer the regular station knows will will take effectively take over you however that there is you have to a little bit a degree of flexibility in that because obviously officers get into the incident

02:40:06 obviously officers get into the incident ground I mean how could the makeup is there might be a little bit by the bang in terms of how long as a watch manager you are in charge of an incident right and is it right that according to lfb policy as six pump fire requires two

02:40:19 policy as six pump fire requires two station managers and a group manager as monitoring officer that's correct yeah now in your statement if you get back to it you say g36 to arrived this

02:40:35 back to it you say g36 to arrived this is just a sentence on from where we were before g36 to arrived at I directed the crew to go to the bridgehead with their breathing apparatus and then you say I also requested the g-33 one get a cover and jet the outside of the flap where

02:40:47 and jet the outside of the flap where the fire was in order to keep it contained and stop it spreading above and below the compartment I just want to ask you a question or two about about that at this point in

02:41:02 that at this point in did you have any thoughts about whether the fire was still within the compartment or whether it had broken out of the compartment when I say at this

02:41:13 of the compartment when I say at this point let me be clear at the point at which you asked g-33 one to put a covering jet on the outside

02:41:28 it's difficult to pinpoint an exact time but yes the the fire did break out the compartment same as the window that's that's not an uncommon thing in

02:41:39 that's not an uncommon thing in compartment or building fires and the way we counteract that is to to suppress that fire spread is with external cover and jet too you know we'd only be put into compartments particularly firefighters are working because that

02:41:50 firefighters are working because that that we can decrease the in crit conditions and risks of fire flights from the compartment but certainly above and below to stop any um up and down the fire spirit say let me just see if I can

02:42:04 fire spirit say let me just see if I can answer the question again a slightly different way at the point in time at which you asked g-33 one to put a covering jet on the outside of the flat where the fire was at that point in time

02:42:17 where the fire was at that point in time did you have any thoughts about whether the fire was still contained within the compartment or had broken out

02:42:41 no direct force come to my mind but it lends itself to see that okay I had come out with compartment cuz that's the job of a covering jet used to protect sorry

02:42:52 of a covering jet used to protect sorry to stop the spread of a compartment father's potentially breach the window yes so I don't put words in your mouth but do I understand it this way that you

02:43:03 but do I understand it this way that you had asked for the covering jet to be put on the exterior because you saw there was a real risk of fire breaching out of the compartment window is that a fair

02:43:14 the compartment window is that a fair sum is that fair yes okay now again you won't have seen this but I had to I want to ask you about it and crew manager secret says in a statement that he's

02:43:27 secret says in a statement that he's given us that he recalls that at the point when the first be a crew which is charlie better be and Daniel Brown were at the door of flat 16 you radioed crew

02:43:44 at the door of flat 16 you radioed crew manager secret and told him that the fire was breaking out of the window that's what he remembers do you remember that you remember having that I'm mister having it there was traffic between me

02:43:56 having it there was traffic between me and Chris because I know us we had be a crew up on the pre-war guard to the fire floor and at a point where I'll start to

02:44:10 floor and at a point where I'll start to feel uncomfortable when I said some traffic into Chris on the bridge head and asked him you know have we got a team within the compartment are they putting water on the fire because from

02:44:21 putting water on the fire because from what I saw on the outside it was you know it was developing I didn't know at that point any face your exterior the building was involved I just thought there was a developing compartment fire

02:44:32 there was a developing compartment fire that had from the window briefs to window and coming out the window right okay can I just explore what you've just

02:44:43 okay can I just explore what you've just said which is that you just thought there was a developing fire coming or a developing compartment fire they've heard come out from the window so when a

02:44:58 heard come out from the window so when a fire comes out of in your experience when it comes out of a compartment window in a high-rise block I think you've said before that that's not uncommon

02:45:07 uncommon but with that - you mean a breach of complementation

02:45:16 not that

02:45:20 not specifically because that's only exto for me the compartment ation is the internal part you know the internal part the building so for me as a needs of

02:45:31 the building so for me as a needs of command on the outside I wouldn't be too concerned if if a fire had breached the window because I would be my assumption was that we could tackle tactically

02:45:42 was that we could tackle tactically control that from the ground particularly for four level we were covering jet so the exit of flames from the window would that be a game changer

02:45:56 the window would that be a game changer in terms of your strategy not at that point the only change of strategy which we had in place was to implement a

02:46:07 we had in place was to implement a covering jet now let's just go to the question of a covering jet and mr. secret crew manager secret says in his statement that you told him that you

02:46:19 statement that you told him that you wanted to put a covering jet on the exterior

02:46:22 exterior do you remember it that way

02:46:31 not not to those exact words

02:46:36 you know purpose of the covering jet is to stop the extent of a fire sense of corny gases they're exiting from the building as well my recollection was

02:46:49 building as well my recollection was that I was hoping that we could not put it into comp compartment but put it above and beyond the compartment to stop this any external fast but that potentially could occur and he says in

02:47:00 potentially could occur and he says in his statement that he who manages secret told you not to put a covering jet on because the be a crew were just was just about to make entry into the flat do you

02:47:12 about to make entry into the flat do you remember it that way I don't remember that don't know specifics now the only thing I really quite a member about the recovering jet is that sickly and I've

02:47:26 recovering jet is that sickly and I've had this confirmed by this Murph who's a firefighter and who was at Kensington at Tommy's now my watch at North Kensington red watch that my instruction was don't put in a compartment just put it above

02:47:37 put in a compartment just put it above and beyond been backed if we play coverage at intercom Parkway as firefighters that is gonna pose a serious risk and and increase the wrister firefighter in the compartment because of that going too much a size

02:47:49 because of that going too much a size the expansion right war to save me seventeen hundred to one so you are really really going to put a real risk to firefighter than any compartment where we put water to into where they are yes and you say that in your

02:48:00 are yes and you say that in your statement in the passage I think we've just highlighted in fairness to you it was necessary you say in your statement

02:48:12 was necessary you say in your statement to aim water above and below the compartment you see where it says that yeah but not directly into it as that

02:48:23 yeah but not directly into it as that could affect the firefighters working within the compartment you see that so that was your question first question

02:48:34 that was your question first question was that you're thinking at the time yes and was that the subject of a conversation that you had with guru manager secret from our mechanic no pick

02:48:45 manager secret from our mechanic no pick pardon from my recollection yes now crew manager secret says in his statement and I just want to put this to you so it says to get your recollection he says that he told you to put the jet above or

02:48:57 that he told you to put the jet above or below the window but not into it he says he was the one who said that do you recall that

02:49:06 again we've everything that you know the initial office has given up five around that night we gave a lot of direction we go a lot of orders we gave we had to make a lot of quick and dynamic

02:49:17 make a lot of quick and dynamic decisions everyone's perception what I did tonight that night is me is going quite different from each and I have to be true to my account and Chris to me Twitter's account yeah that's very fair

02:49:29 Twitter's account yeah that's very fair can I didn't look a little bit down the page and you say

02:49:41 and this is also the top of page five

02:49:50 you say I knew the crews without tackling the fire within the compartment that I noticed that the fire had now breached the window of the flat on the

02:50:02 breached the window of the flat on the fourth floor and was starting to affect the external fascia of the building now can you remember whether your discussion

02:50:15 can you remember whether your discussion with crew manager secret about the covering jet was before you first saw that the fire had breached the window of a flat or or after it

02:50:34 I concur first that's difficult right just to see if I can jog your recollection mr. secret says that it was after you first saw that and will explore with him how he knows that but

02:50:45 explore with him how he knows that but but assuming he's right about that what's your recollection

02:51:10 I can't be Thomas to this specific I know that traffic was happening I happened but I really can't pinpoint in terms of when that happened or in relation to Chris a statement and again

02:51:21 relation to Chris a statement and again mr. Douglas did that's very fair this is not a memory test it's just that we have to go through operation of these details and when you spoke to or having spoken

02:51:32 and when you spoke to or having spoken to crew manager secret about the jet did you give any instructions as to where the jet should be aimed as people discussed it for me it was you know

02:51:43 discussed it for me it was you know above and below that the the compartment of origin but not to be put directly into into the compartment right and who

02:51:54 into into the compartment right and who and who did you give those instructions to do you remember from my memory firefighters Murphy who was on the initial covering jet crew anybody else

02:52:06 initial covering jet crew anybody else there was another firefighter on the jet and I believe it was firefighter Charlie calling us but I can't confirm that Cornelius

02:52:15 Cornelius now I'm going to show you another clip of the Luke Bisbee video and this time at oh one 12:15 and then I let it run on

02:52:33 at oh one 12:15 and then I let it run on over to the next clip and I'm not sure if I need mr. chairman to repeat the trigger warning every time you go to a clip well I think it was probably sensible because we don't know if someone's come in not just to this room

02:52:44 someone's come in not just to this room but one of the other rooms so I think it's quite right good mr. Dunwoodie bear with us while we just give the trigger warning again and we're about to show another section of the Luke Bisbee fire spread video clip which shows scenes of

02:52:57 spread video clip which shows scenes of granite or Tower on fire overnight and if anybody feels uncomfortable of viewing those then they should take steps not to view them now and will allow another 30 seconds to elapse mr.

02:53:09 allow another 30 seconds to elapse mr. chairman if that's enough yes thank you

02:53:13 well we're just waiting mr. dad what I'm going to do and this is the things to look out for I'd like you to look out for two things in these sequences the

02:53:24 for two things in these sequences the timing of the covering jet going on and secondly any any burning material coming off the building as the two things we're just trying to get a get a handle on mr.

02:53:38 just trying to get a get a handle on mr. cha director if you could now play the loop starting at oh one 12:15

02:53:49 [Applause]

02:54:08 right thank you know that that's will perhaps play the neck okay then I play the beginning of the next if you would as well

02:54:32 thank you very much now do you think mr. dad and I want to ask you a number of questions about the sequence we've just seen and I'd ask you first of all to

02:54:45 seen and I'd ask you first of all to look at this and our answer a question whether you see any covering jet on the on the building at the start of the sequence if we can just play the first part of the sequence and just look out for the timing as to when the jet goes

02:54:58 for the timing as to when the jet goes on

02:55:03 [Applause]

02:55:12 here's their so so far 15:47 115 47 we see no jet on the outside of the window and yet we and we see this burning

02:55:24 and yet we and we see this burning material coming off does that accord with your recollection

02:55:41 it's difficult to say god I don't have it they have a time I'm running and but if I'm in or - I thought the cover in jet was was up and working before that

02:55:53 jet was was up and working before that point from what for my recollection that moment in time that's very fair can we just move before we move on can I just ask in the center of those three pictures it might be the case that

02:56:07 pictures it might be the case that someone wearing a white helmet and if that is the case using that might be you that that is that would be me yeah you think it is yeah

02:56:21 so did you have a good view of the covering jet going on to the window and the material coming off the window as it

02:56:32 the material coming off the window as it stands in that those images and yes

02:56:41 and then if we go on just a little bit further with the clip and see the covering jet being applied

02:56:50 [Applause]

02:56:54 I'm free and there it goes on my question and we'll come to the next clip shortly but my question is whether and I

02:57:07 shortly but my question is whether and I think you've answered this but I just want to get it absolutely clear having shown you the hope of the clip whether that was the first time that the jet goes on to the exterior or whether

02:57:19 goes on to the exterior or whether there's an earlier point in the development of the fire before burning material comes down from the window that the jet was being applied I can't recall

02:57:33 the jet was being applied I can't recall two separate times that the jet was working a lot recollection was that I was concerned it's Bentley fine outside of spoke had traffic was chromatic Chris

02:57:46 of spoke had traffic was chromatic Chris secret I'm going to get coverage yet up but no it's a compartment the plan was to make it sure that we could get it bubble above and below and that's the instruction to go to the cover and jet

02:57:57 instruction to go to the cover and jet crew no a heartbeat I'm specific that's my recollection of that event at that time now I'm going to ask for the clip

02:58:10 time now I'm going to ask for the clip to be played once more the question I've got for you is as we look at it whether the jet was being applied below the compartment or above the compartment

02:58:22 compartment or above the compartment [Music]

02:58:26 [Applause]

02:58:50 so from that clip where do you think does that does that prompted recollection as to where the jet was being aimed in that image there looks

02:59:02 being aimed in that image there looks like it it's difficult was the development of the fire it looks like it's pointed at base of where the fire is right at the base that

02:59:13 where the fire is right at the base that it doesn't there yes but I my recollection was that you know my instruction was above and below the compartment but from that image there it

02:59:24 compartment but from that image there it looks like it's a base after the sequence we've just seen do you remember whether you can use stayed there to continue to monitor what the firefighters aiming the jet on the

02:59:35 firefighters aiming the jet on the exterior were doing or did you move away and go and do another task again we had to be Thomas pivot pilot now I was quite mobile took on that ground floor area

02:59:48 mobile took on that ground floor area stay in one position it wasn't static I was a very mobile patient - yeah without this if there's anything images

02:59:59 without this if there's anything images or video that otherwise I was quite mobile walking around I don't think I was static in my position for a long period of time no no we're going to come back to the next sequence in just a moment so the same trigger warning will

03:00:11 moment so the same trigger warning will continue to apply throughout the next five or ten minutes or so mr. chairman that's all right can I just ask you this can you please look at page four of your statements

03:00:23 look at page four of your statements back to page four

03:00:27 and it's a sentence we've already looked at seven lines up from the bottom of page four after the sentence it was

03:00:39 page four after the sentence it was necessary to a mortar above and below the compartment etc and then you say at this point the fire was still in the compartment but the window had failed inverted and broken you see that

03:00:50 inverted and broken you see that let's want to ask you about that but this is at the point when the exterior jet is being applied in the video we saw

03:01:03 jet is being applied in the video we saw that there was burning material coming off the window at the moment when the jet was being applied now if that was the first time that the exterior jet was being applied is it right that the fire

03:01:20 being applied is it right that the fire was still within the compartment sorry could you repeat that question please yes having seen the video and the burning material coming off the building at the moment when the exterior jet was

03:01:32 at the moment when the exterior jet was applied is it right to say that at that point the fire was still in the compartment looking at that the images will be seen then it looks like the

03:01:45 will be seen then it looks like the fires exited out the compartment but at that moment in time and I made that statement that was my recollection of events by this point in time when we see the covering jet going on and the

03:01:57 the covering jet going on and the burning material coming off about 115 did you consider the risk of failure of compartment ation around flat 16 and I

03:02:08 compartment ation around flat 16 and I say around I mean anywhere in relation to flat 16

03:02:27 the only reference after that the the external in terms of the window that had failed in them and the obviously the fire was developing outside that compartment on the external of the building what did you make

03:02:38 building what did you make sorry it's not again do you remember seeing the burning material coming off the building at about that point I remember seeing this at the point where I'll start to feel uncomfortable in terms of how the fire was reacting in

03:02:50 terms of how the fire was reacting in behavior external as I referred to more statement you know it was sparking and spitting and reacting up with magnesium burn so that's the only real reference that I can say that when I saw that you

03:03:02 that I can say that when I saw that you know maybe that was my reference in terms of stuff will Deborah falling from the building okay I'm going to come back to that in just a moment but at the moment when you saw the material coming

03:03:15 moment when you saw the material coming off the building like that did you assess the risk of breach of compartment ation

03:03:25 you know reference I can't make today is just I don't have a member having a conscious decision on that but because I had the covering jet out you know for me

03:03:36 had the covering jet out you know for me that was a control measures trying negate any fires but on the extent of that building here now we're gonna come back to what happens next in terms of fire spread in a moment and you're

03:03:47 fire spread in a moment and you're feeling uncomfortable so I want to ask you about that but before we do can I just ask mr. trial director to to roll the film on again I just want to ask one or two questions about that the exterior jet again but if you start with at 16 I

03:04:01 jet again but if you start with at 16 I want you to follow this through please watch the exterior jet and then listen out also for the audio and just to say the trigger warning I gave five minutes ago still remains in place

03:04:39 just we've paused they're just pausing there what can you see from that video about where the jet is being aimed it's

03:04:54 about where the jet is being aimed it's been aimed at the from that VT at the base of where the fire is the base they're not above no can you continue in

03:05:12 they're not above no can you continue in that clip we can see perhaps just play it again because it looks as if you can see the host stream being applied below the window and the voice saying it's not high enough can you display that just

03:05:34 high enough can you display that just pause there and we heard the voice saying it's not high enough and you can see the host stream being applied below the window can you comment on the voice that says it's not high enough what was

03:05:47 that says it's not high enough what was what was your if you had seen that well first of all did you see that at the time did you see the host stream being applied below the window as opposed to above the window

03:06:00 it's not something either a clear memory over at that moment at that moment in time on that on that instant ground I didn't hear the visual that audio-visual

03:06:11 didn't hear the visual that audio-visual that it's not mine of like it's not high enough I mean assuming it's a member of the public saying it's not high enough can you comment on that let me ask the

03:06:24 can you comment on that let me ask the question what would a member of the public know about where to aim an exterior jet and then say it's not high enough

03:06:41 it's a member of public sign reacting to what they've seen in front of them

03:06:50 but again in that moment of that incident with the resources we had we will try and do what we can to know with

03:07:02 will try and do what we can to know with the resources that we had that chair and at that point in time it was effective did you go back and take steps to ensure that the covering jet was aimed above

03:07:16 that the covering jet was aimed above the window I can't recall that mr. Chairman I think now may be an appropriate moment for a five-year break in just a second I'd like to ask one

03:07:27 in just a second I'd like to ask one question I assume there's the maximum height which recovering jet like that can reach do you happen to know what it is I'll say the maximum you'd be looking

03:07:40 is I'll say the maximum you'd be looking at we know what water pressure you can get is probably a maximum of that's probably by its maximum about four four so from honesty that may be more I mean

03:07:54 so from honesty that may be more I mean I couldn't give even Zacks in terms of height well no but I just wondered whether in your own opinion it would be

03:08:05 whether in your own opinion it would be possible for a covering yet to be playing on the floor above the floor where the fire was it maybe was it maybe it wasn't those wondered what you would

03:08:16 it wasn't those wondered what you would say

03:08:18 at the time that firework I will do the cover injector or the new for coverage it was working you know I was confident that that the resource we had there would be sufficient to try and suppress that fire in a know in a normal

03:08:31 that fire in a know in a normal compartment fire in a high-rise building known as I know need to be constructed so you think there was a fair chance that you could have got water onto the

03:08:42 that you could have got water onto the level above where the fire was at that moment in time that would be my thing you know yeah right thank you we have a

03:08:56 you know yeah right thank you we have a short break then please say resumed at 25 to 1

03:09:14 you

03:16:12 yeah

03:16:27 noticed a doubt and I understand that you would welcome a break at this point and mr. minute I was going to suggest that we might rise for an early lunch now

03:16:37 now but resume at quarter to two instead of two o'clock thereby giving a slightly longer break for lunch without losing too much time with that inconvenience you closer mr. Darden we'll do that

03:16:50 you closer mr. Darden we'll do that we'll have a slightly longer lunch break but we'll take it now and resume at quarter to thank you all right to do that yep and please remember not to talk

03:17:01 that yep and please remember not to talk about your evidence during the break thank you thank you very much

03:17:21 you