Watch Manager Michael Dowden gives evidence about his role managing fire survival guidance calls and the challenges of coordinating rescues from the ground floor during the Grenfell fire.
00:00:38 right mr. Darden yes okay yes whenever mr. davon I get to ask you now about your communications with the control room on the night of the fire can I first ask you to look at policy 790 in
00:00:51 first ask you to look at policy 790 in the policy bundle at top five that's policy 790 far survival guidance calls which to which the relativity reference
00:01:04 which to which the relativity reference is lfv and then there are four zeros one two five seven I put it there that's reviewed as our current as at April 2014
00:01:15 reviewed as our current as at April 2014 can I ask you please to look internally at paragraph nine of that policy doesn't have an internal page number I'm afraid
00:01:26 have an internal page number I'm afraid that's its paragraph nine there should be a it should actually be the relativity reference external page a nation page nine as well
00:01:44 page five perhaps right I'm gravely - infatuated and page five mr. Tran director thank you very much there's the heading nine communication with control
00:01:55 heading nine communication with control and just look at that together with me if you would ninth one it is vital that control is kept informed of the actions being taken to resolve each FSG call the fact that
00:02:09 to resolve each FSG call the fact that control is aware of the actions being carried out on the incident ground will greatly enhance the advice given to FSG callers was that a policy or principle at which you were aware of on the night of the fire
00:02:22 of the fire yes and looking at nine to informative messages
00:02:30 messages it says informative messages from the incident ground should also contain an update on progress relating to those specific FSG calls by both the flat and house number the flat or house number to
00:02:43 house number the flat or house number to avoid confusion were you aware of that policy or principle on the night of the fire
00:02:49 fire yes and then nine three the outcome of every FSG call must be communicated to control and again were you aware of that policy or principle on the night of the
00:03:01 policy or principle on the night of the fire that's correct
00:03:05 now we only I think have two records in the short incident log of informative messages which were persons reported what would what would that expression
00:03:17 what would what would that expression communicate to control about the detail which the policy requires should be contained in messages to the control room from the incident ground
00:03:34 the point from when I said persons reported to per Minister Brown I was unaware that there was FSG cause in progress at that time but if there was at all FST Pro in progress and what
00:03:48 at all FST Pro in progress and what would the expression persons reported tell control room operators about whether the advice that they would be giving to anybody who did call who found
00:04:00 giving to anybody who did call who found themselves trapped in a cup in a flat
00:04:05 should remain could safely remain to stay put
00:04:15 could you ever repeat that question for me please yes what would the expression persons reported tell you or tell the control room operators about whether statehood
00:04:26 room operators about whether statehood advice being given to callers by the control room would remain safe it will
00:04:37 control room would remain safe it will really provide the control operates we have any information it's more assessment from the innocent commander who was myself at the time that I believed that there were people have been that blocked who they were involved
00:04:53 been that blocked who they were involved in a fire did you talk to any control room operators at any point while you were incident commander about the conditions in the building now did you
00:05:07 conditions in the building now did you did you for example did you tell them that you have now started to see people coming out of the building suffering the effects of smoke and splattering coughing with City faces did you did you
00:05:19 coughing with City faces did you did you tell the control room that no the only way that maternity facilitate from the fire ground is really been a fir very informative missus the only informative mention I've seen and had was my first
00:05:32 mention I've seen and had was my first informative measures just after we made pumps
00:05:34 pumps six because of the the work I've done the fire ran out of time the way I was consumed it was gone and around me I had again that tells a story of how unique
00:05:46 again that tells a story of how unique this incident is and how I'm president it was I didn't have time as you officer in charge so you can try and get some message to control because have consumed and everything was going on years ago at that time did you think that it was
00:05:59 that time did you think that it was important for control room to know that you had now by 1:30 seen occupants of the building emerging with the city faces and having suffered the effects of
00:06:11 faces and having suffered the effects of smoke Thanks correct and that's why at that point my assessment was as I said the person reported a message to control for my assessment that I believed that people now involved in this in this fire
00:06:22 people now involved in this in this fire get a person's reported message what would that tell the control room about the conditions you were seeing on the ground at that moment I mean nothing about the condition is now what about
00:06:34 about the condition is now what about residence and what they were suffering in terms of smoke inhalation and and such he faces what would he tell them about that nothing again the only way we could clarify that to control was to send a firmer firmer a formative message
00:06:46 send a firmer firmer a formative message after the person's reported message had had gone again the way this fire was developing was I'm following the front mysians commander why it was too
00:06:57 mysians commander why it was too consuming our resources in terms of both personnel and afar appliances and on the instant ground that was very very difficult to get that message away if I doubt if it's difficult because obviously I physically I myself a person
00:07:10 obviously I physically I myself a person has to grow to be to the fire applies to send that message that can't be done remotely from the fire appliance if you wanted to send a very urgent message to the control room was there a way you
00:07:23 the control room was there a way you could do it from your handheld radio no okay say is the only message system between the incident ground so it was on
00:07:34 between the incident ground so it was on the night of the fire the only method of communication between the incident ground and the control room from the incident command pump or the command unit later and the control room there's
00:07:48 unit later and the control room there's probably two clarify here for station post personnel for officers placed station level we have to access we have access to the main scheme radio only via
00:07:59 access to the main scheme radio only via the pumping appliances in the front of the pump now that we have previously described over the course of this inquiry and all firefighters and officer up to the rank of watch manager be will have their own personal issue of fiber
00:08:11 have their own personal issue of fiber and radio senior officers from the rank of say station manger and above will have again their own personal issue fiber and radio but they also have their
00:08:22 fiber and radio but they also have their own personal issue main main main scheme radio which is portable and it's kept persons did you think of going when you saw the residents or occupants of the building emerging with faces and
00:08:34 building emerging with faces and coughing and spluttering did you think to go quickly to the radio domain scheme radio in the ICP and radio a detailed
00:08:46 radio in the ICP and radio a detailed message about what you have seen to the control room
00:08:54 no from my my decision and my thought process at the time was I was its commander I need to be available you stand ground keep my situational
00:09:05 stand ground keep my situational awareness up make sure I'm visible on the fire ground so any oncoming appliances have the resources or officers
00:09:11 officers I'm easy at that identifiable to those or any other responsible people who have further information and if I did that by going to a fire appliance that would take you away from that role when you saw people emerging with 30 faces and
00:09:22 saw people emerging with 30 faces and spluttering and Kaufering cop and coughing did you think that was information that it was important for the control room operators to know about
00:09:36 I'm gonna be honest I don't have a that ends my thought process at that time was there a reason why you didn't ask one of
00:09:50 there a reason why you didn't ask one of your crew to go to the incident command pump and send a message to the control room saying lots of people coming out suffering the effects of of smoke even
00:10:03 suffering the effects of of smoke even if that's simple again I can only comment on my actions at night the decisions I made and that's something
00:10:14 decisions I made and that's something that wasn't taken
00:10:17 you mentioned loudhailer x' earlier on today as a means of communicating with residents do you remember a firefighter with a loud hailer at some point on the
00:10:28 with a loud hailer at some point on the in the night when you are still incident commander telling people to get out if they could do you remember that I don't have a memory or recollection of that
00:10:39 have a memory or recollection of that now let me see if I can just jog your memory a little bit the Eva Orr the operational response
00:10:50 the Eva Orr the operational response report puts that it event at a 140 state sakes and attributes it to firefighter Marie I think is of hammersmith two
00:11:01 Marie I think is of hammersmith two three six one does that help your recollection no it doesn't remember firefighter Marie going around the loudhailer again I can't collaborate the my my account events and I don't have a
00:11:13 account events and I don't have a recollection of a happy on fire
00:11:18 and can I move them to the topic of fire survival guidance calls and communications if you go back to where
00:11:29 communications if you go back to where we were in policy 719 its policy bundle 10 5 FSG calls
00:11:41 10 5 FSG calls can I please ask you to look at
00:11:48 paragraph 1 1 which is on should be only turn a page 2
00:12:07 right now if they think that's what we're after I'm after something called introduction I'm looking at top 5 of the policies bundles I'm sorry mr. Douglas
00:12:19 policies bundles I'm sorry mr. Douglas and ourselves for communication is difficulty here if you go to page 2 of that document please mr. fogg directly
00:12:36 right thank you very much you can see introduction 11.1 the purpose of this policy is to explain what a fire survival guidance call is and to describe how critical information should
00:12:49 describe how critical information should be exchanged between the gate control and the incident ground provides guidance on how this information is to be recorded for use by incident commanders were you on the night of the
00:13:00 commanders were you on the night of the fire were you aware of this policy and lips supposed to do yes I was and if you look at paragraph 5.1 just starts at the
00:13:15 look at paragraph 5.1 just starts at the bottom of the same page information transfer to the incident there's an awful lot of guidance that we can see between five point one five at point 13
00:13:27 between five point one five at point 13 take a moment or two just to familiarize ourself with it if you wouldn't mind I'm not gonna read it out aloud to you but because there's an awful lot of information there but my question is were you familiar with this the details
00:13:40 were you familiar with this the details of this policy as I say take a moment to take as long as we like mr. Miller there's a lot in this as the home page will serve quite detailed text
00:13:51 will serve quite detailed text they're wondering whether it's reasonable to ask the witness whether he was aware of it I mean we're youwere we're in general terms of the fire survival guidance system yes it was
00:14:03 survival guidance system yes it was there may be particular parts of it that you need to ask you about it so can I ask you to look at paragraph 5.5 specifically
00:14:18 which tells you what control will attempt to do which is to gather all the information on the control information form and to relay this information to the incident as and when it becomes available and the control information
00:14:29 available and the control information form is appendix 2 which you'll find
00:14:36 towards the back of the policy absolution have a look at that that's on internal page 8 are you familiar with
00:14:52 internal page 8 are you familiar with that control information form yes yes that's a form that would be just help me with this because it's it's a mystery at the moment is slightly to me without
00:15:03 the moment is slightly to me without form be filled in in the control room or on the fire ground or both no that's so for those bullet points you just saw previous slide control operates will ask those there's a trigger questions that
00:15:17 those there's a trigger questions that form you see in front of you their control information forms Karen or frontline pumping appliances in a mess in a Tripucka message format so the information by those bullet points you
00:15:28 information by those bullet points you saw earlier will correspond to the information that will be related on that form by either appliances in attendance at the incident if this is about the
00:15:40 at the incident if this is about the dynamic nature then it was a control should pass that information to oncoming appliances and that should be made as soon available to mr. commander when
00:15:52 soon available to mr. commander when eyes don't come your plant has arrived right and if you look at paragraph five point nine I think this makes it like the point you were making it says all FSG calls sorry mr. Chow's director
00:16:03 FSG calls sorry mr. Chow's director could you go back to five point nine that's it and just highlight that for us please thank you all FSG call information as we pass to the IC who will decide on action should
00:16:14 the IC who will decide on action should be taken the expectation is that ICS will treat FSG calls as a priority and consider deploying and increasing resources accordingly on the night of
00:16:25 resources accordingly on the night of the fire were you aware that this was a policy requirement of you yes and just before we move on in terms of
00:16:38 before we move on in terms of prioritization could you look at paragraph four point two on the page before under the section prioritizing calls and if it could just be enlarged
00:16:51 calls and if it could just be enlarged please it says the IC based on their situational awareness and the information provided by control will decide how to prioritize FSG calls and
00:17:02 decide how to prioritize FSG calls and the actions to be taken on the incident ground IC should direct resources to those corners of greatest risk high priority if practicable other callers not seen as the press greatest risk
00:17:13 not seen as the press greatest risk medium priority should be allocated resources weren't available again were you aware of that principal and policy requirement on the night of the fire yes yes I was
00:17:28 now just in the light of the background of those policy requirements and your awareness of them according to our
00:17:39 awareness of them according to our records Brigade control by 136 had received 13 FSG homes the earliest one had come at oh one twenty four or so
00:17:51 had come at oh one twenty four or so from flat one nine five on floor 22 were you aware of first of all an FSG call coming in before 1:30 let's say from
00:18:06 coming in before 1:30 let's say from flat one nine five on floor 22 no I wasn't where you were where by 136 that brigade control had received 13 FSG calls no I wasn't
00:18:25 it seems from the lrr as a record that g27 one wasn't responding to priority messages which then had to be intercepted by actions pump ladder g26
00:18:37 intercepted by actions pump ladder g26 one that's on the ORR I could show to you if you want to but take it for me that's what it says did you know that g27 one wasn't responding to priority
00:18:48 g27 one wasn't responding to priority messages from control
00:18:58 don't recollect that you know we weren't responding to the FSG calls in progress at that time as I said alluded to previously my statement that you know a
00:19:09 previously my statement that you know a dynamic stage of use that that can happen people can't get consumed very very very quickly on the fire ground and in the case of green fields houses some of the none of us had ever seen before and presidented scours up you know keep
00:19:20 and presidented scours up you know keep referring to so there is that default that okay if there was also the ground the stretched and we are consumed and that would be pass through oncoming appliances but I wasn't aware at that time no okay so by and to take at that
00:19:38 time no okay so by and to take at that time 136 also mr. Dan can you tell him what you knew if anything about the about what survival fast by the guidance
00:19:51 about what survival fast by the guidance calls were coming in and being responded to the first knowledge I had at the far table of guidance coalition have spoke about I referred to my statements when I
00:20:02 about I referred to my statements when I was the team leader of command unit a present presented himself to me as soon as I was aware of that I took immediate action that was anything when you enter the bridgehead was it no that was when the command
00:20:15 was it no that was when the command unity leader of homogenate was in attendance and the decision was then the most senior officer on the five men at the time was Brett laughs statesmanship Brett loft he was aware of his responsibility to take over having no no he had FS chin in
00:20:27 having no no he had FS chin in attendance my priorities were for just to save life whereas a strict control measure in terms of that and I decision between herself and station major love was to process manage our resources for
00:20:41 was to process manage our resources for the command unit team leader and manage the fire Survival Guide that's cool and that's the first time I knew on that fire ground died fire Survival Guide soon progress yes I understand I think I'm going to ask you about the handover with and firefighters often hit just a
00:20:54 with and firefighters often hit just a moment just one more question this specific point up to the point at which you spoke to firefighter lofty I
00:21:06 which you spoke to firefighter lofty I think is a station master agent off as Kurtz is more senior to you before that point you could see what was happening with the building and you could see what
00:21:17 with the building and you could see what you could see were you surprised that there had been that you had received no information from control about classified survival guidance calls in progress
00:21:36 I can't say that I had that motion all that thought at that time that night technologies come on Arden I have a lot of emotions running through my body and thoughts everything else but you're not one of surprised that but at that
00:21:48 one of surprised that but at that particular point that sticks help no now mr. Donnegan asked you about a handful just a few or some specific instances
00:22:01 just a few or some specific instances okay just say you're ready for what I'm going to do next and the first question a set of questions and there aren't many questions I've got for you all this is about a young girl called Jessica just
00:22:15 about a young girl called Jessica just if just a few questions you need you need at a time takes five minutes gonna be enough left a 25 to 3 please
00:22:45 you
00:40:15 you
00:40:49 no mister darden before we carry on I came to ask mr. millet to give you an overview of what he wants to cover in the questions and he still got to ask you I think that might help you to see
00:41:00 you I think that might help you to see where we're going thank you
00:41:13 so sorry mister darden first of all I'm not get to keep you for more than a half an hour we'll say so it's not long to go the other thing is that I should tell you what I'm going to cover so that
00:41:24 you what I'm going to cover so that you're comfortable with what is coming up in terms of topics it's the arrival of a station manager loft the handover of incident command and then a few questions about your activities inside
00:41:38 questions about your activities inside the building and then at the at the bridgehead and then one or two very short questions about about PPV fans and
00:41:50 short questions about about PPV fans and about lots of water pressure are you okay with those topics yep that's fine thank you very occasionally okay so you did mention earlier in your evidence the
00:42:01 did mention earlier in your evidence the arrival of mr. Moffat station manager loft now we have it in our short incident log that he arrived at 1:32 base also so around about the time that
00:42:14 base also so around about the time that you that made pumps 2025 now is it right and normally as a station manager he would take over incident command from you that's correct yes and at that point
00:42:27 you that's correct yes and at that point the makeup of the status I think in fact exactly was 2020 Punk fire but it became 25 very soon after that do you remember that yes did you at that point when
00:42:40 that yes did you at that point when station manager loft arrived did you see another station manager at the scene not like I recall no so he was the first one you saw it was the first singer of so I
00:42:51 you saw it was the first singer of so I saw attendance yes did he come up to you or did you have to go and look for him for my recollection he presented himself to make his idly he in stock along at a pardon did he say to you I am taking
00:43:04 pardon did he say to you I am taking over in a clear way and what did he say no what did you discuss with him for my
00:43:16 no what did you discuss with him for my recollection of Britain's I can refer back to my statement that station manager right off was aware of his responsibility to take over and but at that time have we previously discussed that was the first time that I received
00:43:31 that was the first time that I received on the fire ground that we were receiving malp life as she calls rather than delay time he turns did a full hand over to stage remains aloft in terms of where where we were to this
00:43:43 in terms of where where we were to this point resources anything else the instant ground the decision was taken to the most productive and use of social measures lawful for him to be take
00:43:55 measures lawful for him to be take ownership and facilitate the fire of gardens calls and with the team command unit team leader as well in your
00:44:06 unit team leader as well in your statement if you can go to it so we've got it exactly page 9 of 16 just below with just about half way down page 9 you
00:44:17 with just about half way down page 9 you say ordinarily the first sm on-scene should take over as into the commander but I decided the best thing he could do was to deal with the fast survival guidance calls that were coming in so
00:44:33 guidance calls that were coming in so was the decision that you so let me ask it this way did that mean that he wouldn't become incident commander but you would stay in post as incident commander that's correct if it would be
00:44:46 commander that's correct if it would be impossible then instead of that scale to Romanians to commander and then also manage the fire survival Gardens cause that are coming in so what's the decision that you should remain an incident commander your own decision I
00:44:57 incident commander your own decision I would say it's unfair on such a major break left over to a joint assess joint decision okay and was there not another
00:45:10 decision okay and was there not another station manager in attendance who could have handled the faster by the fire survival guidance calls coming in not that I was aware okay so at the point at
00:45:21 that I was aware okay so at the point at which now you have this discussion with him about him taking over fast the five of guidance calls what did you know about the fire survival guidance calls coming in I had no indication of these
00:45:33 coming in I had no indication of these or exact details of the number of FS she calls they just knew it was a moment for my memory yes that you know the
00:45:46 my memory yes that you know the information received we had multiple FSG because they received right do you remember whether it was he it wasn't it was a station manager laughs he mentioned fire survival guidance calls
00:45:57 mentioned fire survival guidance calls to you then you had a discussion about it or whether you mentioned fire survival Gunners calls to him and how did it start from my understanding it was from a self as I received that
00:46:08 was from a self as I received that information from the command unit leader commander team leader picked up a command unit team leader who was that I don't know his name but I believe the first command unit in it was cu8 and it had been a team leader
00:46:21 it was cu8 and it had been a team leader from that command unit right that thank you for that and I'm just going to explore that a little bit more cu8 which I think was Fulham that's correct yes
00:46:34 where is it part do you remember in relation to the tower I don't know did you go to see you ate all did the team leader from cu8 come to see you
00:46:46 leader from cu8 come to see you the team leader came to find me all needs to ground the only time I ever went to a command unit was when I was eventually taken off the fire ground approximately I wait 30 hours on the
00:46:58 approximately I wait 30 hours on the 14th of June yep and
00:47:05 as a result of your discussion others I think you say with station manager loft it was decided between you he would take over the handling of our survival guidance calls what would you do I would
00:47:18 guidance calls what would you do I would resume the role of incident commander and don't and do what
00:47:33 again to have their Pacific detail that conversation will be difficult to recollect it was just you know I was presuming in kilometer or the hints hidden when you had your discussion with
00:47:45 hidden when you had your discussion with station manager loft did you discuss the number of calls that have been received by that point
00:47:57 no I can recall no
00:48:02 did you discuss any system of prioritization of calls with the station manager loft in your conversation with him
00:48:10 no be just at the conversation that I had with station owner Brett loft was in terms of so he would take ownership and facilitate the management of the first
00:48:22 facilitate the management of the first five garden schools change on a to a different radio frequency channel three because obviously channel one was becoming quite congested with with radio
00:48:33 becoming quite congested with with radio traffic so did that radio channel three would be designated just to may as a fire survive Gardens calls and that would be fed up into the super rich head
00:48:49 was it a long conversation with station manager loft
00:49:00 don't remember it'd be a long conversation though do you remember anything about the arrival of Andy Walton on the scene I do minute only one arrived on scene
00:49:12 I do minute only one arrived on scene yes can I ask you to look at your contemporaneous notes which should be in tap won't be of the witness bundle I
00:49:23 tap won't be of the witness bundle I want to look at your main notes page 5 which is the number 5 in the ring at the top right-hand corner
00:49:40 and you say halfway down station manager loft up report it to me can you see that you see that clearly mr. diamond right
00:49:51 you see that clearly mr. diamond right station manager love reports to me along with station manager Andy Walton I handed over to them that I currently have no reports of people trapped but on the 11th and 16th floors two residents
00:50:02 the 11th and 16th floors two residents were unable to leave due to illness and mobility issues we'd covered that then lower down you say the decision was made that SM loft would take ownership of the FSG calls and then he say an SM Walton
00:50:14 FSG calls and then he say an SM Walton station manager Walton would now take over as incident commander and it's that take over as incident commander I want to ask you about based on your note and from your recollection do you think that
00:50:27 from your recollection do you think that Andy Walton took over at the same time as your discussion of about far survival guidance calls with with Brett loft
00:50:43 I think there is in my main statement I provide to the MPS I think it was a delay those contemporaneous notes were
00:50:55 delay those contemporaneous notes were made started to be made that time the morning or that night of June of 14 when we drove back in you know a day as you can imagine that the your deal that
00:51:06 can imagine that the your deal that we've been through I was trying to best remember in terms of you know why thought what happened that incident my perception what happened you know it
00:51:19 perception what happened you know it gave me further reflection I had more time to digest process events of that night from what I remember they station
00:51:32 night from what I remember they station manager Andy Walton attended after the moment that I had had the conversation with station owner Brett loft yeah and do you remember roughly how long
00:51:44 do you remember roughly how long afterwards
00:51:49 it's difficult to put a timescale on it I would be adjusted to but it's a definite if time on that let me see if I can help a little bit if you've got the documents by and turn in it to tap seven
00:52:08 documents by and turn in it to tap seven this is an early LF b log document provided to the inquiry its lfb 7:03
00:52:22 and on page 2 of that document mister darden if you look at the vm sentence in red that says o 50s th for
00:52:34 sentence in red that says o 50s th for one s station manager assembled summers allowance of a commander that's an estimated time of 150 does that help with your recollection of when Andy Walton took over that fits simulus
00:52:49 Andy Walton took over that fits simulus at our scale because for mine style isn't used to commander for roughly about an hour and that night yes
00:53:01 and during the period between Brett loft taking over far survival of guidance of around around 30 minutes been let's be rough for the moment Obama and the next
00:53:12 rough for the moment Obama and the next and the following 20 minutes or so when Andy Walton took over us incident commander do you remember having any further discussions with Brett loft
00:53:24 further discussions with Brett loft about far survival guidance calls
00:53:31 not like I'm a corner okay now can I just ask you about GM's group managers and we're you aware the group manager
00:53:45 and we're you aware the group manager Welch had arrived at the incident ground up Oh 157 and also not on the night events that no not until after the incident that's correct postings no I
00:53:56 incident that's correct postings no I did but so he was the first group manager that you encountered on the night do you remember
00:54:12 think the first yeah the first group manager I encountered was root matter Richard Welch but that was when I was relieved of command that now I went up into the bridgehead and at some point I didn't
00:54:24 bridgehead and at some point I didn't meet group manager Richard Welch when he came into the bridgehead and I've took over control of the bridgehead right so the next question is do you remember having your clear handover of incident
00:54:36 having your clear handover of incident come on - Andy Walton I don't I remember hanging over having had a conversation or hand over to those men - any Walton I couldn't give you a clearer script and
00:54:48 couldn't give you a clearer script and over but I can give you a understanding of what that content should be as a pilot decision-making model okay but I
00:55:00 pilot decision-making model okay but I think the questions are simple one do you remember handing in the white tab on white helmet I would have handed the helmet over because we have both have white helmet so it's not that it's just
00:55:11 white helmet so it's not that it's just a fish dish the case of you hang over the tab earth now and I believe I I did hand over the instant commodity bar - you do Andy bought one yes okay and
00:55:24 what did he do with it did he continue to wear it or did he give it to somebody else from my recollection again and
00:55:38 else from my recollection again and refer to a statement I did a hand over to station manager Tony Wharton and I couldn't give you the time scholar and quite close proximity to the hand over
00:55:50 quite close proximity to the hand over to me and station manager and he brought in another senior officer presently solely on the fire ground who are now now as Deputy Assistant Commissioner haenyeo Lachlan if you could look at
00:56:01 haenyeo Lachlan if you could look at your statement again please mr. downturn at page 9 towards the bottom of the page we see him what you say about the handover and you say six lines up from
00:56:13 handover and you say six lines up from the bottom of the page I was handed the next senior officer in attendance was Andy Walton see that just up from the bottom of the page
00:56:27 and I was handing over to him when DAC auntie Lachlan arrived almost at the same time i briefed them but i can't remember exactly what I said on the night and I handed the incident
00:56:38 night and I handed the incident commander Taba to SM wolves and who gave it to da CA Lachlan and he became the incident commander just looking at that it looks as if you handed over to station manager Walton who immediately
00:56:50 station manager Walton who immediately handed over incident command to da CA Lachlan is that how it happened that's my version of that recollection it was a very short amount of time from the
00:57:01 very short amount of time from the period at station Angie public pardon station magnate handy Walton resumed the rawlings - commander - then that's Assistant Commissioner hand yo Lachlan resuming it role of insta commander were
00:57:14 resuming it role of insta commander were you present when station manager Wharton gave the incident commander Tabard - da CA Lachlan
00:57:31 I can't oven under said let's say I was we could call the actual tab I've been given to a neo Lachlan but I do remember were three of us being outside one point
00:57:44 were three of us being outside one point together yes okay well let's stick with an Andy Walton as the first person who taught thee the white Tabard then when you when he took over walls any
00:57:56 you when he took over walls any operational strategy discussed between you two
00:58:06 so from my recollection of what happened
00:58:13 a detailed it's going to be difficult I think I was he handed over to him about the the VFS recalls the actions I've taken to manage that the the size of the
00:58:27 taken to manage that the the size of the insert interpreter sourcing 25 pumps
00:58:33 can't be confident or a hundred cent accurate on this but I believe also I formed him in terms of the command structure I put in place in terms of the staging area and also resorted their bridgehead
00:58:44 bridgehead did you discuss compartment compartment a ssin I can't record it now did you discuss the fire and smoke conditions of the building internally
00:59:05 that somehow karma cool
00:59:10 do you know from your own recollection weather station manager loft had himself discussed fast survival guidance course with Andy Wharton
00:59:26 not that I was aware
00:59:35 now both anti Walton and DAC a lot in say in their statements and again we'll also have to explore this with them that that they say that they understood from
00:59:47 that they say that they understood from you that the only that only the cladding on the outside was burning and falling off and that the fire was only on the exterior is that something you told you told them it's their recollection is
00:59:59 told them it's their recollection is that your recollection
01:00:10 I cannot confirm if that was a conversation you know that was obvious from that time that you said that it was also external fire on that building because the way I had developed so quickly but I cannot confirm that
01:00:24 quickly but I cannot confirm that something I actually handed over to them
01:00:28 at the point at which you handed over incident command was there any discussion about stay-put advice at all
01:00:48 not our cubicle and at the same point when you handed over incident come on was was there any discussion about or communication with the control room
01:01:00 communication with the control room about the extent of the failure of compartment a ssin all the smoke and fire spread within the building it's a discussion about that color corner was
01:01:14 discussion about that color corner was there a discussion you had at the point of handover about whether it was possible to deploy large numbers of
01:01:26 possible to deploy large numbers of firefighters into the stairs
01:01:37 beginners difficult to confirm but you tryna person suspected of a hot just building jaws of this instant for an hour I've seen something that I don't
01:01:48 hour I've seen something that I don't think most or any of junior officer probably in the UK fire server has ever been involved with and to try and pinpoint and react lets every single bit information that was handed over there and that point is very very difficult at
01:02:05 and that point is very very difficult at the point that you were relieved mr. darling did you have any thoughts about whether it was appropriate that you should have been left as incident
01:02:16 should have been left as incident commander until the moment you were relieved
01:02:19 relieved I have no force on that my force a moment in time just did the best I could as a firefighter to do the job I've employed
01:02:32 firefighter to do the job I've employed to do on that night thank you I've got it just a few questions about what happened next to it going to the bridgehead you say in your statement that after you hand it over you enter
01:02:44 that after you hand it over you enter the bridgehead that's right isn't it that's correct
01:02:53 and you say that at that point this isn't your war winter statement they did take you to but just just help me with it you discover that there were 170 fire
01:03:06 it you discover that there were 170 fire survival diamond schools to deal with that's what you say in a statement that from what I was honest I'm not on that night that's something that I later learned incident oh I see I wasn't aware
01:03:18 learned incident oh I see I wasn't aware at that point when I went to Bridget Lyon under said that was something I was
01:03:25 through also discussions and meetings that that something I was aware I believed us and the number we had yes so when you got to the bridgehead how
01:03:37 when you got to the bridgehead how remember how long after being relieved of incident command you arrived
01:03:48 I remember was in the lobby grandfa Lobby era bit went to the lift area there was a minutes yes who was in
01:04:02 there was a minutes yes who was in charge of the the bridgehead at that point when you arrived do you remember from my understanding I believe at that point there was a watch matter Brian O'Keefe and watch manager
01:04:14 matter Brian O'Keefe and watch manager Louise there was a de Silva from Gulf 34 Chelsea and did you what did you find at the bridgehead when you arrived there
01:04:35 it was a very very busy environment there was number of PA where is from for Iran by
01:04:52 from my recollection I had never seen to my firefighters fire fire an excuse to the urban and firefighter Justin of burn who from my remember II were working on
01:05:04 who from my remember II were working on to enter control boards at that point
01:05:09 it's difficult to really pinpoint other Pacific's but those the pieces that I stick out in my memory mr. just give me one second yes
01:05:33 mr. Dutton I've got no more questions for you I just want to thank you both personally on behalf and on behalf of the inquiry for your courage in standing
01:05:45 the inquiry for your courage in standing there for three days and answering my questions your evidence has been enormous ly helpful to our work and I think we as a team salute you thank you very much mr. chairman well
01:05:58 thank you very much mr. chairman well I'd like to echo what mr. minutes said I'm really grateful to you for coming to give your evidence and you've given it in my view with courage and candor and without shying away from the difficult
01:06:11 without shying away from the difficult questions of which I'm afraid there have been many and in doing all that I think you set a really good example to those who may be asked to come and give evidence with later on so thank you very
01:06:22 evidence with later on so thank you very much indeed and as mr. minutes said I think you should know that your evidence is really very valuable to us and we're all very grateful to you so thank you very much I'm sorry it's been such a
01:06:33 very much I'm sorry it's been such a difficult time you leave us no choice thank you very much
01:06:47 like I'd get ask you to rise for five minutes there is some further evidence of mr. Dalton's that I'd like to have read aloud into the record yes I'm not gonna risk my voice any further so I'm going to ask mr. Kenya to
01:07:00 further so I'm going to ask mr. Kenya to do that well would this be a good time to have a short break there's a wood it's not going to take very long to read mr. Darden's remaining evidences it depends on mr. Killian well yes of course but I think we can
01:07:13 well yes of course but I think we can still earn ourselves about Trevor yes ten minute break you can we'll just say twelve we'll say twenty past three on that clock
01:07:30 you
01:49:47 mr. millet before you continue as a matter I just need to mention I understand that there may be a certain amount of concern and misunderstanding about the remarks if I addressed mr.
01:50:00 about the remarks if I addressed mr. Darden at the end of his evidence I have to say I'm surprised and disappointed that that should be so my remarks were borne out entirely born out of courtesy for the witness and a degree of
01:50:13 for the witness and a degree of compassion for someone who clearly found giving evidence over three day is a difficult matter and sometimes as we all saw more than he could really cope with I would hope that it went without saying
01:50:26 I would hope that it went without saying that my remarks did not in any sense prejudice my view of the issues there's a long way to go in this inquiry and my conclusion in due course will be based
01:50:37 conclusion in due course will be based entirely on the whole of the evidence and the submissions that have been made to be at that stage and I hope that if I extend similar courtesy and understanding to other witnesses wherever they may come from that those
01:50:50 wherever they may come from that those who hear them will understand why they're made and that they have no bearing on my ultimate view of the issues Thank You mr. Jim thank you very much and can I before I hand over to mr.
01:51:01 much and can I before I hand over to mr. Kenya to read into the record the rest of mr. Darden's evidence can I just mention one procedural matter really which is that I was hoping to take a short break or take advantage of the
01:51:12 short break or take advantage of the break to see whether there were any final final follow-up questions that core participants might want me to ask mr. Darden unfortunately because of the
01:51:23 mr. Darden unfortunately because of the way in which the evidence ended today and mr. Darden's circumstances I thought it best to call a halt and and not carry on with that and I hope people will understand that that is what I did and
01:51:34 understand that that is what I did and why I did it yes Thank You mr. Killian sir with your permission I'll read into the record aspects of mr. Darden's
01:51:45 the record aspects of mr. Darden's witness statement yes thank you we went to the second floor where the bridgehead was located this area was very busy with firefighters wearing their BA when I saw that there were to be a boards in use
01:51:56 that there were to be a boards in use which would be managed by a firefighter Oh burn and firefighter to son Tobin the bridgehead commanders were watch manager okie from Gulf 33 Kensington and watch
01:52:07 okie from Gulf 33 Kensington and watch manager Louisa de Silva from Gulf 34 Chelsea they were in charge of managing the be a resources and the FSG calls and they were deploying resources where necessary
01:52:16 necessary i liaise with Louisa de Silva and I remember tasking son ba whereas to the 13th floor where flight people were trapped at that point ba crews were being deployed without firefighting
01:52:27 being deployed without firefighting media which is a hose or an attachment known as a branch the branch is the bit at the end of the house that is used to turn water on and off this goes outside policy but we just didn't have the
01:52:39 policy but we just didn't have the resources the PA boards I mentioned are used to manage and monitor each individual firefighter that enters the fire a system called telemetry is fitted to each be a body set and they have a
01:52:50 to each be a body set and they have a tally which goes into the ba board this system then knows each firefighter those being deployed how much air is in their cylinder the amount of time elapsed and it sounds an alarm when their air is
01:53:01 it sounds an alarm when their air is getting too low the conditions faced by the individual wearing ba can dictate how long the cylinder lasts this system allows us to know if any firefighters are in distress and electronically logs
01:53:13 are in distress and electronically logs their progress at the bridgehead I continue to manage the BA wearers who had tasked to rescue the residence as at that point I later discovered that we'd had 170 FSG calls to deal with
01:53:24 had 170 FSG calls to deal with I remember that one crew I sent to the flats could not bring the resident down because a stairwell had become compromised with smoke although the steps outside policy we had to take breathing apparatus from
01:53:35 to take breathing apparatus from firefighters and hand them to those that were rescuing the residents to provide them with respiratory protection the smoke was so toxic at certain points the stairwell and at different stages of the incident that the residents had come
01:53:47 incident that the residents had come into it with that that protection two mouthfuls of that it would cause them to become unconscious which unfortunately did occur at this point they were the first reports of casualties coming out I was
01:53:59 reports of casualties coming out I was on the bridgehead and the first casualty that I saw was a black huddled male who's in a very bad way I'd fought I advise command unit eight of this casualty I remember that there was a group of firefighters who were working on him near the mezzanine area by the
01:54:12 on him near the mezzanine area by the stairs that went down towards the ground floor I didn't see the specifics of what they were doing as there were three or four firefighters around him I requested that the earliest attend was advised that they wouldn't be able to as there
01:54:23 that they wouldn't be able to as there was a triage area outside to the east of the block near Kensington leisure center I helped the firefighters who included firefighter dog ooh take the mound to the Elias triage center nevertheless we
01:54:34 the Elias triage center nevertheless we carried him to the Elias triage center on the east side this felt like it was a long way from the tower and needed to be much closer by the time I got back to the bridgehead there were a number of casualties coming down I particularly
01:54:46 casualties coming down I particularly remember two young girls aged around four or five years old and seven or eight years old their pair to be sisters were being carried out wearing ba sets I'm assuming that they were also taken to the earliest triage point at that
01:54:58 to the earliest triage point at that point I knew things were going to be really really bad group manager Richard Welsh made the decision to move the bridgehead up to the third floor in order to chase the fire the maximum we could go up was one floor below the fire
01:55:10 could go up was one floor below the fire we therefore had to move the equipment and boards to the third floor and Richard Welsh took over managing the bridgehead he was assisted by group manager Pat Goulbourne and the BA wearers who were constantly being
01:55:21 wearers who were constantly being committed to the fire floor we discovered that the south exit was also compromised with falling debris as a result we took him towards the west side where an entry and exit point had been
01:55:32 where an entry and exit point had been made in some PVC blanking plates by firefighters using forced entry equipment this new entry and exit point was approximately 30 to 40 metres away from an la estrella Center we saw on the
01:55:44 from an la estrella Center we saw on the west side of the tower whilst I was outside I could see people at the windows on around the eighth and ninth floors and told a firefighter to communicate reassurances to them via his loud hailer and I then went back into
01:55:55 loud hailer and I then went back into the town at the bridgehead I was Pat Goulbourne and Richard Welsh to designate an office or firefighter to walk around the perimeter and locate residents the right there windows I could see people banging
01:56:06 there windows I could see people banging on Windows for help when I returned to the VA entry control point on the third floor
01:56:12 floor I saw a firefighter a burn and firefighter Tucson Tobin still on the entry Control Board and they looked exhausted they were having to manage so much information but the multiple FSG calls that were occurring and they had
01:56:23 calls that were occurring and they had been there from the beginning I remember having a heated discussion with GM Pat Golborne about relieving them we're still quite busy in that era there was also no water for the PA cruise or firefighters that needed
01:56:34 cruise or firefighters that needed rehydration and I requested that GM Matt cook from the operations review team obtain water that could be used to both hydrate crews and be used for radial cooling meaning that the firefighters could place their risk pulse points in
01:56:46 could place their risk pulse points in the water
01:56:47 the water therefore cooling themselves down at some stage I went back to the ground floor lobby area where together with W Anglin Williams and SMP Wolff ndon we utilized a grid on the walls showing
01:56:58 utilized a grid on the walls showing which rooms who had rescued resins from and the number of residents that had been rescued there's around this time of the first firefight emergency was declared it happens this happens when a
01:57:09 declared it happens this happens when a firefighter has not returned to the entry control point of being committed and the entry control board or be a set whistle has activated showing that there was no air in that be a set or that there has been no movement from a
01:57:20 there has been no movement from a firefighter for a period of time the firefighter was identified as being a firefighter Hill but I don't know him or his station GM Richard Welch tasked me to look for him and I went round to be a
01:57:31 to look for him and I went round to be a staging area in the lobby and the instant grant asking if anyone knew him or had seen him I could not find firefighter hill and I returned to the lobby area I later learned that he had been found cm Nathan at reported that
01:57:45 been found cm Nathan at reported that the fire was spreading downwards towards the bridge head on the third floor I informed GM Richard Welch and the bridge head was moved to the ground floor lobby because the decision was taken to move
01:57:56 because the decision was taken to move the bridge head a tactical withdrawal was initiated GM Richard Welsh and I used our whistles to alert crews of the withdrawal in this instance I don't think the upper floors could hear the whistles as they were very busy and I
01:58:08 whistles as they were very busy and I don't remember a roll call taking place there's now smoke in the ground floor lobby area and the decision was made to minimize the amount of personnel within the building due to the nature of this far
01:58:18 far those concern about the structure of the building I wouldn't describe the smoke as heavy but there was enough to cause discomfort we started to evacuate those firefighters that were not wearing BA but the west side had now become
01:58:30 but the west side had now become compromised of falling debris I suggested to some firefighters that they utilize some folding tables as shields for protection when they entered and exit the building and later the TSG
01:58:41 exit the building and later the TSG police officers gave us their riot shields and officers to facilitate firefighters entering and exiting the building
01:58:47 building I found myself near the RAS triage area on the west side performing this was very busy with firefighters ba wearers is they've congregated there Robin in the building due to the safety issues
01:58:58 the building due to the safety issues debris that was allied to continued to fall and collect around the base of the tower I saw some firefighters undress slide in the playground with a covering jet to extinguish the debris ground floor level I described the deborah's
01:59:10 floor level I described the deborah's being large sheets of metal and molten plastic there are also smaller pieces falling the falling debris was so bad that the crew from Paddington had to withdraw the aerial appliance I was
01:59:21 withdraw the aerial appliance I was tasked to muster the EDB a wearers to the west side of the tower until EA's with WL matt gregory who is managing their commitment into the tower at this point instant had been made pumps 40 and
01:59:32 point instant had been made pumps 40 and there were more resources available I walked around looking for FIU crews and I told any EDB a whereas to go to the west side of the tower as I walked around I saw that all four sides of the
01:59:44 around I saw that all four sides of the building were alight I didn't know I did not know what time it was it was dark but looked like he was getting lighter when I got back round the tower I grabbed a cup of tea from the Salvation Army that were now near the community
01:59:56 Army that were now near the community center I had a brief moment to gather my thoughts and return to the tower by the forced entrance on the west side I saw a firefighter with a burn on the back of his neck and assisted him with putting
02:00:07 his neck and assisted him with putting water on it my saw crew manager Ben Gallaher from Paddington who was struggling I helped him to take some of his kit off gave him water and found him to pull him down at this point another
02:00:18 to pull him down at this point another casualty came in sorry at this point another casualty came and I assisted with her today young black adult female who's brought out with a towel or jumper over a head and she's very agitated whilst the LA s she
02:00:31 she's very agitated whilst the LA s she was telling them not to touch her I again return to the ground floor lobby area of the tower GM Pat Goldwyn was about to go up the stairwell two branches which he was going to take to the fifth floor of the block I suggested
02:00:43 the fifth floor of the block I suggested that I take them as he was in charge of the bridge head I took them from him and went into the stairwell without any BA I do not think about that I did not think about that and just got on with it as it
02:00:54 about that and just got on with it as it would have taken too long to fetch my BA and I felt that this job needed immediate attention I hadn't been tasked at that point to be part of any ba crew there's heavy smoke from the fourth floor upwards especially
02:01:05 from the fourth floor upwards especially around the fifth floor on speaking to the be a crew here there whose names I do not know I told that the branches were not required and I made my way up
02:01:16 were not required and I made my way up to the sixth floor in case they were needed there where I noticed that the smoke was heavier I didn't see any be a crew there and went to return back downstairs whereupon I bumped into a family of three trying to get out of the
02:01:27 family of three trying to get out of the tower I'm not sure which level this was on I returned upstairs and assisted another black adult male who's clearly in distress and been subjected to smoke inhalation I poured water over him and
02:01:38 inhalation I poured water over him and method to call him down which was extremely thankful I would describe him as being bald thick-set and wearing a suit jacket and jumper I can't remember how he got out of the building I've been asked whether I can describe the smell
02:01:49 asked whether I can describe the smell within the tower I can't recollect anything that stands out I think because there was so much going on around 5:30 6:00 a.m. I went outside to get water and I helped WM Matt Gregory to get
02:02:01 and I helped WM Matt Gregory to get firefighters in and out of the exit with the help of the police riot shields the building was completely alight inside and out apart from the lower floors that we were working from heavy black smoke
02:02:12 we were working from heavy black smoke was rising from the building at around 7:30 a.m. I saw the rest of my crew for the first time there are real water supply issues because the amount of people being committed into the fire floors this was causing a lot of
02:02:23 floors this was causing a lot of pressure and some of the hose had burst due to the debris that had fallen on the south side GM ripped add Welsh told us to change the delivery hose from golf to seven one two the dry riser on the south side of
02:02:35 two the dry riser on the south side of the tower you couldn't see the hose due to the amount of debris on it and debri was still falling from above five firefighter David Dylan I was using a riot shield as protection from the
02:02:46 riot shield as protection from the falling debris went to the dry riser and tried to trace the perished hose however we had two lengths of hose going from the dry riser but any one of them had failed so we tried to trace that back I was very conscious of protecting
02:02:58 was very conscious of protecting ourselves from the falling debris at the same time Dave found the damaged hose so we turned the water supply off which had to be done quickly we plugged in the new length of delivery hose the dry riser all the while with debris falling around
02:03:10 all the while with debris falling around us we then recharged the delivery hose into the dry riser outlet and started working again we've been fighting the fire about seven hours now and everyone in my crew is exhausted and looking
02:03:21 in my crew is exhausted and looking completely shell-shocked thankfully none of my crew had been injured we went to the Salvation Army he got cups of tea around zero 8:30 a.m. we were found by WM schaum cultures who
02:03:33 we were found by WM schaum cultures who direct us to go to c8 in order to get the instruction that we could be stood down appliances golf two seven one in golf two seven two were to remain in position as they're still being used
02:03:44 position as they're still being used I requested over the radio that everyone meet at golf two seven one we walk to see you eight in tredgold Street once there GM Charlie Pugsley a fire investigator in Commissioner Danny
02:03:55 investigator in Commissioner Danny cotton told to wait for a while so he sat and took the opportunity to make calls to our family shortly afterwards we have given a small debrief by the commissioner and were taken to North Kensington Fire Station by an LF be
02:04:07 Kensington Fire Station by an LF be people carrier around 9:00 a.m. then my watch battery ran out so I can't be precise with timings once there we shared stored what equipment we had and started making notes of the incident contemporaneous notes are completed by
02:04:19 contemporaneous notes are completed by individuals where there's a fatal fire and in the case of instance such as rental as this was a major incident the notes were a way of capturing what had happened whilst the events were still fresh in our minds a GM came and spoke
02:04:32 fresh in our minds a GM came and spoke to us but I can't remember his name I remember SM Wayne Johnson and borough commander
02:04:37 commander Sutcliffe calling me in to the station office but I can't remember what was said apart from the fact that it went along the lines of a welfare chat we're due back in for a night for night shift at 8:00 p.m. or instructor to come in
02:04:49 at 8:00 p.m. or instructor to come in and just finish our notes and then go home that night duty we completed our notes and this was facilitated by WM Chris Rose and WL Nick Boyle who are part of the fire investigation team
02:05:01 part of the fire investigation team firefighter Bobby had his tunic taken from him as it was burnt by debris and had to be examined since the events of that night their creme filter the lfp has facilitated counseling and
02:05:13 has facilitated counseling and rehabilitation group sessions I found it very difficult to deal with the events of Grenville tower I've never dealt with anything as unprecedented we're on the same scale of Graham filter since joining the fire service mentally things
02:05:25 joining the fire service mentally things have got easier but I will never forget June the 14th 2017 I was I'm not aware of any other way we could have dealt with this situation we all did what we could and reacted as fast as possible
02:05:36 could and reacted as fast as possible there are 40-plus machines on scene and everyone was exhausted and doing their best I still don't know how the fire travelled as it did and in that manner and rate sir that concludes what has to
02:05:49 and rate sir that concludes what has to be read for from mr. Darden's witness statement yes thinking the final matter before we rise today is just a brief update on housekeeping and yes matter
02:06:00 update on housekeeping and yes matter sir a timetable has been circulated hopefully by now for the balance of the week tomorrow we will start at half-past nine with your permission sir with mr.
02:06:12 nine with your permission sir with mr. butabi giving evidence in the morning in the afternoon he'll be followed by Daniel Brown on Friday the 29th of June we will be hearing evidence from mr. padilha right so that concludes our
02:06:24 padilha right so that concludes our business for today good thank you very much in that case we'll break now and resume and half-past nine tomorrow please thank you