Outbreak of fire (27 June 2018 Pt 1 of 2)

Full transcript

00:00:18 good morning everyone and welcome to today's hearing we're going to hear further from mr. Darden in just a moment when he's done hearing

00:00:59 good morning mr. Dodd in the morning mr. Bennett good morning mister darden morning and what to begin this morning they can by thanking you for your

00:01:11 they can by thanking you for your assistance and giving evidence to this inquiry over the last two days and again during today not only has it been very valuable evidence to the inquiry or you

00:01:23 valuable evidence to the inquiry or you should know that but I know it's times been very difficult for you as it would for any watch manager in your position and my questions are deliberately

00:01:35 and my questions are deliberately intended to be searching and you have if I may say so you shown great courage in coming here and answering them in the way that you have and I hope we hope as

00:01:47 way that you have and I hope we hope as the inquiry team that the firefighters who follow you to give evidence to this inquiry will follow your example can I

00:01:59 inquiry will follow your example can I also just say something else I am going to be going to questions during the course of this morning as I did on Monday which are based on national policy GRA 3.2 when I do that and if I

00:02:12 policy GRA 3.2 when I do that and if I do that I just want to be clear with you that I don't expect you to have read and be familiar with the policy document itself as a document and my questions would be based on the principles

00:02:24 would be based on the principles contained in them as they would apply to you and not the policy document itself okay and I just want to repeat for the record that none of my questions today or hereafter are attended to assume any

00:02:37 or hereafter are attended to assume any kind of familiarity with policy matters above the paper if I can put it that way is that was that clear me thank you

00:02:48 can I start by going back over a couple of things from yesterday on the subject of wet rising mains now first question

00:03:01 of wet rising mains now first question that it is is this if Grenfell tower have had a wet rising main and not a dry rising main would that have made any difference to the speed at which you as the first

00:03:14 speed at which you as the first appliance is arriving could have got water into the compartment I mean as a neutral crew we were very very quick anyway I was really proud of the way

00:03:26 anyway I was really proud of the way that my team and that night made that compartment entry from the time of our call but having said that if we didn't need to all meant water supplies with into that building yes then the speed of

00:03:37 into that building yes then the speed of our accessing second compartment making the initial entry would have been quicker

00:03:46 yes and is that is that the normal experience that where you've got a wet rising man provided the pump is working which you can access compartment fires

00:03:57 which you can access compartment fires much more or more quickly than you could if you had to plug into a dry rising main correct almost had Dave if that system is operable and as I've referred to earlier six

00:04:10 and as I've referred to earlier six weeks prior we did have some challenges at relic tower with the wet riser but generally as a rule of thumb that will increase our timing a decrease of time to make their compartment entry yes

00:04:21 to make their compartment entry yes now you said and forgive me I'm gonna go a little bit more quietly as you can probably tell it I'm not very vocal today I've said bear with me um you said

00:04:33 today I've said bear with me um you said yesterday in an answer of page 70 of the transcript that it would be very difficult to get water pressure the further up you go the building and that

00:04:45 further up you go the building and that was in the context of of plugging hoses into dry rising outlets at every level can I just ask you this even if you are doing ordinary compartment firefighting

00:04:58 doing ordinary compartment firefighting in a single compartment using one or two poses in accordance with the practice you told us about yesterday but you had to do so on floor twenty-one twenty-two

00:05:10 to do so on floor twenty-one twenty-two twenty-three of Grenville tower so above fifty meters what would the water pressure be like up there given that journey had a dry rising main I've not

00:05:21 journey had a dry rising main I've not had any personal experience of using a dry rising mine at that height but the theory would suggest that yes the pressure would be lower because of the increased high and also the the size of

00:05:35 increased high and also the the size of the distance the water has to travel they will be affected from the frictional loss so the what pressure would be affected yes at a higher regard that property yes that's correct right and at around

00:05:47 yes that's correct right and at around 60 or so meters what would that pressure be like

00:05:57 without a wooden bath put a cigarette but it would be significantly reduced given what you told us about the number one rule about not committing

00:06:09 one rule about not committing firefighters into a fire compartment without water would the fact that you had to attack a fire in a compartment that's a height of above 50 meters using

00:06:20 that's a height of above 50 meters using a dryer rising may affect your firefighting strategy in theory it would on the night he didn't we're still committed on that night put firefighters

00:06:32 committed on that night put firefighters into a risky area without firefighting media to save life so in simple terms how would it affect your strategy if you had to put out even a single simple

00:06:44 had to put out even a single simple compartment fire on the 23rd floor save Grenfell tower you'd have to make contingency plans for that it would be very difficult there is a process where

00:06:56 very difficult there is a process where you can put intermediate pumps which is a very small pump with a lightweight portable pump and you'd have to put that intermediate points through the stairwells that is a time-consuming process we also can use a narrow

00:07:08 process we also can use a narrow appliance as a sort of a mock dry rising bang on the outside but again you still got the same issues in terms of trying to increase that water pressure at the upper floors so that's why as of 2006

00:07:22 upper floors so that's why as of 2006 any buildings over 50 meters should be and you should be fitted with a wet rising night yeah I'm just digging a little further this small pump that you would you refer to it without the standard kit that you take on a run or would that be something

00:07:34 take on a run or would that be something you know it's a it's a normal valve special that's Suncrest only request only yes where would you request it from do you know that be viable gate control right are they kept in all fire stations

00:07:45 right are they kept in all fire stations around London or in any specific locations only specifically I wouldn't be asked to tell you what stations in London have those but they are you know

00:07:56 London have those but they are you know held at specific locations of in London yes

00:08:00 thank you and get to get back if I may to the chronology of the night and make pumps 15 now according to the LF be

00:08:13 pumps 15 now according to the LF be short since it o'clock we have make pumps 15 as a message time 201 2759 Zappa does that correspond with your recollection roughly of the time at

00:08:25 recollection roughly of the time at which you made pumps 15 again I can't reference it exactly to that time on the night but the only reference I have is looking back through the vision mobilizing system and so that would be a

00:08:36 mobilizing system and so that would be a correct time okay well perhaps I should just give you the document it's bundled tab 23

00:08:43 tab 23 [Music]

00:08:50 if you turn in that

00:08:54 [Music] not to page 17 you can see that at a 120

00:09:09 today one in fact on there it's oh one 24:34 make pumps ten and then if you go a little bit lower down you can see go over the

00:09:23 bit lower down you can see go over the page I think actually need to get up the page for this you go to a 120 70 there are there exists at the possibly you do

00:09:35 are there exists at the possibly you do see it says RUP g27 one make pumps 15 make aerials to does that reflect the message that you sent or asked to be

00:09:47 message that you sent or asked to be sent to brigade control that's correct and just so I'm clear I should have lost you yesterday RUP is it stands for what I'm not sure

00:10:01 RUP is it stands for what I'm not sure that what that actually stands for honest okay I've seen references to it in some of the evidence as being an incident upgrade would that be um yes that's correct then yeah do I think um when let me ask you did you

00:10:17 think um when let me ask you did you made the decision to make up the pump numbers 215 from my recollection that was for famillies their granite

00:10:32 and did you discuss that decision with anybody

00:10:40 the only discussion that would have been was the my request to again I believe that time firefighters and builders my driver to that message to be sent

00:10:55 now in his witness statement which we'll explore with him mr. secret says that when he left the tower to get his BA set on he came up to you and asked you what

00:11:08 on he came up to you and asked you what have you made it you said ten and he said he says he said I would make it 15 to 20 because it looks like we're losing it that's what he's put in his witness statement is that is that what you

00:11:19 statement is that is that what you remember I don't remember speaking to - Chris secret on the external that build notes on my memory traffic with Chris was when he was up at the bridgehead and

00:11:30 was when he was up at the bridgehead and the traffic we had at that point okay

00:11:37 would you look at your witness statement page five please in the middle of the page and you can see there that just

00:11:50 page and you can see there that just below the middle of the page you say as a 128 hours I sent a further assistance message requesting that the incident was made 50 tops 15 as I noticed the fire

00:12:01 made 50 tops 15 as I noticed the fire rapidly sneaking up the decorative fee of the Eastside exterior you see that yep my question is had it been doing that before that moment what was that

00:12:14 that before that moment what was that the first time that you saw the fire rapidly sneaking up the decorative fee

00:12:22 now can I record that that's my recollection of that visual image of it making its way quite rapidly up that part of the building at that point and

00:12:34 part of the building at that point and when you say decorative V do you mean that column the columns that are since you know that I think that was four columns and each elevation and that's for my reflection where it was rapidly

00:12:46 for my reflection where it was rapidly traveling up to roof level

00:12:49 you use the word sneaking could you just describe perhaps in a bit more detail what you mean by that I just seem to be in one part of that for building a

00:13:01 in one part of that for building a particular v-shape just very progressively making its way way up that well I didn't understand what it was or what part of the building it was but yet it just seems to be rapidly moving on on

00:13:13 it just seems to be rapidly moving on on that part the building in itself yes the transcript might have picked it up but you made a with your right hand just now have left and right movement yeah it is that right that was that what the father was doing moving from left to right like

00:13:25 was doing moving from left to right like a snake that's from my interpretation how it was traveling yes so not straight up but that early age way I want not big

00:13:36 up but that early age way I want not big lateral movements but you know from my recollection that's how that fire traveled up that side the building at that time yes I've had anything changed

00:13:47 that time yes I've had anything changed in the three minutes from the time that you ordered pumps 10 about 124 34

00:14:07 so could you repeat that question yes had anything changed in the three minutes that had gone by between ordering pumps 10 and ordering pumps 15 I think yeah anything like yeah believer

00:14:22 I think yeah anything like yeah believer if that's reference that to my statement as was another decision for for that make pumps 15 was at that point I did sought to and they have a clear memory

00:14:33 sought to and they have a clear memory of people exiting the block I think it was for me the sort of emergency exit on the east side that block that from my mind and hidden subjects of smoke inhalation

00:14:44 inhalation right okay ask you about that yeah topic in the moment and before I do can I just ask you did the share let me put it more

00:14:56 ask you did the share let me put it more neutral did the speed of the increase in number of pumps so from 10 to 15 and three in three minutes tell you anything about the seriousness of the fire you were looking at I think at that point I

00:15:10 were looking at I think at that point I was already under quite stark illusion that this was a very very very serious fire something I've never witnessed up

00:15:23 fire something I've never witnessed up to that point the 14 years of service within London Fire Brigade [Music]

00:15:28 [Music] just due to the way that this fire was escalating on on the external solid of building

00:15:35 building and was the increase in the lead for pumps from 10 to 15 in a matter of three minutes or so something that you had ever experienced before no and that's

00:15:47 ever experienced before no and that's not remote from the tents the first thing I'd say from from the point I made pumps 8 from then on I've never really seen a that rapid increase and resource and I've never been in here to come and allow that to make that rapid increase

00:15:59 allow that to make that rapid increase it was awesome before can I ask you to look back at a document we looked at yesterday Mr Davenport of July 2017

00:16:12 yesterday Mr Davenport of July 2017 which you'll find in tab 24 mr. channel director of the the documents bundle

00:16:28 if you go to the third page of a manuscript which I believe is page seven internally three of the relativity

00:16:39 internally three of the relativity reference yes you could see the makeups on the left-hand side mp6 NPA MP 10 an MP 10 you say it was

00:16:55 mp6 NPA MP 10 an MP 10 you say it was gonna be difficult to fight but beneath that you say @ MP 15 this was a pivotal change multiple residents leaving rapid

00:17:08 change multiple residents leaving rapid spread of having says outside it's not your handwriting or puns save I don't know looks outside that's like outside and it spits the word pivotal changed I

00:17:19 and it spits the word pivotal changed I won't just focus on what could you just explain what it was that was pivotal at that moment I think for me was

00:17:36 if they like a reference to in terms of a pivotal changes at that point I realized the potential there were people in people involved because a similar

00:17:48 in people involved because a similar time and very similar taste I think at we sent pumps which then I made persons reported

00:18:01 yes let's just explore that a little if we can

00:18:14 if you go back a tap to tap 23 and look please at the short incident log of pages 17 and 18 and cited muskies look

00:18:26 pages 17 and 18 and cited muskies look at two pages but page 17 at the bottom is the time at the which make pumps 15 was messaged and flung 2814 we've seen

00:18:38 was messaged and flung 2814 we've seen that moment ago coming from dr envy envy in control room and then over the page

00:18:50 in control room and then over the page at page 18 you can see an over 128 47 make up I UPG to someone persons reported so it looks from this as if the

00:19:03 reported so it looks from this as if the persons reported message at least came back from the control room to the incident ground after confirmation of pumps 15 can you just help me with the precise chronology if you can it looks

00:19:17 precise chronology if you can it looks on this as if and he's a messages of course coming from a control room to the incident ground it looks as if the confirmation of persons reporting came after the confirmation of pumice 15 do

00:19:31 after the confirmation of pumice 15 do you think it was that way around or do you think it was a different way around look at the log its its seconds 30 seconds maybe and at that point in time

00:19:43 seconds maybe and at that point in time any instant ground that you know that's a very very short amount of time and I do remember a very similar time that the pumps 15 and I'm remembering that I

00:19:55 pumps 15 and I'm remembering that I could see people coming out the mimbar if I'm honest there was an adult male and his son who I believe came out for the mergency exit on the east block who had clearly been subject to smoke

00:20:07 had clearly been subject to smoke inhalation from what I could see and I was on the illusion that went if they're not at the same time okay just to finish off the line of

00:20:18 okay just to finish off the line of questioning on on the timing I mean in your experience is it is it possible for messages which are coming back from the control room to the incident command

00:20:29 control room to the incident command pump or the command unit to take a little bit of time to come back to London to confirm that I received that

00:20:40 London to confirm that I received that message yes sorry I asked a bad version yeah exactly there will be there was some delay because the traffic will be sent by the these the instant ground that that we

00:20:51 these the instant ground that that we received and they'll confirm that that so there will be some sometimes a lightness so when we look at those two messages in particular their confirmations back from the control as occurring they're not messages being sent to the control room from the

00:21:02 sent to the control room from the incident that's correct yeah so the pivotal change you're talking about I think this is right is that it was it was the way the occupants in the building were behaving rather than the way the file is behaving is that is that

00:21:13 way the file is behaving is that is that me is that right no it's a combination of both it was the increase in room of the fire spread but as we spoke about

00:21:26 the fire spread but as we spoke about before the primary role the London Fire Brigades to save life so as soon as I became aware that from my point of view instant commander I could see that people were subject to smoke inhalation that's a big change yeah can I ask you to look back at the

00:21:40 yeah can I ask you to look back at the PRC note under MP 15 on page [Music]

00:21:47 [Music] so I play six at the of the internal NFB no I'm sorry Mike mostly seven pace them

00:22:00 so under that under @np 15 we see we've discussed pivotal change most residents leaving at the bottom there you say I

00:22:15 leaving at the bottom there you say I was at Shepherds court 20 firefighters only went a few floors in a previous experience could you just expand on that

00:22:39 I think as I spoke about before and then I was present at Shepherds court and wasn't on the initial tenderness was on the makeup wasn't the real dynamic stages at the incident didn't play a key

00:22:53 stages at the incident didn't play a key decision role for an instant command role on that that afternoon and from my understanding yes it did travel up but not at the same scale and repetitive did

00:23:05 not at the same scale and repetitive did grant felt our and that was obviously very different in terms of how that instant was approached because crews from my understanding were able to fight

00:23:18 from my understanding were able to fight the fire from the internal to the external because there wasn't the same increase and rapidity in terms of external fire spread when you mentioned

00:23:30 external fire spread when you mentioned Shepherd's court at the PRC review which was on the 3rd of July 2017 so a couple of weeks or so after the Grunfeld tower incident

00:23:42 incident teach you was that the first time you remembered Shepherd's court or did you did you think about Shepherd's court earlier on that

00:23:57 I think it would have been earlier because I would have also had to prepare some notes going into that PRC did you think about Shepards call while you're

00:24:08 think about Shepards call while you're on the fire ground of Granville tower on that night did it come back to you as a some spoke about before when you are no

00:24:22 some spoke about before when you are no one else has found themselves in before no UK fire service in that moment in time you do not necessarily have the moment and the time to reflect on Pacific incidents but what you do drawing is your past experiences or what

00:24:34 drawing is your past experiences or what it that come out and help you so try and make some decisions that night so I don't remember having a conscious thought without shivers core but because it's very instantaneous very dynamic

00:24:45 it's very instantaneous very dynamic decisions you have to make then that certainly may well have been part of my experience how they've drawn them

00:24:54 I'm just going back to the message persons reported that message came from you did it initially the rather a

00:25:05 you did it initially the rather a recollection of instruction damn pills to send perfectly sane person reported yes and right so you said to Dani bills who was the driver on 271 I think send a message persons reported that's correct he sent that message to control far as I

00:25:18 he sent that message to control far as I understand yes what does that message mean would it mean to a control room operative it basically allows the control room operative if there's any other officers senior officers remotely

00:25:30 other officers senior officers remotely monitoring the incident that we now have for needs of commander's assessment people in a premise or property that are unable to leave by normal means and in

00:25:45 unable to leave by normal means and in terms of your approach to fighting the fire and rescue search and rescue did that have an effect on your strategy

00:26:00 knowing that you have to send that persons reported message

00:26:07 you just repeat that a Russian before me please you sent the mess you sent the message persons reported because as you've just said there were there were people who might not necessarily be able

00:26:19 people who might not necessarily be able to get out did that fact the fact that they might not necessarily be able to get out have any effect on your strategy of firefighting or or search-and-rescue

00:26:36 I would say not at that point because at that moment obviously I would say that the planet I didn't burn it in terms of what I knew its policy what I know was

00:26:48 what I knew its policy what I know was correct at that time my previous experience that was confident that we could still move on it and try and

00:26:59 could still move on it and try and resolve the incident successfully going back to the page that's on the screen under MP 15 you say all my experience

00:27:10 under MP 15 you say all my experience now gone out of the window in quotes very daunting moment I felt hopeless is that high as a how you felt at that

00:27:23 that high as a how you felt at that moment on the night

00:27:34 there probably was moments where they felt helpless it's a very very difficult place to be as a commander when it just it's just relentless we can usually try

00:27:46 it's just relentless we can usually try and control and get a grip on the dynamic stage of an incident that this was like nothing else I've never experienced before the the ferocity of a that the fires developing it was just

00:28:00 that the fires developing it was just relentless at the very bottom of that entry you say whether you're recorded as saying maybe more experienced officers coming on the word maybe might suggest

00:28:13 coming on the word maybe might suggest that you weren't sure what was the position well you were you confident that they were going to be more senior officers arriving imminently or will you just not not clear in your own mind I

00:28:24 just not not clear in your own mind I think I don't think that was referring to the night I think I had time to reflect before this PLC and I've had some searching moments in terms of

00:28:39 some searching moments in terms of whoever was the most experienced officer like writing proper office all that night because I've got some fantastic colors Ramy London Fire Brigade who are

00:28:50 colors Ramy London Fire Brigade who are very very experienced and what they do who came on at 9:00 assisted me greatly so I think that's more to where that statement alluding to

00:29:02 and this is a repeat of a question I asked earlier but in terms of earlier makeups but it would it be normal procedure for a watch manager to be in

00:29:13 procedure for a watch manager to be in charge of a fire at 15 pumps no and the call for 15 pumps who would that normally be made by in terms of rank okay we have discussed this you know as

00:29:26 okay we have discussed this you know as a watch man should be any officer can make that call only the officer can ask what resources they need in terms of what their assessment is on that fire ground or Instagram at that time there is a

00:29:37 Instagram at that time there is a justification to that within the PLC process but as an instant commander officer you are given that authority yes and correct me if I'm wrong about this

00:29:48 and correct me if I'm wrong about this but I think of the makeup policy the London Fire Brigade makeup policy says that the call for 15 pumps should be normally made by a DAC Deputy Assistant

00:29:59 normally made by a DAC Deputy Assistant Commissioner is that have I got that right that's correct yes and you would normally expect a Deputy Assistant Commissioner to take over an incident command of 10 pumps I think that's

00:30:11 command of 10 pumps I think that's correct sir yeah and and he would have an assistant commissioner as a monitoring officer at that level of pumps correct

00:30:22 pumps correct so if in them is arrived in the normal course of events when you arrive at 15 pumps you should have had well much more senior support on the ground and in fact

00:30:34 senior support on the ground and in fact shouldn't of had incident command at all according to normal procedures in procedures and in normal expected circumstances I think that just lens

00:30:46 circumstances I think that just lens tells a story in terms of how unprecedented he said that was how quick the external envelope of that building was compromised the way that fire just I

00:30:58 was compromised the way that fire just I say it was a relentless and I think the way that make the makeups were so quick and so fast and tells us tells it tells a story having seen what you'd seen and

00:31:10 a story having seen what you'd seen and then send the message persons reported as we've seen from the short incident nor did you have any thoughts at that time about what fire survival guidance should be given to 999 callers by

00:31:23 should be given to 999 callers by control

00:31:24 control we found themselves unable to leave

00:31:33 as a difficult question first of all guidance is when the operant of that billion believes that they cannot leave safely and we spoke about the procedure in the resources that that will attract

00:31:44 in the resources that that will attract to turn change that advice to a resident who feels that they cannot leave that property safety because of the products of combustion fire heat or smoke that's

00:31:59 of combustion fire heat or smoke that's really really tough call to make

00:32:03 standing away from Grenfell tower of the moment herbs are just looking at normal practices and procedures and your experience you see if I can get at this if you send a message persons reported

00:32:15 if you send a message persons reported in a high-rise tower block what would you normally expect control room operators to do with somebody who is calling in circumstances where they are

00:32:30 calling in circumstances where they are one of the persons reported the this need to clarify this that the person reported will come from units and commander so if I come in my information gathering or from my assessment of that

00:32:42 gathering or from my assessment of that scene I believe to be persons within that premise of cap there's big persons involved I will send that message that's not necessarily something that comes to control that would be from the instant ground right okay the only time the

00:32:54 ground right okay the only time the attentional control operator will have will have an interaction with any persons in building or premise where these days okay T is when they are make

00:33:05 these days okay T is when they are make a nine nine nine called to our control room operator and they believe that they are trapped and they cannot make their way out their property safely because of a fire so the person's report everybody will be from the instant commander to

00:33:18 will be from the instant commander to come to control to say that I believe as insta Grindr we have people within that building yes say that I that I follow saying the message comes from you yes as reported what would you then expect

00:33:30 reported what would you then expect could the control room to do in terms of the advice that they would give in the normal case to somebody who called who is a person reported if if we refer

00:33:45 who is a person reported if if we refer to the farce about Gardens procedure they will ask a Pacific set of questions in terms of their location the numbers of persons at that location the

00:33:58 of persons at that location the proximity to fire if no conditions within that compartment if it's if it's a heavy smoke light smoke and any additional information in terms of the

00:34:11 additional information in terms of the orientation the building if they know where that is if they're safer grant Hotel forsake that the compartment all their flat looks over the extent of ation ground fault road because that's

00:34:23 ation ground fault road because that's their the key piece of information and then the control room operator can pass to the fire ground and then we can allocate our resources accordingly to to that to their individual flat compartment or individuals who Ronnie

00:34:34 compartment or individuals who Ronnie they can't leave okay saved the sending of a message purse is reported by the incident commander to the control room

00:34:46 incident commander to the control room would that wouldn't that automatically trigger a change in the advice being given to a resident who did cool so far as the stay-put policy was concerned no

00:34:57 as the stay-put policy was concerned no no not for my understanding none of it

00:35:02 just go for that yeah that will only ever change the instant commander it's not something that's necessarily changed on the fiber and that'll have to go into

00:35:13 on the fiber and that'll have to go into controller and that would be the the operations manager we're going to click within control who's in charge of control at that point in time and that will have to be agreed between the instant commander the operations manager

00:35:24 instant commander the operations manager and that have to be loved because that will go outside and step outside and operate national operating policy for control room operatives

00:35:39 right so I think as I understand directness what you're actually telling us is that we change to any standing stay-put advice in relation to our high-rise block would be a combined decision between the incident commander

00:35:51 decision between the incident commander and the person in control of the controller as how I understand has correct yes right at the moment when you sent the persons reported message did

00:36:06 sent the persons reported message did you have any thoughts about how that might result in a change to these stay put advice that would otherwise already be being given by the controller operators not at that point

00:36:24 now at this point you've ordered 15 pumps which would then get to be on coming

00:36:31 coming of course there earlier pumps of narrative to the firebrand some are already arriving what were you or you what did you think you were going to do with all these appliances when they arrived

00:36:55 but I think I don't mean to use the simplest to try and get as many people into that tower as we can into as bi wearers to perform as many recipes as

00:37:06 wearers to perform as many recipes as possible

00:37:07 possible now you mentioned smoke inhalation a little earlier on and that's a topic I'm now going to turn to are you all right to continue yep thank you that's very good say you say you noticed a number of

00:37:19 good say you say you noticed a number of residents and I think this is in your statement actually if you go back to your statement at page five if you look a little bit below a set a line below

00:37:32 a little bit below a set a line below where the reference to times 15 is I'll say I noticed a number of residents that have been subjected to smoke inhalation exiting the block from the east side their faces were blackened they had

00:37:46 their faces were blackened they had apparent respiratory difficulties and that they were coughing and sputtering but they were making their own way out at that point and you say the east side

00:37:58 at that point and you say the east side in retrospect you think you meant the east side or do you think you meant the main entrance

00:38:10 there was two inches well from there's a main interest on the south side of Greenfield towel from my memory but there is also a an exit on the east and

00:38:21 there is also a an exit on the east and block based on elevation over a grateful Tower and you notice that they had blackened faces and you say they were coughing and spluttering and what did

00:38:33 coughing and spluttering and what did that tell you about the smoke condition of the lobbies and stairs inside the building

00:39:05 but they that they were had smoked or carbonaceous environment within that component or area what did that tell you

00:39:17 component or area what did that tell you about whether compartment Asian internally within the tower was holding up

00:39:45 but don't have a recollection or recall and me thinking at that moment in time that you know compartment ation has failed I think we spoke about yesterday

00:39:58 failed I think we spoke about yesterday in in high-rise firefighting due to you know how we set up and from the five floor one floor below and with something that can even the cell walls can be

00:40:10 that can even the cell walls can be compromised and potentially residents can't be exposed to smoke inhalation in instead was because of those areas can be compromised by it fight internal firefighting teams but don't as it's her

00:40:23 firefighting teams but don't as it's her I can't remember at that moment in time at that point I had a conscious thought that the total failure of the internal compartment ation of that building had

00:40:35 compartment ation of that building had occurred I know it's difficult to try to piece it all together given the dynamic situation at the time that you faced but did you when you saw the effects of

00:40:48 did you when you saw the effects of smoke inhalation did you have a thought as to whether the smoke that they were inhaling and being exposed to that come from their own flats or from smoking the lobbies in the stairways is that a

00:41:00 lobbies in the stairways is that a distinction you made at the time do you think I didn't have that distinction can you remember roughly how many people in you noticed you say in your statement a number of residents I think it's a

00:41:15 a number of residents I think it's a very clarified point there was a number of residence the one there was a gentleman and his son that I particularly remember that I could see that had been subject to smoke

00:41:26 that had been subject to smoke inhalation and they seemed to be to me you know respectfully difficulties it was a doing you know a number of other people in this sort of same vicinity

00:41:37 people in this sort of same vicinity area but those two individuals stick up quite clearly in my mind

00:41:44 a fairly small number of that stage as far as you can recall I would suggest to have our cartographer no thank you

00:41:56 and the next question I think is whether the fire was in their flats or whether it was in the lobbies or the stairs smoke was in the lobbies in the stairs

00:42:10 smoke was in the lobbies in the stairs what did that tell you about whether the fire was still contained in flat 16 or whether it was now breaking into other compartments of the building

00:42:33 did you just repeat a face okay the file is either in this book the smoke that they were suffering from and either come from fires inside their flats or in the lobbies and stairs either way what did

00:42:46 lobbies and stairs either way what did you think

00:42:47 you think did you think that the fire was still contained within flat 16 or had it spread

00:42:51 spread internally through the building

00:42:57 I don't remember have a conscious fault in terms of this is spread internally beyond the compartment I think because I was so consumed in terms of what was happening on the external the building with the fire spread don't remember

00:43:11 with the fire spread don't remember having a conscious thought or the decision in terms of how it has it spread internally beyond that compartment and seeing people coming down with faces and coughing and

00:43:23 down with faces and coughing and spluttering did you have any thoughts about the feasibility of evacuation

00:43:48 I can't move at that time but you know that time to reflect and I know it's not at that moment in time but again it's going to at that time we had a lot of ba teams internally it's just how is it for

00:44:04 teams internally it's just how is it for me as NATO commander looking at that is the challenge that you've faced the most impossible situation of trying to evacuate that building at that time with

00:44:15 evacuate that building at that time with the resources in attendance is something that are still search for today

00:44:25 and the question which I need to need to ask you is at that moment seeing residents coming out of the building

00:44:36 residents coming out of the building coughing and spluttering suffering from smoke is there a reason why you didn't immediately get on to the control room and have a conversation with them about

00:44:48 and have a conversation with them about modifying the advice being given to call us within the building

00:45:03 just I have no fault that moment in time but from being annexed commander on that fire and at that moment in time

00:45:15 Jim witness to what I've seen happen and I'm following in front of me I was never operated that level before and I was

00:45:26 operated that level before and I was making decisions and to the best of my ability with all good intent to try success with the result that incident and that's a decision I did take at that time mr. Jim we're going to go on to

00:45:40 time mr. Jim we're going to go on to another topic but it is only 20 past 10:00 I'm not sure I can cover the next topic in five minutes we could have a short break at this point the tank mighty convenient hey mr. Darden Spanish

00:45:51 mighty convenient hey mr. Darden Spanish oh good have a break mrs. dozen yes all right

00:45:54 right well we'll take a short break now we'll come back at start at half past ten by that clock please thank you

00:46:13 you

00:58:45 all right yes thank you thank you just a minute mr. Dalton can I ask you to the shame tab 24 page 7 of that document

00:58:56 shame tab 24 page 7 of that document which is again the PRC review record with the manuscript writing and a Tempe 15 you see we've looked at the words

00:59:09 15 you see we've looked at the words there this was a pivotal change multiple residents leaving rapid fire rapid spread up outside and then it says was halfway up building and now getting into

00:59:23 halfway up building and now getting into flats when you said that at the 3rd of July meeting was that something that you remembered later or is that something

00:59:35 remembered later or is that something that you could recall was told to you on the fire ground on the night at that point

01:00:01 I can't move with that

01:00:04 at the point of time I was incident commander being given information getting into the flats oh well that's something obviously between the time the incident to the time that PLC that

01:00:17 incident to the time that PLC that something I reflected on all had further information on I don't remember or recall having that information at the point at the time I was instant commander note so this is a reflection you had after the night but before I

01:00:29 you had after the night but before I have waiting in the third of July is it I'm not saying that is the case but I don't have a recollection of it Binion's to come on Dillon on the night and don't

01:00:42 to come on Dillon on the night and don't have a fool or say that that was note down the PRC that's a difficult question for me to answer I can only assume that I didn't have the information there's

01:00:54 I didn't have the information there's either commander night and that was something that affected on between then in the PLC do you have any reason to think that at pumps 15 you weren't told that the fire was halfway up the

01:01:05 that the fire was halfway up the building and getting into flares

01:01:11 you just repeat that question minute do you have any reason to think that at at make pumps 15 you weren't told that the fire was halfway up the building and getting into flats

01:01:30 No so you might have been told that

01:01:36 I may have been told that by there's nothing I don't have a recollection of another lack of that account and that's not something I referred to life or my content per aeneas notes which was done very soon after the incident or we

01:01:48 very soon after the incident or we haven't referred to that into my statement thank you supposing somebody had said to you or you had thought right this is now out of

01:02:01 you had thought right this is now out of control there are persons reported I must change the fire survival guidance advice and I must evacuate the building at this point in the night 128 or so if

01:02:13 at this point in the night 128 or so if that has been your thought and allay this as a hypothetical question mr. Dunn how would you have gone about that task

01:02:25 that's a difficult Western cause I don't think I can answer that on this on the sea because we're weave because I wasn't given the opportunity on that night we've the benefit or reflection that's a

01:02:40 we've the benefit or reflection that's a difficult question for me here just to suppose that in terms relation to that incident do you think it was possible at that stage to undertake a full-scale evacuation of Grenville tower

01:03:01 the way the ground-floor tower was constructed with that one central staircase the number of residents in that block number of firefighters entering equipment how to stress people

01:03:17 entering equipment how to stress people are confused in that environment it's very very difficult

01:03:33 and and if you had decided to adopt a strategy of full-scale evacuation can you give me some kind of idea of what you would have needed in terms of firefighters and

01:03:47 needed in terms of firefighters and equipment at that moment

01:03:58 I can't comment on that because that's something I've not had experience of and it's a hypothetical question I really really want to talk about my

01:04:09 really want to talk about my recollection of that night why did in my actions now at 1:29 46 the short incident log records that you made pumps

01:04:22 incident log records that you made pumps 20 or rather your call to make plans 20 was confirmed by the control room and we can look at it into the children's analog if you go back to tap 23

01:04:42 and at the top of page 18

01:04:49 we could see the timestamp 1:29 46

01:04:59 service requests created our Yuki g27 one make pumps 20 FRU times 2 and that's a message coming back into the fire ground from the control room that

01:05:14 ground from the control room that Stratford yes that's correct and so you would have sent that message is this right from the incident ground to Stratford before that that's correct

01:05:28 to Stratford before that that's correct do you remember maybe you don't but was it long before that or a matter of seconds I don't have a timescale net it would have been seconds or a minute most

01:05:40 would have been seconds or a minute most stop belief now if you could go to your statements and look at page 5 please and look at the bottom of the page

01:05:53 you say in the last paragraph there by the time I had made the incident pumps 20 at a 120 nine hours requesting two additional fire rescue units the fire

01:06:05 additional fire rescue units the fire was on its way up to the top of the building now the first question is what what prompted you to go from 15 pumps which had been called at 127 thereabouts

01:06:18 which had been called at 127 thereabouts to 20 pumps at 129 thereabouts a mere two minutes will say later what has prompted you to go from one to the other

01:06:31 prompted you to go from one to the other like a member at that point there were oncoming officers watch major Paul Watson of doing have a conversation with him along the lines of he presented

01:06:45 him along the lines of he presented himself to me as a warm coming off due to the incident commander and he asked you know what I've resorted to and at

01:06:56 you know what I've resorted to and at that point I believe it was make pumps 15 Porton is a very very experienced off herself it's been in the line of fire brigade properly in 30 years range of busy stations so some like myself are

01:07:09 busy stations so some like myself are the cop to officers like that and I we were hired not being involved in something like this scout and a 15 pump fire I'm being involved we'll had to make up a resource up to that point and

01:07:23 make up a resource up to that point and I will be honest it was an advice from Portman manager a big problem watch mentioned before Watson they believe this is a 20 pump fire 30 pump incident so I was grateful you received

01:07:36 incident so I was grateful you received that information was I was very very much under pressure at that moment in time yes and how long had watch manager Watson been on the incident ground do

01:07:47 Watson been on the incident ground do you remember

01:07:49 I can't remember how long he had been but I do remember he did present himself to me right and we can check and he came from

01:07:57 from I think Gulf 361 Hannah Smith's pump ladder that's correct is your son charged about the red watch Hammersmith right and again the same a similar question to the one I asked before the

01:08:09 question to the one I asked before the break at 20 pumps what did you plan to do with all these extra pumps when they arrived very similar to before it was a matter of we needed resources in terms

01:08:20 matter of we needed resources in terms of PA to enter the tower to help perform rescues if you could be Shane please tab

01:08:33 rescues if you could be Shane please tab 24 which is the PRC notes and just to look at page 7 of that you can see at MP

01:08:44 look at page 7 of that you can see at MP 20 you say that either survival was advised by MP 20 experienced WN Paul Watson I doubted his opinion I didn't

01:08:55 Watson I doubted his opinion I didn't have plan for how to utilize all the places so not having a plan for them let

01:09:07 places so not having a plan for them let me ask you did you in fact have a plan for what you were going to do with all these appliances

01:09:19 but there was my plan with my stripes are still in place the plan hadn't changed from the original in terms of having the bridgehead on the second floor clear in ba into into the internal

01:09:32 floor clear in ba into into the internal of the building I think in terms of

01:09:47 I can't I thought I can't say like maybe I'm fair to say I didn't have a plan at all because there was resourcing where we had crews committed and I did have a

01:09:58 we had crews committed and I did have a plan in place at the time and what was that plan so far as E as far as it went

01:10:11 at moment in time my member tasks and Paul Watson when he present himself to me because else we did have a number of resources in attendance at that time

01:10:23 resources in attendance at that time it's not good practice to send everyone up to particularly in groennfell tower to the bridgehead on the second floor because it quite small lobby areas I remember tasks and poor Watson to

01:10:35 I remember tasks and poor Watson to stage manage a staging area of resource in terms of behavior errors and that was facilitate the ground floor level within the ground floor tower and he was to liaise with awesome and wrote keifa

01:10:47 liaise with awesome and wrote keifa which had level two feed be a resources as and when necessary and watch manage O'Keefe so that would be I would take that as my plan moving forward so in

01:11:01 that as my plan moving forward so in terms of the emphasis of your plan at that point would it be more on committing VA whereas into the tower to do search and rescue or would it be on firefighting all both I would say both both in terms of firefighting at that

01:11:14 both in terms of firefighting at that stage what was what was the plan

01:11:28 I refer back to you know the principal's priority and then the primary role with the violent fiber gauges to save life and to extinguish fire and from my experiences training and everything else

01:11:42 experiences training and everything else that I've that was a plan to save life extinguish fire and is it I think the case that I've got to put this to you in

01:11:53 case that I've got to put this to you in a leading way but correct me if I'm wrong the London Fire Brigade mobilization policy 4:12 requires an assistant commissioner to take command

01:12:04 assistant commissioner to take command when the pumps exceed 15 in number as I got that right I believe so that's correct

01:12:18 let me correct that well I think it's 16 in number and for 16 plus 16 plus yes say plus y I meant over 15 right thank you going back to your statement at the

01:12:35 you going back to your statement at the foot of page 5 you said the father's on its way to the top of the building at that point say 129 do you remember how close to the top it was at that stage

01:12:54 from my memory if not at the top very close to do you remember having any thoughts at the time about what the farm

01:13:05 thoughts at the time about what the farm might do when it got at all not at that point now

01:13:20 at that stage 1:29 I'll save did you have any thoughts about what fast survival guidance called advice should be given to 999 calls by

01:13:32 advice should be given to 999 calls by the control room

01:13:48 I'd say at that point I was still working to stay put policy because of my previous experience and they're not been

01:14:02 previous experience and they're not been in a position before where they never had to make that decision or change that advice yes I understand

01:14:13 did you at that stage and I know it's difficult to remember did you have any thoughts at the time about whether that statement advice continue to be safe advice for control room operators to

01:14:26 advice for control room operators to give to residents calling

01:14:35 everything a previous experience never I've understood as mr. commander yes if a building doesn't fail yes if the building doesn't fail did you have any

01:14:46 building doesn't fail did you have any thoughts about at that point whether the building had failed

01:14:53 not to the extent of what I know now no did you have any thoughts about to what extent the building had failed to any extent

01:15:06 not to the internal but it was obvious it was something was happening to the external that building did you think about what might might be happening to the internal part of the building

01:15:29 I can't record that moment in time No

01:15:41 I'm going to summarize if I can where we've got to and ask you a number of very short position shorts questions the questions that I know we've covered

01:15:52 questions that I know we've covered before I want to see if I can tidy them all up at this point so we've got to 129 on the night can i summarize your

01:16:03 on the night can i summarize your evidence just artists would put it to you as I understand it and you can tell me whether you agree or disagree you're still into the commander despite it being a 20 pound fire that's correct

01:16:16 being a 20 pound fire that's correct you've seen the prior fire progress from the compartment in flat 16 up the exterior till the top or near the top of the building in in less than 20 minutes

01:16:27 the building in in less than 20 minutes that's correct people you've now seen coming out coughing and spluttering with certain faces that's correct

01:16:43 you've gone from make pump six at 1:13 through 8 10 15 and then 20 at 1:29 which you've told us is a degree of

01:16:55 which you've told us is a degree of increase in pump makeup that you had never experienced before sorry correct you say in your statement

01:17:08 sorry correct you say in your statement and it's a little bit later on we haven't gone to it but the jet on the outside of the building wasn't having much effect that's correct

01:17:23 and as you said in your statement and again I haven't taken you to it but it's there large chunks of falling flaming debris were falling off in quantity from

01:17:34 debris were falling off in quantity from the outside the exterior of the tower correct correct

01:17:46 and you are still calling for further resources as we know correct

01:17:55 at that moment did you think did you have any thoughts about how you were going to bring a fire under control

01:18:17 very reference to that compete that I know my statement I referred to it in my decision when the first FIU crew presented himself to you know I know I

01:18:28 presented himself to you know I know I requested make pumps 20 F I used to when we make a resource of Christopher make pumps eight we're getting FIU on the part the PBA predetermined tenders for that so that when at that point when

01:18:43 that so that when at that point when that there was criminal to fill quickly from penitence fyu presenting himself to me I was still thinking of I could extinguish this fire because I tossed

01:18:54 extinguish this fire because I tossed and said go to roof level set up a lineups arrangement which is a safer working system at a height and try to extinguish a fire from from roof level I mean again that was obvious Mike Rana

01:19:07 mean again that was obvious Mike Rana make decisions I fought with all good intent that would successive resolve this incident can I just explore that last answer a little bit more you tasked

01:19:20 Phil Wiggly from Paddington to go to the roof level set up a line fill Wiggly for panicked and is that the F are you or was it a pump ladder yeah that's a fire

01:19:32 was it a pump ladder yeah that's a fire rescue unit right and what equipment does the fire and rescue unit have they don't if they don't carry any firefighting equipment I have specialists extended duration breathing

01:19:44 specialists extended duration breathing apparatus sets they have specialist rescue equipment whether that's water rescue they have mass decontamination equipment from firefighters and there was a specialist cutting gear and rescue

01:19:57 was a specialist cutting gear and rescue equipment for road traffic collisions and also the capability to provide a safe system of work when fire crews particularly fire rescue crews are working at a height

01:20:13 and in terms of the instructions that you gave to fill Wiggly but first of all do you remember from your recollection what time

01:20:24 what time let me try get it this way and when do you think at what pump level in terms of makeup did did Phil wigglies crew from Paddington arrive I wouldn't be able to

01:20:35 Paddington arrive I wouldn't be able to give you a toilet in terms of makeups when that was and when he arrived can you remember when instructions who gave him some detail he presented himself to

01:20:50 him some detail he presented himself to me at that point I believe the fire was on its way up to or at roof level my

01:21:03 on its way up to or at roof level my deeds having to go to two roof level rivers FRU crew to South pay the lineups arrangement and to try to facilitate some kind of dredger system utilizing

01:21:15 some kind of dredger system utilizing fire brigade hose to try and extinguish a fire from the top of the building what did you know about the layout and of the roof of the building and its and its

01:21:26 roof of the building and its and its access I didn't have that information at that point

01:21:34 did fill Wiggly can follow your instructions at that point in time I believe that was the case but from what

01:21:47 believe that was the case but from what I understand that actually didn't happen

01:21:57 did he come back to you and say I can't go where I'm not going not when i briefed in at that time and i didn't

01:22:08 briefed in at that time and i didn't receive any radio track traffic to suggest that he didn't

01:22:20 according to the operational response review produced by the London Fire Brigade Paddington's FRU which is alpha

01:22:31 Brigade Paddington's FRU which is alpha 206

01:22:32 206 but status three at the incident at 135 18 so that's so in fact even after make punch 25 does that help you with your

01:22:44 punch 25 does that help you with your recollection of when Phil wiggly arrived and you gave him the instructions to go to the roof level again I would come about to confirm that as the time but if

01:22:57 about to confirm that as the time but if it's on the instant Logan that would be correct yes and how did you think Phil Wiggy would get up to the roof with his with his crew using the internal

01:23:11 with his crew using the internal staircase and at that time did you have any information about the condition of

01:23:22 any information about the condition of smoke in the internal staircase which would allow you to assess whether it was safe for Phil weakly and his crew to go to the roof

01:23:34 not like a real call at that moment in time but I felt was used to commander my professional moral obligation to try and do something it was operating way

01:23:46 do something it was operating way outside of my comfort zone I thought I had to do something try to think of something entirely and end

01:24:00 do you know how welcome you ask in this way well when did you first discover having given him the instruction to go to the roof level that he couldn't or wouldn't go I can't we met any point during that

01:24:15 I can't we met any point during that incident until I left that instant ground that hem apparent to me

01:24:29 did you at this stage make pumps 20 give any consideration to seeking to have the incident declared a major incident no

01:24:41 incident declared a major incident no was that something you had authority to do I would have the authority to do that generally that would certainly to buy a more senior officer but as an officer London Fire Brigade I had that authority

01:24:52 London Fire Brigade I had that authority yes was there a reason why you didn't think of making a declaration of major incident

01:25:13 ninety none other than I was just totally consumed by a thing that was going on around me the toes of resources sensory overload and at that stage in

01:25:30 sensory overload and at that stage in the light of everything you saw and knew about the fire and the condition on the interior occupants leaving did you have any thoughts at that moment about the

01:25:41 any thoughts at that moment about the wisdom of continuing to or allowing the state or device to continue to be given to occupants of the building

01:26:04 not at that point

01:26:09 we're now going to move to putt make pumps 25 which will be a short topic I think according to the short incident log the message make pumps 25 gets confirmed back to you on the incident

01:26:21 confirmed back to you on the incident ground from control at 131 48 service

01:26:32 ground from control at 131 48 service requests may run it for the reference you don't need to go to it with it's page 18 of tab 23 the short incident log so that's a matter of two minutes after

01:26:43 so that's a matter of two minutes after you've made house can operate your nose-ring at this place this place just five minutes yeah of course of course would you like a little bit longer mr. Dunn would you like a little bit longer five inches fine very good sure yeah

01:26:56 five inches fine very good sure yeah well you leave us now we'll be back after five past eleven but if you don't feel ready to come back send me a message

01:27:19 you

01:38:55 mr. millet as you will realize mr. Darden is finding this very difficult and I think that we really ought to try and break it up into sections of about 30 minutes

01:39:06 30 minutes yes so what I suggest is he's coming in I think just a movement will start me starting again roughly quarter past let's run until quarter to 12:00

01:39:18 let's run until quarter to 12:00 or there abouts yes will then have a slightly longer break so people kind of say well to stretch their legs have a cup of coffee and then we'll take it from there and I think we might perhaps

01:39:29 from there and I think we might perhaps have a slightly longer than usual break for lunch would that be sensible I think I would be very sensible is that going to allow enable you to finish your questioning before the end of the

01:39:41 questioning before the end of the afternoon it will come off me that'll be all right unless anything arises but I haven't anticipated then that will be all right thank you very much well that's what we'll do ok thank you

01:40:12 more a mr. doesn't that's just so that you understand how we're getting run this now again to mr. it's going to question you for another let's say thirty minutes or thereabouts then we'll

01:40:24 thirty minutes or thereabouts then we'll have another break probably a slightly longer break and we'll keep the sessions quite short as we go on into this version all right thank you

01:40:32 thank you yes stop mister darden we then come to make pumps 25 and just to tell you what

01:40:43 make pumps 25 and just to tell you what we have in the incident log it that was confirmed back to the fire ground by control at 131 48 could you tell me how

01:40:55 control at 131 48 could you tell me how that decision was made to make pumps 25

01:41:03 I met the base of the tower can't be specific in terms of the orientation where I was or where I was standing when I was a ground floor level outside had a

01:41:15 I was a ground floor level outside had a conversation and met a firefight David Badillo who I believe had been in been inside the tower getting your question in terms of the resourcing level I said

01:41:27 in terms of the resourcing level I said that we've made it pumps 20 and I think today he reacted in terms of we're gonna need more for my understanding at that moment in time I didn't have anyone else

01:41:42 moment in time I didn't have anyone else I was conscious I didn't leave the fire ground can't remember seeing fire fight damn bills so it was a case of tasks and

01:41:54 damn bills so it was a case of tasks and firefight David did I'd send that assistance message for me and I'll give you my cell can't move our gaming direction to make pumps 25 whatever that was a decision I left in the hands of

01:42:07 was a decision I left in the hands of firefight below to make fire fight David did I was an experienced fire fighter it's been off concern for a very very long time in his career he experienced a range of complex incidents and that

01:42:19 range of complex incidents and that point I felt very much under pressure and I didn't feel that it was right for me to leave used to Brennan and send that message myself did you have any

01:42:32 that message myself did you have any discussion with firefight at Badillo about what you would do with the 25 pumps what strategy you would adopt with another makeup of further appliances

01:42:44 another makeup of further appliances I don't conversation that type no can I just ask you to look at again your PRC

01:42:55 just ask you to look at again your PRC notes tab 24 page 7

01:43:05 and there you see at MP 25f F Dave Badillo at G 27 he had fear in his eyes

01:43:18 Badillo at G 27 he had fear in his eyes valued his view far more I was well outside my comfort zone can you just describe for us what you

01:43:31 can you just describe for us what you saw in Dave Pattillo went when he when you say he as he do he had fear in his eyes what was the what was the atmosphere between you

01:43:47 on of complete astonishment in terms what was unfolding I mean I'm sure that if anyone looked at my eyes anytime during that incident when I was in to come on I had the same look at about

01:43:59 come on I had the same look at about this point at about this point 1:30 or so and mr. butabi says firefighter batter B says that he came out of the

01:44:10 batter B says that he came out of the tower we came over to you to update you do you remember that I do remember seeing chrome as you're about to be at

01:44:21 seeing chrome as you're about to be at some point outside yes do you remember what you discussed with Charlie better better be if anything I didn't at that

01:44:32 better be if anything I didn't at that moment in time but obviously since I've had a discussion with Charlie butterbur yes

01:44:40 what do you recall now standing there about the discussion you had with Charlie Bratley from my recollection again it was what the incident was resourced to but from my memory at that

01:44:51 resourced to but from my memory at that moment in time we hadn't had an aerial appliance in attendance if I understand if I'm correct from the conversation I've had post-incident the charlie

01:45:03 I've had post-incident the charlie better be our deeds had him to remove some bollards that would be blocking the access for the aerial pliers right did

01:45:17 access for the aerial pliers right did Charlie bat if we tell you about the conditions inside the building not like an occult did you find anything out from Charlie vow to be that you didn't already know at that point

01:45:42 I can't remember that information was surrendered but I do remember Tony saying to me that when he looked at me I had a similar expression on my face - the same at that's firefighter Dillo

01:45:54 the same at that's firefighter Dillo state of shock we used you remember were you in communication with the bridge header at that point I can't remember

01:46:11 what would what were the conditions like on the outside of the tower in terms of what was happening on the ground

01:46:35 at that point trying to recall what the conditions were like on the external in particular on the ground that that's that's it difficult never to try McCoy if I'm honest okay let me see if I can

01:46:48 if I'm honest okay let me see if I can give you a prompt do you have any recollection about falling debris at that point I have a memory of falling debris from the tower whether it's a

01:46:59 debris from the tower whether it's a exact moment I can't probably article of thermal and what about crowds do you have a memory of what the crowd situation was outside the tower at about that point then throughout the Hanoi my

01:47:19 that point then throughout the Hanoi my time in sand there were a large number of crowds particularly the beginning part and the incident but I don't have a visual memory at that moment in time in

01:47:31 visual memory at that moment in time in terms of their size or and they natural crowd grateful tower that moment if you go back to tap 23 which is the short incident log go to page 17 this is five

01:47:43 incident log go to page 17 this is five or six minutes or so earlier so we're still it make pumps 10 in fact say even

01:47:54 still it make pumps 10 in fact say even there it's a short period of time there's a lot of pumps earlier you see oh one 2508 on page 17 key EMG g27 one

01:48:10 oh one 2508 on page 17 key EMG g27 one request police for crowd control

01:48:15 what's the mg

01:48:23 do you know I can only not hundreds a pianist but that maybe that we've sent a priority from the fire ground into

01:48:34 priority from the fire ground into control and that denotes that Eston priority message priority message yeah okay and he says put request police for crowd control do you do you remember asking for police

01:48:48 you do you remember asking for police crowd control I do remember at some point journey ins and I requested that yeah and do you remember why you asked for that

01:49:05 as as I mentioned that you know at points and for the 30th there were a large number of you know grateful towers is located within ranked Lancaster West

01:49:17 is located within ranked Lancaster West estate it's a large residential area and and that request for police would have been to assist you know people trying to

01:49:30 been to assist you know people trying to make their way or to to grateful tower because of the scale of the incident do you remember what the crowd was trying to do

01:49:50 I don't have any clear memory of Pacific's in terms of what that crowd we're trying to achieve now do you remember whether they were trying to get back into the building to rescue enough funds

01:50:15 I can't remember that was was occurring that might be the time no no now you mentioned bollards and the aerial ladder and Charlie battered his role in that

01:50:30 and Charlie battered his role in that can you just help me the bollards were up but they require a key it's some kind of some kind of code to lower them so as

01:50:42 of some kind of code to lower them so as to get the aerial ladder in from my memory a bunch of grammar a fixed bullet they weren't an automated system so I

01:50:55 don't know how Charlie did it if I'm honest but I didn't ask him to remove the balos and how generally we have a set of keys on every front line pumping appliance that will generic set of keys

01:51:06 appliance that will generic set of keys that allows to to remove these fixed bollards and could be a locking mechanism on the Bhalla remove that and that allow you to move them for ground do you remember any particular

01:51:18 do you remember any particular difficulties with removing the bollards

01:51:27 not like I can remember no now you mentioned the area that are arriving and we have a time for that in the short incident log as as 130 207 don't need to

01:51:43 incident log as as 130 207 don't need to turn that up

01:51:51 in fact forgive me I'm wrong it's in the in the response reporters Oh 132 132 oh seven would that be about right in terms

01:52:05 seven would that be about right in terms of your recollection that the first aerial ladder arrived just after you'd made pumps 25 about the same time again

01:52:17 made pumps 25 about the same time again I don't have a grasp on the time concept the time but referring back to the the rocks report and the vision system and that time would be correct yes and do

01:52:30 that time would be correct yes and do you remember that Dan Harriman who is the crew manager of a 213 asked you whether you wanted the aerial to perform rescue or to provide water yes I did you said it in your statement

01:52:44 did you is this right that you you realize that he thought that you using it for rescue was a realistic option so

01:52:55 it for rescue was a realistic option so can you repeat that yeah didn't do it put in a different way was it's a good question did you did you think that using the aerial ladder for rescue was a realistic option at that point

01:53:15 I men have been asking he present himself to me asked Mike what would you want the area for rescues of water and

01:53:26 want the area for rescues of water and to doubt replied water

01:53:38 and if you go to page 8 of your statement look at the middle paragraph you can have that piece this is where you deal with the arrival of a 213 from

01:53:52 you deal with the arrival of a 213 from Paddington you say that as you can see shortly after that the aerial appliance repair until 1813 attended and at that point the fire was rapidly developed

01:54:04 point the fire was rapidly developed repair it was a roof level and was developing even more on the east side of the block it had become even more intense debris was continuing to fall and then you say the crew manager in

01:54:15 and then you say the crew manager in charge of 1813 Dan Harriman presented himself to me and asked whether I needed him to perform rescues or provide water 18:13 is a tl that's turntable manner isn't it correct when you say I told him

01:54:29 isn't it correct when you say I told him that I needed air at the aerial plans to stop a fire that was spreading on the east side of the block now I've read that all out to you because I've got a number of questions about different parts of there

01:54:45 what did you think about how realistic is rescue option was

01:55:14 that may be atomic I can't record I considered I wanted a detail for rescue purposes and on the

01:55:25 detail for rescue purposes and on the external I was more concerned about these better the fire was it possible at that point to use the turntable ladder from Paddington as a means of rescuing occupants of the building

01:55:44 again that's a difficult question to answer because that's a hypothetical question and without putting myself back there remember every single detail and everything else up that's a difficult

01:55:55 everything else up that's a difficult decision art oh I would like to comment on that can you just help me a turntable ladder goes up I think - is this right 32 meters or so approximately 10 floors

01:56:08 32 meters or so approximately 10 floors and that was bad my next question so you could have got up to 10 floors does that mean you couldn't have got any higher even if you had decided to use it for rescue it that's the maximum reach yes

01:56:20 rescue it that's the maximum reach yes cause the next

01:56:27 you say in the last sentence I told him that I needed the aerial appliance to stop the fire that was spreading on the east side of the block earlier on you you say that it was a roof level so my

01:56:40 you say that it was a roof level so my question is how did you think that the aerial ladder would stop the fire given that it had arrived at roof level

01:57:08 for millions commander a moment time I had that resource in attendance and I had to use it to the best of its ability

01:57:19 had to use it to the best of its ability again from personal obligation to try and extinguish that fire and external that building you said a minute ago the

01:57:31 that building you said a minute ago the reach of an area of a TL turntable that is 32 meters or so how high if you attach the hose to the to the to the the

01:57:45 attach the hose to the to the to the the platform how high could you get water above the 32 meters if you decided to use it for exterior firefighting but the tale doesn't house a monitor I wanted to

01:57:58 tale doesn't house a monitor I wanted to branch on a better word at the top and the cage area I'm not based at a an Arab station however

01:58:13 it's how ten floors my my maybe potentially another four to five force beyond beyond that tell me tell me a distance a temporal distance so did you

01:58:28 distance a temporal distance so did you think at all that the aerial ladder would help you get water to the top of the building where the fire derived

01:58:47 I don't remember that being a conscious thought but from the brief that I go to do FRU crew previously you know I hate

01:59:04 do FRU crew previously you know I hate kind of plan to try and get some water onto the fire from from on top of the roofs here to the top of the fire could

01:59:15 roofs here to the top of the fire could you be showing the top of page 9 of your statement please

01:59:25 and you're talking about the aerial appliance and you say in the third line a 213 we're now putting water onto the

01:59:36 a 213 we're now putting water onto the tower and by this time about 40% of the Eastside was alight from the fourth floor up to the roof level now we have a

01:59:50 floor up to the roof level now we have a photograph of that before I share it to you Mr Dan Qaeda's all ski whether you are right to be shown a photograph of Greenfield town on the night it's not a

02:00:02 Greenfield town on the night it's not a video it's just a still photograph miss okay I said okay yep I mean if it if not then you look at it you want to break tell me now it's fine it's bundled 25 top 25 and it's be lar

02:00:17 it's bundled 25 top 25 and it's be lar and then there are six zeros and then 12 one two

02:00:32 it should be one that they be mindful this is some should we place 12 and that there it is no that's not it page 12 next one actually doesn't do

02:00:48 page 12 next one actually doesn't do present purposes now that that's a photograph you can ignore the report in which it sits it's an expert's report of Barbara Lane and it's figure 17 11

02:00:59 Barbara Lane and it's figure 17 11 she has timed this photograph at 152 and 14th of June 2017 and you'll see that

02:01:11 14th of June 2017 and you'll see that she's put on it level 9 the chazy where that line is and put a red ring around the whole stream the only reason I show

02:01:24 the whole stream the only reason I show you that is is the timing to ask you about the timing would that be about right that by 152 the aerial appliance

02:01:36 right that by 152 the aerial appliance was applying water to the east elevation as that image shows that's correct okay

02:01:47 as that image shows that's correct okay so it arrived at 132 and was operating by 152 from your recollection as I hope it has 20 minutes from your recollection

02:01:59 it has 20 minutes from your recollection how soon after arrival did the turntable ladder for paddock and start applying water to the east elevation

02:02:11 I've got to give you a time what I will be able to explain is how why it takes time to for that to happen the aerial plant doesn't come and Busan water supply I think we spoke about earlier

02:02:23 supply I think we spoke about earlier that got four to seven one was supplying the dry rising main we have to have a separate fire appliance to then find an additional hydrant so there has to be

02:02:36 additional hydrant so there has to be facism

02:02:36 facism facilitated by a crew on the ground they don't plug find additional water supply in terms of a hydrant that are then plugged in by hose into pumping appliance that pumping plants would be

02:02:48 appliance that pumping plants would be alone dedicate to supply water to the aerial by via our fiber gate hose only when that can happen we can confirm the water supply to the aerial can we apply water or to the fire so it's not as if

02:02:59 water or to the fire so it's not as if we assume zero is in attendance we can use that for water how long roughly would it take between setting in the hose for the the aerial of plants and first starting to apply water it's

02:03:14 first starting to apply water it's difficult to say it depends on you know nearest available hydrant getting access in for the aerial

02:03:27 up to a maximum of 10 minutes potentially got that knife it's difficult to judge do you remember how far away the hydrant was from the east face into which the turntable ladder set

02:03:40 face into which the turntable ladder set its hose not on that point when I was at the incident I since postings that I understand that they had difficulty

02:03:51 understand that they had difficulty sourcing Arjun can you okay you say you understand it who had I wanted who would I talk to to get more detail on the difficulties they

02:04:03 get more detail on the difficulties they had are you just hired to I believe

02:04:13 pre-mounted Dave Davis and cremated Harley better be were evolved in that process at some point so Charlie battery was involved I believe he was I can't

02:04:24 was involved I believe he was I can't guarantee that no how would you describe the success of the firefighting on the East elevation with the aerial ladder once it was working

02:04:47 I'd say Vieira plants was doing his best they possibly could in almost impossible situation did you know that it was withdrawn at about 2:20 a.m. after your

02:05:01 withdrawn at about 2:20 a.m. after your incident commander

02:05:07 the first time I knew I was aware that it was withdrawn was when I was when I was relieved in my command I went into Grand Hotel itself in the first time new it was withdrawn because when I left the

02:05:22 it was withdrawn because when I left the internet Grandpop's mid-thigh 100 like 30 hours do you happen to know why the aerial appliance was withdrawn from

02:05:35 aerial appliance was withdrawn from understanding it was the applies itself was compromised in terms of material falling from the building right and I'm

02:05:48 falling from the building right and I'm sorry to ask you this but who would I talk to if I wanted to know more detail about about that less person to speak to I believe would be crew manager Dan Harriman who was the officer in charge of now for to l-3 yes thank you can I

02:06:03 of now for to l-3 yes thank you can I now should be able to cover this before the next break mr. chairman just just ask you some questions about the spread of the fire to the north face of the building now on page 7 of your statement

02:06:27 you say that

02:06:35 GUP crew manager ash of g34 Chelsea that was telling you that debris was falling on the north side of the tower

02:06:54 Mabley around bad reference and never mind mistake me for the language do you remember crew manager ash telling you that debris was falling on the north side of the town like their m7

02:07:07 side of the town like their m7 information yes did you tell any anybody present to relocate to the north side of the tower to stop a fire that was

02:07:19 the tower to stop a fire that was spreading at that point I believe I detailed that task to watch man - James berry who's a watch manager of and chart

02:07:31 berry who's a watch manager of and chart officer in charge of Richmond's pub letter and if you look at page 9 of your statement which is where others are

02:07:42 statement which is where others are pretending to go you can see about a third of the way down the page say crew

02:07:53 third of the way down the page say crew manager Nathan ash of g34 Chelsea informed me by his radio that debris was falling on the north side of the building

02:07:59 building so now I knew that the file is wrapping around the building to the north side did you have any thoughts about how this fire was wrapping itself around the

02:08:11 fire was wrapping itself around the building to the north

02:08:28 don't remember having any thoughts about how it was doing up just bear witness to it wasn't falling in front of my eyes right and he tells you it's wrapping around the building where were you standing at the time of that

02:08:40 standing at the time of that conversation for me my memory I was more sullenly on that grassy Virgil Hill this on the still me the East elevation of

02:08:52 on the still me the East elevation of Grand Hotel right where was you know where crew manager ash was standing located when he sent you his radio

02:09:05 located when he sent you his radio message about the fire spread to the north I don't know okay you go on to say that I obstructed watch manager to James

02:09:16 that I obstructed watch manager to James Barry from Richmond 842 to take his plants and relocate at the north side of the tower to stop the fire from spreading and to put out the debris that was alight now can I just ask you to

02:09:31 was alight now can I just ask you to look at your contemporaneous notes that you made on Saturday the 18th of June 17th of June so after the event which will funding in your witness bundle should be on your table of tab 1b

02:10:00 and it's on the screen safe you can look at the screen version if you go to mr. moderator you could go to the one for Saturday the 17th of June 2017 it's got

02:10:15 Saturday the 17th of June 2017 it's got an 11 in the top right hand corner

02:10:34 that's the one now well this I've got a paper copy button the copy on my screen is virtually an engine what can you read

02:10:46 is virtually an engine what can you read was today in Festival you may have I can read that he got a paper copy as well you should have a paper copy in that folder you may find that there's a copy

02:10:59 folder you may find that there's a copy of your statement is there a tab B yes well I think you'll find easy to use that you've got to move on quite a long way towards the end to last last but one

02:11:12 way towards the end to last last but one page

02:11:21 yes it's got its got an 11 at the top right-hand corner you know yeah it's also on the big screens now the fan I don't know who else is trying to read this on a small screen I doubt that we

02:11:34 this on a small screen I doubt that we can do much better than we've got but I think you have to Crane your neck submissiveness even like I'm sorry but I've just got a very short simple question mister don't move this level then we'll have a break in the second

02:11:48 then we'll have a break in the second half of that written document you say I have reports from group manager Nathan - Chelsea that debri was when the bot was

02:12:00 Chelsea that debri was when the bot was planing down landing beyond the fence line on that on the east side of the block do you see you see that was correct and then you say I detailed

02:12:11 correct and then you say I detailed watchman Etta James bearing age 42 Richmond's partnered to get an appliance if possible to this location as I was worried I was concerned about it spreading to the surrounding properties on the eastern side of block beyond the

02:12:23 on the eastern side of block beyond the fence line I just want to just ask you whether in fact when you say no statement north side you actually meant

02:12:34 statement north side you actually meant is east side as this document records

02:12:40 my orientation in the building was that change I wasn't aware that so they did that brief I gave to to what trans James Barry was to retire to the north side

02:12:51 Barry was to retire to the north side but in the concert pianist notes that's incorrect it should read North Side

02:13:01 I did promise a break after this document say would be wrong for me not to mr. Dworkin and unless you've got something very short to follow others which will finish the line your question it went quite right

02:13:12 line your question it went quite right break anyway mr. Dodd and we'll have another break at this point and they probably everyone would benefit from having a slightly longer break so we'll resume at midday thank you

02:13:34 you

02:28:25 like carry-ons done yes thank you mister darden I get to turn to a different topical together which is communications go ask the general question if you as

02:28:39 go ask the general question if you as the incident commander or anybody else's incident commander wish to communicate with all the residents in a high-rise block at the same time is there any

02:28:53 block at the same time is there any other way of doing it other than through the established systems of communication via the bridgehead and by VA wearers

02:29:06 you're very very difficult to communicate very single resident of a block the size of Greene from tower we can have the ability to communicate from

02:29:17 can have the ability to communicate from the ground that we have loud hailer z'

02:29:22 you know instance of my ground floor tell there was a lot of noise pollution and background noise anything else that that might be quite difficult to do in your experience have you ever attended

02:29:35 your experience have you ever attended an incident in a high-rise block which had an internal tannoy system or loudspeaker system which allowed the incident commander to communicate with everybody inside the building

02:29:48 not for my memory now

02:29:56 now I'm gonna show you or least ask you very briefly about a number of policy statements and requirements about the incident commanders responsibility for communications are you familiar with

02:30:09 communications are you familiar with high-rise firefighting 633 and the part of that which says that regular communication should be maintained to ensure that the incident commander is aware aware of the developing situation

02:30:22 aware aware of the developing situation yes you are would you would you like to see it in black in black and white or are you happy to go on your recollection of what what the policy says yeah to say

02:30:33 of what what the policy says yeah to say it would be good to make your freshed in every place if you could go to policy bundle tab for

02:30:45 and go in that please to paragraph 7.26

02:30:56 which is on page 11 of 28 regular communications should be maintained to ensure that the IC is aware of the developing situation and then can

02:31:08 developing situation and then can anticipate resource requirements effectively and it goes on this also ensures the fire sector commander is kept updated regarding any fire and smoke spread that may only be visible to

02:31:19 smoke spread that may only be visible to those outside the building so Akron fell on the night were you aware of that as a policy requirement

02:31:31 yes now we're going to get back into six three three I think at some stage depending on how we get on but can I show you another policy which is policy

02:31:43 show you another policy which is policy four eight eight this is a lfb policy are you familiar with policy 488 institute communications I would have some fun or ization with it yes yes okay it's um it's tab 12 and it's lfb five

02:31:57 it's um it's tab 12 and it's lfb five zeros 736 subtraction this is the one that is current as a May 2016

02:32:10 can I ask you to look at paragraph 1.1 on page 2 internally and it says

02:32:23 on page 2 internally and it says effective communications are the key to success the reliable communications network is essential for safe operation at incidence and fundamental for security at the level of command

02:32:34 security at the level of command required to manage operational resources efficiently this policy procedure aims to standardize simplify and improve the setting up of the communications network at an incident and say question on the

02:32:47 at an incident and say question on the night were you aware that this was a policy requirement the policy principle

02:32:57 yeah most of the commanders are aware that you know effective communication is a key part of its that and then finally in this short survey of policies are you

02:33:08 in this short survey of policies are you familiar with policy 431 this is a London Fire Brigade policy policy 431 incident commander yes and if you look at the tab before tab 11 we've looked at

02:33:24 at the tab before tab 11 we've looked at this before yesterday I think mr. data if I can ask you to go in that to paragraph 7.1 which we haven't looked at

02:33:36 paragraph 7.1 which we haven't looked at under the heading communications it's on page 5 of 10 internally that could be enlarged it says at 7.1 the IC would

02:33:50 enlarged it says at 7.1 the IC would establish clear lines of communication throughout the incident using the most appropriate communications method available on the night of the fire were you conscious that that was a policy

02:34:03 you conscious that that was a policy principle

02:34:06 yeah yes I was and seven point two and seven point three same question seven point two the IC would it show that

02:34:17 point two the IC would it show that communications are maintained between the incident of the brigades of mobilizing control again the same question were you aware on the night of the fire that that was a policy requirement or principle yes and then

02:34:34 requirement or principle yes and then seven point three the IC should establish and maintain effective communications with all other services and agencies that that can contribute both to resolving an incident and the

02:34:46 both to resolving an incident and the effective coordination of activities again on the night were you cognizant were you conscious that that was a policy requirement or principle

02:35:05 I am feeling of that policy but it is difficult to actually pinpoint every single detail it was in your policy but you know again I will refer back to mr. commander understands that having effective communication is very

02:35:17 effective communication is very important any incident

02:35:23 and if I can ask you finally to look at appendix 2 and page 7 internally considerations for the role of incident commander and it says at the top the IC

02:35:37 commander and it says at the top the IC should ensure the following and there's a list of things establish and maintain information regarding the number of casualties involved see the zipper top

02:35:49 casualties involved see the zipper top establish under the words in bold information about task or event do you see it says establish and maintain information regarding number of casualties involved developments of

02:36:01 casualties involved developments of progress of the operations affected the incident and a fire service operations to the server surrounding environment

02:36:09 but on the night of the fire were you aware that those considerations were considerations that you as incident commander should keep in mind something

02:36:22 commander should keep in mind something of an awareness source because that's that's relating back to the decision-making model process ok

02:36:32 in the light of the position as set out in the parts of the policies I've shown you which I appreciate his only a very small part of these much bigger policies

02:36:44 small part of these much bigger policies and it may well be other parts of the policy though that we would need to look at together but I'm trying to be trying to take this in a focused way in the light of the position in the policies that we've seen

02:36:55 that we've seen can we talk together about how it worked or didn't work by reference to communications about what was happening first of all inside the building up to at about 1:30 so we're looking at

02:37:07 at about 1:30 so we're looking at communications between you and inside the people inside the building your crews inside the building up to about 1:30 p.m.

02:37:15 1:30 p.m. a.m. first question is do you recall and receiving any information either from all about firefighter O'Byrne and his

02:37:26 all about firefighter O'Byrne and his visit to the higher floors above the faulty fuel that was discussed and I don't remember receiving that traffic for a firefighter a burn note

02:37:40 so you don't remember any discussion with fire fighter air burn about what he was finding on the fifth sixth and seventh floors when I was in school and on the outside of building no did

02:37:55 on the outside of building no did anybody tell you at that time the fire fighter Oh burn had gone up higher into the building and what he had found not

02:38:09 the building and what he had found not far out the duration of the incident has sown something that kind of power of post-incident so if I was to ask you questions about what mr. firefighter a burn found when he went up higher into

02:38:21 burn found when he went up higher into the building and the people that he met would you be able to answer them no

02:38:27 firefighter secret firefighter secret says in his statement that he did hear messages from firefighter Rayburn

02:38:38 messages from firefighter Rayburn reporting internal fighters on the 6th and the 7th floors and had heard a radio message from him is that something that mr. secret passed on to you firefighter

02:38:50 mr. secret passed on to you firefighter secret passed on to you correct a secret or crew manager schematic returned again

02:39:01 or crew manager schematic returned again that relates back into the information that the firefighter had been hidin and from when I was into commander and the extent of the building I don't remember receiving their traffic so if I were to ask you questions about what firefighter

02:39:15 ask you questions about what firefighter crew manager secret himself found inside the building would you be able to answer them

02:39:23 the only question is that why we've got to answer these questions whip imposed already in terms of the traffic between myself and Chris chromatic Chris Secret in terms of the confusion in terms of the escalating

02:39:36 confusion in terms of the escalating fired upon the external building in the progress of the initial firefighting crew into the compartment of flat 16 did

02:39:50 crew into the compartment of flat 16 did career manager secret tell you that firefighter Stern and hip hell looked spooked and thought there was something

02:40:02 spooked and thought there was something in this something wrong did crew manager secret tell you that I've not received that information nope are you sure about that always it that you just can't remember I'm very confident that I have

02:40:17 remember I'm very confident that I have not received that information

02:40:20 turning to firefighter Hipple

02:40:27 do you recall getting any communications about what he was finding from his own visits to the higher floors in the tower and about that time of the night

02:40:38 and about that time of the night I don't remember seven any traffic or information I must refer back to say that you know

02:40:49 I must refer back to say that you know these are individual counts from individual people and their their true affection what's happened and I can only be true to what I understand and what I remember from that night did he

02:41:00 remember from that night did he or do you recall him telling you that he had found black smoke on the 16th floor

02:41:09 in respect in terms of telling me was that a would that be a face to face or by radio traffic either way I don't I

02:41:22 by radio traffic either way I don't I have no recollection of it was a face to face conversation whether it's a radio traffic perceived he says mr. hippler firefighter Hippel says in his statement and will obviously have to explore this

02:41:34 and will obviously have to explore this with him but he says that he had expressed deep concern to watch manager O'Keefe at the bridgehead at this time and my question is did

02:41:48 at this time and my question is did watch manager O'Keefe pass those concerns on to you

02:42:08 again I can't recall receiving that the Cosenza were pasta myself but again that's not saying that that's not a true reflection of his account I could only comment on what I recollect

02:42:21 I could only comment on what I recollect from that evening and turning to another firefighter firefighter Stern and again we'll have to examine what he says about was carefully but he says we'll say that

02:42:32 was carefully but he says we'll say that he discovered smoke on all floors but zero visibility on floor 16 do you remember that information being passed back to you either by him firefighter Stern or indirectly through

02:42:46 firefighter Stern or indirectly through the Bridget know what mechanisms of communication did you have up to 1:30

02:42:59 communication did you have up to 1:30 a.m. between yourself on the ground and the individuals firefighters in the building so the mechanisms for that

02:43:14 building so the mechanisms for that would be that as amazing to Commander no it doesn't make that a an officer would be the bridgehead all be aware as

02:43:25 be the bridgehead all be aware as committed would be committed and they would have to observe be a radio channel 6 and that would be observed by a nature control officer and that is a firefighter in charge of committing firefighters past the point of enter

02:43:38 firefighters past the point of enter controlling all radio traffic from be a teams should be able received back to engine control over to the engine

02:43:49 engine control over to the engine control or operator or to if the resources permit a comms communications officer and that can be a rank of a firefighter so for my expectation it's a

02:44:00 firefighter so for my expectation it's a commander

02:44:02 commander that's how traffic from Baker's or people within the within a compartment not just with specific to ground felt our would communicate to the intricate control point and in terms of Grand

02:44:15 control point and in terms of Grand Hotel at the bridgehead and that information via channel one from the bridgehead would be pasta needs in commander

02:44:22 commander so to summarize or evidence is it is this right that you didn't actually have direct radio control and individual firefighters inside the tower your

02:44:35 firefighters inside the tower your communications would go through the bridgehead that's how they come our structure should work that's correct and was there any way of changing that so that you could communicate directly

02:44:46 so that you could communicate directly with firefighters on on different floors within the building

02:45:02 that something potentially could be facilitated or if they change if they individually take the initiative to change the channel but I'm not going to comment on that because that's something that I didn't order or directly do I was

02:45:15 that I didn't order or directly do I was observing channel 1 as the intercept commander so it would it be a question of simply changing the channel so that they could speak on channel 1 as a place to channel 6 or do you need a different

02:45:26 to channel 6 or do you need a different piece of equipment no it's all facilitated by every individual who's like fire ground will have access to their own personal issue fire ground radio but as in policy firefighters who

02:45:38 radio but as in policy firefighters who are committed under air MBA should be observing be a channel 6 right what if they were committed but weren't under air what would they have with them they

02:45:49 air what would they have with them they would have their fiber and radio and that would be tuned to channel 1 that bill channel 1 that's correct yes they could use that to speak to you directly could be they would be able to yes but

02:46:00 could be they would be able to yes but if they were under air wearing the mask and the full kit what raid what radio equipment would they have they would have again they'd have the person issue

02:46:12 have again they'd have the person issue fire and radio but they'd also not always a case but we do have a facility in the 105 gate that we can put communications equipment onto breathing

02:46:23 communications equipment onto breathing apparatus sets is that a Barry that's correct

02:46:26 correct what does Barry stands for breathe breathing apparatus radio interface equipment in your experience is it effective or are there problems with it there can be issues with our Barry sets

02:46:39 there can be issues with our Barry sets that's correct yes what kind of issues lots of traffic

02:46:49 yeah lots of traffic then it can be unreliable on the night of the fire was the fact that as you say Barry radios one could be unreliable something that you thought was quite well known in the

02:47:01 you thought was quite well known in the London Fire Brigade or was that just your opinion

02:47:10 I think this is well known in the London Fire Brigade that buries communications equipment is unreliable yes review did

02:47:21 equipment is unreliable yes review did you ever take that up with anybody more senior with Barry radios one I believe that has been raised and I certainly did raise that point not only that point but

02:47:34 raise that point not only that point but about I did raise the point of communications at the PRC yes I did

02:47:46 so is it right to summarize that by 1:30 you haven't had any direct communication with any firefighter had gone into the building whether they were under air or

02:47:58 building whether they were under air or not from my memory and my recollection that is correct I'm not saying that that's not the case and whether there was a communications I'm not gonna speculate but from my memory of my recollection that is the case but for

02:48:12 recollection that is the case but for those individuals who put that in a statement the necessary reflection and can I just turn to another part of the

02:48:23 can I just turn to another part of the same topic which is communication with the bridgehead that you had mr. tan and you say in your statement that you that watch manager O'Keefe arrived at the bridgehead and you sent him to the

02:48:35 bridgehead and you sent him to the breach head and till the A's with crew manager secret is that right that's correct and you asked him to manage the VA resources I think that's correct

02:48:46 VA resources I think that's correct I just want to explore with you how much of what mr. O'Keefe says he discovered once he was at the bridgehead was actually relate back to you if you go

02:48:59 actually relate back to you if you go first of all to page 6 of your own statement

02:49:05 and look at the second paragraph you set out there what information you had for a

02:49:16 out there what information you had for a mr. O'Keefe and you say between a 125 and 128 we looked at this yesterday we had reports of one person not being able to leave a property on the 11th floor another on the 16th floor and you're

02:49:29 another on the 16th floor and you're going to give the reason and we looked at that yesterday so we're to ask you about it again my question is is that the only information you got for mr. O'Keefe from watch manager O'Keefe at

02:49:40 O'Keefe from watch manager O'Keefe at those between those times

02:49:55 we're not saying that other traffic wasn't received by myself but that's the piece of traffic I do really remember receiving from wash made rotation did

02:50:09 receiving from wash made rotation did watch manager Akif tell you that there was light gray smoke logging in the ground floor lobby at any time call that no

02:50:23 did do you remember whether mr. weather farm I sorry that a watch manager at Keith's told you that firefighter Jamal Stern

02:50:31 Stern told him that the lobbies of floors five and six were completely smoked out do you remember being told that by mr. Hoyt oh thank you

02:50:42 do you remember being told by watch manager Keith that he had seen residents coming down the stairs with soot on their faces

02:50:53 no time and what about him telling you that he seen significant smoke in the main stairwell do you remember in

02:51:05 main stairwell do you remember in telling you that no I don't and what about smoke logging at the bridgehead itself on the second floor did he did you tell you that I don't remember

02:51:18 you tell you that I don't remember receiving any traffic to that effect

02:51:25 it sounds from what you've been telling us to the best of your recollection you've got very little traffic from watch manager a key for the bridgehead up to 1:30 a.m. is that is that right

02:51:44 I think I think we'll have trauma members that again I explained it when I was in charge of the instance that first hour I was I felt extremely under

02:51:56 hour I was I felt extremely under pressure I do have some some you know some black spots and a memory blanks in terms of you know Colin Colin school through events what actually happened

02:52:08 through events what actually happened now I'm not going to credit anyone in terms of their statement that's not for me to do you know if that's their account and that's a understanding of a version of anus then I can only you know

02:52:21 version of anus then I can only you know that's a true for extra balcony stand here to be honest and give an account of what I remember and that's very fair but this mister darden I think you might

02:52:32 this mister darden I think you might need another break it is that a Riedel he's able to ask a few more answer a few more collective I like to carry on just a few more questions that's fine okay

02:52:42 same theme mr. O'Keefe has recorded at his contemporaneous notes that firefighters stern and hippo had

02:52:56 firefighters stern and hippo had reported to him going to the 16th floor to rescue two persons in smoke do you remember being told that by watch manager O'Keefe I don't know

02:53:10 manager O'Keefe I don't know I'm sorry to ask you the similar sort of question in respect of other people on different floors he has a record of real a collection of firefighters Murphy and

02:53:22 a collection of firefighters Murphy and Cornelius reporting to him that they were going to the 14th floor and finding numerous people in heavy smoke do you remember being told that by watch

02:53:34 remember being told that by watch manager Eric Keith no why would like to write it I know before I know Keith it was on this is significant pressure on

02:53:45 was on this is significant pressure on that bridgehead yes mr. Duggan I think I needed an amazing yeah mr. dump thank

02:53:57 needed an amazing yeah mr. dump thank you very much I'm going to invite you to take a break every thank you well of course I'll have a break if you if you feel the new floor would you like to

02:54:08 feel the new floor would you like to break that but before you want so that let me just ask mr. you what what's the shape of the rest of the morning so to speak with the lunch adjourn I think

02:54:21 speak with the lunch adjourn I think that from mr. Dowd ins point of view people would be it may be I can't speak then that it may be helpful if if he had the lunch break now knew it was a lunch

02:54:33 the lunch break now knew it was a lunch break in that he could take a significant break yes we don't have a vast amount of ground to cover after that but now if we were to adjourn and take a long lunch break and resume it to

02:54:44 take a long lunch break and resume it to trot how would that affect your program for the rest of the people that would be perfect but that would be perfectly workable mr. Jeff and that would not

02:54:56 workable mr. Jeff and that would not prevent you from reaching the end of your questioning well within the usual dirt

02:55:01 dirt No so they are subject to anything unusual arising well of course what never knows well that maybe that answers everyone's questions together we could stop now at the lunch and give you a

02:55:12 stop now at the lunch and give you a long break come back at 2 o'clock would that be alright that's fine I can you heard was mister minute said you should go to finish asking questions well within the course of the afternoon Benji why thank you

02:55:47 you