Watch Manager Dan Dowden's testimony about his role as first incident commander on the night of the Grenfell Tower fire. Covers critical early decisions including making pumps 8 and 10, fire survival guidance coordination, and the unprecedented nature of the external fire spread.
00:11:10 [Music]
00:11:26 mr. dad he's on his way mr. Burroughs
00:11:55 [Music]
00:12:13 let's start again you're asked a question I think by the Chairman about water pressure in a covering jet and it's maximum reach in your experience are there any issues
00:12:27 your experience are there any issues which impact on water pressure in a covering jet which might affect it's covering its maximum reach
00:12:39 young greedy effect on that would be the amount of hoes on that cover in jet depending on the size of that hose so as we referred to earlier a 70 mil 70
00:12:50 we referred to earlier a 70 mil 70 millimeter length of hose the friction loss and that will be point to the bar the 45-minute length which believe that coverage it was on the fire Brown that
00:13:01 coverage it was on the fire Brown that more evening was the frictional losses one bar per per length of hose so that's the only real sort of issue you're gonna
00:13:13 the only real sort of issue you're gonna have against your your pressure at the branch right and how when you say per length oppose how long do you 23 minutes on 20 throws both for 70 millimeter hose
00:13:24 on 20 throws both for 70 millimeter hose and a 45 mil I was at 23 meters in left right thank you secondly at the time when the covering jet was being applied did either
00:13:36 jet was being applied did either firefighter Murphy or Cornelius tell you about whether they could or couldn't reach above the window in flat 16
00:13:52 mmm can't record conversation of that respect taking place now so they didn't come to you and say well we know you had told us to put water above flat 16 we can't because there's no pressure or too
00:14:03 can't because there's no pressure or too little pressure on your home confirming that correct my recollection is that I don't remember that okay now in your
00:14:14 don't remember that okay now in your statement if you could get back to it please at page four six lines up from the bottom you see the sentence just after the sentence at this point the
00:14:26 after the sentence at this point the father still within the compartment that the window have failed in that it is broken and then you then say I then asked crew manager Dave Davis from g36 to to send an informative message to
00:14:37 to to send an informative message to control stating residential block of flats plus 20 plus floors 25 meters by 25 meters high rise procedure implemented five room flat on the fourth floor 75% alight MDT in use tactical
00:14:50 floor 75% alight MDT in use tactical mode Oscar and you explain what to tactical mode Oscar there is I just want to get a precise fix on that time with
00:15:02 to get a precise fix on that time with you and then we'll move on because you turn to bundle of documents tab 23 which is the short incident log
00:15:23 and in that document if we go to page 17
00:15:38 if you focus on the message that you're referring to it's about third of the way down the page under informative you see know about the know above that
00:15:50 know about the know above that informative SCP from G 272 residential block of flats that message there mister darman is that the message that you're referring to in your witness statement that's correct so we can put a time on
00:16:02 that's correct so we can put a time on that of oh one sixteen and Oh - and you can see an initial in the OP column s ad do you know who that might be
00:16:13 do you know who that might be I can only assume that would be the control room operator who took that informative message right
00:16:25 informative message right and what does sup from G to 272 mean [Music]
00:16:34 [Music] no I wouldn't have understand TsUP stands stands for but I'll sue from is that measures are from golf to seven on the Instagram so okay according to your
00:16:46 the Instagram so okay according to your statement you asked Dave Davis crew manager Dave Davis from g36 to to send that massive message but it looks as if it came from g27 - can you explain why
00:16:57 it came from g27 - can you explain why that why that was just because I tossed a an officer and he was from the station doesn't mean he had necessary has to pacifically send it from his machine a moment in time as we referred to earlier
00:17:09 moment in time as we referred to earlier golf 272 was to come and pop and it says in the message that you implemented the high-rise procedure and I think you
00:17:21 high-rise procedure and I think you explained this morning what that what that was can I just ask you why the message seems to suggest that you
00:17:32 message seems to suggest that you implemented that that's at 160 no - and not on arrival because when we arrived on the scene an incident we haven't I've
00:17:44 on the scene an incident we haven't I've no time to do my dynamic risk assessment in terms of choosing the safe systems of work references policies or procedures that Mister can only be sent when we've
00:17:55 that Mister can only be sent when we've committed personnel as a risk environment or to hazard area and I think the minute a safe system of work following the decision-making model as well if you look continuing to look at
00:18:06 well if you look continuing to look at page 17 of the short incident log you can see that two entries above one we've just been looking at at oh one 1602 there's an entry at oh one 1339 again s
00:18:20 there's an entry at oh one 1339 again s ad make up IUP g-33 one make pump six and one HP and then amended amendment to one area lot about forty seconds later
00:18:32 one area lot about forty seconds later so you can we get from that that you implemented the high rise procedure after you'd May pump six and one aerial it doesn't
00:18:43 pump six and one aerial it doesn't necessarily work that when we transplant a bit more women so quad or an officer turns up on the fire ground from among we book status three which means we're in a tender and attendance at an incident generally we have the rule of
00:18:55 incident generally we have the rule of thumb is within messages it's the policy we have 20 minutes of transmitted window to get a fan informative message away to let control know in terms of what the insta commander is doing and basically
00:19:06 insta commander is doing and basically painting a picture up to to the officers in control and monitoring officers any other officers listening to the main scheme radio okay Dina stern commander this is his or her decision and this is
00:19:18 this is his or her decision and this is resources he or she needs the only other side to that is that when we we send an assistance message a priority message which will in this terms of a makeup I needed more resources that also has to be followed
00:19:30 resources that also has to be followed up as soon as practicable with a informative message to inform control and monitoring officers or who are remote from the incident why I have asked for additional resources right now
00:19:46 asked for additional resources right now we then go on to the next topic which is making pumps eight and as we do so can I take you to your statement at the top of
00:19:57 take you to your statement at the top of page five I've shown you this before and it starts at the very foot of page four let's begin there I knew that the crews were now tackling the fire so if you
00:20:09 were now tackling the fire so if you look at the very top of the screen I knew that the crews were now tackling the file within the compartment but I noticed that the fire have now breached the window of the flat on the fourth floor and was starting to affect the
00:20:21 floor and was starting to affect the external fascia of the building and then you say it was at this point that I noticed the situation is beginning to turn because the fire wasn't behaving in a way that I would have expected from previous experience you go on it was
00:20:34 previous experience you go on it was sparking and spitting in a similar way to when magnesium burns and was making me feel
00:20:44 now now was that point when you noticed
00:20:55 now now was that point when you noticed that the situation was beginning to turn do you remember whether that was before or after you'd made pumps eight
00:21:12 my recollection was that was before that was one of the markers in terms of that there was also need since make bomb site was that moment and you noticed the
00:21:24 was that moment and you noticed the situation was beginning to turn before or after you'd sent the informative message which we looked at a minute ago at O 164 my memory Apple is our afternoon fluent initiative after the informative message and would you say
00:21:38 informative message and would you say that when you noticed the situation was beginning to turn because the fathers are behaving in a way you would have expected from previous experience is that the moment you would you looking back on it would say was the turning
00:21:51 back on it would say was the turning point you crossed a line that was the first real moment I just refer to my
00:22:02 first real moment I just refer to my statement that I felt uncomfortable and that's why wouldn't confirmation from from Comanche a secret at the bridgehead in terms of we know what was happening
00:22:13 in terms of we know what was happening to the firefighting crew of in here in that building it's not uncommon for as a fire within a compartment develops and if the window has failed for that to
00:22:24 if the window has failed for that to show on the external of the building because if you'll see that fire it is trying to search for a to supply and if a window or compartment has failed and the option supply will be external to
00:22:35 the option supply will be external to the building so that's that's a source of its oxygen supply so it's not nothing so uncommon I just I knew there was a be a team within that compartment and it
00:22:48 a team within that compartment and it could understand why that fire wasn't being suppressed just trying to get a handle on on more precise timings I think you've said that the turning point is he described it in the author
00:22:59 is he described it in the author statement came after you'd sent an informative message at a 1:16 you remember the video we looked at this morning and I'm very happy to show to
00:23:10 morning and I'm very happy to show to you again but timed Oh 1:12 I think we could see pieces of molten and flaming material coming down from the building at Oh 1:12 I asked you
00:23:22 from the building at Oh 1:12 I asked you about that and you couldn't remember but on the basis that the video is accurately timed would you agree that it looks like burning material was coming
00:23:33 looks like burning material was coming off the building at that time Oh 1:12 and therefore earlier than you sent your informative message I can only refer to
00:23:44 informative message I can only refer to that I've seen those images today but my decisions my actions were taken what I saw that night and previously I'll put in my statement and I don't have a
00:23:57 in my statement and I don't have a reflection of the timeline of that night it's so for me that night if the the decisions and the choices I took were I had to be very very quick I didn't have
00:24:10 had to be very very quick I didn't have the benefit of work into a timeline it was very much reacting to I saw in front of me and why from my training my previously spirits my colleagues around me in terms of what I thought was the best and good intent in terms of resolve
00:24:22 best and good intent in terms of resolve this instance successfully yes understand and when you saw the material coming off the building leave aside timing for a moment but on the video that we've seen and I'm not gonna share
00:24:34 that we've seen and I'm not gonna share to you again but but unless you want me to I will do if you want me to but but when you saw what was coming off the building what did you think it was
00:24:48 at that point you know it was it was something something on the external building I didn't know at that point it was what I know now in terms of flammable cladding the ACM cladding if
00:25:02 flammable cladding the ACM cladding if if we were aware of that risk and that hazard at that point as we are now as the organization we put things in place but I wasn't aware that of this cladding
00:25:15 but I wasn't aware that of this cladding material that was pulling external and for life of the building all right let's take it let's take it in stages then at the top of page five after the sentence
00:25:29 the top of page five after the sentence about sparking and spitting you say I contacted crew manager secret on the radio and checked at the be a crew were tackling the fire to which you replied they were making good progress now was that contacted with crew manager
00:25:43 now was that contacted with crew manager secret after you think you saw the multiple and flaming material falling off the exterior
00:25:59 dr. reference mistake I don't know if it was when I you know saw the I can't say with Moulton and what I you know from my interpretation of it was sparking in spitting so recollections I don't
00:26:12 spitting so recollections I don't remember the fascia the building falling it was more of the way it was reacting but yes I do think that was around the same time of that happened our contact to Christy Creek yes that's a very
00:26:23 to Christy Creek yes that's a very honest that's a very fair answer it saved it I understand what you're saying see you went to whether it was molten material falling off but for the sparking and spitting but you put the
00:26:34 sparking and spitting but you put the conversation with mist with crew manager secret that after that point hmm I believe so yeah yeah now the crew manager secrets has provided a statement
00:26:46 manager secrets has provided a statement in which he is going to say that he radiates you it was he who radioed you and told you there was a fire in the fridge in the kitchen and that the file is now out do
00:26:58 kitchen and that the file is now out do you remember that
00:27:14 carminative is the worst leg effects or exactly to that point but um I do remember getting traffic back from Chris
00:27:25 remember getting traffic back from Chris along the lines of it hold on let me get some information from the from the crews of in the compartment and four minds that you know my recollection of what I
00:27:37 that you know my recollection of what I put it next open they were making good progress in terms of into that compartment extinguishing the fire I can't remember if he said it was extinguished you know my recollection of that event was that they've been making steady progress into that compartment during that conversation did you tell
00:27:49 during that conversation did you tell him that you were going to make pumps eight but I believe that traffic was sent back into Chris on further resource
00:28:01 sent back into Chris on further resource in it because from my understanding they'll see from his point of view the dealing with the attacking a compartment of fire that they were making good
00:28:14 of fire that they were making good progress on and from what I was seeing the outside that that was a different story
00:28:20 story so I thought from what I understand yes I do believe that traffic I was favored resourcing use that went way need to push secret yes and you could see the
00:28:32 push secret yes and you could see the exterior is this right you could see the exterior because you were on the ground but he couldn't because he was inside the building yes did you tell him what you could see
00:28:47 Conte member if it was a real detail description of what was occurring on the outside of the building I can't recall no never you see if I can just dig a
00:29:00 no never you see if I can just dig a little further did you did you tell him that the fire was sparking and spitting in a similar way to where magnesium burns and and you were uncomfortable did
00:29:11 burns and and you were uncomfortable did you tell him any of that but that record did not he says in his statement and I appreciate you haven't seen it so I'm going to put it in a very gentle neutral
00:29:24 going to put it in a very gentle neutral way but he says that he told you to slow down because the fire was now out do you remember that don't member those words to that effect night do you remember
00:29:36 to that effect night do you remember slowing down what you were doing because of anything that crew manager secret said absolutely you know you say absolutely not with some convictions yeah like I was familiar on that fire
00:29:49 yeah like I was familiar on that fire ground at that point I was almost you know I was very much about was gonna building on never at one point slowed down I think in my actions no way did and at this point and I'm not going to
00:30:02 and at this point and I'm not going to be absolutely precise with the timing and mr. Darden but at this point when you're talking to crew manager secret and he's telling you that he's put the fire up did you get any messages from
00:30:14 fire up did you get any messages from firefighter Oh bear do you remember on your way I didn't intercept a new traffic from far far tried by now not at all
00:30:23 all did you know the time that he'd gone higher up into the building that was at this point not at that point
00:30:32 he says that he was sending you radio messages to tell you about the conditions on the fifth sixth and seventh floors do you remember that no
00:30:42 where was your where were you let me ask you you didn't have a radio with you a handheld radio with you at all times yes my handheld right five gram radios on my tunak tunak the channel was it - -
00:30:56 on my tunak tunak the channel was it - - I used to come on channel 4 channel 4 on channel 1 for the fire ground channel 1 yes was there any was there a point
00:31:07 yes was there any was there a point around this time or a little bit more generally early on in the fire when you like to discover that your handheld radio on channel 1 wasn't receiving messages no not at that point because I
00:31:22 messages no not at that point because I up until that point me and Chris hug hug communication on that channel it seemed to be receiving traffic ok so just so I'm clear are all the firefighters at
00:31:33 I'm clear are all the firefighters at that point that they're in the building communicating with you or able to communicate with you on channel 1 generally that encircle on channel
00:31:44 generally that encircle on channel should be left for instant command so some is come on I put him in place it was in myself down at the ground floor level and I was you know I was directly
00:31:55 level and I was you know I was directly feeding to Chris secret on the bridgehead it's not uncommon for you know firefighters to put track of traffic on that on that radio wave that's not uncommon but generally it
00:32:06 that's not uncommon but generally it will be for instant commanders or decision makers on minister grounds who communicate on that come on channel okay if a firefighter who'd been sent to higher up into the building or had gone higher up into the building with a hat
00:32:20 higher up into the building with a hat with a radio who's going to communicate with anybody who would it be but it'd be with you or would it be with the bridgehead
00:32:31 generally if it was an interim of the building then whoop still gonna channel one but the information because it's in Siler building would be transmitted and
00:32:43 Siler building would be transmitted and through the bridgehead and then that other information will come through to me from the bridgehead correct yeah so if for example mr. firefighter a bear
00:32:57 if for example mr. firefighter a bear had wanted to communicate what he'd seen on floors 5 6 & 7 you just to be clear you're saying that he would have communicated that with the bridgehead in the bridgehead but then have communicated that review by radio that's
00:33:10 communicated that review by radio that's my understanding but you know from firefighter burn what he did inside that tower and on the upper floors in that traffic then I'm not gonna discredit in
00:33:23 traffic then I'm not gonna discredit in terms of how he communicated that because obviously there was some valuable information but I didn't receive that information but I think you are saying that there was at least a mechanical means whereby and radios could have talked to each other absolutely yes okay
00:33:37 now when you say in your statement that you were starting to feel uncomfortable you then go on to say after the sentence
00:33:52 you then go on to say after the sentence about contacting crew manager secret you say I did not feel reassured due to the way the father was developing on the outside of the building you see that yes
00:34:03 outside of the building you see that yes what did you think was happening with the fire on the outside of the building at that point
00:34:31 it's difficult to go back in that point of time so it's a really pinpoint I
00:34:39 think my assumption would be that you know the fire if it was still going in the compartment cannot pinpoint a particular memory of okay what is happen
00:34:53 particular memory of okay what is happen how is that igniting on the external of that building didn't know I can refer you know a lot of those firefighters an office is it we did what we also have
00:35:04 office is it we did what we also have policy to authority but a lot of what we do and the instantaneous that split-second decision-making is is based on previous knowledge I had no previous knowledge on how that building was reacting I had nothing to fall back on
00:35:16 reacting I had nothing to fall back on no default in terms of my own previous knowledge of how that building was reacting at moment in time so I you know I did that my comfortable I'm
00:35:27 I did that my comfortable I'm comfortable outside my comfort zone because I didn't have any previous experience to fall back on in terms of what how that build in the way it was behaving reacting did there come a point when you realized that the exterior of
00:35:42 when you realized that the exterior of the building had ignite at its self ignited yeah what about a gal comp at a time on hitted else it was a point that
00:35:55 time on hitted else it was a point that was evident because the way the rapidity in terms of but that building on the external that the flames were spreading up the extent of that building and can
00:36:06 up the extent of that building and can you help me with the timing as best you can in terms of when you first realized that the exterior of the building had ignited
00:36:22 it's gonna be really difficult to put time on that I thought to see if I can help let me see if I can help you was it do you think it was before you made pumps 8 or after
00:36:38 I'd say it we all know around the time that I'm a pumps out with just after now we've gotten to see we can get a time
00:36:50 we've gotten to see we can get a time fix on that you say on or around what perhaps just after that's some a bit more specific if you could please be shown again to have 23 of the documents
00:37:01 shown again to have 23 of the documents bundle the short incident log page 17 time slot
00:37:06 time slot Oh 1 1935 make up IUP g27 to make puns 8
00:37:21 Oh 1 1935 make up IUP g27 to make puns 8 so that's when the short incident log would cause that decision as having been taken with that with that accord with what you remember of the night yes I
00:37:33 what you remember of the night yes I agree with it but ok so we've got pumps 8 at that time [Music]
00:37:44 I'm going to show you the video against down are you alright to see that in right could you just remind everybody
00:37:56 right could you just remind everybody about the video because people may have come say yes see a new job yes exactly and mr. Kinney is signaling madly to me on my my right saying secondly say I
00:38:07 on my my right saying secondly say I will repeat the trigger warning that we are about to see video and hear audio are of the fire on the night grenfell tower on fire on the night and that
00:38:18 tower on fire on the night and that people might find that uncomfortable and distressing say if anybody doesn't want to see or hear it then they should take steps and not to do so either in this room or if they're watching remotely
00:38:29 room or if they're watching remotely then not to look or to take themselves away from me from the media mr. Dunn I'll wait 30 seconds or so what I need to show you is
00:38:40 seconds or so what I need to show you is a time slot of the video sequences between 116 so around about the time according to the message that pumps though that the something I'm sorry that
00:38:53 though that the something I'm sorry that the informative message is sent that through to about 120 so that's what we're gonna look at so perhaps we can see the shed I'm going to do the video twice we're going to look at it first
00:39:05 twice we're going to look at it first time round and then I'm going to go through it and we're going to be looking at what you see and what you hear from members of the public as well
00:39:30 unguarded to you
00:39:48 oh I believe
00:39:58 Oh run
00:40:16 okay now we can go over it again you can see what's happening with the fine are you okay take a break please yes yes of course of course five minutes all right
00:40:29 course of course five minutes all right twenty maybe mr. Douglass a little longer
00:40:31 longer well would you like longer than five minutes mr. Dunn 10 place oh yes yes of course well that's what we'll do we'll review this 25 parts two one two
00:40:58 you
01:15:28 ladies and gentlemen I'm sorry that the break has been rather longer than I had originally indicated it would be in when to escape anyone's attention I'm sure
01:15:39 to escape anyone's attention I'm sure that mr. Darden is finding giving this part of his evidence very difficult and in particular he's asked to view the film of the fire itself but he is now
01:15:53 film of the fire itself but he is now ready to go on and we will go on but we shall rise early actual finished no later than four o'clock [Music]
01:16:18 no mr. Dudley you able to go on right yes that's fine and I've been told maybe you impose as well but I've been told there are no more videos to watch and we
01:16:30 there are no more videos to watch and we shall finish the afternoon no later than four o'clock so it's a relatively short spell no alright but if you do need a break just indicate and Thank You mr.
01:16:48 break just indicate and Thank You mr. chairman
01:16:49 chairman mr. Darden can I go back to a question based on the informative message in the short incident log if you could please be shown tab 23 of the documents bundle and turning it to page 17 up on the
01:17:02 and turning it to page 17 up on the screen it's a process question and you'll see there that the affirmative message comes on to the short incident
01:17:13 message comes on to the short incident log at oh one 1602 informative sup from G 272 then we see the rest of the message we looked at before and I want
01:17:24 message we looked at before and I want to ask you to some process questions about this really does what does the time over 160 know to tell us is that the message coming from Begay control to
01:17:37 the message coming from Begay control to g 272 confirming that the message has been received or or what is it what actually happens at that time from my understanding of I've never worked in a
01:17:49 understanding of I've never worked in a control room but I believe that would be the time the informative was received from the fire ground that control at Stratford sorry and does that mean that the decision which was your
01:18:01 that the decision which was your decision to send the informative message that we see there on the screen was taken earlier than Oh 1 1602 that be correct yes and how much earlier
01:18:16 I mean is it roughly coupla minutes by the Tony up the conversation getting to be fire appliance and then that message been sent I mean it's two minutes maybe I can't be exact on that so just taught
01:18:28 I can't be exact on that so just taught me through the little bits of the process and you make the decision to send the message yes and then you communicate it to somebody I think in the instant that night because I was
01:18:42 the instant that night because I was quite busy on the on the fire brain at that moment in time ER I think it's not uncommon for another officer to visit that role to another officer on the fire ground and that was Dave Davis but the
01:18:54 ground and that was Dave Davis but the you know for him to have format the message but to make sure I see that message before it goes from the fiber and goes I have some responsibilities right and I believe that's what so what happened he was drafting a message and I
01:19:07 happened he was drafting a message and I was happy with that message and that message was sent right I see did he press the buttons to send the message it's not pressing any buttons that be done verbally over the main screen radio host on the right say the buttons on the
01:19:19 host on the right say the buttons on the radio then if you like okay yes and then that's received by the great control and what happens next
01:19:30 what would the control operates of will they just take down a message on them on the message log on the computer system and that's how that's then reflected on
01:19:41 and that's how that's then reflected on the instant report I see is that the vision log vision that's correct right okay mr. dad no going to take you away from the events of the knife for a little little bit of time we'll go back
01:19:53 little little bit of time we'll go back to it but I just want to take you away from that and ask you about a piece of machinery if I can the smoke extractor operating system now in your witness
01:20:04 operating system now in your witness statement many pages on from where we're looking you say that after you were relieved of incident command now you went to the ground floor lobby where you knew the smoke vent system was located
01:20:19 how do you have any occasion in the past before when felt our fire to look at the smoke vent system in the lobby of Granville Tower I do believe when they the freedom or as
01:20:34 I do believe when they the freedom or as a service I was on that I was shown that panel in the lobby area yes right and you were showing it by whom do you remember a comment with the individuals
01:20:46 remember a comment with the individuals name but it was a believed a contractor from widens or who was responsible for that refurbishment right do you remember what they showed you
01:20:59 it's more if I understand it was the more the location of the the smoke extract panel itself no discussion had an understanding how it worked anyway
01:21:10 an understanding how it worked anyway because it's not a unique fixed installation or fire engineered solution within a premise so common their specifics but it was along the lines of
01:21:24 specifics but it was along the lines of how it would actually in event and how it works okay so not that far engineers are so familiar model was it yeah it's not something that's specific to grow
01:21:35 not something that's specific to grow our town and did the person from you think it was right into you I believe so yes did the person from right and show you anything else apart from the panel
01:21:47 you anything else apart from the panel did they show you the extractor fan units in the building no did they explain to you how the system is supposed to work in the event of a fire
01:22:02 well I would suggest they probably would but I had an understanding that anyway in terms of how that would operate right and that understanding you had about how it would operate did that come from
01:22:13 it would operate did that come from experience you've had in the past or did it come from specific training well both I'd say both now you also say in your statement and we're go to it if we need
01:22:25 statement and we're go to it if we need to but is this right you saw the panel this is on them on the night you saw the panel open and keys hanging from it is that right that's correct that's my recollection yes no and it's difficult
01:22:37 recollection yes no and it's difficult to be specific with times but roughly when do you think you were relieved of incident command the only reference I
01:22:48 incident command the only reference I have to this is is back from the vision log and I think I was in child that instant for an hour so it would have been between 10 to 2 or 2 o'clock in the morning we've got around about that time
01:23:00 morning we've got around about that time as well look at the time of 150 estimated is what was in the original LFP log but then that seems to be right
01:23:11 LFP log but then that seems to be right when you went to look at the smoke vent system at that time were you with anybody
01:23:16 anybody do you remember I believe at that time I was with station manager Annie water because there was a very short hand over to Andy walking outside and then very
01:23:29 to Andy walking outside and then very shortly after that was another hand over to another senior officer that came on the scene against the ground and from that me myself and station and a big
01:23:40 that me myself and station and a big pond station manager Andy Walton both went into Grand Vitara yes ok at that time do you remember whether you knew
01:23:51 time do you remember whether you knew whether the smoke vent system was working or not
01:23:58 the two memories up the first memory I have is that the the panel you have a panel in front of you that was open and the keys were in it and now I remember thinking that was strange because
01:24:09 thinking that was strange because generally the panel will be closed and also the keys will be no sure a secure location outside on a break glass next next to the panel so we can access those keys or it will be in office of some
01:24:21 keys or it will be in office of some description the caretakers office I remember looking at the panel first of all thinking of that but I don't remember reading any data or anything of any significance it
01:24:33 data or anything of any significance it would assist us on that night but can't recall
01:24:44 now if you go to page 10 of your statement still all the smoke vent this you you say the very top of the page you
01:25:01 found it strange that the panel was already open then the keys hanging from it see that at the very top yes
01:25:14 and then you say that you found that strange why did you find that strange
01:25:30 as I said before just because you know
01:25:36 my experience of that description it's not something that would be in that condition when you expect to see it it will be close you have to have access to the keys to get into the panel so why
01:25:48 the keys to get into the panel so why would the you know the keys don't Jerry should be in the panel because it's not it's something that only responsible person or you know trained fire officers can can access you know it's there for a
01:26:02 can can access you know it's there for a reason and for no one else to tamper with do you just on the peas question do you know where the keys were to be found at Gregg filter if somebody wanted to
01:26:15 at Gregg filter if somebody wanted to access inspect panel I can't be specific in terms of where the keys would be located now in your experience what would you have expected in my experience one or two things that either been in premises information box but we have
01:26:27 premises information box but we have access to via turkey or it would be in a small rounds or break glass box and next to the panel or thirdly it may well be in a secure location of in the building
01:26:38 in a secure location of in the building a responsible person would have access to but on the night I think you you've said and pretty clearly you don't know what where the keys were to be found that there are keys I saw were in the unit already and you then going to say a
01:26:52 unit already and you then going to say a couple of lines down I went to the ground floor lift with SM Olson station manager Walton and saw that the smoke vent point was on automatic can you just
01:27:04 vent point was on automatic can you just tell me what does what does that mean the smoke vent point being almost a Murphy so it shouldn't have to be detect that what happens is you live on these
01:27:15 that what happens is you live on these systems a smoke extract system you have a detect head in each in each lobby area where the flats sort of accumulate area where they come out with and lobby so if there's a fire in a compartment I have flat and is to hit detector head senses
01:27:27 flat and is to hit detector head senses that they're not also automatically open what kind of a IV automatic opening event that goes in to protect the shaft that goes up the building and valence the products of combustion so so we don't have a carbon I combination
01:27:38 don't have a carbon I combination environment in a communal area that's an automatic thing however there is a manual override so in each of those Lobby areas there's a very small little box where you can a key override
01:27:50 little box where you can a key override you can go from automatic it's a manual then you say I went to activate the point using the keys and switch it to manual but decided against this as interfering with any fire solution
01:28:02 interfering with any fire solution within a building can worsen conditions for both the residents and the firefighters what would have been the purpose of switching it to manual which
01:28:14 purpose of switching it to manual which of course he decided against the idea that you know the idea of beat suit potential you know to try and clear this stairwell but he smoked but I you know
01:28:25 stairwell but he smoked but I you know didn't have an understanding at that point that the internal how the Intel building was behaving if indeed it was working and generally some of that nature should only be facilitated within
01:28:38 nature should only be facilitated within our policy as it is in high-rise police of 63 via the responsible person of that building or a trained to fire safety officer of a station manager rank or above yes so I was very conscious that I
01:28:49 above yes so I was very conscious that I didn't want to actuate that in case I worsen conditions we've who knows just there well for our residents or firefighters yes and and on that exact point to the best of your knowledge who
01:29:00 point to the best of your knowledge who was the first London forgot fire brigade person to attend the fire who was an appropriately trained Fire and Rescue authority person do you do you know I don't know did you take steps to find
01:29:15 don't know did you take steps to find out
01:29:18 I didn't on that night I've since understand that it was a special magical Danny Graham I don't know who Dan Egan is been in the organization now in the
01:29:29 is been in the organization now in the next sentence you say I did I did inform station and Walton of my actions I then returned the keys to the smoke panel in the lobby area where I found them do you
01:29:43 the lobby area where I found them do you remember what station manager Walton did next after you told him of what you've done with the AOV other words left it I
01:29:55 can't recall there's a confirmation he received that but I do remember that he was obviously to my side him that was something I was trying to confirm to him that I wasn't going to actuate it
01:30:06 that I wasn't going to actuate it manually can I show you a document very briefly mr. and mr. dameran it's a bundle of documents tab three and
01:30:18 it's a bundle of documents tab three and it's an email and the reference is met zero zero zero zero five seven one three
01:30:36 now this is an email which he wasn't sent to you or sent by you so don't expect you to have seen it before mr. Dan I'll just show you what it is it's an email from Andy Dalton but it starts
01:30:49 an email from Andy Dalton but it starts as an email from Charlie Pugsley to ops Grand Vitara dated June 19th 2017 and it forwards effectively an email from Andy
01:31:01 forwards effectively an email from Andy Walton or of the 18th of June 2017 to steve Apter who is director of safety and assurance and the subject is
01:31:13 and assurance and the subject is official sensitive Gregg felt our significant information for investigation and in there if you look at it it says and it's signed by andy warhol sent by andy war zone and he's telling us to actor in the first
01:31:24 telling us to actor in the first paragraph that I've just recalled an action or omission by me in the early stages of the Grenville terror incident which I only bring to your attention then he says this as I move to take up the fire sector commander role I passed
01:31:36 the fire sector commander role I passed through the lobby and encountered watch manager Dowden G 271 oh I see and original incident commander I directed him to make sure that smoke extraction
01:31:47 him to make sure that smoke extraction system was operating using the control panel on the wall in the lobby just pausing there is that correct did he do that I can't remember if I got
01:31:58 did he do that I can't remember if I got direction from station manager annual no he then says he went to the panel seemed to try and operate a touchpad on the screen and came back and said something like it's not working or it has not operated I cannot be sure of the exact
01:32:10 operated I cannot be sure of the exact wording I'm just pausing there is that correct maybe worse that effect yes yeah then he says I know my understanding was that the system had failed and watch
01:32:21 that the system had failed and watch manager Dowden had tried to turn it on but it was not responding is that correct
01:32:31 don't remember trying to actuate the panel itself the only point I had any views of the keys when I took it out and
01:32:42 views of the keys when I took it out and went to has a referred earlier to the individual lobby area to try and actuate in that Lobby area not at the main panel
01:32:55 thank you very much
01:33:03 now can I get back earlier in the night - making pumps 8 which takes us to as we
01:33:19 - making pumps 8 which takes us to as we sought from the short incident log around about 119 in the morning and you've said in your statement on pages 4 and 5 in particularly the top of page 5
01:33:30 and 5 in particularly the top of page 5 that you were not reassured due to the way the phone was developing on the outside of the building and then just look look with me if you will
01:33:41 look look with me if you will paragraph was no paragraph lead so that's 7 lines down from the top of page 5 at o 190 now as I sent a message to control via my driver Dan Bill's
01:33:52 control via my driver Dan Bill's requesting further assistance and to make the incident pumps 8 at that point did you have any thoughts about how the
01:34:08 did you have any thoughts about how the fire was behaving on the exterior
01:34:16 young you thought I could relay that to is that be Arden I cannot seen a building reacting this way on the external extended before referring back to use that we had tried at our six weeks prior to that we had a half an
01:34:27 weeks prior to that we had a half an hour delay of making entrance in that compartment and okay the windows failed it is staggered in that compartment this is about twenty minutes into the
01:34:39 is about twenty minutes into the incident and it wasn't behaving as I would expect from my previous experiences so that that's the only resource I had at that at that moment in time did you have any thoughts drawn
01:34:51 time did you have any thoughts drawn from your experience of Shepards court
01:34:57 the continent there were preferring battered shed his court now did you have any thoughts about considering the impact of the building materials on the behavior of the fire and its spread
01:35:16 no because I wasn't aware at that point in time of the building materials on the external envelope that building what was
01:35:28 external envelope that building what was it that prompted you to increase the makeup from six pumps to eight at that point about Oh 119
01:35:45 can I refer to that the way that the fighter was developing on outside that compartment on the external did you discuss what you'd seen with anybody at
01:35:59 discuss what you'd seen with anybody at that point I can't recall
01:36:06 at that point did you consider whether it was necessary to appoint a search coordinator no
01:36:19 did you at that point consider evacuation
01:36:28 no the only reason for that is [Music]
01:36:36 I'm aware I'll see that would be referenced into a policy but that moment in time as I said before things are rapidly developing and it was a very very dynamic situation feel very
01:36:47 very dynamic situation feel very uncomfortable wasn't at that point wasn't aware of what was happening internally within that building and you know those decisions I made on that night no no sex commander what the theme
01:37:02 night no no sex commander what the theme search sector commander or to do at that point not did you start at that point to consider what might what you might do if
01:37:16 consider what might what you might do if the fire got out of control on the exterior
01:37:34 I can't recall a point of of that conscious thinking but doesn't mean to say I didn't or did but I think this is the point where upstarts become very consumed in terms of what was happening
01:37:45 consumed in terms of what was happening in front of me I think way it was increasing in the better ping that I have never seen anything like that before and it was almost I was consumed by that in terms of sensory overload and
01:37:57 by that in terms of sensory overload and yeah and because of the way it was and I do have some blanks and it's very difficult to recall specific parts of that incident can I ask you just one or
01:38:09 that incident can I ask you just one or two questions about what you knew or didn't know about what was happening inside the building at this point around Oh nineteen i sorry 119 on the night
01:38:20 Oh nineteen i sorry 119 on the night when you make pun sate first of all were you aware of any reports from a any residence or anyone's inside the building reporting a fire on the fifth
01:38:33 building reporting a fire on the fifth floor not like remembered internally no flat 26 specifically
01:38:46 did you have any information about floor 6 at all at about that time not like record that's why I'm now at about that
01:39:00 record that's why I'm now at about that time as I say Oh 119 roundabout did you see any residents emerging from the tower
01:39:17 along with the affection there may have been but I cannot record that moment in time those people were exiting the building at that moment in time let me see if I can help you remember where you were standing
01:39:28 were standing so pumps 8 you ask him to make pumps 8 and build where were you standing you know remember my understanding I was
01:39:40 you know remember my understanding I was around we had to start with a grassy verge believe on the Eastern elevation of the building still so you know if it
01:39:53 of the building still so you know if it wasn't enough but you were only is this round the east side of the building underneath the fire looking up not directly underneath a safe distance back but yes that's roughly where I was right
01:40:04 but yes that's roughly where I was right I'm not saying that there was not people extended that probably was but I don't have a recollection of it can you
01:40:15 have a recollection of it can you explain how you made pumps 8 in the sense who put the message across was emanating from my memory it was my
01:40:27 emanating from my memory it was my driver firefight Dan bills who was a driver of golf to seven one two seven one yes
01:40:50 yes can I just ask you then about that can you please go back to bundle of documents tab 23 page 17 this is the short incident log again and there at
01:41:02 short incident log again and there at one 1935 we have makeup I you P g27 to make pumps 8 so it looks mr. dad is if
01:41:13 make pumps 8 so it looks mr. dad is if according to the shore incident log the message had come from G to 72 but you your recollection that was to is that it was 271 was it try and make a bit
01:41:26 was 271 was it try and make a bit clearer no damn bills was a driver of golf to 7 month it doesn't necessarily mean that the message of a central Gulf to 7 1 he may well it's a because of golf to tend to is the inter command pod still I didn't specify what machine I
01:41:39 still I didn't specify what machine I just wanted that message to go
01:41:48 do you know of any not that it may not matter very much but just a bit clear do you know of any reason why Danny bills would have gone to 272 to send the message as opposed to 271
01:42:06 no which was nearer to the tower at that point here having gone to several month
01:42:18 now going back to the kind of question I asked you a bit earlier today about makeups is it normal procedure for a watch manager to be in charge at a fire
01:42:29 watch manager to be in charge at a fire where there are more than six pumps no it's not and so the call to go from six to eight who would that normally be made by the watch manager can make that call
01:42:42 by the watch manager can make that call we can we have deal authority to to call what resources we need if we can justify it I wouldn't miss it I wouldn't
01:42:54 it I wouldn't miss it I wouldn't generally be in charge of a six pump fire or a pump fire if a similar senior officer was in attendance unless as mitigating circumstances but I as in watch manager being off to learn the
01:43:06 watch manager being off to learn the five code will have the authority to to request that resource if I needed it and can justify it and what level of seniority or what rank would you expect to be involved
01:43:17 to be involved there's taking over at incident as incident commander that's faked pumps when the news is declared eight pumps a G group manager will resume the role Vince to commander a Deputy Assistant
01:43:29 Vince to commander a Deputy Assistant Commissioner will then be notified as a monitoring officer and I think we know the answer to this mister dunne but were you relieved of incident command I think pumps by a group manager know do you
01:43:42 pumps by a group manager know do you know why not just because of the way that that incident was made up and how quickly that was made up generally to where I resource it to that's generally
01:43:55 where I resource it to that's generally over a longer period of time and we do have senior officers in attendance but the way that fire developed the resources meant that I was in charge for
01:44:07 resources meant that I was in charge for longer than usual because of the way that fire developed yes now at that point having asked for a make up to eight pumps at O 119 also when the
01:44:21 eight pumps at O 119 also when the message gets sent did you think you could control the exterior fire spread
01:44:36 there'd be honest and from some of the decisions I took a bit later on I would say yes how did you think you were going to do that one of my decisions was and
01:44:50 to do that one of my decisions was and when I had my first the first day for fire whiskey unit crude attendance and this is referenced in my own statement I do tell them to to make their way to
01:45:01 do tell them to to make their way to roof level the fire rescue unit has is not a frontline pumping appliances they have specialist equipment part of the equipment is line ups capability and basically what that allows them to do is
01:45:13 basically what that allows them to do is work at height without referencing it to my statement and in the timings I wanted to give you that but I tasked them to if they could make an attempt to get to
01:45:24 they could make an attempt to get to roof level and try and get water from above the fire on to in terms of some kind of replicating a dredger system so
01:45:38 kind of replicating a dredger system so I would say that would suggest that yes I was still thinking that we were try but this far out so at that stage / 119 your thought process was to attack the
01:45:49 your thought process was to attack the fire by applying water from above the fire once that was at that point but there was a point it referred to my statement that that was my thinking so I was I would still be on the same train
01:46:02 was I would still be on the same train of thought that I would be looking to extinguish this fire okay what what about an aerial appliance would you have been able to control the fire at that
01:46:13 been able to control the fire at that point I 119 if you had an aerial appliance do you think that's very difficult coming on we didn't
01:46:25 I can't comment on that you know the Arrowwood turned up when it did we got it to work as quickly as we could I didn't have that moment in time so I can't comment
01:46:42 you talk about going up the building to roof level and this may be a speculative question mister darden but did you think at the time that it would be possible to go to a lower level say the 12th floor
01:46:54 go to a lower level say the 12th floor and downward hose the exterior from from there but at that point that I made that decision with the FIU crew the the fire
01:47:05 decision with the FIU crew the the fire was already pretty much that roof level yeah okay at that point again Oh 119 when pumps get made up to age did you
01:47:17 when pumps get made up to age did you assess the risk that flats now exposed to the flame front might be pregnant penetrated by an external fire
01:47:40 I can't move up that foot Prost coming into my head again with the way that fire was developing and how by Nanak it
01:47:51 fire was developing and how by Nanak it was it was just I was trying to make the best decisions I could in terms of my previous experience and what I was sitting in front of me I had never
01:48:04 sitting in front of me I had never experienced anything like this before and just on that last answer let me see if I can dig a bit further than that it are you saying that you had never experienced fire on the exterior
01:48:16 experienced fire on the exterior breaking back into a flat in a high-rise block higher than the compartment of origin not at the right it was develop
01:48:27 origin not at the right it was develop in nine had you ever had that experience not as an instant commander but I have seen it on the honest and ground yes you know when lighted when when was that do you remember that would be the ship
01:48:38 do you remember that would be the ship is caught fire Chevis cool so when you saw the fire developing up the exterior at about 119 did you have any thoughts
01:48:49 at about 119 did you have any thoughts about Shepards court and a repeated experience
01:49:02 can't remember that night at me it's how I'm not
01:49:09 now it was a it was a warm June night did you have any thoughts about the effect of people having their windows open and what that might mean given the
01:49:23 open and what that might mean given the development of the fire
01:49:33 from I'd like to a thought that the traffic I had some kind of traffic going into the bridgehead in terms of of making some action in terms of getting
01:49:45 making some action in terms of getting crews internally to go to the floors above it's how you from reading statement the NFB response we did have crews on that fifth floor fire fighting so I don't have any recollection of that
01:49:59 so I don't have any recollection of that traffic going from me into the bridgehead but there are big gaps in my memory in terms we're not in charge of that that means that because of the amount of information that was coming in this might you know I've referred to it again the sensory overload this was an
01:50:12 again the sensory overload this was an unprecedented fire an unprecedented rate that I found myself in them trying to do the best thing that they were good intent to try and you know suppressant as a native commander carry out my duties yes I fear that many of the
01:50:28 duties yes I fear that many of the questions I'm going to ask you from now on may have the same answer which is find it okay I can only apologize for that because there is when always needs to call or a concern there is some real
01:50:41 to call or a concern there is some real big blurs and blanks because I think purely I keep referring to you know the amount of the information was coming it was just the right that fire was developing you know it's been a real
01:50:53 developing you know it's been a real struggle and my sinks that twice with core lies events have been really really difficult do you remember having any thoughts about whether compartment ation on the inside of the building would hold
01:51:05 on the inside of the building would hold up not like on call did you have any thoughts at about this time 119 120 whether as to what fire
01:51:17 time 119 120 whether as to what fire survival guidance should be given to 999 callers who might be caught in control at that point I wasn't wearing a fastball guidance was in process right did you have any thoughts about whether
01:51:29 did you have any thoughts about whether the stay-put advice as the standing advices it was was it had continued to be safe advice to be given to any resident who called
01:51:48 at that point in time I had for my recollection I didn't receive any information - in terms of the internal conditions within that building that were warrant me to change that advice
01:52:25 now at pumps 8 it's right isn't it that there's a predetermined attendance under the mobilization policy for to command units that's correct
01:52:36 units that's correct did and you knew that at the time to do I was aware yes yes and say is it right that at that time 120 you were expecting to command units to turn up at some
01:52:49 to command units to turn up at some point else it is not a quick process again I have to be like any my realization that will be may couple we received by control that that will be
01:53:01 received by control that that will be picked up the division will pick that up allocate the nearest available command unit and then the command unit team will be mobilized don't have to see don't get on to the command in itself can be
01:53:12 on to the command in itself can be mobile to the incident so there is a delay like any any attenders from the point of call yeah when these command units were status - were you made aware
01:53:25 that's not something appears to be on you Jerry made aware of no no what about status 3 no that's what you see them I suppose that's when you say yeah but the first you know in attendance when the
01:53:36 first you know in attendance when the command unit team aid will present yourself to you as seems to commander right now we have in our record see you 8 which is Fulham as the first see you command unit that to arrive at the
01:53:50 command unit that to arrive at the incident and we have that time at oh one thirty forty eight do you remember big being aware of the arrival of that command unit yes I did when it arrived
01:54:02 command unit yes I did when it arrived did you make any use of it at that point that was the first time where we had mole we had a fire support guidance in progress right just dis just walk me
01:54:14 progress right just dis just walk me through that so you see see you eight arrived Fulham at about 1:30 arrives what did you do did you go to
01:54:25 arrives what did you do did you go to could you go up to it no the I didn't go up to any team leader I can't remember his name he came on to the fire ground and he presented himself too much to me because at that point I
01:54:37 too much to me because at that point I was still getting used to come on the table art yes okay and where do you remember words cu8 was parked in the whole time was it near the tower or thought we wouldn't be near a tower because of the reactors into going from
01:54:50 because of the reactors into going from tower it's just by ground for road and by that time we had other fire appliances in attendance right just help me out maybe you don't neighbor how long
01:55:01 me out maybe you don't neighbor how long would it take to walk at a good pace between the tower and cu8 but when it had part I wouldn't like I don't know where cu8 was located
01:55:12 where cu8 was located is it important generally in your experience to have the command unit when it arrives at eight pumps near the incident
01:55:20 incident what does it not matter
01:55:25 you might if a closed location because I see that but in a city located in terms not too far away from the incident but
01:55:39 not too far away from the incident but yeah right on top of the incident but it was difficult of Grenfell tower because their grandfather out in the the access difficult was in fully appliances that
01:55:51 difficult was in fully appliances that wasn't that was an issue yes wasn't it alright couldn't just I can I just get back to an answer you gave a minute ago and follow up on it oh you said I think that it was on the arrival of cu8 that
01:56:03 that it was on the arrival of cu8 that you first became aware of the fire survival guidance calls were in process is that does that your evidence that's man's that's what that is referred into my statement yes yes yes that's that's that's what you recall yes so who told
01:56:15 that's what you recall yes so who told you do you remember that far survived ins fire Survival Guide missed calls were in process for my row recollection and from what I had my statement it was the command unit team leader right so do
01:56:30 the command unit team leader right so do I take it that nobody from the control room had contacted you or the ICP 271 to tell tell either you or whoever was in the ICP that fire survival guidance
01:56:43 the ICP that fire survival guidance cause were in progress they may have been attempt but I was unaware at that point what did you learn about the fire survival guidance calls from the cu8
01:56:57 survival guidance calls from the cu8 personnel that point in time I think that statement we've had we've
01:57:08 I think that statement we've had we've got multiple efforts vice of our guidance in progress and the a very sort of similar time I had another senior officer that was in attendance now the
01:57:19 officer that was in attendance now the incident station manager Brett loft sorry Brett Brett loft look Brett loft yes yes okay and he was in he was on the
01:57:31 yes yes okay and he was in he was on the incident ground when from my recollection it was almost simultaneously that the command unit team leader was in attendance right okay now I'm gonna come back to the some detail on that mr. mr. done at there but
01:57:43 detail on that mr. mr. done at there but but at that moment I just want to get her an understanding of the what you got by way of the picture of fast survival guidance calls what was your impression when you first learned that they were in
01:57:55 when you first learned that they were in progress about the volume of fire Survival Guide was calls I can't remember I got a specific number in terms of the volume fire survival guides course no but was it your was it your
01:58:06 course no but was it your was it your impression that there were some a lot of you well the the mark it was multiple so multiple yeah did you ask how many are we talking about I don't I can't recall what I did
01:58:19 about I don't I can't recall what I did that no
01:58:28 and did you gain any kind of understanding about where in the building the fast survival guidance calls for coming from and - in other words where which floors or flats that fire survival guidance calls were being
01:58:40 fire survival guidance calls were being made in respect of no at a point that we have the command unit team leader in attendance as I referred to a we had stationed mounted Brett off there's also an attendance now if a more senior
01:58:53 an attendance now if a more senior officer attends the fire ground then it is their responsibility to take over from the most with generals who are in charge at that point in time were to myself the decision was taken between
01:59:06 myself the decision was taken between myself and Brett laughter at that point in time the most important thing my priority and was the local fire fire God's cause that we had so the decision
01:59:19 God's cause that we had so the decision was made that Brett loft the station owner would not take over the incident but the the most the priority was for him to take the the team leader to
01:59:30 him to take the the team leader to command unit and he was to take ownership and manage the fire survival guidance calls and decision was to aim directly to liaise with Brian and Keith
01:59:42 directly to liaise with Brian and Keith who by that point was in charge of the resourcing up on the bridgehead and because there was multiple FSGS going on there was a decision made not to use the intercom on channel which is ten to one
01:59:53 intercom on channel which is ten to one but to go to dedicate different channel which is channel 3 so we can have it that channel dedicated to managing the fire survival guidance traffic or radio traffic and how we're going to resource that up to the bridgehead I just want to
02:00:07 that up to the bridgehead I just want to clarify that as soon as the authority the longer fire brigade receives fire survival guidance that will attract its own predetermine attendants so we have
02:00:18 own predetermine attendants so we have as soon as we receive that that information that we have someone in a premise or property that is trapped and they cannot leave safely by normal means immediately we will mobilize a command unit a station manager pump that up with
02:00:32 unit a station manager pump that up with a watch man in charge solely to manage the fire survive guidance procedure because it his own Pacific task and that as additional to any attendance has already been made because of understanding that
02:00:43 been made because of understanding that I thought at that time and that was a thinking with Brett loft the most important thing at that moment in time was to have a rule strict control measure and rather than Brett loft take
02:00:56 measure and rather than Brett loft take over me the late time in handing over to Brett loft the most vital and most time critical thing was for him to take ownership of the fights of other guys cause with the team need of command unit eight and just on that last answer you
02:01:10 eight and just on that last answer you say it would be you mobilize a command unit the station manager and a pump ladder with a watch manager in charge solely to manage the fire survive the guidance procedure did that happen
02:01:28 that's I if the policy procedure was followed that was something that the control operator would have managed that's not something we manage up a five-round that's done by the control
02:01:39 five-round that's done by the control center that night was it Stratford right and he refer to a pump ladder with a watch manager in charge and I just wonder whether that it was that that happened or whether it was the control
02:01:51 happened or whether it was the control unit eight commanding lead eight with Brett loft instead or as well do you remember from my understanding Brett loft wasn't mobilized as the FHD coordinator as a station manager no was
02:02:04 coordinator as a station manager no was there a scope and a a an FSG coordination manager mobilized she remember I would not be able to confirm that would have to be confirmed by the control room staff
02:02:24 now can you get back to your statement please and we've shown page 5 I'm now going to turn to the topic of make pumps 10 and in the middle of page 5 of your
02:02:38 10 and in the middle of page 5 of your statement you say after the reference to the crowd and the police attendance you say I also made the decision to make the
02:02:50 say I also made the decision to make the incident pumps 10 as the fire was rapidly developing beyond the flat on the outside of the tower but do you
02:03:02 the outside of the tower but do you remember where you were standing when you made that decision
02:03:11 I couldn't give an exact location but just from my recollection for the most of that incident I was around the East
02:03:22 of that incident I was around the East elevation of that tower Ranna is the start of the grass and Virg
02:03:33 did you discuss that decision with anybody
02:03:44 not like I recall there may have been traffic coming going into the bridge and or coming back from the bridge head which wouldn't be uncommon because obviously you give that authority to Evers in charge of that resource that
02:03:57 Evers in charge of that resource that bridgehead or and if they need additional resources then they're your eyes and ears would internal move in that building so that would help you to come to that decision but I bunk with Corey traffic being been been sent or
02:04:08 Corey traffic being been been sent or received let's just see if I can prompt a recollection mr. Ayer Keefe's contemporaneous notes and his statement recalled that it's his recollection I
02:04:22 recalled that it's his recollection I think among examining with him but he says he told you of the sudden spread of fire and urged you to make pumps 10 is that right do you remember that I don't
02:04:36 that right do you remember that I don't remember that but that that may be a true account of what happened and and that's Joey it's something that happens if if that decisions been you know that
02:04:48 if if that decisions been you know that role has been given to an officer at the bridgehead and that's going to assist me to make or what an officer in charge to make her attend for further resources then yes because that was that was his his task to resource the bridgehead with behind
02:05:00 to resource the bridgehead with behind if more resources needed to come through myself but I cannot recall receiving that traffic but that's not to say it didn't happen and he was at the bridgehead at this time by this time and
02:05:11 bridgehead at this time by this time and you were on the outside and I know you can't recall whether that's that's what happened but if that if that is what happened do you remember having any impression about what he could see on
02:05:23 impression about what he could see on the inside of the building that you couldn't see because you were on the outside of the building you remember having an impression not like I remember not okay now
02:05:35 not like I remember not okay now according to the short incident log and I don't need to get back to it with you the time of the making of the makeup two pumps ten was oh one 2409 with that would that agree with your memory
02:05:48 would that agree with your memory roughly could you just repeat that sorry yes according to the short incident log that the message to make pumps 10 was sent 201 2409 and would that agree with
02:06:00 sent 201 2409 and would that agree with your with your memory roughly I don't have a distinct timeline on my memory of that night the only way I can refer to it will be back off to her statement and that was taken from vision so that would be correct yes do you have a
02:06:12 be correct yes do you have a recollection about being asked for additional be a wearers at about that time
02:06:23 don't have a actual recollection of that but that would be potentially part of the thought process in terms of further resourcing the incident right see mr. O'Keefe says and will obviously explore
02:06:34 O'Keefe says and will obviously explore it with him as well but he says that he sent an urgent request for additional VA where as to you because there were now numerous calls for rescue on on many floors do you remember that no I don't
02:06:48 so we're now at 124 and we've gone from six pumps to ten pumps in 11 minutes also Oh won 13-6 function o 120 for 10
02:07:04 also Oh won 13-6 function o 120 for 10 pumps was that an increase in demand for appliances that you had ever experienced before
02:07:11 before no not at that time at a short timescale no no so did you realize even at that point
02:07:21 point Oh 124 that you were dealing with something beyond your own experience that's a fair assumption yes what did that tell you about the nature of this
02:07:33 that tell you about the nature of this fire
02:07:39 it's something that is next ekkada I've never witnessed before and I'm sure that many people not firebrand has never witnessed before either did you have any
02:07:51 witnessed before either did you have any thoughts about how you were going to bring this fire under control
02:08:03 and I can only refer back to the statement in terms it later or not I was still we've all good intent but you know
02:08:15 still we've all good intent but you know hopefully we were asked to put that fire out with with the further resources that were going to come in attendance and a
02:08:26 were going to come in attendance and a similar question to what I asked before is it normal procedure for a watch manager to be incident commander at a 10 pump fire no it's not and who in terms of rank would normally
02:08:40 and who in terms of rank would normally make the me call to make lumps 10 okay no I have referred to it mayors of watch mains would be given that authority to request that resource if I felt was
02:08:52 request that resource if I felt was adequate and I will need that resource in the justification for it but the assumption is that I wouldn't resume command of a 10 pump fire for a long
02:09:04 command of a 10 pump fire for a long period of time
02:09:09 and what about having an assistant commissioner as monitoring officer at that point would that be something you might expect yes did you have any
02:09:22 might expect yes did you have any expectation that an assistant commissioner would arrive soon I had an expectation there will be senior officers very soon yes and what did the
02:09:35 officers very soon yes and what did the fact that you were still in command as I see despite the rate of escalation of the makeup tell you about the way the farmers behaving
02:09:53 that it was behaving in terms of it particularly for me as a it's the commander you know you know president it's guy with something I've never never witnessed before you know having to make
02:10:05 witnessed before you know having to make those very quick decisions in that dynamic stage and you know dynamic stage generally units that it will be something that's a you know you can get on top of it you can you can handle it
02:10:16 on top of it you can you can handle it with the resources you've got that just kept the dynamic stage of that incident for you know for a long time and try and resource it to to try and have it on try
02:10:27 resource it to to try and have it on try to get under control it was very very very difficult now at this point in time about 124 when we make pop when you make poms 10 do you remember where the fire
02:10:41 poms 10 do you remember where the fire had spread to on the East elevation of the tower
02:10:54 no not at that tire it's difficult to put a timeline on exactly 126 Rome but the weather fire was developing too right and we have got video evidence but
02:11:05 right and we have got video evidence but they're not anything show it to you but would you take it from me that just just for the purposes of these those next few questions that at that point about 124
02:11:18 questions that at that point about 124 the fire was rapidly spreading to the top of the East elevation was that that's what the video evidence would show is that something that you remember I remember it rapidly dependent compass
02:11:32 I remember it rapidly dependent compass up the side of the East East and elevation but I would not have any reference to time right but from I see your statement and that would be true
02:11:44 your statement and that would be true yes and seeing the extent of the height of the flame plume at that point having made pumps 10 did you have any thoughts about whether if callers were calling
02:11:57 about whether if callers were calling for fire survival guidance what caught what what what guidance they should be given did you have anything thoughts or ideas about that cotton remember at that
02:12:09 ideas about that cotton remember at that point in time no
02:12:12 did you have any thoughts about the stay-put advice and whether that was safe advice to give if call is called
02:12:25 I would say not at that point but I think it's important to clarify it I think around that sort of time I only had six from looking that back at the division log we have six fire applies
02:12:37 division log we have six fire applies and attendance at that time for- day and most of them because you know consumed in terms of be a resource at the bridgehead for me at that moment in time
02:12:49 bridgehead for me at that moment in time to facilitate and change a statement policy to a full evacuation there isn't possible I didn't have the resource at that time we're looking at 20 floors
02:13:01 that time we're looking at 20 floors above the fire floor of just six fire engines in attendance one central staircase
02:13:09 staircase it's something I've never experienced as he used to come on before as I said I was very very much out of my comfort zone I just don't know how that could
02:13:21 zone I just don't know how that could could have been done with the resources we had in attendance at that moment in time did did you did the thoughts that you've just articulated in your evidence
02:13:32 you've just articulated in your evidence just now were those were those thoughts that you had at the time they're not full-size either time but that's a reflective thought that you know I've had a lot of time to think and process
02:13:46 had a lot of time to think and process the event which I didn't have on that night do I have the time the thought before there is effective and moments I was reacting in a way that I thought was
02:13:59 was reacting in a way that I thought was best of all my previous experience in something that I've never witnessed before and
02:14:10 you know it's that now in the middle of page six of your statement and I'm going to just ask you whether you're right to
02:14:22 to just ask you whether you're right to continue because it's not fun to continue incapable it's another ten minutes and that's fine okay you just focus you on to your statement and if you look with me together we'll look at
02:14:33 you look with me together we'll look at page six in the middle of page six excuse me in the middle of page six you said between 125 and Oh 128 I received
02:14:47 said between 125 and Oh 128 I received information from watch manager Brian O'Keefe it was on the bridgehead at this point that we had had reports of one person not able to leave the property on the 11th floor and another on the 16th floor now I'll go on with the rest of
02:15:00 floor now I'll go on with the rest of that in a minute I just want to ask you about that evidence your time you give us there is between 125 and 128 and my
02:15:12 us there is between 125 and 128 and my question is how can you when you were doing your statement how could you be so precise
02:15:24 I think from when I made that staple within metropolitan police it was between those two times I can record any times at the incident but referring back to the vision they would that was the
02:15:35 to the vision they would that was the time of two different makeups so that's the only real point of reference I have is is referring anything back to when I made beer setup right I see and you've
02:15:50 made beer setup right I see and you've had reports of a person one person not being able to leave the property on the 11th floor and another on the 16th floor as you say there and you go on to say this wasn't because of the fire itself
02:16:01 this wasn't because of the fire itself that was due to them having mobility issues and illness now can I show you a more contemporaneous record it's bundle
02:16:14 more contemporaneous record it's bundle of documents tab 2 and it's a record of a PRC meeting that you had on the 3rd of July 2017
02:16:37 so done will you forgive me I made a mistake if it's NFB doesn't matter I can do it this way it's l FB 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 7 get it up on the screen and it's tab 24
02:16:53 get it up on the screen and it's tab 24 of the bundle
02:17:02 and if you go to the first page is of the type document PRC chairs brief Granville tower 14th June welcome to participants and it's a note
02:17:16 welcome to participants and it's a note of the meeting on that day at which it looks as if the incident commanders who were present on the night all attended nothing from you g2 71 all the way up to Danny cotton you
02:17:27 g2 71 all the way up to Danny cotton you see that yes yeah do you remember being at this meeting yes I did could you just tell me what does PRC stand for it's um it's a performance review of commands so we have two procedures we follow up
02:17:39 we have two procedures we follow up following any Civic instead of four pumps of above any makeup so the first one is at PR Oh performance review of operations and that's for all who attended the instant four firefighters
02:17:50 attended the instant four firefighters are two basic discussed these instant have a debrief the PRC is purely for the instant commanders and decision-makers in terms of a debrief on to how the
02:18:02 in terms of a debrief on to how the instant weight in terms of instant command and that will all inform future practice in terms of any learning outcomes right and if you go on in the
02:18:13 outcomes right and if you go on in the document please to page should be page five you can see that this is some manuscript which says PRC grant felt our
02:18:24 manuscript which says PRC grant felt our time at 800 hours 3rd of July 2017 I see I Mike Downton first question is either handwriting yours or is it the handwriting of someone you don't
02:18:35 handwriting of someone you don't recognize that's not my handwriting like do you remember how the meeting went was there somebody taking a note of what you were saying if there's this all prc's we check it would be chaired by someone and
02:18:46 check it would be chaired by someone and this meeting is chaired by our tongue jaws director of operations right okay and you can see a signature at the bottom of that page T George so do we
02:18:58 bottom of that page T George so do we think that's his writing I mean I didn't you know you don't know I can only be assumed by the signature that is is what I've never seen his right before right it won't matter very much I just want to
02:19:09 it won't matter very much I just want to ask you one or two very short points about the contents of the document at this stage if you turn to the next page now you can see that at the top it says FF bill has told him to setup grandmama
02:19:22 FF bill has told him to setup grandmama to make it ready and then and then about six lines down from that do you see it says WM O'Keeffe @bh told me people on 11th and 16th floors that couldn't leave
02:19:35 11th and 16th floors that couldn't leave nan ambulant so
02:19:47 if my first question is is that a recollection that you had independently of what happened on that on the night what on what watch manager O'Keefe told you that will reflect in terms my
02:20:02 you that will reflect in terms my statements that was the same that's what I referred to my statement in terms of the traffic I received from WatchMojo Keith liked the bridgehead that we had reports of an individual 11th and 16th
02:20:13 reports of an individual 11th and 16th floor that weren't trapped by the fire itself but you know one due to illness and one due to injury right and when you usually Express but Kasasa did you use
02:20:25 usually Express but Kasasa did you use the expression non ambulant I'm a applying the pure self I may have done I can't remember what what did you mean by that it can make people have mobility
02:20:37 that it can make people have mobility issues okay do you know where watch manager O'Keefe got the information from that there were people on the 11th and 16th floors with mobility issues I can
02:20:50 16th floors with mobility issues I can only push no exactly I can only presume that was from people within the tower where other o'the residents within the tower within those floors all that the flats on that floor do you remember when
02:21:02 flats on that floor do you remember when watch manager O'Keefe told you that there were people on the 11th and 16th floors who couldn't get out because they have mobility issues at what time
02:21:13 have mobility issues at what time yes roughly again I don't have a specific timeline of events on that the only way I could reference it is when I have the makeups as I ever put my previous statement and pier statement so
02:21:26 previous statement and pier statement so accomplices that actually Pacific all the time so some say summarizing it is this your your evidence that but sometime between as you say 125 and 128
02:21:37 sometime between as you say 125 and 128 between the makeups
02:21:40 watch manager O'Keefe told you that there were people on the 11th and 16th floors who couldn't get out because they had mobility issues sometime between there that's correct yes now at that time did you ask him
02:21:55 yes now at that time did you ask him where he got that information from [Music]
02:22:01 I can't recall like that that conversation happened again it may have done I don't have a recollection what did the information that he was giving you about non ambulant people on those floors mean to you at the time
02:22:35 at that moment in time there was potential my furthest but fire spread or or compromise of you know compartment ation and turning to building that assess of really important piece of
02:22:46 assess of really important piece of information because I had reports that they they would need assistance to get out the building so what did you do with the information I had it written some it was quite a clear direction the form
02:22:57 was quite a clear direction the form from which meant O'Keefe I had a nice his notepad so I member scribing up down on my eyes his notepad and this may not be a true account of what actually
02:23:09 be a true account of what actually happened that night or whether this is a reflection I had seen but I have a vague memory of could we get a be a crew to tomorrow at these there's two
02:23:20 tomorrow at these there's two individuals on the 11th and 16th floor I can't 109 confirm whether that's so I gave clear direction of the night or where that something thought of part
02:23:31 where that something thought of part postings that I've been polluted so I can't can't confirm though and what did do you remember whether the fact that there were people
02:23:42 whether the fact that there were people who needed rescuing on the 11th and 16th floors
02:23:45 floors do you remember whether that fact told you anything about how the fire was behaving inside the building I've got be clear that marked mine was standing it wasn't that they needed rescuing it was
02:23:58 wasn't that they needed rescuing it was that they they weren't able to leave the property by themselves so from my understanding wasn't they needed rescuing it was a case of through information purposes if we needed to rescue that they would need a risk if
02:24:09 rescue that they would need a risk if that part building would be involved so that was my understanding at that moment in time
02:24:18 was mr. O'Keefe watch manager O'Keefe saying anything to you about evacuation
02:24:28 not like I remember that time though one more question mr. mr. mr. Dunn do you remember anybody saying anything to you at that stage about somebody
02:24:41 to you at that stage about somebody needing rescuing on floor 18 in our time
02:24:49 mr. Dell thank you very much it's very nearly four o'clock mr. Chairman I got more questions but I am going to turn to a slightly different topic we very forward very night like this is a good
02:25:00 forward very night like this is a good point we're gonna stop now mr. Dunn I'm afraid mr. millet does have more questions we'd like to have your help on so I hope you're going to be able to
02:25:11 so I hope you're going to be able to come back tomorrow is that going to be possible that's possible yes thank you just at what time do you think you stopped I think if we say 9:30 that would be helpful
02:25:22 would be helpful well would that cause you crazy inconvenience to start at 9:30 no that would be all right that's fine all right well they will great they'll finish now and please remember not to talk about
02:25:33 and please remember not to talk about derivatives to anyone overnight and we'll resume at half past 9:00 tomorrow thank you very much you leave us now
02:25:55 right think you have one of us nine to our