Outbreak of fire (28 June 2018 Pt 1 of 2)

28 June 2018 · Crew Manager Christopher Batterby - North Kensington Fire Station, Counsel to the Inquiry · 3:32:21
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Crew Manager Batterby's testimony about North Kensington Fire Station's familiarization visit to Grenfell Tower during renovation and response on the night of the fire.

Key moments

Full transcript

# Transcribed with OpenAI Whisper (medium model)

# Source: Local audio transcription (no YouTube captions available)

00:01:00 Good morning Mr. Bathaby.

00:01:07 Good morning sir.

00:01:12 I invite you to take the oath of your word please.

00:01:14 Or it's an affirmation of whichever you prefer.

00:01:17 I swear by Almighty God,

00:01:25 That the evidence I shall give,

00:01:28 Shall be the truth,

00:01:30 The whole truth,

00:01:32 And nothing but the truth.

00:01:34 Thank you very much.

00:01:36 Now, I guess since they've taken away the leptin, you'd rather sit down.

00:01:40 Yes please.

00:01:41 Yes, well that's a very good idea. Make yourself comfortable.

00:01:43 Thank you sir.

00:01:49 Now, I'm sure you'll be told this more than once, but

00:01:53 We can all understand if you find it difficult dealing with some aspects of the questions you're asked.

00:02:00 So, we will have some breaks quite frequently,

00:02:04 But if at any stage you feel you need to have an extra break,

00:02:07 Just make sure I realise that and then we'll do that. Is that alright?

00:02:11 Yes sir.

00:02:12 Alright, thank you.

00:02:13 Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bathaby, good morning.

00:02:16 Good morning.

00:02:17 First of all, can I thank you very much for coming to the inquiry to give evidence today.

00:02:23 It is very much appreciated.

00:02:26 My questions are intended to be short and simple,

00:02:29 But if you have any difficulty understanding anything I'm asking you,

00:02:33 Then please just ask me to repeat the question or put the question in a different way.

00:02:39 And if you feel you need a break at any point, just let me know.

00:02:43 Also, my voice isn't great, so if you can't hear me, then just tell me.

00:02:49 Could you please take your statement, which you'll find in the bundle in front of you, the blue bundle,

00:02:56 And turn to TAD 2A.

00:03:00 And for the reference, its relativity reference, its MET00012871.

00:03:10 And you can see Mr. Bathaby that it's dated the 21st of March.

00:03:16 Can I ask you, first of all, have you read this statement recently?

00:03:20 Yes.

00:03:21 Can you please confirm that its contents are true?

00:03:24 It is. Can I just point out one, I believe one small error.

00:03:30 Yes.

00:03:31 Just an oversight. I think it's with regard to, basically when I went to North Kensington

00:03:38 From Wilson Fire Station. I believe I went there in 2015 as opposed to 2016.

00:03:47 Thank you. 2015. And can you remember when in 2015 you went to North Kensington?

00:03:55 I think it was around early summer, June or July time. You'd have to check.

00:04:00 Thank you.

00:04:04 Have you, well before I, can I just read into the record, you should find in front of you also

00:04:10 Your contemporaneous notes.

00:04:14 Where would that be?

00:04:15 It should be CJB1, the reference to that is MET, or Met, quadruple zeroes 5674.

00:04:25 Sorry, what folder would that be?

00:04:26 That should be in TAD 2B.

00:04:28 TAD 2B.

00:04:40 Have you got that?

00:04:42 I do, yes, yes these are my notes.

00:04:45 Thank you very much.

00:04:46 And then if you turn to TAD 2C, you should find, I hope, two exhibits. CJB2, which is a map,

00:04:55 and CJB3, which is fire survival call information. Are they that?

00:05:01 Yes, yeah I've got those.

00:05:03 Thank you. And the references to the map are, is MET, triple zero, one five seven three two,

00:05:10 and to the fire survival call information sheet it's MET, triple zero, one five seven three one.

00:05:18 Yeah, I've got that.

00:05:20 And they're taken as read into the record.

00:05:22 Can I ask you this, have you discussed your statement or your evidence with anybody prior to coming here today?

00:05:29 No.

00:05:30 Thank you. Can I start just by asking you to give us a summary of your career in the London Fire Brigade?

00:05:37 So I joined the London Fire Brigade on the 22nd of November 2010.

00:05:49 I attended Southwark Training Centre for the firefighters phase one course.

00:05:58 I think that lasted approximately four months.

00:06:01 When I passed out of training school, I was posted to White Watch Chiswick,

00:06:08 where I completed my phase two firefighter development.

00:06:13 Once I was deemed competent, I then transferred to Wembley Fire Station,

00:06:19 where I then undertook a fire rescue unit course,

00:06:25 and at the same time I had also applied to become a crew manager.

00:06:31 On the successful completion of my selection process, I was then posted onto Willsden,

00:06:38 where I completed the majority of my crew manager development folder,

00:06:45 and then moved to North Kensington, where I then finalised that folder,

00:06:51 and was then signed off as competent in the role of crew manager.

00:06:57 I've been there at North Kensington Red Watch up until just before Christmas this year.

00:07:04 I detached into Fulham Fire Station on the command unit as an observer,

00:07:10 so just a temporary detachment.

00:07:14 Thank you very much.

00:07:16 Just picking up one or two features of what you've just told us,

00:07:20 the fire rescue unit course.

00:07:23 I think in your statement you say you completed that in 2013.

00:07:26 What expertise did that give you?

00:07:29 Okay, so the fire rescue unit is essentially a dedicated rescue appliance,

00:07:35 so it doesn't carry any water or ladders,

00:07:40 but what it does carry is extended duration breathing apparatus,

00:07:44 slightly more dedicated or a large amount of cutting gear for road traffic collisions,

00:07:50 winching equipment, and on top of that, each fire and rescue unit has its own specialism,

00:07:57 so that could be line operations, water rescue, or even urban search and rescue,

00:08:02 just to give you an oversight of what the vehicle is.

00:08:06 When I did it, it was the month-long course at Southwark,

00:08:09 and during that time, essentially the course taught you everything that was,

00:08:14 or is rather on that rescue appliance,

00:08:17 so I'm a standard duration breathing apparatus wearer,

00:08:22 but then you do an upgrade course to do the extended duration,

00:08:26 and you learn more advanced techniques to rescue people from basically situations

00:08:33 that they could be trapped, so cars or trapped in buildings, etc.

00:08:41 Thank you.

00:08:43 And having had the training in extended duration breathing apparatus,

00:08:48 how experienced in the use of EDBA, extended duration breathing apparatus,

00:08:54 were you on the fire ground in terms of actual experience?

00:08:59 Well, I did the EDBA conversion course, and I can't be sure of dates,

00:09:08 but I imagine I've worn it in drill since, but I've never actually worn EDBA operationally.

00:09:13 The closest I've got to it is I've put it on and been briefed to be in standby mode,

00:09:18 but I've never actually, what we say, used it on a job, but I've never used it operationally.

00:09:25 On a job, right.

00:09:27 If you look at the top of page two of your statement,

00:09:31 you say at the very top of the page, in North Kensington we have lots of high-rise buildings,

00:09:35 so we also concentrate on high-rise training.

00:09:38 What do you do especially in North Kensington to train for high-rise fires?

00:09:45 Okay, so essentially as part of our policy DAMOP,

00:09:50 which is the development and maintenance of operational professionalism,

00:09:56 we cover a core skills subject, that's set out.

00:10:00 And then as part of DAMOP, you aim to spend the other 50% of your training time on risks in your borough,

00:10:11 as I've said.

00:10:13 Now, high-rise training is something that we do, obviously, an amount of.

00:10:20 To facilitate that, it would generally be classroom-based.

00:10:25 An example would be drawing up a tower on a whiteboard and then discussing sectorisation,

00:10:32 so that's where we would deem the fire floor to be, where our bridgehead would be, so we would discuss that.

00:10:39 And basically go through the scenario of it and have a talk about on-arrival tactics,

00:10:44 so essentially who does what, so that's one example.

00:10:47 I think memory serves to the...

00:10:52 The last practical exercise I did regarding high-rise was at the Back to Basics session,

00:11:03 which was held at Hammersmith Fire Station in, I think it was 2016,

00:11:07 and that's where we used the drill tower there to essentially simulate a high-rise.

00:11:13 Yes, thank you.

00:11:16 Now, I'm going to come to the Back to Basics in just a moment, just before I do.

00:11:20 Just in terms of classroom-based high-rise training, do you know, and if you don't know, you don't know,

00:11:26 but do you know who designs that training?

00:11:29 No.

00:11:31 Anything I ever deliver is based on what I learned at training school.

00:11:36 Right.

00:11:37 And also my experience.

00:11:39 So you deliver high-rise training, do you?

00:11:46 Yes, we deliver the policy, so we'll have a look at the policy,

00:11:50 and we'll facilitate the lecture and give the training in the sense of we'll lead a discussion

00:11:57 or a lecture, if you like, around high-rise policy,

00:12:03 and as far as I'm aware, that policy also comes from the National Instant Commodity Structure.

00:12:09 Again, that's something I've learned through electric-based courses, so computer-based courses.

00:12:17 Right. So when you deliver training, who do you deliver training to?

00:12:23 The watch. And in terms of what you deliver, am I right in thinking from what you've just told us,

00:12:29 that what you deliver comes from your personal knowledge of policy and experiences?

00:12:35 Yes, so it comes from the policy and our experience.

00:12:39 Right. It doesn't come from a designed pack which you're asked to deliver to the watch?

00:12:49 No, generally it will come from our knowledge of the policy, the sectorisation and our experience.

00:12:56 And how often, prior to June 2017, were you delivering high-rise training,

00:13:03 classroom-based high-rise training to Redwatch?

00:13:07 The last example I remember is when my fire engine was stood by over at Norfolk on a standby,

00:13:18 and the pumps crew, the crew we were that day, we had a little chat around it following an incident

00:13:23 we'd recently been to. But to be honest, with regards to scheduled training, I can't remember.

00:13:32 Prior to June 2017, is dealing with a fire on the exterior of a high-rise block part of the training you received?

00:13:43 So could you repeat the question?

00:13:44 Prior to June 2017, did you ever receive any training in how to deal with a fire on the exterior of a high-rise block?

00:13:52 No.

00:13:53 Did you, I suppose the answer would be no, but did you deliver any training to Redwatch on how to deal with a fire on the exterior of a high-rise block?

00:14:03 No.

00:14:07 Going to the Back to Basics course, which you say is in 2016, do you remember roughly when in 2016?

00:14:16 I believe it was summertime perhaps.

00:14:20 Have you ever heard of a fire at Sheppard's Court?

00:14:23 Yes.

00:14:24 Did you attend Sheppard's Court?

00:14:25 I did, yes.

00:14:26 Did you attend at the same time as Mike Dowden?

00:14:29 No. My fire engine was stood by at Soho, and upon leaving Soho and returning to our base station, it got made pumps 20, so we came on on the 20.

00:14:41 Right, and casting your mind back, at what point in the development of the fire at Sheppard's Court did you personally arrive?

00:14:47 When I arrived, I remember seeing black smoke, so the fire was in it, it was already developed, and I would say probably towards the latter stages of that incident.

00:15:04 Do you remember whether the Back to Basics course was before or after the fire at Sheppard's Court?

00:15:08 It was before. In terms of the Back to Basics course content, do you know, and again if you don't, you don't, but do you know who designed it?

00:15:16 No.

00:15:17 Who delivered it?

00:15:19 That was delivered by our borough team essentially, so the, we call them SSSOs, so Service Standard Support Officers were present, and the senior officers in our borough, and also other crews from our borough attended that and delivered the training.

00:15:38 Right, so am I right in thinking they would be senior officers? SSSOs, can you just help me with that? You say they're, you call them SSSOs, Service Standard Support Officers, what kind of seniority would they be?

00:15:56 Generally station managers.

00:15:58 Station managers.

00:16:00 Yeah.

00:16:01 And in very brief terms if you can, what did the exercise, what did the Back to Basics training actually involve?

00:16:09 Okay, so the first part was the practical session, where the brief was to essentially set up high rise procedure, so set up a bridgehead, and get to work on the fire floor.

00:16:25 And the second part was what we call a TDU, so that's a tactical decision exercise. So we were split up in groups in different rooms, played different roles, and throughout that exercise were given essentially obstacles to overcome, and that's how the second part was, what the theory base was facilitated.

00:16:45 What was either part of that Back to Basics course directed as to what to look for and do if the exterior of any building, to start with, is on fire?

00:17:00 I don't remember any part of that course being about that.

00:17:05 Right. Was any part of that course directed to high rise fires in particular?

00:17:11 Yes, high rise fires. Coming back to your question about fires on the exterior of a building, it's quite common for windows to become involved, you know, fire to jump, so that would have been discussed, but actually on the external of the building, no.

00:17:31 Right.

00:17:33 Okay, I'm going to come back to that in a minute.

00:17:37 Was any part of the Back to Basics course directed as to what fire survival guidance advice should be given?

00:17:46 I don't remember.

00:17:48 And what about, was there any part of the course directed to what happens if there are fires in multiple compartments in a high rise?

00:17:56 I can't remember.

00:18:00 Was there anything in there about stay put?

00:18:04 I don't remember. What I do remember vividly is that I was given some scenarios about firefighters that had gone above the fire floor and they were radioing back, asking questions, but I don't remember what you just asked.

00:18:19 Okay. And finally, on Back to Basics, was there any part of the course, theoretical or the TDE, which was directed to communications on the fire ground at an incident?

00:18:32 Well, the second part was facilitated by handheld radios and to try and, if I remember rightly, to simulate the communication process.

00:18:43 Sorry, repeat the question, sorry.

00:18:45 Yeah, I'll try to hear.

00:18:46 Sorry.

00:18:49 Yeah, was any part of the Back to Basics course directed at communications at an incident?

00:18:59 I don't recall.

00:19:03 It was quite some time ago.

00:19:07 After Shepard's Court, do you remember receiving any training or intelligence or updates about lessons learned from Shepard's Court?

00:19:22 No.

00:19:24 Do you remember receiving any training or updates more generally about lessons learned and things to look for in terms of fire spread on the exterior of buildings?

00:19:35 No.

00:19:38 I'm going to turn now to a different topic, Mr. Batterby. Are you okay to continue?

00:19:41 Yes.

00:19:44 I'm going to ask you about your prior visit or visits to Grenfell Tower before June 2017.

00:19:53 Now, you say in your statement on page two, just to show it to you, in the middle of the page that you see just the fourth paragraph down.

00:20:09 Oh, thank you.

00:20:12 During the renovation works at Grenfell Tower in 2016, you say, I attended the building.

00:20:18 I was with watch manager Michael Doughton at the time.

00:20:22 Just pausing there, we'll look at the rest in a minute.

00:20:25 I just want to see if I can place this in time.

00:20:28 Do you remember when in 2016 you attended the tower?

00:20:33 Ah.

00:20:34 Let me see if I can...

00:20:35 You've got this on the other screen there.

00:20:37 Oh, thank you.

00:20:38 We haven't got a cranial net quite so much to look at that one.

00:20:41 Thank you.

00:20:43 No, I remember it was during the summer of 2016, but I don't remember the date.

00:20:48 That was my next question. Summer time, right.

00:20:50 Did you go once or more than once?

00:20:53 Sorry, say again?

00:20:54 Did you go once or more than once?

00:20:55 Once.

00:21:00 Who else went with you, if anybody, on that trip?

00:21:05 I obviously don't remember.

00:21:10 Excuse me.

00:21:11 But I imagine if I was there and Michael was there that both of our machines would have gone,

00:21:15 because I would have been in charge of the pump at the time, I imagine.

00:21:18 Yes.

00:21:19 Now, did anybody ask you to attend?

00:21:26 I believe we were notified by the station manager and instructed,

00:21:31 all watches were instructed to get down there and have a familiarisation visit during the works.

00:21:37 Right, and who was the station manager, do you remember?

00:21:39 Station manager Nick Davis.

00:21:47 What were you asked to do?

00:21:52 So I was just informed by Michael Darden that we're going to go down there and do a familiarisation visit,

00:21:58 so I then communicated that to the watch and that's what we did.

00:22:02 Well, you are...

00:22:04 Mr. Millett, are you all right?

00:22:06 I'm all right, but I can't be heard.

00:22:10 Well, we could have a break if you're throat is quiet.

00:22:13 You indicate if you need one.

00:22:15 Let me soldier on, as if I can.

00:22:19 Mr. Batterby, can you hear me?

00:22:22 Yes.

00:22:26 Were you asked by station manager Davis to look for anything in particular on your visit?

00:22:33 No, because I got that information, but it was Michael who informed me that we needed to do it,

00:22:39 and to best my memory, that came from the station manager.

00:22:45 Right.

00:22:46 Do you remember whether there was a document setting out what station manager Nick Davis asked you to look at?

00:22:52 No.

00:22:57 On page three of your statement, in the first main paragraph,

00:23:07 you talk about completing 72D visits to high-rise builds,

00:23:16 and then in the second sentence, you say,

00:23:19 if we have an existing operational database plan, ORD, following a 72D visit,

00:23:24 that now doesn't fit the building, i.e. if there have been changes since our last visit,

00:23:29 then we would adjust the plan.

00:23:33 Now, when you say changes since our last visit, in your experience,

00:23:42 what kind of changes would they be? Would they be big changes or small changes?

00:23:46 Generally, it will be contact details, small things like that.

00:23:54 Just to give you an overview, the 72D for us on the ground as firefighters or crew and watch,

00:24:03 we get a template you fill out called an operational risk database tactical plan,

00:24:09 and within that, it's like an electronic template,

00:24:15 and in that you'll have contact details that you need to update or ensure it filled in,

00:24:21 along with other information relating to the tactical plan.

00:24:25 So what we'll do is we'll print off a copy of that, and we'll take that with us,

00:24:29 and then we will compare that against what we found.

00:24:33 And so, just to answer your question, commonly, I'll give you an example,

00:24:37 like a train station will go down and see who the supervisor is.

00:24:42 It's normally minor things, more administrative.

00:24:48 Yes. Now, you say in the next sentence that the visit that I did during the renovations at Grenfell Tower

00:24:54 would have been an ad hoc visit and not a scheduled one,

00:24:57 as we attended once we were informed of the temporary changes.

00:25:02 First question is what were the temporary changes that you're referring to there?

00:25:08 Sorry, could you repeat the question?

00:25:10 What were the temporary changes that you're referring to there?

00:25:12 Before that, when I visited.

00:25:22 Sorry, could you start from the...

00:25:25 I know you mentioned temporary changes, but before that,

00:25:28 just so I can understand the full context of the question.

00:25:30 Yes, of course. I'll just read the sentence back to you.

00:25:33 Thank you.

00:25:34 It's highlighted. You say, the visit I did during the renovations at Grenfell Tower

00:25:38 would have been an ad hoc visit and not a scheduled one,

00:25:41 as we attended once we were informed of the temporary changes.

00:25:45 And my question is what were the temporary changes?

00:25:48 Okay. Perhaps I can word that a little bit more clearly.

00:25:53 More informed of the temporary changes, I was referring to the fact that

00:25:58 the building was now under renovation, so that is naturally a change in our information.

00:26:03 So when I said there about the ad hoc visit,

00:26:08 we have a premises risk assessment upon filling that out on any ORD we do.

00:26:14 That will then give you your scheduled visits, so that's why I said it was an ad hoc one,

00:26:18 because the temporary changes I'm referring to is the fact that it's now a...

00:26:22 we've been informed something's different, and that was the renovation works.

00:26:26 That's what I was trying to explain.

00:26:28 Thank you very much. And just exploring that a bit more,

00:26:32 did anybody tell you about what detailed changes had been made,

00:26:38 or give you an idea about the kinds of temporary changes that the renovation works involved?

00:26:43 No, the main thing I remember is around where the dry rising inlet was going to be.

00:26:51 So it was going to be... if memory serves it, it was going to be cut off.

00:26:55 So our normal plan of going to the base of the tower and setting into the riser there wouldn't be possible.

00:27:01 So I remember it being the third floor.

00:27:05 So that was the biggest temporary change for me, is, okay,

00:27:11 how are we going to get water into this building if we get a job here?

00:27:14 If you... thank you. If you go back to page two of your statement,

00:27:22 I'm sorry to jump around, Mr. Batterby,

00:27:26 but if you look at that page and look at the last main paragraph that starts during the renovation works,

00:27:33 you see in the third sentence, second line, we looked at...

00:27:38 you see that? We looked at a variety of things relating to our response and on arrival tactics,

00:27:45 and considered the fire actions we would need to take.

00:27:49 Yes.

00:27:53 First of all, did you talk to anybody on site?

00:28:01 I don't remember meeting with anybody. I can't remember. Sorry.

00:28:09 Do you remember being shown round?

00:28:11 I do remember having fragments of walking round, but I don't remember being shown round. Sorry.

00:28:21 Right. Who let you in?

00:28:26 I can't remember.

00:28:28 Would somebody... I mean, I know you can't remember, but doing the best you can,

00:28:33 would somebody have let you in and then let you go round, or did you just turn up and look round the building without accompaniment?

00:28:42 I can tell you that we went... we didn't go in the new entrance downstairs.

00:28:46 We went in from the walkway up from the Lancaster West,

00:28:49 and I can tell you that commonly if we go to the cemetery and there's no one there to greet us,

00:28:54 we can let ourselves in with our firefighter key to have a look around,

00:28:58 but I don't remember meeting with anyone on that day.

00:29:00 Right.

00:29:02 Did you go up Grenfell Tower?

00:29:05 Yes.

00:29:06 How far up did you go?

00:29:08 I can't remember.

00:29:09 Did you observe anything? No trouble?

00:29:11 Mainly looking at where the stairwell was and looking at where the outlets were,

00:29:17 and essentially going to identify where we could put our hose into, what the inlet was,

00:29:23 and mainly focused around that.

00:29:31 Right. Did you have any or did you form any particular views about the stairwell and the lobbies and the dry riser inlet?

00:29:40 Apart from the fact that we'd be going into the building to ship into it,

00:29:44 it's like any other... you know, many other high-rise buildings I've been to on a daily basis.

00:29:52 You know, nothing stood out to me.

00:29:55 Apart from the fact that we would have to go into the tower unusually to plug in on the verpal.

00:30:02 Right.

00:30:05 Can I just ask you to look at Policy 633, high-rise firefighting, which is Policy Bundle 4, Tab 4.

00:30:15 Sorry, where is it?

00:30:25 It's Tab 4. It's Policy Bundle.

00:30:27 Volume 1 of 2.

00:30:29 It's on the screen.

00:30:31 It would be easy if you'd use it on the screen. Thank you.

00:30:33 Yes, it's on the screen. You don't have to look at that.

00:30:36 When I refer to a document, it's to the Documents Manager for him to put up on the screen,

00:30:41 so you don't have to trouble yourself with the file.

00:30:43 Can I ask you to look... well, let me ask you first of all. Are you familiar with this policy?

00:30:47 Yes.

00:30:50 Can I ask you to look at Appendix 1, please, which is on internal page 19.

00:31:00 And this says, Appendix 1, 7.2d. During 7.2d visits, personnel should ensure that they are familiar with the following

00:31:07 and their impact on firefighting and search and rescue operations.

00:31:11 And then there's a long list. Are you familiar with the requirement that visiting personnel should ensure

00:31:21 that they are familiar with things in a list such as that?

00:31:25 Yes. So when we gather information for our tactical plan or TAC plan, a lot of that list is encompassed into that.

00:31:33 That's why it's there.

00:31:35 Right. I'm going to spend just a minute or two just showing you one or two things on the list.

00:31:42 When you did your visit in the summer of 2016 to Grenfell Tower, did you look at the means of access

00:31:50 and egress from the site and the building?

00:31:52 Yes.

00:31:53 You did. Did you form a particular view about it?

00:31:56 Yes. So access at the end of Grenfell Road, which essentially is below the walkway and opposite the main tower,

00:32:04 is really quite restricted. Also access from the walkway from the Lancaster West.

00:32:11 Basically, if you had to run water from where the old entrance was back down that walkway back to where

00:32:21 Latimer Road Tube Station is, that's a long way. So we had discussions around how we would get water to that,

00:32:29 and that was part of our access observations.

00:32:34 Right. Did you form a view about whether access and egress was good or bad?

00:32:41 Yes. It wasn't great, but ultimately we have to work with what we're given.

00:32:50 So it wasn't great, but we have to look at ways to try and overcome that.

00:32:54 That was what led to our discussion around how we'd get water there.

00:32:57 Right. Okay. I'm not going to take you through every single item on the list. You'll be pleased to know.

00:33:03 Can I just ask you to look at about eight bullet points down, firefighting shafts and protected lobby areas.

00:33:12 You told us just a little earlier that you looked at the protected stair and the dry rising inlet on the third floor.

00:33:20 Did you look more generally at firefighting shafts and protected lobby areas on your visit?

00:33:29 Sorry, I don't understand the question. Could you rephrase it?

00:33:31 When you visited in Grenfell Tower in the summer of 2016, did you look at firefighting shafts and protected lobby areas?

00:33:38 Yes. So we went into the stairwell. That gives us a feel of how big it is and where the outlets are.

00:33:44 And again, did you form a particular opinion as to whether it would help or hinder firefighting operations?

00:33:51 No, because it's nothing that we haven't seen before. It was quite common, the amount of room you had to work with and things like that.

00:34:00 Next item down, location and function of firefighting lifts.

00:34:03 Noting not all lifts provide the necessary protection to meet the most recent standards and lift machinery.

00:34:09 Did you look at the lifts?

00:34:14 I imagine so, but I honestly can't remember.

00:34:19 Can you remember whether coming away from Grenfell Tower on that visit, you had an impression of whether they were firefighting lifts or something else?

00:34:32 I'd imagine due to the age of the building, there'd be more fireman's lifts, so lifts that have been potentially upgraded or converted for our use.

00:34:44 Okay, I'm going to come back to the question of lifts later when we look at the events of the night.

00:34:48 In terms of the list, going back to it, the next bullet point down is the likelihood and impact of any fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and the potential for multiple rescues.

00:35:00 When you did your visit in 2016, did you look at or assess the likelihood and impact of any fire spread beyond the compartment of origin in Grenfell Tower?

00:35:11 No more than what you would commonly expect at a high-rise building similar to Shepherd's Bush Court, whereby fires, if they break out of the compartment, will jump floors.

00:35:22 But no more than that.

00:35:26 And next one, did you look at occupancy and use profile?

00:35:34 Yes, so from that, just to gather, it's a residential building as opposed to a multi-use.

00:35:41 And probably again, it's common to acknowledge, is there a porter or isn't there? And I don't remember there being a porter.

00:35:49 And then this one, the next one down, floor layouts and early building construction features which may promote rapid or abnormal fire spread, such as sandwich panels, timber-framed construction, atria or voids.

00:36:03 When you did your visit in July 2016, do you remember looking at those things, floor layouts, building construction features, etc.?

00:36:14 So yes, floor layouts would be just in the lobby of where the houses are. It's not common to go into a flat to try and identify a floor plan of a flat.

00:36:25 So layouts with regard to where the entrance is in relation to the stairs and then the individual, the floors to have access to the front doors.

00:36:33 You'd consider whether they're masonets or scissor constructions.

00:36:38 Building construction features, wouldn't expect it to be timber-framed due to big concrete building.

00:36:45 And as for rapid or abnormal fire spread, no, nothing beyond my common knowledge and an expectation that a fire jumps through windows.

00:36:57 What about sandwich panels?

00:36:58 Never in a million years would dream that there'd be sandwich panels involved on a commercial high-rise building.

00:37:04 On a commercial high-rise building?

00:37:06 A residential. Sorry, apologies.

00:37:09 Because my experience with or what was talked to me with sandwich panels is they're generally found in places like, I suppose, big shops, big DIY shops and commercial premises or factories and stuff like that.

00:37:23 So yeah, I'd never imagine that anything like that would be on a residential building.

00:37:28 Okay, just so I'm clear, when you tell us about your experience of sandwich panels, what do you mean by a sandwich panel?

00:37:35 Okay, so a sandwich panel is essentially two sheets of metal with an insulation that fails suddenly and can give off toxic smoke.

00:37:46 And they're dangerous, but they're commonly found in things like big DIY shops or big commercial premises and factories and stuff like that.

00:38:01 That's the only real input I've ever had on that.

00:38:05 Have you heard of the expression infill panels?

00:38:11 No, I don't recall.

00:38:16 Did you, when looking at the building construction features, did you look at the exterior of Grenfell Tower on that visit?

00:38:27 Well, yeah, because we would have looked up at the building.

00:38:31 What did you note about it?

00:38:35 I'm pretty sure I had scaffolding. Again, I can't really remember, but nothing that would concern me.

00:38:44 Did you note that there was cladding either on the exterior or being placed onto the exterior?

00:38:50 No, I didn't know what cladding was.

00:38:54 When you were there, did the scaffolding cover the entirety of the exterior? Do you remember?

00:39:03 I can't remember. Honestly, can't remember.

00:39:08 So you don't remember whether the exterior was actually capable of being inspected?

00:39:14 I don't actually remember. Just looking at it, obviously I'm trying to do my best here.

00:39:20 Yes, I know.

00:39:22 I just remember scaffolding, but the answer to your question is I don't remember.

00:39:29 And again, you may not remember, but did anybody tell you at the time that one element of the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower was the construction of a cladding system on the exterior?

00:39:50 I don't remember.

00:39:53 Looking down the list a bit further, you'll see eight bullet points up off the bottom, means of ventilation and smoke control, including location of operating switches.

00:40:08 When you did your visit in July 2016, did you look at that, means of ventilation and smoke control?

00:40:14 Again, it is something we look at, but again, I don't recall. My main memory from doing that visit in 2016 is based around tactically how we'd get water into that building. That's the strongest memory I have from that.

00:40:33 The next one down, and I've only got two more to ask you about, the next one down, evacuation arrangements which may include phased evacuation.

00:40:43 When you did your visit, did you inquire about or examine the evacuation arrangements for Grenfell Tower?

00:40:52 Again, I don't remember. Commonly, you don't have phased evacuation, it's stay put.

00:41:12 When you saw the single stairway, which I know you say is very common in high rise buildings, at Grenfell Tower, did you have any particular thoughts at the time about how people were going to evacuate in the event of a multi-compartment fire?

00:41:32 No more or less than any other high rise I've ever been to, to perform the same visit.

00:41:38 In the usual run of things, if you were visiting a high rise block under a 72D visit and you wanted to know about evacuation arrangements, who would you ask? What would you do?

00:41:52 In the normal, usual run of things, if you were visiting a high rise residential block and doing a 72D visit, who would you normally ask about evacuation arrangements?

00:42:06 A responsible person on site or you can often look for their policies will sometimes be on notice boards, so the evacuation plan or policy will sometimes be on notice boards. And again, I've never seen one that isn't stay put.

00:42:23 Right, and do you remember seeing a notice, I think they called it an FAN?

00:42:29 No.

00:42:33 And finally, did you notice any potential, look at potential communication problems? It's the bullet point third from the end, if you look at the screen, potential communication problems, did you look at that?

00:42:48 Again, I can't remember. We would have had handheld radios with us on the day, but I don't remember any problems. I don't recall, I'm sorry.

00:43:08 Could you go please, we're just finishing off this last bit Mr Chairman, it arises out of some questions that I've asked and out of his statement. Mr Batyby, could you please go to page 18 of your statement?

00:43:31 Yes.

00:43:38 And if you look please at the third paragraph down.

00:43:47 This is to put it in context for you.

00:43:53 After you say just near the top of the page, I've been asked to clarify a couple of things which I will now do.

00:44:01 Yes.

00:44:07 The first of those is stay put policy, and you explain your views about that, and we can read them there. If you don't mind I'll read it into the record and then ask you a couple of questions about it.

00:44:19 Okay.

00:44:41 Yes.

00:45:00 Okay, so it's control will gather the information from the occupant, and they will determine if it's fire survival guidance.

00:45:27 So I'm probably just lost my train of thought, would you mind please.

00:45:31 Yeah, the question you've posed, are we putting them into a toxic atmosphere or are they better and safer staying in their flats? Who involved in a high rise incident would ask themselves that question.

00:45:44 I guess us making the decision to affect a rescue, so we would have to have information about what the conditions like up there.

00:45:56 And also from the control room staff, they would ask questions based on, okay, so if you've got smoke in your flat, can you escape? What are the conditions like outside?

00:46:07 If it were the case where a person said, I've opened my front door and it's filled with smoke and I can't get down, or something along those lines, you would expect that that information would be conveyed from control to us on the ground, so that both those processes would formulate a decision as to are you bringing that person into a toxic atmosphere?

00:46:31 So you have to look at the risk over benefit.

00:46:34 So in very simple terms, abandoning stay put carries its own risks, I think.

00:46:41 Again, it would depend on the situation. So to abandon stay put.

00:46:54 So could you repeat the question?

00:46:56 We'll come back to it.

00:46:58 Thank you.

00:46:59 It's more of a comment, really.

00:47:00 Perhaps it will.

00:47:01 Anyway, we'll come back to some properly formulated questions by me later.

00:47:05 Mr. Batterby, it's now an appropriate time. Do you want to break now?

00:47:08 Yes, please.

00:47:10 Yes.

00:47:11 Well, I think Mr. Minutes' throat might like a break as well, so we'll have one anyway.

00:47:16 There will be other breaks in the course of our evidence. So can I just say this to you now and ask you to remember it?

00:47:22 Now you've started giving your evidence, please don't discuss your evidence or anything related to it with anyone else until you've finished.

00:47:29 Yes, sir.

00:47:30 All right. Thanks so much. Will you go with the Aushanand?

00:47:38 Just so that you know, we'll break for 10 minutes.

00:47:53 We'll resume at 25 to 11.

00:48:08 Thank you.

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01:04:00 Yes, Mr. Chairman. Somebody, a member of the public, I think, has given me some cough

01:04:04 sweets. I'm very grateful for the number it is.

01:04:06 pity on this. I'm very glad who it was.

01:04:09 I think he's just on his way.

01:04:12 Maybe have the witness back please. Yes, I think he's just on his way.

01:04:15 I think what we'll do now, we'll have another break at 10 past or possibly quarter past 11.

01:04:43 As you find a convenient moment please. Yes, Mr Chairman, we will.

01:04:46 And it will be convenient come what may, I think.

01:04:49 Mr Batterby, can I ask you please to go to page 18 of your witness statement.

01:04:56 Back to where we were looking before the break.

01:04:59 And this is still under the paragraph state put policy.

01:05:03 And in the last sentence you say, having referred to the state put policy and when it works,

01:05:10 you say this policy works when the building is not clad in that flammable material.

01:05:16 When you say that flammable material, what are you referring to?

01:05:22 Okay, so my witness statement was given some time after the event.

01:05:32 And so I want to make it clear at the time I had no idea what I was looking at.

01:05:40 I don't know a great deal about it now.

01:05:43 I know it's called AMC category three cladding.

01:05:48 And that's what I was referring to.

01:05:53 All right.

01:05:59 Okay.

01:06:02 Can I then turn to the arrival on the night of the fire.

01:06:16 On page three of your statement, if you turn to it.

01:06:24 In fact, sorry, page four.

01:06:27 If it's page four, my mistake.

01:06:29 If you go to the fourth paragraph down,

01:06:39 you say there after referring to crew manager secret beginning to use a key to call the lift in the previous paragraph.

01:06:47 In this paragraph, you say, whilst this was happening, we were approached by a resident,

01:06:52 a lady who asked if it was safe to go back up to her flat on the 13th floor.

01:06:57 Yes.

01:06:58 I told her it was probably better to stay downstairs for now.

01:07:02 She says she asked about a relative.

01:07:06 You told her to stay down stairs for now.

01:07:10 Why did you tell her that?

01:07:13 Because at that time, my thinking was if she's trying to get back up to a flat,

01:07:19 we're going to be coming with more equipment going up the stairs.

01:07:24 Need to do that speed.

01:07:26 Essentially, just stay out the way for the minutes so we can get our operation in place.

01:07:30 Right.

01:07:32 I see.

01:07:33 So this wasn't, or was it, any kind of concern about the possibility of fire spread or smoke spread within the building?

01:07:43 Absolutely not, because as you can see, she also asked about her son.

01:07:48 And I started to talk and my colleague started to talk and we gave her the same advice as you can see in the statement.

01:07:57 Now, you in the previous paragraph talk about the lift.

01:08:04 You say CM Secret began using a lift key to call the lift.

01:08:09 Do you remember where did he get that lift key from?

01:08:12 Okay, so the lift key we're referring to is there's a multitude of lift keys.

01:08:18 The general one we use every day is an express key.

01:08:23 You get one key per pumping appliance and that's carried in a bag with lots of other keys that we've gathered over the years,

01:08:31 but also the set ones that we need to carry.

01:08:35 I can tell you I have a personal key, which I bought myself.

01:08:40 I imagine Chris's was a personal key.

01:08:43 And the reason why we carry personal keys is because when it comes to being quick and leaving a building needs a re-enter, you need it on you.

01:08:52 So I imagine it was either his personal key or one that he had got off the appliance.

01:08:57 Right. And these are standard keys, are they?

01:09:00 Standard keys you can buy from most locksmiths, I believe.

01:09:04 Can you? You can buy an ordinary standard key which converts the lift into a private?

01:09:09 Well, it's called an express key.

01:09:12 And in the next paragraph, two down mute, which starts, CM Secret then informed us, you see the bottom of the page,

01:09:22 CM Secret, crew manager Secret, then informed us that the fire lift mode wasn't working.

01:09:26 Yeah.

01:09:29 Do you remember sitting here what his words were? What did he say?

01:09:36 I don't remember the exact words, but I remember him telling me, it's not working.

01:09:42 What did you understand by that?

01:09:45 Okay, so when you call a lift, what you would expect is that sometimes you have like a little LED display and obviously firefighting lift now or firefighting mode.

01:09:57 But the key thing you would expect is that lift would instantly return to the ground floor.

01:10:03 And then you have control of that lift only from the buttons inside the lift.

01:10:09 So the call point buttons outside the lift, you know, the power, it's knocked out. You can't control them.

01:10:15 So how I interpret that when he told me was we can't get it into firefighting mode.

01:10:23 Right.

01:10:27 And you go on in your statement to say this does not mean we cannot use the lift, just that we don't have sole control of it, which could present a risk to us.

01:10:36 However, we decided to take the risk.

01:10:38 Yes.

01:10:40 Just looking at it, first of all, generally, when you can't take sole control of the lift, what consequences would that normally have in a fire in a high rise block?

01:10:56 The consequences could be deadly.

01:10:58 Can you explain?

01:11:00 Yes. So when you take control of the lift, as I've mentioned, the standard practice as a firefighter will get into that lift.

01:11:10 And if you imagine people in the room, you're in a lift and you're pressing the lift button, the open and close.

01:11:16 There's so much control over that lift whereby if you press the door open button and then release it, almost like a car window going up and down.

01:11:25 The second you take it off, that door will stop.

01:11:27 So we don't have control of the door.

01:11:30 And it also means that somebody from a higher floor may have already called the lift, which means that we could end up going up, have no control over the door and it would open on essentially the fire floor, which could be fatal.

01:11:47 And how you say that could be fatal.

01:11:50 How might that be fatal?

01:11:53 So as I've explained, the lift, if it's not in firefighting mode, you decide to use it.

01:12:00 And that lift goes up to a floor which is compromised by smoke or fire even.

01:12:05 And that door opens, you're not going to stop it.

01:12:08 No.

01:12:09 So now you've essentially you're in a fire.

01:12:12 And from the occupants point of view, if they can call the lift freely at will when it's not under your control, what would that mean for their safety?

01:12:25 Sorry, could you repeat that question?

01:12:27 If an occupant could call the lift freely in a fire, what would that mean for their safety?

01:12:34 If an occupant could call a lift and fire, well generally, you know, the standard advice is don't use a lift in a fire in case it shuts down, the power shuts down.

01:12:42 So it would be dangerous to get into that lift anyway.

01:12:47 But if you didn't have, you the fire brigade did not have sole control over the lift and another occupant used it, what risks would that present to the occupant?

01:13:00 Only the risk that if they got into that lift and it became compromised, then they could be trapped in the lift where there was a fire present in a building.

01:13:19 And so was the effect of not being able to bring it under control mean that it was effectively useless for your firefighting operations?

01:13:33 No, so obviously we've discussed the risk.

01:13:38 However, we decided to take that risk because we wanted to get our equipment up to the bridgehead as soon as we could.

01:13:48 And in that case, it did go to the second floor.

01:13:51 Yes, and you say in your statement just beyond that, that is what you did. What equipment did you take up with you?

01:13:58 Okay, so I personally, again if memory serves, I was carrying some 45 millimeter hose.

01:14:05 So that firefighting hose we use, which essentially is 23 meters long, but it's rolled up into, we call it a length hose, but it's already rolled up.

01:14:16 So if I remember rightly, I had a couple under one arm and I had a firefighting branch.

01:14:22 Other members of the crews were bringing stuff in.

01:14:26 So at that time, the equipment that had to go to the bridgehead was sufficient 45 mil hose to reach the scene of operations.

01:14:35 Two breathing apparatus sets, an entry control board, an IEC kit, so that's an immediate emergency care kit.

01:14:44 So that's provisionally for any casualties, but also protects us whilst we're in BA should we become ill.

01:14:50 A long line, which is a rope essentially, but it's 30 meters long.

01:14:56 We carry that in a duro skin, a yellow bag.

01:15:02 Braking in gear. So braking in gear is an enforcer.

01:15:07 It's a handheld piece of equipment and we use it for bashing doors in.

01:15:12 A halogen bar, which is another firefighting tool.

01:15:17 We would also take lift keys, floor plans if we had them available.

01:15:24 So I'm just trying to note what I've already said.

01:15:28 It's approximately 10 items and that's the equipment that we take to the bridgehead so we can set up our operation.

01:15:35 Can I just pursue one thing you just said? Floor plans.

01:15:38 Do you remember on the night having floor plans?

01:15:41 No.

01:15:42 Do you remember looking for them?

01:15:44 No. At that time, my focus was on taking my equipment.

01:15:51 My focus that night was firefighting, so I was making sure I did my bit to bring my equipment with me.

01:15:58 I personally didn't look for them.

01:16:01 Where would you normally expect to find a floor plan?

01:16:03 Even in a premises information box.

01:16:06 A red box on the outside of a building.

01:16:11 That box is only accessible via a girder key.

01:16:14 So that is a secure key, which we carry on all front line appliances.

01:16:18 Or on the mobile data terminal on all the appliances.

01:16:22 Do you remember whether Grenfell Tower had a premises information box?

01:16:27 I don't.

01:16:28 You don't remember seeing one on the wall? 7-2-D visit?

01:16:31 No.

01:16:33 Would it be unusual for a high rise block like Grenfell Tower not to have a premises information box?

01:16:41 It would be unusual.

01:16:45 I've been to high rise blocks that have them, and I've also been to a vast amount that don't.

01:16:51 How would you and your crew go about preparing to attack a fire in a compartment on, say, the fourth floor as you were, without a floor plan?

01:17:09 It would be based on our general on arrival tactics.

01:17:13 So when you say prepare to attack a fire, we would set up our high rise procedure.

01:17:21 And then we would essentially go up and react to what we see.

01:17:29 Right.

01:17:30 But if you don't have a floor plan, how do you know in advance where the fire is in relation to the lift or the dry riser outlet?

01:17:41 You wouldn't.

01:17:43 You always hope to gather as much intel as you can and information as you can on scene.

01:17:50 And again, it comes back to you deal with what you get given at the time.

01:17:54 If we didn't have floor plans, it wouldn't mean that we wouldn't make progression.

01:18:02 And you got out of the lift on the second floor, I think you said, and you entered the stairwell with firefighter Brown.

01:18:09 Yes.

01:18:10 And then you waited for more information. Did you wait in the stairwell or in the lobby?

01:18:13 In the stairwell. So we entered the stairwell.

01:18:16 And my partner, firefighter Brown and I, we stayed together when you're in BA teams.

01:18:24 You know, you're in twos, you stay in twos. And we awaited more information.

01:18:31 And what happened on the second floor?

01:18:34 OK, so in that stairwell, my colleague, a firefighter, Alex Deason-Orban, entered the landing on the stairway with us and placed down the entry control board.

01:18:49 And then from there, we again waited for more information.

01:18:54 You say the landing on the stairway. Can I just be a little bit more precise with you?

01:19:02 Is that the landing within the stairwell?

01:19:05 No, so we were on the second floor. We opened the door, walked through that door, that door then closed.

01:19:11 We're now in the stairwell. And that's where the three of us were.

01:19:18 So I had not gone up any stairs at that point. I was still on the second floor.

01:19:22 I see. So you came, sorry, I just need to clarify this a bit more. You come out of the lift into the lift lobby.

01:19:29 Yes. And you then open a door. And that's the door into the stairwell, is it?

01:19:34 That's correct, yeah.

01:19:35 Right. And then you wait there. And then where does Alex Deason-Orban set up the entry control point?

01:19:42 Just there. He places it down. So Danny and I, the firefighter Brown and I, were standing. The stairs were on our right.

01:19:50 And just on my left at that time, I was facing Danny, he just placed it down. Again, that's quite standard.

01:19:58 You place it down and start prepared to set up entry control.

01:20:02 Right. So the entry control board in the stairwell, not in the lift lobby?

01:20:07 In the stairwell, yes.

01:20:09 What were the air conditions like in the stairwell at that point? Do you remember?

01:20:12 Clear.

01:20:13 And what were the air conditions like in the lift lobby when you got out of the lift?

01:20:18 On the second floor. And just referring to the second floor here, clear.

01:20:28 On page five, the top of the page, first main paragraph, you say,

01:20:33 members of Pump Crew G272 were looking for an outlet to set into,

01:20:39 and they ascended to the next floor up in order to locate the dry-rizer outlet.

01:20:46 To be clear, can you remember who the members of 272 Crew were?

01:20:52 Two members I definitely remember is Crew Manager Chris Secret and Firefighter Christopher Dawgu.

01:21:01 Dawgu and Secret. And what about Firefighter O'Byrne? Do you remember what he was doing?

01:21:09 No.

01:21:10 You then go on to say, eventually we were told that it was on the fire floor,

01:21:15 and that's where they were going to have to set up the first line.

01:21:18 Yes.

01:21:19 You say eventually. How long did that take?

01:21:23 Not long. Within entering that section of the stairwell, not long at all.

01:21:30 Seconds or minutes?

01:21:32 I would say a matter of seconds as opposed to a matter of minutes.

01:21:36 Right. And who told you that the dry-rizer outlet was on the fire floor? Do you remember?

01:21:46 I can't remember how I received that information, but I do remember receiving it

01:21:53 and then preparing myself for the next bit.

01:21:56 And then I think what happens is, is this right, you go up and book in at the bridgehead and then proceed to level four.

01:22:04 Okay, so floor two was the agreed bridgehead, because that was two floors below the fire floor.

01:22:11 We decided there to start up, so that means we're going from having the cylinder on our back

01:22:18 and the mask hanging around our neck and our helmets on,

01:22:20 to now putting the mask on having turned the cylinder on.

01:22:24 So we're now what we call under-air, so we've started that process.

01:22:28 Now the reason why I decided to make that decision was because I was conscious the team were up there

01:22:35 setting up the attacking line, and they wouldn't be able to do that.

01:22:40 They wouldn't be up there if they weren't able to do so.

01:22:43 So I was satisfied at that point that that was the quickest and safest proportionate way to,

01:22:49 well look, let's book in here and go up.

01:22:53 So that's what we did. So we then ascended to the fourth floor once we had our breathing apparatus on,

01:22:58 and we were breathing through it.

01:23:00 And who did you meet on the fourth floor?

01:23:02 When I got up there, I remember seeing Chris Secret and I remember seeing Firefighter Dogu.

01:23:08 And what had they done?

01:23:10 So they had plugged in a length of 45mm hose, I believe it's two lengths,

01:23:16 and they had laid that hose, so when we plug it in it's flat, if you like.

01:23:22 So Danny and I, with the rest of the punks crew, started quickly just laying that out

01:23:30 according to the room that was available to us.

01:23:34 So the idea there is you don't just plug it in, because when water comes on it rushes through

01:23:39 and you don't want it to become tangled, you want a nice quick line of water to get to the branch.

01:23:44 You don't want the hose line to be tangled because obviously you want to get into the flat.

01:23:49 So we laid that out, and that's what they had done for us.

01:23:53 They had begun setting that up for us.

01:23:56 Right. And what about another line on the third floor?

01:24:01 Had that been set up yet?

01:24:03 Not at that time, not to my knowledge, no.

01:24:06 If you stay on page five and look at the third paragraph down,

01:24:11 we then set our positions and made entry on our knees.

01:24:15 Yes.

01:24:19 You describe entry.

01:24:21 Now, Mr Batybyn, I'm going to be asking you to look at some thermal imaging camera work.

01:24:28 It's only that, that's all there is on the video.

01:24:33 And so are you okay with that?

01:24:36 Yes.

01:24:38 Just to be clear, there are no pictures or audio, there's no audio at all,

01:24:43 and there are no pictures or video of the exterior of the tower.

01:24:47 Just so everybody knows that.

01:24:49 Okay.

01:24:51 Now, according to the thermal imaging camera,

01:24:55 entry into flat 16 was made at 01-0723.

01:25:03 I wonder if Mr Documents Director, you could...

01:25:06 Sorry, I didn't hear that.

01:25:08 Yeah, entry into the flat, flat 16, was first made at 01-0723.

01:25:14 Okay.

01:25:16 Now, I wonder if we can just see that.

01:25:20 Just talk us through what we can see at that time on the thermal imaging camera.

01:25:28 So do you want me to talk, when you say talk you through, describe the scene?

01:25:32 Yes, we'll go through it slowly.

01:25:34 We'll just see a 10 or 15 second clip of it and just describe for us what was going on.

01:25:45 So who's that?

01:25:48 Who do you think?

01:25:52 That's Firefighter Daniel Brown.

01:25:55 Are you all right watching this?

01:25:58 Can I have a break?

01:26:00 Yes, of course you can.

01:26:02 I think we'll take a slightly longer mid-morning break at this point,

01:26:07 so we'll break for 15 minutes.

01:26:10 Yes.

01:26:12 Asher, could you look after Mr Baty, please?

01:26:15 That's right, nothing to be ashamed of.

01:26:34 I'm going to say 20 past 11 and try and be back promptly if you would, please.

01:26:39 Thank you.

01:27:15 Thank you.

01:27:45 Thank you.

01:28:15 Thank you.

01:28:45 Thank you.

01:29:15 Thank you.

01:29:45 Thank you.

01:30:15 Thank you.

01:30:45 Thank you.

01:31:15 Thank you.

01:31:45 Thank you.

01:32:15 Thank you.

01:32:45 Thank you.

01:33:15 Thank you.

01:33:45 Thank you.

01:34:15 Thank you.

01:34:45 Thank you.

01:35:15 Thank you.

01:35:45 Thank you.

01:36:15 Thank you.

01:36:45 Thank you.

01:37:15 Thank you.

01:37:45 Thank you.

01:38:15 Thank you.

01:38:45 Thank you.

01:39:15 Thank you.

01:39:45 Thank you.

01:40:15 Thank you.

01:40:45 Thank you.

01:41:15 Thank you.

01:41:45 Thank you.

01:42:15 Thank you.

01:42:45 Thank you.

01:43:15 Thank you.

01:43:45 Thank you.

01:44:15 Thank you.

01:44:45 Thanks you.

01:44:53 Thank you.

01:44:55 Mr. Villett, I understand that Mr. Batterby is willing and able to continue, but I think

01:45:14 we shall need to have another short break after half an hour or so.

01:45:20 Certainly, Mr. Chairman. I don't know whether this message got passed to you, but I've

01:45:25 been informed that he is willing for his own sake to look at the thermal imaging camera

01:45:33 work. I wasn't going to ask him to look at it, but I have been advised that he wants

01:45:40 to do that now, obviously. We will take it as it comes.

01:45:44 Yes, very well. Thank you. May I ask how your throat is holding out?

01:45:49 Admirably. Thank you.

01:46:19 Mr. Batterby, you feel able to carry on now, and we'll have another break before too long.

01:46:41 Thank you. Yes, Mr. Middle.

01:46:55 Mr. Batterby, can you please look at your, or be shown your statement? And page five,

01:47:03 in the middle of the page, you describe what happens outside flat 16 on the fourth floor

01:47:10 of Gremmelfeld Tower. And you say, we then set our positions and made entry on our knees.

01:47:16 I was on the branch, and firefighter Brown put the door to flat 16 in with one hit of

01:47:22 the enforcer whilst standing. So was he in front of you, or was he, where were you standing

01:47:29 in relation to him? I was on my knees, in front of the door, slightly

01:47:40 over to this position, to allow firefighter Brown to hit the door. When we hit the door,

01:47:49 you hit it so your body's with the door. So what I'm trying to explain there is, I had

01:47:53 to give him room to hit the door whilst making sure I had enough room, if any fire came at

01:47:59 us, that I could get water, I could get a jet in. In the time it would take him to then

01:48:04 drop the enforcer and get behind me. So I was on my knees.

01:48:08 At that point in time, as you just described, had anybody on the ground outside told you

01:48:17 what the fire was doing on the outside of the building? No.

01:48:23 Now if you go to page 6 of your statement, you say in paragraph 2, now you're inside

01:48:41 the flat, and you say at the beginning of the first main paragraph on that page, or

01:48:45 second main paragraph, we progressed to the end of the hallway, do you see that?

01:48:48 Yes. And found a door to our left and a door to

01:48:50 our right. It was at this point when I noticed that this end of the hallway was warmer. How

01:48:58 much warmer was it than when you first came into the flat? Do you remember?

01:49:03 Well as I said, it was a warm night, and it was getting warmer due to the activity we're

01:49:11 doing. And the fact that our fire gear doesn't let us, it's not breathable very well, so

01:49:19 we do tend to heat up. But when you say how much warmer, it was to the point where I noticed

01:49:27 it, it felt warmer, and it was to the point where it got my attention and I noticed it.

01:49:36 And you then say we carried out a door procedure to the door on the left but there were no

01:49:42 signs of fire. That's correct.

01:49:45 What is a door procedure?

01:49:48 So a door procedure is a process of assessing what's in the compartment by using the door

01:50:00 as an indicator and a form of protection. So the first thing we do when we get to the

01:50:07 door, we'll confirm it's a door, so have a feel around using the back of our hands. And

01:50:13 we're trying to identify is if there are hinges that we can feel on our side of the door

01:50:20 or not. That would normally indicate if the door opens towards us or if the door opens

01:50:26 away from us. Because that would dictate where we would position ourselves. So the first

01:50:31 process of a door procedure is to find a door, identify it, have a feel, try and work out

01:50:37 which way does this door go. The second part of the procedure is to wet that door. Now

01:50:43 the objective of this is to essentially put water on the door to see if there's any adverse

01:50:48 effect. So if that was a hot door, you might see steaming off, what we call. So when it's

01:50:57 demonstrated to us at training school, it's facilitated in such a way that you can clearly

01:51:02 see it steams at the top and it's cool at the bottom. So that tells us where the smoke

01:51:05 is and potentially what's happening on the other side of the door. So we need to identify

01:51:09 if that door is hot. We've got gloves on, the only way we can do that is, okay, well

01:51:12 let's put some water on it and see what happens. The other benefit to that is by spraying some

01:51:19 water droplets, so adjusting our branch settings to the point whereby when we turn the water

01:51:23 on it doesn't come out like a watering can, almost like an aerosol. It sprays very quickly,

01:51:29 very powerful. That will cool any hot smoke or fire gases above that door and hopefully

01:51:38 that cooling air and that water will stay in that area. So we've identified the door,

01:51:45 we'll use the water to try and indicate what's going on on the other side of it. So that's

01:51:48 the first part. When it's decided that we're now going to open that door, we don't just

01:51:55 open it and have a look because again if there is any danger to us, we need to be prepared

01:52:01 for it, we need to be able to control that door. That's our protection, that's why we

01:52:03 open and shut the door. Now generally the person who's armed with the firefighting branch,

01:52:10 so that they have the protection, they will be in the line of fire if you like, in the

01:52:16 line of anything that's going to harm us coming out of that compartment, that's where they're

01:52:20 going to be, but that's why they've got the protection. So they're in a position to control

01:52:24 opening and closing of a branch to combat the effects of that. The second person is

01:52:32 controlling the door on the orders of the first person. So again the second person will

01:52:38 get into place, take control of that door and then we have a set procedure, words of

01:52:45 command so clear communication can be effective between the two of us and we go about making

01:52:52 or opening, have a look, have a look around, can you see anything? Okay, put some water

01:52:56 in, what does that indicate? Okay so if the water goes in and it comes back down and hits

01:53:01 the floor, it's cool in there because the water's come back down and you always close

01:53:07 the door. Go in again, have another assessment, so you wouldn't go okay on the next one we're

01:53:14 going to go in, you have to open that door, you have to carry out the procedure and you

01:53:18 have to make your assessment. So that is essentially what door procedure is. Thank

01:53:21 you. Thank you. And in your statement just continuing you say I was controlling the door,

01:53:35 does that mean that firefighter Brown had the branch or? That's correct, yeah. So on

01:53:41 that door procedure he had the branch and you were controlling the door? Yes. Okay,

01:53:48 now who had the thermal imaging camera, do you remember? I did. You did? Yeah. So does

01:53:54 it work that, is it because you need two hands for the branch? Sorry, can you clarify? Well

01:54:01 in order to operate the branch do you need two hands? Yes, yeah. Right, so you have a

01:54:06 branch. Yes, so the branch itself will have a handle, a pistol grip, so you're controlling

01:54:12 it. Now you have to imagine the amount of force of water going through that branch,

01:54:17 unless you have a good grip of that and also the opening and closing of the branch is with

01:54:21 the left hand or the other hand, so there's no way someone would be able to use a branch

01:54:25 and a ticket at the same time. Yes, and I wondered Mr Baxter whether we could continue

01:54:31 this by looking at a picture of a branch, it might help the Chairman and me and others

01:54:36 perhaps. If you could please be shown the operational response report, which I think

01:54:43 is the first time we've actually gone to the document, but you'll find in a tab 7, sorry,

01:54:52 tab 8, and it's NFB quadruple 01914 and turn internally to page 90, and you'll see that

01:55:01 page 94. That's the next page. That's it. If you could just enlarge that where it says

01:55:12 branch, that's the, it's described as the nozzle at the end of any fire hose which

01:55:19 is used to direct and control water flow onto a fire. And there's a photograph and you can

01:55:24 see there's a red handle at the bottom and a black two hinged lever over that. Is that

01:55:30 what you're referring to? Yes, that's the, I recognise that as the Rosenbauer Compartment

01:55:36 Firefighting Branch that we have in the London Fire Brigade. That's what I had at the time,

01:55:40 or we had rather. I've got it. So, which hand would you hold the red handle? I imagine it

01:55:47 depends which, for me I hold it with the right hand, so the pistol grip I hold the right

01:55:52 hand and I can do the controlling with my left hand, but it may be different for somebody

01:55:56 who's left handed, but that's the way I do it. Right, okay. So at that point, you could

01:56:04 put that away, but at that point, so you had the thermal imaging camera and Firefighter

01:56:11 Brown had the hose. And then just continuing on, you say, I was kneeling up higher in order

01:56:18 to reach over to open the door and check the room using the camera. So just trying

01:56:26 to get a picture in our minds of how you were standing or squatting. Where was Firefighter

01:56:32 Brown? Okay, so the door procedure I've just described would be our correct door procedure

01:56:40 or our default one. In this instance, we had to adapt our door procedure due to the fact

01:56:48 that we had very limited space in that hallway. If you imagine, we've got our breathing apparatus

01:56:55 cylinders on our backs. The branch and the hose is not an easy thing to manoeuvre. The

01:57:06 way we got to the end, because Firefighter Brown at that time was leading, when we got

01:57:12 to the end, he was naturally in a position where he was in front of me. So if the door

01:57:19 to the kitchen is here and the door to the living room is here, Firefighter Brown is

01:57:22 here up against the wall, okay? Now the time it would have taken to try and reshuffle our

01:57:30 positions, manipulate the branch into the right, well into a manageable position, we

01:57:36 would potentially have to stand up into a flammable atmosphere, wouldn't be toxic to

01:57:42 have BA on, but a flammable atmosphere. And that would have taken a lot of, well in my

01:57:47 opinion, that would have taken too much time because we want to make a quick attack on

01:57:51 this fire. So as a result of that, I put myself in the way of danger in the sense that when

01:57:58 I open that door, I place myself where I was at greatest risk, because I didn't have the

01:58:08 branch. So I opened the door, we're talking about the first room, sorry. So yeah, on the

01:58:16 first room, sorry, apologies, sorry, I was talking about the second room then. On the

01:58:20 first room, I think I was in the right position because I was able to stand here with cover

01:58:25 against the wall and use my hand to open the door. But still, due to the position of the door and the lack of room, I was still in a position whereby I'd get the effects of heat if there were some.

01:58:38 Right. So when you come to the door on the right, the kitchen door, Firefighter Brown,

01:58:48 is he kneeling?

01:58:49 We're both on our knees at this time. So your objective is to stay as low as you can.

01:58:53 Right. So he's on his knees, but you're, as it were, on your knees but above him.

01:58:58 Yes, because I had to kind of lean over and round Firefighter Brown, because he's in this

01:59:03 position with the branch. Because I want the best extension of my arm I can get to get

01:59:09 that door open controlled, but as much as we can to get a good look inside the compartment.

01:59:15 And also I was conscious, because I had the camera, I wanted to see if I could see anything

01:59:19 with the camera.

01:59:21 Absolutely. Okay, now what I'm going to do is just ask you one or two questions on the

01:59:24 rest of this paragraph in your statement.

01:59:26 Yeah.

01:59:26 And then look at the footage.

01:59:28 Can I just point one thing out? At that stage it was pitch black. So my visibility was zero.

01:59:34 Right. Yeah.

01:59:37 And at that stage...

01:59:38 So you're working entirely by feel, really, eh?

01:59:40 Feel and close personal contact. So I'm referring to the point when I opened the door and obviously

01:59:46 you're trying to use the tick, but you can just about make out what's in front of you

01:59:50 if you're on top of it. But generally, low to zero visibility.

01:59:57 Did you have a torch of some kind?

01:59:59 Yep, I had a torch but it's not much good. It's thick, oily black smoke.

02:00:06 So my next question is, before you made the first entry into the kitchen in flat 16, you

02:00:13 were in the hall at the end. What was the condition of the smoke at that point?

02:00:17 It was thick black smoke. So I couldn't see.

02:00:22 So what I'm going to do is just show you the rest of this paragraph in your statement and

02:00:26 then perhaps we'll look at the thermal imaging camera as we go in. You say, when he put a

02:00:34 pulse in, it's in the middle of the paragraph, I thought, wow, it was hot and steam cut through

02:00:39 my PPE, personal protective equipment. I felt a burning sensation on my arms from

02:00:45 my elbow to my wrists around the back of my neck and head.

02:00:53 That great heat that you felt, was that after the door was opened or while you were in the

02:01:00 hall before you went in?

02:01:02 That was after that door was open.

02:01:07 Now, can I ask you to be shown, please, Mr. Batterby, the thermal imaging camera at time

02:01:19 point 01.14.16. But if, can I just say this before the image is shown, if, and I know

02:01:27 you want to look at it, but if at any point you feel you can't or can't answer any questions

02:01:32 on it, all you have to do is just put up a hand and we'll stop.

02:01:39 Okay, thank you.

02:01:42 So we're going to play it slowly and I'm just going to ask you what we can see. This is

02:01:49 timed at, before we go, this is timed at 01.14.16. Okay, and it's what we think is the first

02:01:56 door opening. And I just want you to explain to us what we can see through the thermal

02:02:01 imaging camera that you were holding.

02:02:08 So it's there, just pause there. It's not ideal. Could you just go back a bit, please,

02:02:15 and say, if you just run this slowly, what are we seeing there, do you think? Which is

02:02:23 a second or two after the door has been opened.

02:02:29 That exact moment. Okay, so would you like me to describe what's on the screen?

02:02:33 Yes, please.

02:02:34 Okay, so I believe the black line you can see from the middle top of the screen coming

02:02:39 down is the door.

02:02:43 The four arrows in the centre, that's the direct temperature measurement. The battery

02:02:50 power shows, you know, full battery. The colour indicator on the bar on the right is reference

02:02:58 to the colour on the screen. So the grey you can see, if you look at the colour indicator

02:03:03 on the right, that goes 150, 170, 200. That indicates to that. So the grey at the bottom

02:03:11 is obviously of a lower temperature. The 61 is referring to what that direct temperature,

02:03:18 what the camera's aiming at at that exact time. And in the top left corner you can see

02:03:23 yellow. So come back to the colour indicator, and that's indicating that there's something

02:03:33 there that's 150 degrees in temperature. And the top H in the top bit is telling us

02:03:41 that it's in high sensitivity mode.

02:03:43 Right, okay. When you say high sensitivity mode, could you just explain what that is?

02:03:50 High sensitivity mode is when you first switch it on in a cool ambient temperature like

02:03:55 this is what it operates in.

02:03:57 I see, okay. And it's difficult to tell, but on the basis that the door is opened at 01,

02:04:05 14, 16, so this is a second or so afterwards, how far open was the door, do you think? It's

02:04:13 hard to tell.

02:04:14 It wasn't fully open, probably the extension of my arm.

02:04:21 So how far down the room, kitchen in flat 16, do you think that the hot spot was at

02:04:26 that point that we can see?

02:04:29 Looking at that, well you can clearly see it's to the left, but I'd have to see more

02:04:34 of it. I just want to point out, at the time I didn't see any of this.

02:04:38 No, no.

02:04:39 Okay. I saw a bright, blurry white light.

02:04:43 Okay, can I just ask you a question about that? So when you open the door, you open

02:04:47 it with your right hand, I think.

02:04:49 My right hand, and I have my tick here.

02:04:51 And the door opened which way, from left to right?

02:04:55 So the door opened the hinges, were next to my shoulder, and it opened, if you're facing

02:04:59 at the door, it opened from left to right, yeah, it opened that way.

02:05:02 From left to right, so into the room?

02:05:04 Yep, so into the room, opening up into the room.

02:05:06 So you use your right hand to open the door. Which hand are you holding your thermal imaging

02:05:10 camera in?

02:05:10 In my left hand.

02:05:11 And how do you hold it? Where do you hold it?

02:05:13 Again, it's got a grip similar to a firefighting branch on it, and you can hold it up and look

02:05:18 at it.

02:05:18 Has it got a viewer that you look through?

02:05:20 It's got a screen.

02:05:21 I see. And was your screen at eye level or were you holding it?

02:05:27 I had my screen.

02:05:28 Below.

02:05:29 At first, I kind of held it up to look into the room, and then I brought it closer to

02:05:35 get a better look, and I couldn't make out the image.

02:05:39 I see. Okay, that's helpful.

02:05:40 I wonder if we can just move on a little bit and see what happens in the next sequence

02:05:45 as we go. We'll take it as slowly as we can. So you've got the door open, keep going.

02:05:53 What's happening here?

02:05:54 So that there looks to me like Firefighter Brown has advanced to put water in.

02:06:00 Okay, we're going very slowly. At that point there, you can see, just pause, you can see,

02:06:06 it disappeared. There was a hot yellow spot there. Whereabouts in the room do you think

02:06:12 Firefighter Brown was aiming? Sorry, that's a bad question. Let me start that again. Whereabouts

02:06:17 in the room do you think that hot spot was?

02:06:19 Can you play it again?

02:06:20 Yes, can we play that again?

02:06:36 You can see his right shoulder, I think. The yellow.

02:06:39 I'd say, based on what I can see there, and based on my knowledge of the room now, because

02:06:44 obviously I was in it after the smoke had cleared, I think it's in the top left-hand

02:06:53 corner from the position I'm in in the door.

02:06:56 Right. And what is, if we just watch the end of the sequence, I want to ask you what Firefighter

02:07:01 Brown is doing in the images we can see.

02:07:21 So if you pause it there, from looking at it, it looks as though that strip at the top

02:07:27 might be a light in the kitchen, and obviously over in the left-hand side there is obviously

02:07:33 where that heat was. If you're asking what he was doing, I believe at that point he was

02:07:39 putting in a pulse spray.

02:07:42 So the dark shadow in the middle of the picture running from the bottom to the top, do you

02:07:47 think is a spray? It's hard to tell.

02:07:51 I can't be sure.

02:07:52 And then keep going to see what happens next.

02:08:09 So what do we think is happening there?

02:08:11 So I can see my hand. So I think what's happened there is Danny's gone in, put in the spray,

02:08:30 and now we're shutting the door. Can you just go back a few clips? I just want to point

02:08:33 something out.

02:08:34 Yes, please.

02:08:35 Just hold it there for a second. Right, so you see we're talking about the arrows, the

02:08:41 target, if you like, in the middle. If you notice that the temperature's gone up, but

02:08:45 in the top left-hand corner you can see a triangle. That indicates to me that the camera's

02:08:50 going into basically, it's called 1000 plus mode, but a low sensitivity mode. So that

02:08:57 there is, on this camera, if the overall field of vision is 240 degrees or plus, that will,

02:09:04 to protect itself and its internal working parts, it will drop down into a low sensitivity

02:09:08 mode. So that indicated to me is that there's a significant change of temperature in that room.

02:09:15 Downwards or upwards?

02:09:18 Upwards.

02:09:19 Right. Okay, and perhaps we should run this sequence again to see when the little triangle

02:09:29 comes on. Mr. Documents Director, could you do that from 114.16? It's not there now, at

02:09:38 114.17, so just run it at normal speed. Let's see if we can look at this together. There.

02:09:52 It's about 114.19. What's happening at about that time?

02:09:58 Can you play it through the way it was before so I can see it in full?

02:10:02 Yes, perhaps a little bit more slowly. Okay. 14.16, no green triangle. Moving forwards.

02:10:12 So doors open, you see my hand doors open?

02:10:15 Yes.

02:10:18 Okay, so?

02:10:19 Can you interpret that for us?

02:10:23 Only that the water's gone in and it's created steam.

02:10:27 It's created steam, okay. And would that account for the green triangle coming on?

02:10:31 Potentially the raising temperature. To the best of my knowledge, yeah, there was water's

02:10:38 gone in. Steam must have been created because the temperature's gone up and that's the effect

02:10:42 I felt. When that initial water went in, the change in temperature that hit me, I've never

02:10:50 experienced any heat like that in training or operationally.

02:10:54 Really?

02:10:55 Yeah.

02:10:56 What does that mean to you?

02:10:58 We were, because at that time I hadn't seen any flame or any globing, so it meant we're

02:11:03 close to finding the fire and it's hot.

02:11:06 Right.

02:11:07 It's hot.

02:11:08 Okay. Now, in your statement, if you go back to it, you say just towards the bottom of

02:11:28 the main paragraph in the middle of the page, on page six, you say, I tried to use the TIC

02:11:34 but every time the door was opened to put in a pulse, it was pitch black and visibility

02:11:38 was zero. I had the TIC pressed against my visor on my BA mask but all I saw was a blurry

02:11:44 white light in the shape of the screen.

02:11:46 That's correct.

02:11:47 From recollection, how many times did you do a door opening before you eventually got

02:11:52 into the compartment and put the fire out?

02:11:58 Definitely more than, I remember it definitely more than three before I actually saw the

02:12:02 fire and definitely multiple times after that as well.

02:12:11 And then towards the bottom of the page you say we did multiple door procedures on the

02:12:15 door to the right. I believe it was more than three. By this stage I had seen the fire in

02:12:19 the room in the top left corner, if you were looking from the doorway, but it was too hot

02:12:24 to get in there. At what point was that? Was that on the first door procedure or later

02:12:33 for door procedures?

02:12:35 That was after the first door procedures and as my statement says, my interpretation of

02:12:48 what was happening at that time was I could see the fire in the room. Yeah. But it was

02:12:59 still very hot.

02:13:01 At the top of page seven you say I remember telling firefighter Brown that I could see

02:13:06 what I thought was the fridge and cupboard to light.

02:13:08 That's correct.

02:13:09 There was a line of fire that stayed at a ceiling height above the window. It went from

02:13:13 right to left to the point whereby I couldn't see where it ended. This was due to my position

02:13:20 in the doorway behind firefighter Brown. So at this stage when you're telling firefighter

02:13:25 Brown what you could see, did he still have the branch and you had the thermal imaging

02:13:29 camera?

02:13:30 That's correct.

02:13:34 Did you see anything burning there?

02:13:36 I did. I could see orange flame. I could see the fire. It was hard to make out because

02:13:41 the room was still filled with lots of black smoke. But I could see the fire where I've

02:13:46 described it.

02:13:47 Right. You told firefighter Brown you say here that you could see what you thought was

02:13:51 the fridge alight.

02:13:52 Yeah.

02:13:53 When you said that, do you remember what your exact position was?

02:13:57 It's still the... If memory serves, we didn't move from that position from when we were

02:14:04 doing our door procedures. So I imagine it was still at the point where I was when we

02:14:09 first attempted the door.

02:14:10 Right. So you were in the doorway with the door...

02:14:12 Yeah. We weren't in the room at that stage.

02:14:14 Okay. What made you think it was a fridge that was alight?

02:14:18 So we got information that it was a fridge believed involved when we first turned up.

02:14:26 And it was sort of looked like either a cupboard or a fridge in the shape, you know, a layout

02:14:34 what you would expect to see in a kitchen.

02:14:37 I see. Okay. So would it be right to say...

02:14:39 I couldn't have been 100% sure, but that's what I said what I thought was the fridge

02:14:43 in the cupboards.

02:14:44 Right.

02:14:45 Kitchen cupboards, yeah.

02:14:49 So is it that you saw a fridge on fire or did just what you saw confirmed the information

02:14:56 you had about a fridge?

02:14:59 It sort of built the picture. I couldn't... What I saw, I couldn't confirm categorically

02:15:05 that's a fridge and I didn't see something that's a, you know, but it was kind of more

02:15:09 information to the picture.

02:15:11 Right.

02:15:12 I believe that it could have been the fridge.

02:15:14 Okay. You say in the next paragraph of your statement, all I can think now is that this

02:15:20 must have been because it was venting. I'm sorry, I should have put to you the last sentence

02:15:26 of the paragraph before. From what I can remember, it stayed in the same area and did not move

02:15:30 towards us. And then you say...

02:15:31 Yeah.

02:15:32 In this paragraph, all I can think now is that this must have been because it was venting.

02:15:36 Otherwise, I would have expected it to move along the ceiling towards the doorway and

02:15:39 us.

02:15:41 Yeah.

02:15:42 My question is, why would it have... Did you think it was had vented?

02:15:50 Okay. So just to put this into context, this piece of information was taken from my contemporaneous

02:15:58 notes and incorporated into my statement to try and build a picture. Okay. So it might

02:16:04 be more useful if you want to read my contemporaneous notes to see what I was talking about. But

02:16:08 just to answer your question, generally, if you have a ventilated compartment, when you

02:16:14 first open it, you wouldn't expect it to be pitch black, super hot, essentially backdrop

02:16:21 conditions. If it was venting, you would expect that you'd be able to see the fire and some

02:16:26 of that smoke would have already escaped. Okay. However, if it was a case that it wasn't

02:16:37 vented, eventually that line of fire I'm talking about, you would, again, you would expect

02:16:41 it. If it wasn't a ventilated compartment, you would... Or my training has prepared me

02:16:49 to expect that that fire would slowly start following the fire gases coming towards you

02:16:54 and you didn't knock it back. So I think it's probably better... What I'm trying to get

02:17:00 at there is probably better explained by looking at my contemporaneous notes.

02:17:03 Well, should we go to those so that in fairness you can see what you're telling us? If you

02:17:07 go to your contemporaneous notes, which should be in tab 2B, but they'll be on the screen,

02:17:13 but if you're happy with them looking... If you're happy looking at them in paper form,

02:17:18 we can do that. If you could be shown those and the reference to that is MET quadruple

02:17:29 zero five six seven four. This is CJB one. And I'd like you, I think, to look at the

02:17:38 last page of that and it'll be on the screen. And in the second paragraph on that page,

02:17:52 you can see... You say, once I got inside, I could see what was alight. It looked like

02:17:58 a fridge and cupboards in the right-hand corner. The fire was ventilated, making visibility

02:18:02 better. I believe that the fact that it had vented made conditions slightly better, thus

02:18:07 making it possible for us to get in there. Now, the first question is that at this point,

02:18:12 when you could first see that what you thought was a fridgillite and cupboards, was that

02:18:17 still in the door procedure or was that when you actually entered the compartment to fight

02:18:22 the fire? So just to be sure what I was just referring to, if you turn to the contemporaneous

02:18:30 notes that I was referring to where there's more information built around that statement,

02:18:35 that's MET quadruple zero five six seven five hyphen one. And it says at the top there,

02:18:44 added to info in flat 16. So this was post-incident. I just put more of my thought down on paper

02:18:51 and I sent that off to our fire investigation team, just more information that I could give

02:18:57 at that time. Yes. And you, in overall terms, at this point, and I think we're at some point

02:19:15 in the door opening procedures, you say that you could see the fridge on fire. You could

02:19:21 actually see the object on fire, could you? As I said before, I saw what I thought could

02:19:27 have been the fridge, so I couldn't confirm it at that time, but what I was seeing was

02:19:32 building up to that picture. Or just supporting the information I already had, which was we

02:19:39 believed it was a fridge involved. Okay. Now, if we could just move on in the TIC imagery,

02:19:45 we've counted, I think, four in total door openings. Okay. But the first question is,

02:19:52 are we right? Is it four or was it fewer than that, do you think? As I said, it's definitely

02:19:57 more than three, but I can't be sure of the overall number because I don't remember. I'm

02:20:01 going to go and show you another thermal imaging camera image. Would you like a break? Only

02:20:07 quickly to run to the toilet, if that's possible. That's absolutely fine. Of course it is. Very

02:20:11 good reason to, yes. You go with the ocean.

02:20:41 Okay.

02:21:11 Okay.

02:21:41 Okay.

02:22:11 Okay.

02:22:41 Okay.

02:23:11 Okay.

02:23:41 Okay.

02:24:11 Okay.

02:24:25 Okay.

02:24:39 Good. All right. Sir. Good. Thank you. Mr. Millett.

02:24:46 Thank you very much. I'm going to show you another image of thermal imaging camera.

02:24:55 Okay.

02:24:56 Now, do you think that this is a second door opening that you did? It's hard to tell without

02:25:12 seeing the full picture. Yes, I'm not sure that's possible. Could you just back up a

02:25:17 little bit? Let's go back to 1425. Could you just run it from there?

02:25:47 Okay.

02:26:01 Okay.

02:26:15 Okay.

02:26:22 Right. Run it for a little bit longer. Just pause it there, perhaps. You've seen the run

02:26:33 up to that, Mr. Vattaboo. Yes. What could we see? That was a door opening into the kitchen

02:26:41 compartment. Do you think that was by you at that stage? I don't know. Do you remember

02:27:00 roughly, did you swap roles with? We did. Yeah, we did swap roles. Do you remember at

02:27:05 that point? So the thing is, I can't, I know we did multiple door procedures, then we did

02:27:12 a gauge check and we swapped around. So I can't tell you which door procedure number,

02:27:16 if you were, that is. So therefore, I can't clarify if it was me or not, but I can confirm

02:27:23 to you that we did swap roles. Okay. And what can we see in this image here? It looks to

02:27:30 me like the kitchen. It looks to me like the tick is angled up into the far corner of

02:27:39 the room. Right. And then if we could move on in the thermal imaging camera to about

02:27:47 01, let's say 12. You started at 01, 12. Or maybe it's the next one down. 01, 15 actually

02:27:55 is what we've got. These are sections. Just about, we don't have the whole reel here for

02:27:59 you. Just on that screen there, that still, what can we see? This is a minute or so after.

02:28:07 Just looking in that interpret, trying to interpret what I'm seeing now, that looks

02:28:11 like, again, potentially a doorway and again, looking into the kitchen. Right. And if you

02:28:18 could just run the film on a little bit. Could you just tell us what we're seeing? Again,

02:28:26 door frame on the left. And what's happening now? About 1534. Okay. So, this is the door

02:28:47 frame. That looks like a door again that's been closed. Or a door. Right. Okay. So,

02:29:14 that looks like a door and a branch there at some stage. Right. But again, these, this

02:29:30 is just my interpretation of what I'm seeing now at the time I didn't see any of this.

02:29:35 Okay. And then if we could stop that. After a door opening, we think this is the third

02:29:45 door opening, but just to get your recollection, was there a gap, a period of time before you

02:29:52 opened the kitchen door a further time? Again, I can't be sure as to in relation to the number

02:29:59 of door procedures or openings we did, but there was a gap when we swapped over. Right.

02:30:06 Can we have the thermal imaging camera at 012046? Yes. And as we run this, could you

02:30:17 just tell us what we see here? Looks like it's upside down. The door's open. You can

02:30:31 clearly see there, you can clearly see one of us. Yes. I can't confirm which one it is.

02:30:38 But just on that picture there, you can see the back of either Danny or myself, the cylinder

02:30:45 and the helmet. Right. Keep going Mr. Documents Director, please. Thank you. I heard a spot

02:30:53 track is on. So the thermal imaging camera at this point is upside down. Is that right?

02:31:07 It appears to be so.

02:31:09 What do we see there?

02:31:34 I can't interpret that picture.

02:31:42 Okay. Now, I think we'll go back to your statement, page seven. In the middle of the page, you

02:31:58 see a paragraph, we took a gauge check. See how much air we had left in our sets. We then

02:32:04 swapped back around. I started again with our attempts to get in there. When you say

02:32:10 we swapped back around, what do you mean? Because when we first entered flat 16, I was

02:32:17 on the branch. Yes. So when we swapped back around, because then obviously the branch

02:32:24 went into Danny and I've got the branch again now. You've got the branch again. So it goes

02:32:29 you branch, Danny branch, you branch. Me branch, yes. So at this point you've got the branch.

02:32:33 Then you say, I thought to myself, this plan isn't working. What plan? Okay, so the plan

02:32:41 to enter a compartment using door procedure with a 45mm jet. That was our plan at that

02:32:48 time to use that procedure, that piece of equipment and that technique to enter the room.

02:32:53 And what was it about the plan that wasn't working? Because for me, it wasn't, the conditions

02:33:00 weren't getting better. What I mean by that is for me, I still thought it was too hot

02:33:07 to go into that compartment. And I would have, again in training and operation, I would have

02:33:14 expected after the amount of efforts we made on that compartment that we'd be in a better

02:33:19 position to make progression and that the conditions would have been better for us.

02:33:24 Okay. And then you go on a little bit lower down and say you carried out another door

02:33:31 procedure to the left, that's the living room door, is it? Yes. No signs of fire, didn't

02:33:38 make sense and it felt like there was something else going on. Yes. And then you go on to

02:33:44 describe how you thought you could get in there. And then you say, once I got inside,

02:33:49 I could see what was alight. Yeah. So is that, is what you're describing there the first

02:33:54 time that you actually enter the kitchen of flat 16? That's correct, yeah. And what made

02:34:01 you decide that you could go in at that point? After carrying out yet another door procedure,

02:34:07 so if you, obviously where you've got the yellow highlight, if you look above in that

02:34:11 same paragraph, I'll explain that. Yeah. Maybe, my thinking at the time was that both doors

02:34:17 are potentially leading to an open plan compartment, so every time we're hitting it from the right,

02:34:21 we're getting the effects from the left, okay. Right. But then when, yeah, and based on that,

02:34:30 so we did another door procedure to the front room and again, no signs of fire. So up until

02:34:39 that point, it didn't add up. We were doing all the right things as I've said and it wasn't

02:34:43 getting better. But then when we did, directly after that one where we've done it to level

02:34:49 nothing, I did another one and it was at that point, I felt the heat stabilized enough where

02:34:54 it was safe for me to make progression into that compartment. So that was the first time

02:34:58 we got right the way in and I was still on my knees at that stage. I was on my knees

02:35:05 making my way towards it whilst using as little water as I can to try and knock it down but

02:35:12 not steam us. Firefighter Graham was right behind me. We were communicating the whole

02:35:18 time and he followed me in and we got in there and we put that fire out. Okay. Just taking

02:35:25 it slightly more slowly, you say once inside the room, this is in the next paragraph, I

02:35:29 could see the fire had vented because the window had gone. That's correct, yeah. Can

02:35:33 you just help me with what you mean or what you saw when you say the window had gone?

02:35:39 So I could make out the window frame, the blackened window frame, but there was no glass.

02:35:44 No glass. So the frame was there but no glass? Well, say the frame was there, the shape of,

02:35:50 you know, the rectangle shape of a window was there but there was, it was all burnt

02:35:55 away. There was no glass in place. So was there just a window opening? Just a window

02:36:00 opening, yeah. If you imagine a building with just a square opening. Yeah. Right. That's

02:36:07 helpful. And you say I started to extinguish the fire and knocked it right out. How did

02:36:15 you do that? As I just mentioned, I was putting water onto it, using as little water as I

02:36:24 could. The objective there is to put the fire out without creating too much steam and I

02:36:31 applied enough to put that fire out and that's what we did. So within kitchen, yeah, within

02:36:38 the kitchen of flat 16, where exactly was the fire that you extinguished? Okay, so progressing

02:36:44 forward, it was in front of me, in the corner of the room, on the right, so the right-hand

02:36:50 corner of the room, so you had the, if I turn this way, you might be able to see the window

02:36:54 frame here and it was in this corner, it was this area of the room which was alight. Right.

02:36:59 And that's what I progressed forward on and was putting water on and that's what I put

02:37:03 out. Okay. And you say the area was alight. Could you see anything that was alight? The

02:37:12 only memory, the only vision I've still got in my head was what looked like just kitchen

02:37:17 furniture and the fridge. Right. And then you say, I aimed the jet out of the window

02:37:39 and used it to draw the smoke out. That's correct. This worked well and we could then

02:37:44 clearly see and it was cool enough for us to stand up. Yeah. At that point, did you

02:37:50 look to see what it was that had been burning? Yeah, so at that point, it was just a standard,

02:37:58 forgive me for a lack of better time, a bread and butter job. It was no different to any

02:38:03 other compartment fire. Obviously, the obstacles leading up to it didn't make sense, but at

02:38:07 that point, once we put that fire out, it was just a question of, okay, well, let's

02:38:12 stand up and let's make an assessment of what we've got here and what we've put out. And

02:38:16 it looked to me as though I'd put out a fridge and some kitchen furniture and just what you'd

02:38:23 expect to see in a kitchen. Once the air had cleared, did you see what was going on outside

02:38:33 the window space? Okay, yeah. So once we stood up, I gave, that's my note, so branched back

02:38:44 to Danny and I remember getting on my radio, on my BA set, so I wanted to update entry

02:38:52 control that we'd done our job, we didn't put the fire out. And if you look here, maybe

02:39:00 further down, I don't know, I see. In your statement? Yeah. And I remember the room wasn't

02:39:06 100% damaged, it was just in that corner. There were burn patterns, I remember burn

02:39:12 patterns above on the ceiling, but we put that compartment out. And then I noticed outside

02:39:19 the window up to the right-hand side, I noticed a flame, something was alight. Right. Can

02:39:27 we just go a little bit more slowly for me? You noticed burn patterns? Yeah. Can you

02:39:33 just describe as best you can exactly where the burn patterns were? I can't remember exactly,

02:39:39 but there were, again, this is just if memory serves, just above the fire, where you would

02:39:48 expect to see it. Where in relation to the window were the burn patterns? Above the window,

02:39:56 above the window, in this corner and then a little bit over here. And was there any

02:40:06 fire still burning in where you just indicated, around the window? No, we put it out. No,

02:40:12 you put it out. Okay. Then you go on to say, in your statement, at the end of the paragraph,

02:40:20 we took a quick gauge reading and I handed the branch to firefighter Brown so I could

02:40:24 get a message to Alpha Control to update them. I remember the room wasn't 100% damaged.

02:40:30 Then you go on to say, I then noticed outside the window, up to the right-hand side, just

02:40:37 above ceiling level, I saw what looked like or could have been a large extractor fan box,

02:40:41 which was alight. Now, what I want to get a handle on is timing. Did you send a message

02:40:49 to Alpha Control to update them before or after you noticed what you thought might be

02:40:54 this large extractor fan alight? It was almost instantaneous. It was a question of past the

02:41:02 branch. You're constantly still assessing the area, going through to Alpha Control.

02:41:08 I cannot categorically remember if it was before, after or even at the same time. I

02:41:18 know it was all pretty quick on top of each other. Right. Alpha Control, what is that?

02:41:28 The entry control point, which is part of our command and control for breathing apparatus

02:41:34 procedures, is where, do you remember earlier on in the incident we said we started up and

02:41:38 booked in? That's where we have a dedicated operator to take our BA tallies and that's

02:41:47 the person we really have information back to and that's on a dedicated channel, that's

02:41:51 channel six. Alpha Control is the call sign for that person or that control point. I see.

02:41:57 So this is you speaking to the bridgehead effectively? Yes. Right. So not the incident

02:42:03 commander? No. Right. Do you remember what your message was that you sent? I should ask

02:42:17 you first of all. When you say, so I could get a message to Alpha Control to update them,

02:42:21 did you send a message? As I said before, I did get a message to them. Yeah. But I can't

02:42:34 remember if that message was just, yeah, we're here and we've put fire out or priority, priority,

02:42:40 which a priority message is completely different. It has a much higher sense of urgency because

02:42:46 I now want to immediately report on what we're seeing outside the building. I can't

02:42:50 remember exactly, but I remember going for my Barry and trying to communicate a message

02:42:56 out. I mean, it might be up. I read my contemporaneous notes. I'm trying to go off memory. Well,

02:43:05 don't worry for the moment. Okay. Okay. We may come back to that in a moment, but in

02:43:17 the last paragraph. Yeah, I'm good. Yeah. I'd like to continue if possible. Yes. Fine.

02:43:27 In the last paragraph, you said, I then noticed outside the window up to the right hand side,

02:43:32 just above ceiling level, I saw what looked like a, or could have been a large extractor fan box,

02:43:36 which was a light. Yeah. And you describe it and say, essentially it was a large object that was

02:43:41 a light. And it was this that first drew my attention to the fire outside the building or

02:43:45 window. Just looking at that and casting your mind back, can you describe for us what it was you

02:43:55 could see? Exactly. As I've said that it was a large object at the time. I'm trying to make sense

02:44:03 of what I'm seeing. There are no balconies at Grenfell tower, but I can see something outside

02:44:10 the window, which is a light. And I'm trying to, you know, I'm trying to make sense of it. I'm

02:44:16 trying to rationalize. Well, what is that? So that's why I said essentially, essentially it was a

02:44:21 large object. It was on fire and that's what drew my attention to it. I couldn't say categorically

02:44:28 what it was. So I was just trying to, you know, just trying to work out what it was. But that was

02:44:32 my thought process at the time. And was this large object, as you describe it, in relation to the

02:44:37 window looking outwards, where was it? You think? So this is the window here. It was going to the top

02:44:44 right hand corner, look out, and it was just up here, just outside. So outside of the top right

02:44:48 hand corner of the window. How good was the visibility? The visibility, well the smoke had cleared

02:44:54 from the room. And obviously it's nighttime. And you're looking out and you can see fire.

02:45:03 Visibility was good enough for me to look outside and know something was wrong. In relation to the

02:45:09 top of the window space, in relation to that, where was the fire that you could see? Was it above it?

02:45:19 At least a few feet above it. A few feet above it. And in relation to the window space itself, was it

02:45:29 far out from the building or immediately above the window space? Just enough far out to catch my

02:45:34 attention. So when I saw it, I was kind of in the center of the room, facing towards the window. It

02:45:39 wasn't a question of having to get right out that window and look up to see it. I could visibly see

02:45:43 there was fire outside that compartment. Right. Okay. That's very clear. And then you say in your

02:45:55 statement, it was at this point, this is four lines down from the start of that paragraph, we were both

02:46:00 assessing what we were seeing and I thought the fire had jumped to the floor. I then sent priority

02:46:06 messages to Alpha Control via my Barry radio. What was your priority message? What were these priority

02:46:16 messages? That the, exactly that, that I wanted to get a message out that, because at that time I

02:46:26 believed it jumped to the floor, that the fire was still going and it jumped to the floor. So that was

02:46:30 the priority message, exactly that. Right. And your Barry radio, could you just explain what that is?

02:46:35 Yeah. Barry stands for Reven Apparatus radio interface equipment. So it essentially works on the

02:46:42 same technologies as our handheld radios. It's attached to the BA set. It has a press talk button so you

02:46:49 can just, you don't have to hold a radio, you know, you're in a mask, you can just press it. It's got a

02:46:54 bone conduction microphone which sits on the top of your head, which I imagine picks up when you speak

02:46:59 and it's got an earpiece which sits just here. Right. And you say that you didn't get anything back as

02:47:06 your earpiece was dislodged. That's correct. Is that a common experience in your experience? It can,

02:47:11 yeah, as I've mentioned, it can happen when you're working. The way in which that piece of equipment

02:47:16 clips onto it, it can move, there can be movement, yeah. And you then say I use my personal radio. Is

02:47:23 that your handheld radio? Yeah, that's the radio that's mounted to my tunic here. How do you use that if you're

02:47:28 wearing a breathing apparatus mask? Control your breathing because when you breathe through a breathing

02:47:34 apparatus set, you hear the air gushing through so you have to control your breathing, be very clear and

02:47:43 hold it as close to the, you know, by the diaphragm on the mask as you can. You then say Firefighter Brown

02:47:52 climbed onto a counter in front of the window. That's correct. Whilst he attempted to fight the fire.

02:47:59 Do you remember where exactly in front of the window this counter that you referred to was? It's pretty much

02:48:06 directly in front of it. Okay. Do you remember what it looked like? What colour was it? I can tell you,

02:48:18 you know, from memory I want to say, you know, like just a normal worktop which is obviously smoke stained at this

02:48:26 stage. But yeah, it looked like an MDF, just normal kitchen counter worktop. Okay, can I show you a photograph

02:48:37 and see if this will help your recollection. It's in Master Docs bundle tab 38. It's a, you know what it is,

02:48:49 it's a fire investigation photograph of the kitchen after the fire. But after there had been, it is thought of a

02:49:00 second fire in the flat. Now, before I show you that, are you all right to look at a picture? I'll try. Yeah. Yeah.

02:49:09 I mean, if there's any problem, just say it and we'll look at it. Okay. Can we please have a look at tab 38? Thank you.

02:49:18 Now, I just want to look at the second page of that. Should be a second page. Yes. Now, if you look at the bottom

02:49:32 photograph there, Mr. Batterby. You can see the window on the left. You can see the window on the left and you can see a lot of

02:49:39 metallic material in the foreground on the left of the photograph. Does anything there look like anything on which

02:49:48 you remember firefighter Brown perching? Is the position of those metallic objects roughly where you remember him perching?

02:49:59 Yes. From this photograph, if you just in front of the window, there was something like a kitchen counter, a board across there,

02:50:10 which he climbed up onto, which obviously you cannot see now, but it was there. Okay. We can close that down.

02:50:27 If you go to page eight of your witness statement and look at paragraph two. I'm sorry, Mr. Batterby. It's my fault.

02:50:49 Can I just go back to the first paragraph on that page where you explain what he's kneeling on and then you say firefighter Brown started hitting it

02:50:58 with the jet, but it was having no effect. What was he aiming at? Do you remember? At the time, he was leaning right out the window on the

02:51:10 fourth floor. I couldn't see what he was aiming for, but I imagine it was the fire. Right. And then you say eventually I received a message back

02:51:20 via my personal radio saying that they were aware it was a light outside. That's correct. First of all, you say eventually, how long was that, do you think?

02:51:30 I couldn't say for sure. Long, short minutes, seconds? It wasn't a long time, but it wasn't a matter of seconds. It wasn't an overly long time.

02:51:46 Less than a minute. And who was it? Do you remember? I don't. Who contacted you? I don't remember, no. I imagine I would have gone through on channel one.

02:51:59 Mr Chairman, I want to know whether now may be an appropriate time for another break. Yes, can you tell me how you're getting on? I'm in the middle of a topic really, but there is a further way to go.

02:52:11 But in five minutes, it's up to the witness, I think. Mr Medley, how long would you like to break? Well, first question, do you feel you'd like a break now? I asked the question because I was hoping Mr Millett would tell me how much longer he's likely to require you.

02:52:28 Because if we're going to go over lunch, then we can... I think we are. I think we're likely to. There are some other topics to cover. Well, we could have a break now, or we could go on for ten minutes or so until about 22 or closer to and then have a longer lunch hour.

02:52:44 Carry on. What would you prefer? Just carry on for a bit. I feel comfortable to carry on. Okay, should we do that then? Very good, thank you very much. And then we'll aim to break around about a course to one.

02:52:56 That's excellent, thank you very much. Thank you very much, Mr Battyby, it's very helpful.

02:53:02 Looking at page 8 of your statement, paragraph 2, firefighter Brown continued to hit it and from what I could see it wasn't having any effect.

02:53:15 And then you say it became clear that it was going up the building or at least higher than the flat above. Yep. See that in the second sentence in that paragraph. Yep.

02:53:25 And what did you see that made it clear to you that it was going up the building?

02:53:34 Because the amount of debris and the noise and how rapid and when I say violent, I mean it was it just rained fire.

02:53:47 Right. That to me at that time I was thinking it's coming back to like Shepherd's Bush call. It's jumping multiple floors. This isn't just one or two windows and frames that have failed and have come down.

02:54:00 This is lots and it was getting worse. It didn't slow it, it just got worse if anything. So that's why for me at that time.

02:54:10 So you have to imagine I'm hanging on to Danny by the BA strap. He's got a hose which weighs a lot and he's got that hose outside the window.

02:54:20 He's lent right outside that window. You know I'm holding on to the dear life. I'm digging my hips into the into the counter so that we don't both go together.

02:54:29 And I've got my left hand on my radio. Obviously all trying to communicate priority messages and whilst looking at whilst he was hitting it, it was just getting worse and worse.

02:54:40 So that for me I interpreted at that time that it was it was obviously going higher. Right. And higher by you. What else would be burning?

02:54:48 That that's you know. For me it was I thought it was windows. You thought it was windows. Yeah. Okay. Let's see if we can get a time on this because I think we can with some thermal imaging camera if that's all right.

02:55:03 Can we. Are you all right to look at some thermal imaging. Okay. So if we look at the TIC image at 121 24.

02:55:10 Could you just help us to see what we we can see here. You run it.

02:55:19 Just go slowly there.

02:55:26 Looking at what can we see there Mr. Batyfi do we think.

02:55:32 The spot tracker. So you see the little blue crosshair. Yes.

02:55:37 That's pretty much landed on one of the bright spots that's come down. It's showing up a hundred and eleven degrees.

02:55:44 So I imagine that's indicating there's something hot falling outside and it looks to me like this.

02:55:49 Like I say it's raining sort of objects are on fire and they're coming down. That's what it looks to me. Let's continue a little bit more.

02:55:59 Again what can we see there. Looking outside the window what we think is the window.

02:56:08 So in the top left corner you can see some still some hot spots.

02:56:14 And outside that could be a combination of fire and potentially even water because those other droplets that came down were gray.

02:56:21 So that might be water. Again I'm just trying to interpret what I'm saying.

02:56:26 Can we just pick up on that answer. Go back a bit if we can.

02:56:31 You say water. That's interesting. I just want to just go back to the bit where you think you might have seen water.

02:56:51 You can see bright objects which if you look right.

02:56:56 What I'm doing is I'm comparing what I'm seeing here across to the indication bar and where it goes from dark gray to kind of that light white before you encroach into the yellow.

02:57:07 That's what those bits are. So that that looks to me like it could be fire.

02:57:11 Right. OK. Just carry on for a bit.

02:57:19 What are we seeing there. I guess the same thing. Same thing.

02:57:23 And then stopping there we saw movement downward movement of material in the top left hand corner.

02:57:30 Yellow spots. Do you remember what that what was happening there.

02:57:36 No. Obviously I can see on the screen it's been identified as being hot.

02:57:44 Right. Just getting a time on this then when you talk in your statement as you do about the fire going up the building in the second paragraph on page eight.

02:58:00 Is what we've just been looking at something you recognize as that experience.

02:58:08 Like I say from what I've seen here it looks like there's droplets of something hot coming down.

02:58:21 And when I saw it from my own eyes there was droplets of hot stuff coming down.

02:58:26 And if you go back to your paragraph to one page eight you go on to say I can only describe it as huge balls of flame.

02:58:36 Third third line I can only describe this huge balls of flame falling down with debris along with debris.

02:58:44 It didn't stop it was violent. Is the thermal imaging camera sequence that I've just shown you.

02:58:54 Does that does that help. I can't confirm if that picture you just showed me was at the time when I'm describing what I'm saying here.

02:59:01 Right. OK.

02:59:07 And you say I think you said earlier on that you thought that it had jumped more than one floor.

02:59:11 Is that something that you told the bridgehead.

02:59:16 Yeah. I said you know it was jumping. Again this is a the Coanda effect.

02:59:23 This is a this is something that we're not you know it's not it's not unusual.

02:59:28 Look at Shepard's Bush Court. This is a something that we identify as a hazard of what can happen with high rise fires.

02:59:35 You refer to Shepard's Court but at the time you saw these huge balls of flame falling down along the debris.

02:59:43 Did you have did you think in your mind Shepard's Court. Did it come back to you.

02:59:47 No I just thought it was the Coanda effect that it jumped.

02:59:51 So at some stage the the windows above had heated up and become involved and that that process was carrying on that.

02:59:59 That was my thought at the time.

03:00:02 And you say in the next sentence in the second paragraph of page eight I thought the fire was jumping quick and the debris were windows falling in window frames.

03:00:14 Yes.

03:00:21 So what did that tell you about whether it was possible that it could have been the cladding that was alight.

03:00:28 I didn't think that at the time because I didn't think that was possible.

03:00:31 That's why I've said you know what else could it be.

03:00:34 Like I said earlier I thought it was windows because I had no idea what it was.

03:00:37 Now you sent a message at 0 1 21 15.

03:00:50 This is what we have in the in the operational response report to the bridgehead confirming that the fire was out in flat 16.

03:00:58 And I say you I mean you the BA crew.

03:01:01 Do you know who sent that message that the fire was out in the flat and 16.

03:01:05 Yeah it was it was me who said the fire was out in the flat flat 16.

03:01:12 Did you stay in flat 16 after that message.

03:01:17 Yeah because so I confirmed the fire was out and then we was now concentrating on trying to deal with what was going on outside from in turn internally.

03:01:25 Right.

03:01:35 Were you joined at any point in the flat by the second BA crew.

03:01:40 Yes they came into the flat and they came into the kitchen.

03:01:45 And then it was at that point we're communicating amongst ourselves.

03:01:52 They can imagine that you know that they can see what was going on.

03:01:55 So at that time me and Danny were we were close to the end of our way.

03:01:59 So it's time we saw I don't remember a whistle going off but we would we would near to the end of our way or so.

03:02:06 The normal practice we hand over to the backup crew.

03:02:09 That's that's standard.

03:02:11 And where did the handover take place in the kitchen in the kitchen.

03:02:14 Yeah that'd be normal to do a handover in the.

03:02:19 Well at that time the fire in flat 16 was extinguished.

03:02:24 So to do a handover at scene of operations because where we were in that compartment that was the fire was out.

03:02:32 So that that is normal to do that.

03:02:34 Yes.

03:02:35 Did you have any discussion with the incoming BA crew about what you'd seen on the exterior.

03:02:41 Yeah because they came into the kitchen they would have seen it for themselves.

03:02:44 I imagine.

03:02:45 Right.

03:02:46 I'm pretty sure they were in the kitchen with us.

03:02:47 OK.

03:02:48 Did you talk about what you could see coming down outside.

03:02:51 Yeah I remember 10 of them it's going on the outside.

03:02:56 And obviously hand in responsibility flat over to them.

03:03:00 Which again is all standard standard practice.

03:03:04 OK.

03:03:05 And could you just explain how you then retreated from the kitchen.

03:03:08 Yeah we walked back without the firefighting branch.

03:03:13 And we reported back to the entry control point.

03:03:16 Right.

03:03:17 And came back.

03:03:20 Just trace your steps a little.

03:03:21 You came back out of the flat did you.

03:03:23 Out of the flat across the lobby into the stairwell.

03:03:27 Descended the stairs in the going back to entry control which was still on the bridgehead at the second floor.

03:03:36 What was the what were the conditions in the lobby outside flat 16 when you retreated.

03:03:43 I don't remember but I was under air so it's not like I could I could smell anything.

03:03:48 But what could you see.

03:03:53 It was hazy it was basically common to what you would expect to see after you've just put a flower you know.

03:04:02 There was obviously smoke but the visibility was clear.

03:04:07 And then you went into the stairwell.

03:04:09 What were the conditions like in the stairwell.

03:04:14 Well I think there's nothing at that time which alarmed me.

03:04:26 Yes thank you very much.

03:04:27 Mr Chen I am going to turn to a different topic and the topic so that you you know where we're going next Mr.

03:04:33 What happens after you leave flat 16.

03:04:35 Okay.

03:04:36 Okay and I'm afraid I was hoping to finish by lunchtime but I haven't quite got there so it won't be a great long time after lunch.

03:04:43 That's all right.

03:04:44 Is this the last topic.

03:04:46 It is in general terms it's the last topic.

03:04:49 Yes I just wondered it's slightly earlier than we would normally break.

03:04:53 I'm happy to continue I'm happy to break whenever it's convenient.

03:04:56 How are you feeling at the moment Mr. Bass?

03:04:59 Have a break please.

03:05:00 You'd like to have a break now.

03:05:01 Yeah.

03:05:02 Okay.

03:05:03 Well then we will stop now for lunch and we'll have a longer break than usual.

03:05:08 I hope that's not going to disrupt the program too much.

03:05:11 No not at all.

03:05:12 So can I ask you to be back at two o'clock.

03:05:16 Give you a decent break.

03:05:18 And please don't talk to anyone about your evidence.

03:05:21 Thank you very much.

03:05:30 Thank you.

03:05:39 Two o'clock please.

03:06:00 Thank you.

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03:13:00 Thank you.

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