Evidence session examining the circumstances surrounding the outbreak and spread of the fire at Grenfell Tower.
# Transcribed with OpenAI Whisper (medium model)
# Source: Local audio transcription (no YouTube captions available)
00:00:00 Good morning everyone. Welcome to today's hearing. We're going to resume in a moment
00:00:12 I think with the evidence of Mr Secret. Yes, thank you very much.
00:00:19 Could we ask the Asher to bring Mr Secret in please?
00:00:38 Good morning Mr Secret. Good morning. I hope you're feeling ready to carry on.
00:00:43 Absolutely. Now we're going to take this in fairly small chance but if at any stage you feel the need
00:00:49 for a break just indicate and we'll take one there and then. Okay.
00:00:54 Yes Mr Secret. Good morning Mr Secret. Last night we had got I think to the point where I was about to start asking you
00:01:02 questions about the bridgehead and I think we can take it from that point.
00:01:07 The bridgehead is to be set up on the second floor and you go up by lift as we
00:01:14 saw to the second floor with all that equipment and set up the bridgehead.
00:01:18 Yeah. Can we now look and see if we can get a picture of exactly where the
00:01:23 bridgehead was set up on the second floor and for that I'd like to ask you
00:01:27 to look at your exhibit number two to your statement if you can which is MET
00:01:32 00013085.
00:01:45 When it comes should be the map or diagram of the floor plan which you've used.
00:02:02 That's the first exhibit. Mr Documents Director I think it's the next one immediately behind it.
00:02:33 That's it. Now I wonder whether you can just help us identify precisely where the
00:02:38 bridgehead was set up and which parts of which equipment were set up. Here we've
00:02:43 got the floor plan of the second floor of Gronefowl. I think it's the second floor.
00:02:56 It doesn't look like the second floor but just roughly in terms of the stairs
00:03:00 and the and the communal hall where was the bridgehead set up. So the bridgehead
00:03:05 is the generic term for the scene of operations if you like with inside the
00:03:12 buildings there's not a fixed point the bridgehead is the name for that general
00:03:16 area. Right. The entry control board was set up next to the lift cars.
00:03:23 And then so far and then committing firefighters into the stairs where would
00:03:30 that be done? From memory I was stood to the top on that chunk of wall between
00:03:39 the lift cars to the top of the second lift but like I say the bridgehead would
00:03:46 just be the the area where the operations are it's like I say it's not
00:03:50 like a breathing apparatus entry control point where it's in a fixed position
00:03:54 and it's just kind of where everyone gathers to be briefed and debriefed.
00:04:00 Now I'm going to do this again by slightly different document we're
00:04:06 looking I think probably a floor plan higher up in the building. Can I just
00:04:10 ask you to be shown the plan of the second floor? Maybe we can use the cursor
00:04:16 to identify what's where. It's MET00012593.
00:04:30 Page number 10.
00:04:33 Now this is this is the second floor and you can see the boxing club to the north.
00:04:46 I think it probably it comes to the same thing but just on this plan if you could
00:04:52 identify where the entry control boards were that you said they're by the lifts.
00:04:56 Yep so to the north of the second lift right that sort of piece of wall that
00:05:03 you have there from memory it was it was there. So to the north by the words
00:05:07 communal hall what you see them print it. That's it yep so parallel to that communal hall sign.
00:05:12 So BA wearers coming up to the bridgehead would come up the stairs is
00:05:20 this right to the walkway gallery? Yes it was. Yeah so they were walking up through
00:05:31 the gallery and coming into that lobby that's Mark communal hall. Right and
00:05:37 then in order to go out once they've been committed from the bridgehead
00:05:42 where did they go next? Where it says steps up and they'd make their way to
00:05:49 the steps and go up the internal staircase of Granville tower. So in the part of the
00:05:54 area which has the word steps up to the right which is long and thin where
00:06:00 there's the door to the entrance rather to the stairs yeah you've got is this
00:06:07 right you've got BA wearers going in to the bridgehead yeah to tally out and
00:06:12 then once they've tallied out they then double back on the queue as it were
00:06:17 through the steps up into the stairs into the building. Yeah that's right it's
00:06:21 quite a confined area so you just have to work with what you've got but
00:06:26 bridgeheads are notoriously tight for storing resources ready to go.
00:06:31 It's a notorious not an issue but it's a characteristic of a bridgehead they get
00:06:36 very busy because you're working in a confined space but yeah you would have
00:06:41 you would have had BA wearers coming in through that corridor and then going
00:06:45 being committed into the incident going back through the same corridor right
00:06:49 stairs. Okay so you've essentially got a queue in and a queue out. Yeah I mean
00:06:58 there wasn't a queue when I was there but they would come in and go out that
00:07:02 way. Was there a reason why you couldn't set up the bridgehead on the walkway
00:07:08 gallery so as to avoid congestion in the narrow area which is marked steps up?
00:07:15 Noise I mean it from memory that walkway gallery had a had a balcony and then you
00:07:20 sort of looked down into the ground for lobby. Yes. You want a bit of a quiet
00:07:24 area for your briefings and stuff like that so being in the lobby just gives us
00:07:28 it's like a room to brief your crews and just have that you just sort of that's
00:07:32 your area. I wouldn't I would never set up a bridgehead in a sort of an
00:07:38 open space like that unless of course you know smoke was coming in but there's no
00:07:43 reason it would be normal to set it up in a communal hall. Now you say in your
00:07:52 statement and it's page four if you just go back to that in the middle of that
00:07:58 page
00:08:04 that I requested firefighter Justin O'Byrne and firefighter Dave Bodeo go
00:08:11 upstairs to the fourth floor start laying out a length of hose and report
00:08:15 back to me on what they could see and then you say I requested they lay the
00:08:19 hose out on the third on the third and take it to the fourth. Now firefighter
00:08:29 Dawgu also says that he went up to the fourth floor did you ask him to go up as
00:08:34 well as firefighters O'Byrne and Bodeo? I can't I can't remember if I did. At that
00:08:41 stage of an incident and indeed any incident there's lots to get done and
00:08:47 it's very much everyone will just muck in and get get things done and once
00:08:53 everything's set up and that's when you take the step back and you start policing
00:08:59 it a bit more want of a better word but that initial stages hose to run out is
00:09:03 equipment to come up and it's not at that stage you would detail each
00:09:08 firefighter to do each individual task get everything set up and then that's
00:09:13 when the level of control really kicks in once you're ready to start committing
00:09:16 crude. I can't remember if I specifically said to firefighter Dawgu to go up. Right.
00:09:21 Now did you did you know that firefighters O'Byrne and Bodeo had decided to lay the
00:09:28 hose out on the fourth floor? Yeah they told me that by handheld radio
00:09:33 like you say you can see there what a brief and they radio back something
00:09:39 like it's absolutely clear on the floor for laying it out here. Right and you
00:09:46 were happy with that were you? It wasn't firefighter Bodeo and O'Byrne
00:09:54 the two very experienced firefighters and if they're telling me it's clear I
00:09:59 was happy with that. It's not standard it normally would come from the third and
00:10:04 go up but that does bring complications of it it takes longer you're immediately
00:10:10 you're tying up extra firefighters because where it passes through the door
00:10:14 when it's charged you need someone there to make sure that it's not gone under
00:10:18 the door and got stuck you need to make sure it's all set up. It's a lot quicker
00:10:23 to go on the fire floor although it's not in policy and so that's why they
00:10:27 made that decision because the lobby was clear and there was no danger I
00:10:31 guess they kind of risk-assessed it when they got up there and I know them well
00:10:35 enough to be happy with that and I let them run with it and I passed that
00:10:39 information on to my watch manager Mike Dowden as well I told him what happened.
00:10:43 Right and how did you pass that on? Handheld radio I just radioed down I
00:10:48 said look the initial attack line of hose is coming from the fourth floor I
00:10:54 said when the backup crew when that line of hose gets laid out I'll make sure
00:10:59 that comes from the third so we still got the two lines of hose one from the
00:11:03 fire floor one from the floor below and so it will default pretty much back to
00:11:07 standard procedure but at that time yeah it was yeah so I did tell him. Just in
00:11:15 terms of that radio communication did you receive a confirmation back from
00:11:19 Mike? Yeah Mike came straight back to me on the radio and said okay that's fine
00:11:26 just he reiterated what I'd said he said just make sure that second line goes in
00:11:31 from the floor below. He said that didn't he? Yeah. Right and then you did instruct that
00:11:36 yes to give that instruction yeah who did you give that instruction to to set
00:11:40 the hose in also on the third floor? That was to the I think it was
00:11:49 even fire part of Burn, Padilla or Dawgu and that so they laid out that initial
00:11:54 line of hose and then the second line of hose was laid out from the third floor
00:11:58 I can't remember which ones exactly but it's mainly those three that were doing
00:12:01 all the hose running. Right and if you'd set the if you or anyone set the hose
00:12:06 into the third floor yeah dry rising main outlet and then ran it up to the
00:12:12 fourth floor would that not cause the stair door to both the third floor lobby
00:12:19 into the stairwell and the fourth floor door stairwell into lobby to be propped
00:12:24 open? Absolutely it would yes. And what would that mean in terms of smoke spread
00:12:27 if there was smoke in the lobbies on either floor? It would it would increase
00:12:32 the likelihood that smoke would filter into those staircases it's far from ideal
00:12:39 but where you know wherever the dry riser is located we have to run up we
00:12:43 have to run hose out we've got no option with that each building has a different
00:12:48 design at Grenfell Tower that's that's the way it was so that's what had to be
00:12:52 done. Right is it quite common to find a dry rising main outlet in a lobby as
00:13:00 opposed to a stairwell in your experience? I wouldn't say it's uncommon
00:13:06 it's generally you'll find a dry rise in a protected shaft or staircase that's
00:13:16 sort of designed for firefighting operations and that is a lot better
00:13:20 because it the hose doesn't have to prop open the doors and like you're saying
00:13:23 it doesn't affect the smoke spread and stuff as much right and but yeah we
00:13:28 just have to work with what we've got and at Grenfell that was the that was the
00:13:31 layout so that's what we had to do. Now in your statement at page 4 at the
00:13:39 bottom you say that Danny Bills was setting into the dry riser that's four
00:13:47 lines down from the start of that paragraph and filling it with water do
00:13:51 you see that? Yeah. Now he was the driver on G271. That's correct yeah. Do you know
00:14:00 how it was confirmed when water was coming? He he either told me or he told
00:14:07 Mike but I could hear the communication on my radio I specifically I remember
00:14:13 him saying okay it's it's charged now you've got water going in I remember
00:14:18 sort of the words I can't remember he was talking to me on Mike. You heard it
00:14:21 by radio? Yeah. And you then say that you directed firefighters Brown and Batterby
00:14:36 to put their sets on and gain entry into the flat where the fire was on the
00:14:39 fourth floor. Mm-hmm. You see that. Do you know where you where they were when you
00:14:46 gave them that instruction? Yeah all three of us were at the bridgehead. You
00:14:49 were at the bridgehead at that point okay and then at the very bottom of page
00:14:53 four you say well just actually you said a couple of places but there's four
00:15:03 lines above the bottom you say the crew said they were at the door and
00:15:07 attested the hose ensuring water is present in the hose and that is it is
00:15:15 Brown and Batterby is it saying that? That's correct yeah. Okay and then you
00:15:20 say at this point you see watch manager Dahlgren said the fire was starting to
00:15:28 break out the window and he wanted to put a covering jet on it. I told him not
00:15:33 to do that as the crews were just about to go in and then you go on to say I
00:15:38 requested the jet go above or below the flat but not in it. Now just looking at
00:15:48 that in a bit of details because there's quite a bit of information there. First
00:15:53 of all do you think firefighters Batterby and Brown had tallied out by
00:15:58 that stage? They definitely had. They had they definitely had? Yeah right. No one
00:16:07 certainly while I was on the bridgehead and as far as I'm aware for the whole
00:16:11 incident left that bridgehead without tallying out so that's when you take the
00:16:14 tally out of your bodyguard and it gets put into the entry control board. Okay
00:16:18 now we've got the reason I ask you that question is because obviously they were
00:16:21 on the fourth floor by the stage. So they were under air and they
00:16:26 tallied out and they were in the entry control board. Yeah the reason I ask you
00:16:29 that is because we can get a time fix from the telemetry data on their times
00:16:33 of tallying out. For Batterby we have 0104 11 and for Brown we have 0104 19
00:16:41 for the tally out. Okay. So that fixes it in time. My question is how long after
00:16:48 they had left the bridgehead? Do you think Mike Dowden told you that this fire
00:16:54 was starting to break out the window as you say?
00:17:02 It could only have been a couple of minutes. Okay and Mike Dowden to your knowledge was
00:17:10 was standing where at that point? Outside the building. And when he
00:17:17 said to you the fire was starting to break out the window how did that
00:17:21 communication come to you? Via my handheld radio. Right. Did what he told you
00:17:28 cause you any concern? Yes. Could you expand? Yeah I mean it's so it's telling me
00:17:37 that the fire is intensifying. When we were initially arrived and it
00:17:43 appeared to be a fairly small fire at the window it wasn't particularly what
00:17:48 I would call raging fire it was just some flame at the window and now if it's
00:17:52 escalated and the windows broken yeah that's that's a concern that it's
00:17:56 escalating and we need to try and get on top of it. Right and is that a what I
00:18:00 would call a step change or a pivotal moment? Fires develop and they develop at
00:18:07 different rates and it's an indication to me that it was developing at quite a
00:18:12 significant rates. Right okay.
00:18:19 Was that an indication to you that any different kind of strategy in terms of
00:18:29 attacking the fire should now be adopted? No not at all. It's it it's normal for
00:18:34 fires to develop it happens all the time you know when we first turn up you know
00:18:39 they always develop in front of your eyes that's the nature of fires and so
00:18:42 it didn't particularly ring any additional alarm bells in my head it was
00:18:46 just right okay you know it's getting bigger. Okay now you say he's he
00:18:55 requested you to put a covering or he wanted to put a covering jet on it and
00:19:01 you told him the crews are about to go in how did you know that the crews were
00:19:05 about to go in? Because before Mike had radioed that message I've received a
00:19:11 message from Charlie or Danny I think it was Charlie Batterby I think I
00:19:18 remember his voice coming on the radio saying we're at the door and we're about
00:19:22 to make entry so I've got that message and then almost immediately after that
00:19:29 radio traffic had finished that's when Mike came on the radio and which is why
00:19:34 I explained that. Right and in terms of that communication from Charlie
00:19:38 Batterby to you you're at the bridgehead yeah what was the channel that was
00:19:44 being used? My radio was on channel one but I was stood right next to the entry
00:19:50 control board with Alex Decent-Orbin and his radio is on channel six right so I
00:19:55 can hear both channels. Just in terms of mechanics his radio was on channel six
00:20:05 does the BA entry control board have its own radio which you can hear or is
00:20:10 it that when somebody communicates with the BA control officer you do it
00:20:16 on the handheld radio? Yeah so our handheld radios and the radio on your
00:20:20 breathing apparatus set you can change channels manually they all work on all
00:20:26 channels it's standard to have fire ground communications on channel one
00:20:31 and breathing apparatus communications on channel six and so the radio on the
00:20:36 breathing apparatus that was set to channel six and Alex Decent-Orbin had
00:20:40 turned his radio to six so he could communicate with them. I understand
00:20:44 and would you know or would he know receiving the message on channel six that
00:20:49 he had got the message from a handheld radio on floor four or a Barry set?
00:20:56 There's no way of telling really you can take an educated guess by the tone of
00:21:01 the voice if it's from a handheld it's slightly more muffled because they're
00:21:06 talking through their breathing apparatus mark if it's from the Barry set if it's
00:21:11 working it will be clearer. Right okay and then we've got entry into flat 16 in
00:21:17 terms of time at 01, sorry 01 0721 according to the thermal imaging camera
00:21:23 which I won't I won't show you. Was your discussion with Mike Dowden about
00:21:30 covering jet before that moment? Yes. So we I think we've got a time fix about
00:21:34 this covering jet discussion that before 01 0721. Now just standing back and
00:21:42 looking at the generalities what is standard practice for the use of external
00:21:47 jets? Standard practice would be if the fire is breaking out of the window a
00:21:55 covering jet helps to stop the external spread of fire on that building.
00:22:01 And given what you say about what might happen let's just look at that the
00:22:09 bottom of the page you say I requested the jet go above or below the flat but
00:22:13 not in it if the jet over to the top of page five if the jet had been directed
00:22:20 into the flat the water would have turned to steam and basically it would
00:22:23 have scolded the FF crew this can cause serious injuries. Given the given what
00:22:30 you say about what might happen were you surprised that Mike Dowden was saying
00:22:36 that this is what he wanted? No at the same time I don't remember Mike saying
00:22:46 that he was going to put the covering jet inside the window it was just me
00:22:50 being belt and braces if you're going to put a covering jet don't put it into the
00:22:54 window put it above or below I wanted him to make sure that he knew that there
00:22:58 was crews going in I wanted to be crystal clear about that. I see okay and
00:23:02 you then go on to say it was quite chaotic at this time and I had to reconfirm
00:23:06 what manager Dowden had received what I had said you say it was quite chaotic
00:23:16 chaotic what what what do you mean by that? Just because of the position I
00:23:21 was in on the bridgehead I'm talking to Alex the control officer I'm listening
00:23:25 to their radio his radio I'm listening to my radio on channel one and people
00:23:32 outside a talk to Mike by their radio so you've got you know each year has got
00:23:36 a radio that's constantly got traffic going on so I'm trying to sort of
00:23:40 listen to it all and take it all in. Did you reconfirm or did you feel the need
00:23:44 to reconfirm to Mike Dowden what you had said because of a concern you had about
00:23:51 whether he had actually heard it over the radio? I think I was aware he'd heard
00:23:55 it but it's potentially a very dangerous situation that so I just wanted to make
00:24:02 sure that he was crystal clear what was going on. And did he confirm to you that
00:24:07 he did understand crystal clearly what was going on? Yeah and I could hear him
00:24:11 on the radio directing the crews outside basically confirming what I've said. I
00:24:18 remember hearing some radio exchange and making sure that the jet doesn't go into
00:24:25 the window. And you you say three lines down four lines down from the top of the
00:24:33 page two lines down from the start of that paragraph watch manager Dowden was
00:24:37 getting a bit flustered and was asking what was going on and can you explain
00:24:41 what you mean? So Mike's on the fire ground he's normally very cool calm and
00:24:52 methodical. He still was but I could tell by the intensity of his the messages on
00:24:58 the radio that things were ramping up a gear. There was lots of messages there
00:25:06 was lots of urgency in his voice and that was an indication to me that things
00:25:12 were sort of starting to escalate. Right did he tell you how things were
00:25:18 escalating from where he from where he was standing outside the tower? In a
00:25:23 roundabout way because he told me that the fire was breaking out the window and
00:25:26 he wanted to put a jet on it. So that was that was enough information for me to
00:25:31 appreciate that it was starting to break out of the window. I see okay. Did he say
00:25:38 anything else to you other than that the fire was breaking out of the window? Not
00:25:41 I remember no. You then go on to say in the same sentence that he was he was
00:25:49 asking what was going on and then you you go on to say that Batterby came on
00:25:59 the radio fairly quickly and said the fire was out and it appeared to have
00:26:02 been the fridge in the kitchen. I radioed this to Mike and told him the fire was
00:26:07 out. First of all did you get a response from him when you radioed Mike and told
00:26:16 him that? I can't remember if I did or not. Were you confident that the message that you were
00:26:24 radioing him with had got through to him and he understood it? I don't remember
00:26:29 having any concerns that it hadn't. Right. But yeah I'd be lying if I said I can
00:26:36 clearly remember that conversation because I can't. No fair enough. And you then say it had taken
00:26:42 about 10 minutes to extinguish the fire. 10 minutes from when are you counting?
00:26:47 From time of them leaving the bridgehead. Right. Did you have a means of measuring that or is that
00:27:00 an estimate? No it's just a guess and I put it in my statement it's just an estimate. I wouldn't.
00:27:08 Yeah it's hard to judge you know it was a high-pressure situation there's a lot going on.
00:27:15 That was my best estimate of that time frame. You then say in the next sentence
00:27:25 watch manager Dowden asked what was going on and said that he was going to make pumps
00:27:30 eight. Now we've got a timestamp of making pumps eight at 01 1908. So was your discussion
00:27:42 with him before or after that? I would assume it's before. Okay when he asked what was going on
00:27:53 what first of all did he ask you how did he ask you that what was the means of communication?
00:27:58 I remember I do remember that very clearly he said what's going on up there Chris? He said
00:28:03 because it's coming out the window pretty bad now. Did he? Around that time I was getting
00:28:09 messages from the BA crew inside saying that they they'd found the fire in the kitchen and
00:28:15 extinguished it. So that was my first warning that something's I miss here. I was getting
00:28:22 very conflicting one person inside telling me it's out and my governors outside you know
00:28:29 about to make it up it was a bit of a surreal situation really. Did he describe to you what
00:28:37 he was seeing? Again I can't remember. Did you think that when he said he was going to make
00:28:52 pumps eight that that had a significance pumps eight? It did that means you know the yes the
00:28:59 incident is escalated fairly significantly that's quite a bold move for what was initially a you
00:29:06 know a small fire in a kitchen which is why I sort of questioned a bit on it. It wasn't it that's
00:29:13 not that's not a response I would normally expect to have come through the radio from the officer in
00:29:19 charge for a fire of that size. Now we've just again we've just in terms of timing on the
00:29:27 information we've got there's a message 01 21 15 or so it's not absolutely necessarily accurate to
00:29:36 the second but around about that time 01 21 15 but BA team one Batybin Brown confirmed from flat
00:29:46 16 that the fire was out. Do you remember receiving that message from then? Yeah I definitely remember
00:29:54 getting a radio message from one of them saying the fire in the kitchen's out yeah. And would that
00:29:59 have come to firefighter Decent Alvin or to you? Yeah that would have gone through his radio. I would
00:30:05 have heard it instantly because that's how I was purposely stood next to him so I could hear both
00:30:10 okay both radios. And just to re refocus on the question I asked you a minute ago
00:30:18 with that timing in mind do you think that a discussion that you had with Mike about make
00:30:23 pumps eight was before that? It must have been because I remember him saying he was going to
00:30:30 make pumps eight otherwise he would have said I've made pumps eight. Right now you say in the
00:30:38 next sentence I told him to slow down because the fire was out and would I be right in thinking
00:30:46 that that is because that is what Charlie Batyby had told you through of that suggestion line?
00:30:52 Right and did firefighter Batyby give you or firefighter Decent Alvin any other information?
00:31:02 No and I wouldn't normally expect that the comms are pretty poor to be honest. You can hear what's
00:31:09 going on but it's not a clear conversation like we're having now. It's quite difficult to get your
00:31:15 message across sometimes so when you're in breathing apparatus wearing a radio it tends to be
00:31:21 the bare minimum short sharp messages. Yes now Mr Batyby's given evidence to the inquiry and when
00:31:29 he did say last week he said that he remembers telling the bridge head that he thought the fire
00:31:37 had jumped to floor. Is that something you remember? Is that a message you remember getting?
00:31:45 That the fire had jumped to floor? I don't specifically remember that
00:31:51 you know but that's probably my memory if Charlie said he sent it then he sent it.
00:31:56 Fair enough now you say in the next sentence well let me just ask you when you say I told him to
00:32:06 slow down what were you asking him to do? I was just double checking with him really is this really
00:32:17 a movie he wants to make but say from my position I'm getting told on the radio that the fire's out
00:32:23 and then Mike's telling me it's make pump state so I was questioning that because I'm kind of
00:32:29 I'm stuck in the middle and that's two very conflicting stories which in 19 years I've never
00:32:34 had they normally go hand in hand you know that I'd normally get a message from the crew saying
00:32:38 right it's going pretty well in here then the officer in charge would be making it up
00:32:43 or it would go the other way you know so the fire's out and yeah it's looking all right out here.
00:32:47 I've never had such been in a situation where there's two conflicting stories so I was questioning
00:32:54 Mike and because I was basically in my mind I was really confused as to what's going on here.
00:33:04 And you then say I realised something was amiss and asked firefighter Decent Albin on the BA
00:33:14 board to ask what was going on. Who did you ask him to ask? At the BA crews. Right and did he?
00:33:26 Yes. Do you remember what he asked do you remember what they told him?
00:33:30 Um no um I guess that could have been well been when Charlie said that the floors jump in but I
00:33:40 can't remember the the radio exchange I just remember thinking right I need to sort of
00:33:45 get a picture of what's going on here because I say because the two conflicting accounts of
00:33:49 what was happening. You then go on to say by now there was lots of radio traffic it transpired
00:33:56 although the fire had been extinguished inside the flat the fire was travelling on the outside
00:34:00 of the building. You say it transpired do you know where that information came to you from?
00:34:09 Yeah so at some stage with the radio traffic talking to Mike he told me that the fire was
00:34:17 now on the outside of the building which I assumed to mean that the flat above had
00:34:26 caught fire what we spoke about yesterday you know fire traveling up it's not that unusual it
00:34:31 doesn't happen all the time it's not any so my assumption was that's what was happening.
00:34:37 Right but my question was a bit slightly different it transpired yeah uh that although the fire had
00:34:43 been extinguished inside the flat the fire was traveling up traveling on the outside of the
00:34:46 building uh the information that it was traveling on the outside of the building let me just ask the
00:34:52 question again that information it's traveling on the outside of the building where do you think
00:34:57 that information came to you from? It would have come from Mike. Right okay do you remember what he
00:35:03 would did it come to you the information or did it come to you did it come to you directly? Yes
00:35:09 yes and Mike's radio would have been on channel one and so um as my radio was and I remember him
00:35:16 saying something along the lines of it it's on the outside of the building it's going quite well up
00:35:21 here um going quite well up here or quite well out out here sorry not up here um yeah it I've
00:35:29 got a vague memory of the conversation um I can't remember it word for word. Right okay and
00:35:40 when he said that did you get an impression that it I think you said it had jumped to floor which
00:35:44 is your assumption is there anything is there anything that Mike Dunn said to you that might
00:35:48 have indicated to you that instead of simply jumping a floor which you go on to say can happen
00:35:54 the actual exterior itself was a light? Um
00:36:02 no um but in fairness to Mike he probably didn't know what was happening at that point either
00:36:08 because neither of them had seen a building burn on the outside before so he was probably a bit
00:36:13 perplexed as to what was happening as well. Right at that stage did you
00:36:19 encounter or think you'd encountered any difficulties in communicating with Mike?
00:36:25 The only difficulty would have been just the the volume of traffic the radio was constantly going
00:36:32 and I know myself as a being an officer in charge of incidents everyone's trying to talk to you
00:36:38 and it can be you're trying to get back to everyone and the radio was just constantly going
00:36:44 and so the only difficulties I remember was sometimes I had to sort of like Mike did you
00:36:49 get that yeah I've got it Chris sort of thing you know I had to make sure he got it but that was for
00:36:53 my my benefit more than his I just wanted to make sure the messages were getting through. Right.
00:36:58 But the the actual physical radio there was no problem with sending and receiving messages at
00:37:04 that point. Yes and indeed you say in your statement three lines up from the end of that
00:37:08 paragraph by now there was lots of radio traffic are you able to give us an impression
00:37:14 of the kinds of traffic kinds of messages you were hearing at that point?
00:37:21 I remember him talking I remember him directing the cruise with a covering jet
00:37:25 and I think there was messages about water and hydrants and bits and pieces
00:37:36 yeah I can't remember the the sort of the specifics of the conversations I just
00:37:41 remember being very busy right it's hard because when I'm running the bridgehead
00:37:46 although I'm trying to listen to everything that what's going on I've also got an important job to
00:37:50 do so I need to be aware of what's going on around me but likewise I can't forget about what
00:37:55 I'm doing and just listen to the radio I'm trying to manage the bridgehead and make sure that my
00:38:00 cruise is safe but also keep my ear out of to build up a picture of what's going on around
00:38:08 so you're kind of in a position where you're trying to do two jobs at once.
00:38:12 Yes and in terms of impression what's your impression as far as you remember it that the
00:38:18 volume of traffic that you were hearing on your fire ground radio was normal or abnormal?
00:38:25 No that was consistent with Mike's message that he was making it eight and the fires on the outside
00:38:30 of the building I was getting a real feeling in the pit of my stomach that something was going
00:38:34 wrong and that was consistent with that you know if the fire you know it's like anything if the
00:38:39 fire's getting if you're controlling the fire everyone calms down a bit because you're on top
00:38:44 of it if it's going the other way there's loads going on and everyone's trying to talk to everyone
00:38:49 so it was just a part of the picture that was telling me this fire was escalating.
00:38:55 Yes and at that stage escalation and just going back to your training we discussed yesterday
00:39:08 did it occur to you at that stage that there was something some strategy some way of attacking the
00:39:15 fire or dealing with the residents that now needed to be thought about? No absolutely not
00:39:21 because at that point you know everything's easy with hindsight at that point we still
00:39:26 didn't know what was happening it's like okay this fire's behaving very differently but we wasn't
00:39:32 and we wasn't aware why. No. Mr Chairman I'm about to move on to a different topic
00:39:39 and we've had quite an intense 40 minutes I just wonder whether now might be.
00:39:42 But I wanted to ask Mr Secret you've been running for 40 minutes how do you feel? I feel okay but
00:39:49 a quick coffee would do well. You'd like a break? Please. Yes well you're probably not the only one.
00:39:54 Okay thank you. So all right we'll stop for 10 minutes. Okay. And we'll resume at 20 past 10.
00:40:01 Thank you very much you go with your.
00:40:03 Thank you.
00:40:33 you
00:41:03 you
00:41:33 you
00:42:03 you
00:42:33 you
00:43:03 you
00:43:33 you
00:44:03 you
00:44:33 you
00:45:03 you
00:45:33 you
00:46:03 you
00:46:33 you
00:47:03 you
00:47:33 you
00:48:03 you
00:48:33 you
00:49:03 you
00:49:33 you
00:50:03 you
00:50:33 you
00:51:04 you
00:51:28 me
00:52:03 All right, Mr Secret, ready to go on? Good, thank you. Mr Millett?
00:52:09 Mr Secret, I just want to go back to something that I skipped over a little bit too quickly.
00:52:15 If you go back to page four of your statement and look at the very bottom of the page, you
00:52:19 see that you say, I requested the jet go above or below the flat but not in it. You see that?
00:52:31 Could you just explain there what help the jet going below the flat would give in terms of
00:52:40 containing fire spread? If it's going below the flat, it depends how the fire is behaving on the
00:52:47 outside of the building, but it will stop any falling debris catching anything below. It can
00:52:53 go both ways. It's quite common for the fire to spread upwards, but it can also have fire and
00:52:59 debris dropping down. It's just as effective, just protecting a different risk, if you like.
00:53:08 What about aiming the jet above the window? What benefits would that bring?
00:53:14 Say 99% of the cases, the flame will come out of the window and travel upwards as heat rises,
00:53:21 and the jet would break that wall of fire, if you like, and it would protect or
00:53:30 minimise the risk of anything above that catching a light.
00:53:37 In terms of the ability of an ordinary hose plugged in to a pump at ground level,
00:53:50 how high would you usually expect the water jet to reach, assuming normal water pressures
00:53:56 are available in central London? I would expect a handheld branch to be able to get up to the
00:54:02 fifth or sixth floor. Right. If you were confronted, and this is a hypothetical question,
00:54:15 so take it in that spirit, but if you're confronted with flames coming out of the window,
00:54:19 but also material falling down from the window, ignited form of material falling down,
00:54:25 what would be the best approach? Would you aim the jet below the window or above the window?
00:54:30 Or a mixture? Just manage it as you see it. If you're the firefighter on the jet,
00:54:37 you just prioritise the direction of the water, really.
00:54:41 And what was the upshot of your conversation with Mike Daddon about the covering jet?
00:54:47 My concern was that he was going to put it into the window, or not necessarily on purpose.
00:54:57 It's a very fine line. The fire's on the fourth floor and you've got a firefighter with a jet
00:55:01 that's squirting it up, so they might not even mean it to go in the window, but it would go
00:55:06 into the window, and the danger of that is the steam that will be created in that compartment
00:55:11 for the firefighters. So water turns to steam at a ratio of 1700 to 1, at 100 degrees.
00:55:22 The handheld jets that the firefighters on the ground would have been using,
00:55:27 that will throw water out set at 230 litres per minute. So if that's going into the compartment,
00:55:36 roughly every second you'd have just over three and a half litres of water going in,
00:55:43 which would expand into roughly 6,500 litres of steam, and that's every second. So even if it's
00:55:51 just a quick blip down just because they've moved or something and that goes in there,
00:55:55 that could potentially be 6,500 litres of steam, which equates to about 80 bin liners full of
00:55:59 steam. That's every second, so it's a really dangerous situation.
00:56:02 And if you're confronted with a flat on fire and you know the crew is going to go in,
00:56:09 but you want to put a covering jet on it, which is the safest course, aiming above or aiming below
00:56:14 the window? It depends what's happening in front of you. I'd say there's no crew-wise,
00:56:20 there's no safer option, it's just prioritising that jet of water to where it needs it most.
00:56:26 Okay, thank you. Now, moving ahead, you say on page five, in the middle,
00:56:40 that another crew from Hammersmith arrived, FF Nick and FF John, we think that's Barton and Hanlon.
00:56:47 That's correct. And you say they came to the bridgehead and you say, I told them to get a
00:56:54 hose and a branch and go to the fifth floor as we were getting reports of a fire.
00:57:07 Getting reports of a fire where, is the first question. Well, before we carry on,
00:57:14 I said at the start of this, I've read my statement recently and that highlighted to me I'd made an
00:57:19 error. If you look at my contemporaneous notes, that's not what I asked them to do. I got confused
00:57:24 at the time of making my statement. That crew, I asked them to go and back up the initial crew in
00:57:31 the, there was a backup crew for the initial firefighting crew onto the fourth floor.
00:57:38 That's what I say in my contemporaneous notes, but I got mixed up in my police statement.
00:57:47 Yes, and
00:57:49 just say I'm clear about that. If you go to your contemporaneous notes, which
00:58:00 should be in the next tab in the witness bundle,
00:58:07 you say, and I think the reference you're giving us is about halfway down,
00:58:15 where you say other appliances have started to arrive. I briefed G36 BA crew to lay out a
00:58:23 covering jet. Is that the Hammersmith crew? That's it, yep. Right, and back up the initial crew.
00:58:28 That's correct. Is that the reference? That's what happened, yeah. I got confused at the time
00:58:32 of making my police statement. Okay, because I just wonder how, when you made your police statement,
00:58:36 you came to refer to going to the fifth floor as you were getting reports of a fire.
00:58:41 Because that's what I, in the end, that's what I asked Kensington's BA crew to do.
00:58:47 Right, okay. I initially asked, as I say there, I initially stood them by as an emergency team,
00:58:54 but when I got confirmation there was a fire in the fat on the fifth floor, I then asked them to
00:58:59 go up to the fifth floor. Right, just taking this slightly more in stages, could you explain what
00:59:05 an emergency team is? Yeah, so when resources allow, we have an emergency crew standing by
00:59:15 at the bridgehead where the entry control point is, and the purpose of them is to be
00:59:22 deployed should any of the firefighting teams get into difficulties.
00:59:28 So on this incident, we was quite short of, to start off with, everyone was busy, so
00:59:41 we were sort of getting tight with crews. Hammersmith turned up, I sent them in to back
00:59:45 up the initial crew, but by this time I had a really, it was obvious something was going wrong
00:59:51 because it had started, the incident was ramping up as we discussed earlier. So when they,
00:59:58 when Kensington crew turned up, they were very keen to get under air and get going and get in,
01:00:05 but I wanted them to stand by initially as an emergency team because I didn't know what was
01:00:09 going on, and it's my job to look after my crews. Yes, and standing by as an emergency
01:00:17 team, they would be in BA, would they? Yes, but not under air. But not under air. Yes,
01:00:22 what we call in standby mode, so their cylinder will be turned on, but they won't be under air,
01:00:29 they'll just be there with their face mask on, their necklaces, their helmet and gloves on,
01:00:33 ready to be deployed should they need to be. Right, and if they were needed to be deployed
01:00:39 for an emergency, what equipment would they take with them? So the emergency crew has to have a
01:00:46 minimum rank of a crew manager, and it has to be at least the size of the biggest crew. So if we
01:00:52 had a crew of three in there at that time, they would have to be a crew of three. At that time,
01:00:57 we had two crews of two, so that was enough to be my emergency team. If resources allowed, they
01:01:03 would take with them what we call a second set bag, so they'd literally have a bag with a spare BA
01:01:07 set in it, but we didn't have one at that time. So it's really, for their job at that point was
01:01:14 to listen to what was going on and be ready to be deployed to carry out any rescues to any
01:01:21 firefighting crews. Now you say that you were getting reports of a fire.
01:01:34 Were you getting reports of a fire higher up in the building? Yes, I was. And was that before or
01:01:40 after or at the same time as the Kensington BA crew arrived? That was before.
01:01:48 That was before. How long? No, sorry, that was after. So the Kensington crew had arrived,
01:01:54 and I told them to stand by the emergency team. When the confirmation came through,
01:01:59 there's a now fire in the flat above, that's when I deployed them to go to the fifth flight seat.
01:02:04 Now, first of all, who gave you the information that there was a fire in the flat above?
01:02:15 I can't remember if it was Mike or Justin O'Ban. Right. How did you hear it? Was it heard
01:02:23 on your fire ground radio or did you hear it? I heard, I've got the message over the fire ground
01:02:27 radio, but yeah, it was one of those two that I couldn't say for definite which one told me.
01:02:36 It was either Justin O'Byrne or Mike Downe telling you that. Yes. Okay. And
01:02:44 you then go on in your statement to say that
01:02:52 they both looked spooked so I could tell something was amiss. Now, that's a reference to, I think,
01:02:58 Jamal Stern and Richard Hipple. That's right. Just to clarify that. You say they both looked spooked.
01:03:07 Could you just expand on that? Yeah, I know them both fairly well. They're at the station next to
01:03:14 ours, and I could tell by the look on their faces that they were very upset.
01:03:20 I could tell by the look on their faces that they'd obviously seen on the way and what was going on
01:03:25 the outside. I could tell by the look on their faces that they had a look of concern about them
01:03:29 as to what was going on. Did you ask them what they'd seen on the outside? I don't think I did
01:03:34 because at that time, like I say, it was very chaotic and I was dealing with a task. I can't
01:03:41 remember what I was doing. I remember I looked round and they were there and one of them was
01:03:44 pretty much taking his harness off his mask, pretty much ready to put it on to go straight in.
01:03:51 That's when I said, no, stand by as an emergency team because I want to keep an emergency team for
01:03:55 the time being. Then I carried on with what I was doing. It was a very brief, you're not going in
01:04:03 just yet, stand by. Okay. You then go on a sentence or two on to say in your statement,
01:04:08 firefighter Robert was doing a sweep. You see that? He reported back that there were fires on sixth
01:04:13 and seventh floors. That's correct. Now, just breaking that up a little bit, you say he was
01:04:17 doing a sweep. What was he doing in general terms? He was doing some investigating of what was going
01:04:25 on inside. Like I say, none of us, this was all alien territory for all of us. Everyone was like,
01:04:33 what is going on here? Because this is strange. This isn't normal. Justin O'Byrne was having a
01:04:41 look around inside to see where the fire was breaking out and just giving us a feel of what
01:04:45 was going on inside the building. I remember him telling me that it's now going on the sixth and
01:04:53 the seventh. Okay. I'll come back to that in just a second. Just in terms of Justin O'Byrne's
01:04:57 movements, he told us when he gave evidence that that was something he did off his own bat. Did he
01:05:03 tell you that he was going to conduct an exploration of the higher floors? I can't remember if he's
01:05:10 specifically used those words, but at the same time I was aware he was doing it. Right. Okay.
01:05:17 Did you hear him report back to Mike Dowden that he had found a fire on the fifth floor?
01:05:30 I can't remember specifically that piece of information, but I can remember he was having
01:05:36 lots of communication. I remember hearing his voice a lot on the radio, so he was communicating
01:05:43 back, but I can't remember specifically the message he just asked me about. Just to get it
01:05:48 from your point of view, if Justin O'Byrne had got to the fifth floor, found a fire there, used his
01:05:54 fire ground radio to communicate that fact on channel one, is that something you would have
01:06:01 heard? Yeah, and that's probably what I heard when I committed Kensington's crew to the fifth floor.
01:06:06 Okay. In the same way, in the normal course of things, is that something that Mike Dowden
01:06:13 would have heard downstairs on the ground? I say yes, it would have come through his radio,
01:06:19 but I can't guarantee he wasn't talking to someone. Right. But yeah, if he was listening
01:06:25 to his radio at that moment, yes, most definitely he would have heard it. Okay. Then you say,
01:06:30 just to come to it, he reported back that there were fires on sixth and seventh floors.
01:06:35 Just taking these in stages, we've heard the message about the fifth. How soon after
01:06:40 his report that there was a fire on the fifth floor did he report that there was a fire on the sixth?
01:06:45 It was straight away, because I remember he said it was going on the fifth floor, so I said to
01:06:52 Kensington, the far far, a kipple and crew manager stern, I said, right, get under air and go up to
01:06:58 the fifth floor and see what's going on up there. And as soon as I said that to them, he was then
01:07:03 saying it's going on the sixth. And then I was like, right, okay. I was thinking of my next plan
01:07:08 of action. And then he, you know, before I had a chance to process what was going to happen,
01:07:13 he's just now telling me it was going on the seventh as well. Right. So the space and time
01:07:19 between him telling you about the fifth, the sixth and the seventh is what? Short. Short.
01:07:26 Right. Now, you then say, I heard watch manager down and make pumps 10. Now, just in terms of a
01:07:37 time fix on that, we have that in the short incident log as timed at 01 24 09, is when pumps
01:07:45 were made 10, or the message at least had come back, had come back as confirmed. So the discovery,
01:07:52 your discovery from Justin O'Byrne or fires on the sixth and seventh floors was
01:08:00 was before that or was that after that? I think it was before that. Before that.
01:08:08 Right. So when you say I heard Mike down and watch manager down and make pumps 10, that's after you
01:08:12 heard the files on the sixth and seventh floor. Yeah, a lot happens at that moment. I was getting
01:08:18 reports from Justin that the fires were breaking out on the sixth and seventh floors. I had Mike
01:08:23 saying that he was going to make it up. And we'd also used all of our BA wearers. And it is that
01:08:28 point I handed over the bridgehead to watch manager O'Keefe. And because we've run out of
01:08:33 breathing apparatus wearers, so I was going to go and put on a breathing apparatus set to go myself.
01:08:39 Right. Now, you then say in the next sentence, I told the Kensington firefighter crew,
01:08:44 that's Jamal Stern and Dickie Richard Hippel to go and back up the Hammersmith firefighter crew on
01:08:51 the fifth floor. Was the Hammersmith firefighter crew on the fifth floor? No, that was me getting
01:09:02 confused at the time of my statement. So that's the same mistake, isn't it? Yeah, I apologize,
01:09:08 but it's not accurate. No, no problem at all. I just want to get this clear. So I told the
01:09:13 Kensington firefighter crew something. What did you tell them to do? The Kensington firefighter
01:09:18 crew, I asked them to go to the fifth floor and investigate and firefight if they needed to.
01:09:22 Right. And what did they do next? Reported to entry control, went under air and took some
01:09:30 equipment with them and off they went. Right. Now, we've got, just in terms of a timestamp,
01:09:40 we've got Hippel and Stern, Kensington, tallying out respectively at 01 1722 and 01 1746.
01:09:51 So that's quite a long time before make pumps 10, seven minutes or so on our timing.
01:10:01 And indeed, that's actually before make pumps eight. So just in terms of timing,
01:10:06 can you help me? Would that be about right? It doesn't help you, but it's very hard to remember
01:10:12 the exact time scale of how it happened. It was all sort of, it's all coming in. And it all happened
01:10:19 in that short space of time. But unfortunately, I can't give you a definite answer of this happened
01:10:25 and that happened and that happened. There's a lot of information in a very short period of time.
01:10:37 Let me just see if we can get a clearer fix on this.
01:10:45 If you, if you're shown, and I'm sorry to ask you to look at this as a sort of digression,
01:10:50 but let's work, it may be worth it. If you look at the telemetry data, you could be shown that.
01:10:57 And let's just look at the Hippel-Stern pair, Kensington in brown,
01:11:05 or no, it's green actually. There you can see that they tally out at 1.1722 Richard Hippel and 1.1746.
01:11:19 And if you just go across the page a bit, you can see when they log on to the ECB, which is only a
01:11:25 minute or so later, 01.1819 and 01.1821. So if that's correct, and we've got no reason to think
01:11:34 that isn't correct, what would that tell you about when you dispatched Hippel and Stern to the fifth
01:11:43 floor? Let's say it all happened kind of at once. It may have been that I said to them, look,
01:11:53 going up to the fifth floor, and I may have handed over to Brian O'Keefe, and then he may well have
01:12:00 rebreathed them or committed them. It was at that point the bridgehead was handed over and I went.
01:12:07 I can't remember if they'd left the entry control point by then. So it may well have been that Brian
01:12:14 O'Keefe rebreathed them or held them back. I don't know. But because it all happened at once,
01:12:23 that could have been why there was a bit of a delay there from what I'm saying and how it happened.
01:12:29 Let me just try and unpick that a little bit. Was it you who asked or instructed Hippel and Stern
01:12:35 to go to the fifth floor? From memory, yes. And then short, like I say, when you're talking about
01:12:48 it, it sounds like a lot, but it's kind of like, right, there's a fire on the fifth.
01:12:53 And I gave him a real basic brief of what was going on. And then I turned to watch manager O'Keefe
01:13:03 and said, look, we're running out of BA. There's no point in two of us doing this. I said, are you
01:13:08 happy to run the bridgehead? And I'll go, I'm going to say, yeah, great. So at that point I went. So
01:13:14 I don't know if they then turned to Brian O'Keefe and said, what do you want us to do, Gav? Or I
01:13:19 don't know if he rebreathed them or I don't know if they took my briefing, checked in and went.
01:13:23 I never actually saw them checking the BA board. So I did give them a woolly brief, a loose brief
01:13:29 of there's now a fire on the fifth, but I'm unclear from my memory if they checked in and went or if
01:13:36 I'd gone and it's all a bit. Right. Can we be clear though that you received your message from
01:13:43 Justin O'Byrne about a fire on the fifth before Hippel and Stern tallied out and logged onto the
01:13:51 ECB? Yes, that's clear. Yeah. So on that basis, would it be right that Justin O'Byrne had found
01:13:57 a fire on the fifth, told you about it before 01 17 22? Yes, I would say so. Thank you very much.
01:14:13 Okay. You then just described how you left the tower.
01:14:30 Before you do that, if I can just show you your statement, it says two thirds of the way down on
01:14:35 page five, you say, I told firefighter Brian O'Keefe to take over the bridgehead and I would go and
01:14:44 get the BA set on. And that's, that is what you just told us today. Firefighter Brian O'Keefe.
01:14:52 He's a watch manager. I've just either I've made a mistake or it's, yeah, exactly. And he's
01:14:59 more senior to you. He is. Yes. Yes. And when you say you
01:15:09 told him what had happened and that the fire was spreading to other floors,
01:15:14 could you, are you able to expand on that in terms of the briefing you gave him or is really?
01:15:20 No, from memory, I was up there running the bridgehead and then watch manager O'Keefe arrived
01:15:28 and he was kind of watching what was going on. He was kind of taking it all in, I guess,
01:15:33 and building up his own picture of what was happening. I remember him on a radio discussing
01:15:40 with Mike about making it up and requesting more resources. I remember seeing him do that.
01:15:49 The handover was really brief
01:15:50 and in the sense that I just, I know Brian, he's at the station next to me. He's a competent officer.
01:16:04 I knew he'd been standing there watching what was going on. So he had a good sort of picture
01:16:09 of what was happening. And it was, it was at that point I turned and said to him, look, we're both
01:16:15 stood here doing this. So we're running out of BA. Shall I go and get a set on? He's like, yeah,
01:16:19 great. So it was a brief handover. But at that time it was, there was a real sense of urgency
01:16:26 of, you know, we needed to get going here. In the ideal world, I would have given him a full
01:16:30 handover and, you know, but it wasn't, you know, haste was of the essence really.
01:16:37 So you told, the gist of it isn't you told him that the
01:16:44 fire was spreading to other floors. Did he say anything to you about exterior fire spread?
01:16:57 I can't remember. I remember we'd had, while I was still running the bridgehead, I remember we'd
01:17:03 exchanged words, but I can't remember what we'd spoken. He could have well done that,
01:17:07 but I can't remember. Right. Because he, of course, had come into the tower from the outside.
01:17:12 Yeah. So he'd seen it. You'd have to ask him how the, you know, what he saw.
01:17:18 I think I was in a bit of a, not in a nice way, I was in a bit of a unique position there because
01:17:26 when I was pretty much the only one that had seen it from a small fire and then I hadn't seen it
01:17:31 any other way, all I was doing was picture him trying to picture what was going on.
01:17:36 The other crews arrived and they've seen whatever they've seen as they've arrived and they've come
01:17:41 knowing that hang on, there's something missing. And all I'm running on is a picture that I've
01:17:45 built up in my mind because last time I saw it outside, the building was fine and it was just a
01:17:49 small fire in the window. I'm trying to picture what's going on. Yes.
01:18:00 At the moment you left the bridgehead, had Charlie Batterby yet tallied in or arrived back at the
01:18:08 bridgehead? No, I don't think he had. Right. Now we've got him tallying into the bridgehead at 0131,
01:18:17 sorry, 0132 11. So can we take it that you had left the bridgehead by that point? Yes. Okay.
01:18:29 Okay. If you want a time fix of when I left the bridgehead, I tally in
01:18:37 and when I left the bridgehead, I went downstairs, made my way outside to the nearest fire appliance.
01:18:44 It was one of North Kensington's, I can't remember which one it was and I grabbed a BA set,
01:18:53 put it on and went straight back in. So I would say that would have taken me five minutes.
01:18:58 Another couple of minutes for briefing. So I would say I probably left the bridgehead with
01:19:01 Brian O'Keefe seven to eight minutes before I tally in at the vehicle. Right, but that's helpful.
01:19:07 And we have your tally in time as 1.33.57 in fact, but we'll explore that in some detail now,
01:19:14 but if we can. So you leave the bridgehead, Charlie Batterby is not there, so we think that's before
01:19:21 01.32.11 because that's his tally back in time and you go downstairs where you say,
01:19:28 and this is at the bottom of page five of your statement, you have a conversation with Mike
01:19:32 Dowden. You see that you say, I left the BH and ran downstairs. I went outside and met
01:19:38 watch manager down outside, just pausing there. Where exactly was he standing when you met him?
01:19:46 So he would have been on the southeast corner on the grass.
01:19:50 Southeast corner. And you look up at the tower and you say the fire must have been at least
01:19:56 three quarters of the way up the building. Would you like a break? We could take a break if you
01:20:10 want to. Okay. Let's just take this slowly.
01:20:18 Let's just take the statement off the board.
01:20:24 Just close down. I'm okay, sir. Thank you.
01:20:27 Thank you.
01:20:40 Now in your statement, you say, I said to Mike Dowden,
01:20:46 Jesus Christ, what have you made it? He said 10 pumps. And you said, I said, I would make it 15
01:20:54 to 20 because it looks like we are losing it. By this, I meant that the fire appeared to be
01:21:00 getting away from us. It was doing what it wanted rather than us controlling it.
01:21:05 I think we need a break. Whether you think or not, we need a break.
01:21:09 There's the usher, if you would. And don't talk to anyone about your evidence.
01:21:13 I think at this stage, Mr Millett, unless it's going to disrupt your questions too much,
01:21:27 we'll have 15 minutes. I think we should. And I'll see if I can move on from this detail.
01:21:38 Take whatever course you think necessary. Let me just examine my questions.
01:21:42 Yes, of course. Right. We'll break now and we'll resume at five past 11.
01:22:12 Thank you.
01:42:12 Mr Millett, the secret is ready to go on. Yes. But I think we ought to be
01:42:34 thinking about another short break in half an hour, 40 minutes, depending on how things go.
01:42:40 I think not more than 40 minutes. Not more than 40 minutes.
01:42:43 Outside, I'm afraid. Well, thank you very much, Mr Chairman. If we could please have Mr Secret back.
01:42:57 All right. Happy to go on? Yes.
01:43:08 Now, I've already said to Mr Millett that I think we should
01:43:12 seek to have another break in 30, 40 minutes. Okay.
01:43:16 In any event. But if you need a break before then, just make sure I know.
01:43:20 Okay. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Millett.
01:43:27 At the point at which you had this discussion with Mike Dowden outside,
01:43:34 did you have a discussion with him about alternatives to firefighting?
01:43:39 No. No, I came out and had a look and like I said in my statement, asked, you know,
01:43:46 realised what was going on. And yeah, my initial suggestion was to request more pumps. I'm sure he
01:43:53 was on top of it anyway. That was just my input, if you like. What did he do next? Do you remember?
01:44:00 He ran straight off to the appliance and I assume that's what he did.
01:44:05 Can we scroll forward then a little bit in time? You go back to the bridgehead.
01:44:11 And I think you say you went there with Chris, with Chris Dawgu. That's correct. Right.
01:44:16 Where had he been when you met him?
01:44:21 When I got to the appliance, it was either Gov 271 or Gov 272 to get a breathing apparatus set.
01:44:30 I can't remember if I was on there then he got on or if he was already on there. But we basically
01:44:34 met in the back of the machine or back of the appliance putting on our breathing apparatus sets
01:44:39 together. And I asked him, had he been briefed to do anything? He said, no, I'm just getting a
01:44:44 set on us. We'll come with me because we might as well go in together as we know each other.
01:44:47 Right. And to cut a slightly long story short, you went back to the bridgehead. That's correct.
01:44:54 And who was in charge there at that stage? Do you remember? Watch manager Brian O'Keefe.
01:44:57 Brian O'Keefe. And who was on BA entry control? Alex Decent-Orbin.
01:45:02 At that time you might have had Justin O'Byrne assisting him.
01:45:06 Right. And picking it up in your statement on page six, about a quarter of the way down,
01:45:12 what I might call the third paragraph, you say, when we got to the BH it was
01:45:15 even more chaotic than when I'd left it.
01:45:21 Can you give us an idea of how many people were at the bridgehead at that stage? I say people,
01:45:27 BA wearers.
01:45:35 I can't give you a number, but it was busy up there. There was people in breathing apparatus
01:45:43 sets. Justin was back there with Alex on the BA board. I've got a vague memory of the bridgehead
01:45:58 just being busy. I couldn't tell you how many people were there. I'll finish, yes, sir.
01:46:06 Okay. In your statement, you go on to say in this next line, people were writing on the walls.
01:46:12 There were numerous FSG calls coming in, a list of them, which I have not experienced before.
01:46:19 And then you mention a report of someone being stuck in a wheelchair on eighth floor
01:46:24 that couldn't get out. And then just numerous calls going up on the walls, one after the other.
01:46:31 We'll just see if I can explore that a bit. People were writing on the walls. Who was doing
01:46:35 the writing? I can't remember. I think it was
01:46:38 Justin or Alex. And they were just sort of like... You say Justin? Justin O'Byrne is that? Yeah.
01:46:51 Or Alex Decent-Orbin. And what was the wall they were writing on? Which wall in the
01:47:00 second floor lobby? I really can't remember. Okay.
01:47:08 And where did you think at the time they were getting the information they were writing up on
01:47:14 the walls from? Over the handheld radios. Because I could hear some of it going on.
01:47:22 You know, various people stuck. And I just remember the information going on
01:47:29 as we were sort of pretty much running back from the appliance back into the room.
01:47:36 Pretty much running back from the appliance back into the building. I remember hearing it
01:47:39 all going on. And when we got there, there was lists being written down. Right.
01:47:51 And when I put FSG call in there, that may be an assumption on my part. There was definitely...
01:47:59 So the FSG is the process that I'm sure you're aware of now.
01:48:04 There was basically lists of people that were stuck. I assume there were FSG calls.
01:48:10 Right. That was what I was going to ask you. So people were writing on the walls,
01:48:13 there were numerous FSG calls coming in. A list of them. So
01:48:22 when you say numerous FSG calls, can you just explain what you mean?
01:48:25 Yeah. So like I said, that was partly an assumption on my part. Because that would be a normal...
01:48:33 That would normally be where information would come from of people stuck in their flats.
01:48:38 They would make the call to control and control would feed that back to the fire ground. So we
01:48:42 was getting that information coming in. So my assumption was that they were, you know,
01:48:46 it was going through the normal method. But I'm now aware that a lot of, or at least some of the
01:48:53 reports of people stuck in the building were coming from various other means. But again,
01:48:57 that's not really a normal situation. Normally when we get information specifically
01:49:03 about someone stuck in a flat, it's normally via an FSG call.
01:49:08 Okay. And you say a list of them. Were people writing, or Justin or Alex, writing a list on the wall?
01:49:16 Yeah, I remember stuff getting written on the wall. It's kind of very helpful, but it's kind
01:49:23 of a hazy memory that I have, you know, stuff being written down. I can't remember the specifics
01:49:30 of the list, how many there was. I just remember it sort of looking and thinking, you know.
01:49:35 Okay. Let me just see if I can get a visual fix on this. If I can ask you to be shown
01:49:42 what is an exhibit to Justin O'Byrne's statement. It's exhibit four, which is at MET00015625.
01:49:50 Mr. Documents Director, if you could put that up. Let's see if this is anything like what you saw.
01:50:01 Now that's a list which Mr. O'Byrne gave evidence about, and it's an exhibit to his statement.
01:50:07 The three we think is wrong should be, I think, two. But leave that on one side. That sort of
01:50:13 information written on the wall there, is that the sort of thing that you remember seeing when
01:50:17 you got back to the bridgehead? Yeah, the list wasn't as large as that, but I probably saw the
01:50:23 start of that list. Right, thank you. And just to go back to a question I asked you a minute ago,
01:50:30 I know you answered it, but I just want to get some clarity if I can.
01:50:36 To get back to your statement, you say that there were FSG calls coming in.
01:50:48 I think you said they were coming in over the radio. Do you know where they were coming from?
01:50:55 No, like I say, that was my assumption that they were coming through the normal means,
01:51:01 i.e. from the caller to control back to the fire ground.
01:51:07 But I've learned they were coming from other sources, people that were there,
01:51:11 people that were grabbing hold of fire fighters. So it was coming in from all different
01:51:15 avenues that wouldn't be a normal situation. It was all getting past, everyone was talking to
01:51:22 each other over the handheld radios. Like I say, there was a constant flow of information coming
01:51:27 over and that's wherever the report of someone stuck came from, it got passed over the handheld
01:51:37 radio back to the bridgehead one way or another. When you got to the bridgehead, do you remember
01:51:43 what the pumps make up was? You've had a conversation with Mike Dowden and he said he'd
01:51:52 made pumps 10 and you suggested a higher number. Do you remember hearing what the pumps had gone
01:52:01 at the point when you rejoined the bridgehead? No, I would take a strong guess that that was
01:52:09 put across the radio but I don't remember hearing it. Right. Now we know that pumps went to 15 at
01:52:14 01 27 26 or so, I mean that's the message on the short incident log. Do you think that you went
01:52:21 back to the bridgehead before or after that time? 01 15. 01 27 26. I can't remember but like I say,
01:52:33 if you're trying to get a fix of when I got back, I wasn't on there long before I took my tally out
01:52:37 and went in, I wasn't hanging about on that floor for long. That's probably more accurate than my
01:52:42 memory. That's absolutely right and we've got your time of tally out at 1.33.57. So again,
01:52:49 just getting a time fix. Did you see these FSG calls being written up onto the wall?
01:52:56 Not that full list but there was stuff on the wall. And that was before you tallied out? Yes.
01:53:03 That's very helpful. Thank you. Now,
01:53:11 before we leave this FSG question in terms of information, did you see anybody
01:53:18 coming to the bridgehead with FSG information on a piece of paper?
01:53:26 Or pieces of paper? No. Okay. Did you see anybody coming up to the bridgehead and telling either
01:53:33 Brian O'Keefe or Alex Decent-Orbin about fire survival guidance information? I remember
01:53:42 Dave Padillo coming up with information of someone stuck and again at the time I assumed
01:53:46 that was from an FSG call. Right, we're going to explore that in a moment in some detail.
01:53:53 Before we do that, you say in your statement, and I've skipped over it a minute ago, you say
01:53:58 there were reports of someone being stuck in a wheelchair on the eighth floor.
01:54:04 This question of reports, what do you mean by reports? Was that talk on the bridgehead or was
01:54:09 there a written? No, from my memory, someone had made their way out of the building and
01:54:17 informed someone on the fireground that they've left someone behind that was in a wheelchair.
01:54:28 I remember that information being passed over the handheld radios.
01:54:31 Do you remember
01:54:39 there being any discussion about whether that was the right floor?
01:54:44 Was there a doubt about whether that was the floor?
01:54:51 There is doubt because that's my best recollection of the floor from my memory,
01:54:56 but a lot happened that night and I stand to be corrected that that wasn't the right floor.
01:55:02 That's my memory of it, but it could have been a different floor.
01:55:15 Do you remember whether there was any discussion, dispute, disagreement about whether the man was
01:55:22 stuck on the 11th floor as opposed to the 8th floor? No. Do you remember there being any
01:55:30 discussion at that stage about difficulties in numbering the floors, people having difficulties
01:55:35 finding people up in the building? Not at that stage, but I know from my own experience that
01:55:41 we'll probably move on to in a bit, there was difficulties in identifying floors,
01:55:46 but at that stage I hadn't heard anyone reporting it. Right, let me just capture this now then while
01:55:52 I can. You say that later on you knew from your own experience that there were difficulties in
01:56:01 identifying floors. When did you come to discover that there were those difficulties in identifying?
01:56:06 When I was making my way up to the 20th floor. Right, we'll come to that right now. Now on that
01:56:12 you say in your statement, page six, halfway down, beginning of I think the third paragraph,
01:56:19 I was standing there basically choosing one to go to and whilst I was doing that,
01:56:28 another FSG call came in for a 12 year old girl stuck on the 20th floor. Before I go on, Mr Seager,
01:56:35 I'm going to ask you some detailed questions about that process. Is that okay? Yeah. Okay.
01:56:40 All right. Now you say it's first of all basically choosing one to go to. Was that how it was working
01:56:50 on the bridgehead that a BA crew would look up and go and choose for themselves which one they
01:56:55 would go to or would the bridgehead manager or BA and control officer tell you? I can't speak for
01:57:03 everyone else but when we got to the bridgehead there was loads going on and before I'd had
01:57:14 chance to be briefed and given a task, I was just sort of standing there thinking, you know,
01:57:19 what's going on and just taking in the information and the list was starting to be put up and
01:57:27 I was looking to choose, well not choose, but I was looking for which call to go to.
01:57:35 Right. I hadn't been tasked and we was going to go under air and get going so it was just...
01:57:42 From what you could see, was watch manager O'Keefe or Alex Decent-Orbin
01:57:47 giving specific instructions to BA crews as to what flats or floors to go to?
01:57:52 I can't remember. I really can't remember. Okay. And you say whilst I was doing that,
01:58:00 another FSG call came in for a 12 year old girl stuck on the 20th floor.
01:58:05 Now you say another FSG call came in. What do you mean by that? So what I mean by that was
01:58:12 information was being told to me about a 12 year old girl stuck on the 20th floor and that
01:58:19 information came from firefighter Dawgoo. I remember I was kind of standing there
01:58:25 next to Alex at the BA board just thinking, right, where are we going to go? Because at that time,
01:58:29 it was me. I was paired up with Chris Dawgoo and we was kind of just sort of standing there waiting
01:58:35 to be tasked. I remember looking at the writing thinking, right, where are we going? And Chris
01:58:42 grabbed hold of me and said, look, there's a 12 year old girl stuck on the 20th floor.
01:58:46 And Dave's going up there. And I looked around and spoke to Dave. I said, what's going on, Dave?
01:58:55 He said he had the information of the flat and the age and who was stuck in there. And at that
01:59:04 point, no disrespect to the firefighter that Dave was with. But I said, look, if you're going up
01:59:10 there, we'll go up together as we all worked with each other. We knew each other and I felt
01:59:16 more comfortable us three going up together. Let's just take this a little bit more in stages if we
01:59:22 can. You say the information that you got came from Chris Dawgoo. Do you know where he got the
01:59:29 information? From Dave. Okay, because you say an FSG call came in for a 12 year old girl. I'm just
01:59:40 wondering whether that had come in to the bridgehead from a source. So again, that was my
01:59:46 assumption where that information came from. And it turns out I was wrong because that information
01:59:52 was passed directly today by a member of the public. Right. At the time of my statement,
01:59:59 I wasn't aware that's where he got the information from. I follow. And then when you go on in the
02:00:03 next sentence to say firefighter Dawgoo and I took that call. So yeah, so so referring to.
02:00:11 So as I said, I was standing there sort of waiting to be tasked or, you know, take ownership of a
02:00:19 rescue that needed carrying out. And then Chris pointed out to me that Dave had information.
02:00:25 So as we were a crew, that's, you know, what what the wording is there, we sort of decided to
02:00:32 attach ourselves to this piece of information and go and sort of attempt the rescue. So did
02:00:38 your information about fire survival guidance for the 12 year old girl on the 20th floor come from
02:00:45 or come through the bridgehead or did it come ultimately from Dave Bodeo?
02:00:49 Came from Dave Bodeo, but he was on the bridgehead. This is where the discussion and the.
02:00:55 And did you know where he had got that information from?
02:01:03 No, like I said, you know, time is of the essence and it's not normally a conversation.
02:01:13 And although it may seem obvious that here now it's not a conversation you'd have. I was given
02:01:18 that information. So it was a case of right. Well, look, us three, let's go. I didn't ask him where
02:01:22 he got that from. And that's why I said in my statement it came from an SSG call because that
02:01:26 was an assumption at the time of my statement. But I've learned that wasn't correct since.
02:01:32 How soon before you tallied out and you tally, we've got you tallying out at 013357 as I
02:01:43 think I mentioned. But how soon before that did you have this discussion with Chris Dawgu
02:01:51 about the girl on the 20th floor? It was immediately before there wasn't hanging about.
02:01:56 As soon as we got the information, it was right. OK, we rejigged the crews. Like I said, we set up
02:02:03 a crew of three, me, Dave and Chris, and we were straight under air and tallying out.
02:02:12 Let me just show you something in the short incident log that gives a time, but also maybe
02:02:17 some further information. It's tab 23 of the documents bundle.
02:02:25 I can ask you to go to page 18 in this document. And if you've looked with me at the timestamp 013138,
02:02:39 just to orientate you in this document, this is a short incident log created by the LFB
02:02:47 from a much longer document. And it shows the messages coming back and forth.
02:02:54 And 013138 PD service request, do you see that? RT4 to G271,
02:03:08 further call to say fire on 20th floor also, people trapped.
02:03:14 Now, first of all, that timing 013138, would that be about the time that you were having your
02:03:23 conversation with Chris Daugher about a girl trapped on the 20th floor?
02:03:28 I forgot what time I tallied out at.
02:03:30 1.33.57.
02:03:32 Yes, so within that two minutes, yeah, it was about all happening at the same time.
02:03:40 Happening at the same time.
02:03:41 Right. And just now I've shown you that that was a service request created and that message was
02:03:47 sent to G271. Do you remember whether that message came to the bridgehead at all in any way before
02:04:00 you tallied out? No, I don't remember if that specific message came to the bridgehead, but it
02:04:08 corresponds with the information Dave had. Yes. Now, you say in your statement,
02:04:27 halfway down, two lines down into that paragraph you've just been looking at, that firefighter
02:04:33 was there and he said someone had given him the keys to the flat with 12 year old girl in on 20th
02:04:38 floor. Do you know who had given him the keys? No. Did he say anything about who had given him
02:04:58 the keys? He could have done, I can't remember. Did he tell you anything else at that point
02:05:05 about the girl on the 20th floor? No, just the information that's there. I remember him saying
02:05:12 there's a girl on the 20th floor. Did he tell you that he'd already tried to get up to the 20th
02:05:16 floor on his own? I wasn't aware of that at the time, no. Did you know the girl's name? No.
02:05:24 Okay. At the time? I'm not sure, obviously do now. I'm not sure at the time. Okay, all right.
02:05:34 Do you remember any discussion about the flat number? Yes, Dave knew the flat number. Did he
02:05:40 tell you what it was? He did, yes. Do you remember what it was? 176.
02:05:46 You say in your statement, just to look at your statement, you say in the next sentence,
02:06:00 I told watch manager O'Keefe we were going to the 20th floor and we reported to firefighter Deeson
02:06:07 Torbin on the ECB as a crew of three, firefighter Dawgoo, firefighter Padillo and I.
02:06:18 Did you tell watch manager O'Keefe anything else during that briefing? No, it was very, very sure.
02:06:25 Did you tell him which flat you were going to, do you think? I really can't remember.
02:06:30 Did you know anything or see anything to lead you to think that
02:06:41 the girl was no longer in that flat but had moved? No, the information we got I considered
02:06:49 current and accurate. Just before I leave that
02:06:54 topic, did you see anything written on the wall? No, that information solely came from
02:07:00 David Padillo. Okay. Now the three of you then tally out and you give your tallies to
02:07:08 Alex Deeson Torbin and we do as I said to you before, we've got your tally out personally at
02:07:14 01 3357. It might just be worth just looking at the telemetry detector to get a fix on that.
02:07:22 If we go to that, it's tab one of the documents bundle and in the
02:07:30 BA timeline two in the light blue we have you as the second of the three,
02:07:40 secret Christopher and then we've got you tallying out 01 3357 and logging on to ECB at 01 3424.
02:07:49 Do you see that? Yes. We've got your crewmates, David Padillo, tallying out at 01 3333 and logging
02:07:56 on to the ECB at 01 3358 and Chris Dawgu, very similar, tallying out at 01 3501 and logging on
02:08:06 to the ECB at 01 3519. So that gives a time fix. Then what happened next? You tallyed out,
02:08:18 where do you go next? We went to the lift. Is that in accordance with policy? No. So why did
02:08:25 you go to the lift? It was a decision, I can't remember if I made it solely or we discussed,
02:08:36 but we was going a long way up the building and it's not in policy but I wanted to use the lift to
02:08:42 break the back of the journey going up there. It was probably in hindsight too far to go on
02:08:47 a standard duration BASET because it's a lot of work to get up there so I wanted to use the lift
02:08:52 to get a lot of the hard work done for us. Did you tell anybody you were using the lift to get up?
02:08:59 No. But I think I've got your evidence which is that you used it because you were concerned
02:09:06 that otherwise you would run out of air because it was so far to go. Exactly. Okay. Now you then
02:09:11 say in your statement that two thirds of the way down,
02:09:21 well no, let me just pick it up a little further down. You say four lines up from the bottom.
02:09:30 The lift arrived, we put all our equipment in and then went in. I retained carrying my hose. The
02:09:38 doors shut and moved up and it stopped on the sixth.
02:09:45 And then you say a line or two down. As the doors opened the lift immediately filled with
02:09:50 a thick black wall of smoke. Straight away we could not see one another.
02:09:57 Now just in terms of sixth, Dave Bodeo told us that his recollection was that it had stopped
02:10:04 at the eighth floor and I think Chris Dawg who's statement says something similar.
02:10:11 We've explored that with Dave Bodeo and I just want to explore that with you. What do you remember?
02:10:17 Was it the sixth or the eighth? I remember it being the sixth but like I say that's, you know,
02:10:26 a lot happened that night so I could be wrong. Okay. And you've described the conditions.
02:10:35 Immediately you opened the door and in terms of smoke, what about temperature? Did you experience
02:10:41 anything in terms of temperature at that floor when the lift doors opened? Not that I remember.
02:10:47 Right. And what about visibility into the lobby? Did you see anything when the doors opened?
02:10:54 It was very poor. Right. I said that the lift doors opened and
02:10:59 immediately, yeah, it filled with fairly thick smoke and I couldn't really see the other two
02:11:08 that were in the lift with me and it was at that point I said look we're not going up any further,
02:11:13 we're going to get out of the lift here. Were you surprised to find smoke on the sixth floor?
02:11:18 Absolutely.
02:11:24 You I think told us earlier that you had learned from Justin O'Burner earlier,
02:11:29 indeed before you I think you left the bridgehead, that he had found fire on the fifth, sixth
02:11:34 and seventh floor. So if it was the sixth floor, why would you be surprised to find smoke on the
02:11:39 sixth floor? Because if there's a fire in a flat it doesn't necessarily mean that the lobby is
02:11:44 going to be smoked out as badly as it was and also it was a surprise that we stopped at the
02:11:52 sixth because I pressed floor 15. I thought it was going to the 15th and it stopped at the sixth
02:11:58 unexpectedly. You say you pressed 15.
02:12:11 Not sure we got that from you. So when you got into the lift you pressed 15? Yeah, one of us pressed
02:12:17 floor 15. Right and why was that and not floor 20? Because we knew there was
02:12:24 all we had before, so a fire on the floor on the 20th floor. My intention was to break the back
02:12:30 of the journey using the lift. I was fully aware that it was not the brightest idea to use the lift
02:12:37 but it was a case of weighing up the risk of going up there with standard duration BA set
02:12:43 or utilizing the lift. So I didn't want to go all the way because obviously the
02:12:47 worst case scenario is that the lift opens and you're faced with a fire with no water.
02:12:53 So I made the decision to go to the 15th to break the back of the journey and hopefully
02:13:00 it would be okay. Right, you said a minute ago that you knew there was or I think it's been
02:13:10 taken down as had thoughts of fire on the floor on the 20th floor. Did you say thoughts or reports?
02:13:20 Sorry. In your answer, your last answer to me. Yeah. Well let me just see if I can get at it this way.
02:13:25 You pressed the button in the lift to go to the 50th floor. Yeah. What at that stage did you know
02:13:31 about the possibility of there being fire on the 20th floor? Because someone was trapped that's
02:13:41 that would be you know there's no smoke without fire so the assumption would be that there's a
02:13:46 fire on the 20th floor so that that was what I was planning for in my mind and that's what I was
02:13:52 expecting. Right. Had you actually heard any reports come to you that there was in fact fire or smoke
02:13:59 on the 20th floor? No, but that that's the assumption I made because someone was trapped.
02:14:04 Now you say the floor the lift stopped do you know why it had did you know why it had stopped on the
02:14:12 sixth or eighth floor? I had an educated guess that someone's called the lift but there'd be
02:14:18 no other reason for it to stop. When the lift stopped and the smoke came in did did you or did
02:14:27 Chris Daugher or Dave Padillo radio down to the bridgehead to let them know about the conditions
02:14:33 that you have just discovered at that floor? No, but our radios were quiet by that point which
02:14:39 indicated to me was out of range. Your radios were quiet. When you say quiet do you mean not
02:14:45 receiving any human voices or simply completely silent? I don't remember any communications
02:14:54 coming over the radio. At what point do you remember the communications over the radio
02:15:00 ceasing as you went up? I don't remember the specific point.
02:15:07 I just remember that there was nothing coming over it. Not at this point but fairly soon after that
02:15:16 I tried to communicate with the inch control board myself and I had no joy. Right so so but you're in
02:15:24 the lift at this stage sixth or eighth floor the doors have opened you've seen the smoke
02:15:29 yeah but at that at that stage you're saying yes the radio had gone yeah whatever floor we was on
02:15:36 my radio was quiet which tells me it wasn't receiving any communications okay and just to
02:15:41 just to pick it apart a little bit more did you notice at any point when the lift was rising that
02:15:47 traffic on your radio had stopped? No. Did you still get radio traffic on your
02:15:55 fire ground radio when you were still at the bridgehead?
02:15:59 I can't remember yes I would get the radio was definitely working at the bridgehead.
02:16:03 Right so at some point between you leaving the bridgehead and arriving at the sixth or eighth
02:16:08 floor in the lift you're saying your fire ground radio stopped? That's correct. Communicating
02:16:14 right but you can't remember when exactly but definitely by the time you've got to the sixth
02:16:19 or eighth floor in the lift. It was quiet yeah whichever floor it was like so there's obviously
02:16:24 confusion there um it was even it was definitely the sixth or the eighth whichever floor we was on
02:16:29 yeah that was out of range. And you say you um you said sorry you say at the top
02:16:44 of page seven I said we're not going any further in the lift and that we would get off here and
02:16:49 walk up. Why did you think you weren't going any further in the lift? I wasn't prepared to um I see.
02:17:00 So that was a decision you made rather than the functionality of the lift giving out on you? Yeah.
02:17:04 Okay you said I swept about for the person who had called the lift but I was not able to find them.
02:17:09 When you say I swept about did you did you shout? Yes no I didn't shout I don't remember shouting
02:17:14 if I did um so the lift filled with smoke and then we kind of shuffled out and we knew roughly that
02:17:22 where the staircase was and uh as we made away I'll sweep in my boot to see if I could feel anyone.
02:17:28 Right okay and what about the others were they were they doing the same thing? I don't know I
02:17:33 couldn't really see them I could just about make out whichever one was in front of me make out their
02:17:38 breathing apparatus cylinder. Right and then you go on to say page seven four lines down
02:17:44 I felt about the walls and found the door the temperature was hot but nothing I wouldn't have
02:17:48 expected. How were the conditions uh sorry what condition the temperature was hot was that in the
02:17:55 stair stairwell or in the in the lobby where it was hot? Um I don't remember having any feelings
02:18:03 or thoughts of temperature in the lobby but I remember feeling it was warm on the steps.
02:18:12 Yeah right so you come out of the lift on this floor sixth or eighth conditions are very poor
02:18:19 you find the door to the stairwell uh and you open it do you? Yes. Do you are you the one who opens it?
02:18:27 No I believe I was in the middle. Right so who would have opened it? Dave Padillo. Dave Padillo
02:18:31 owns it and you come into the stairwell and what are the conditions like in the stairwell? Smoky.
02:18:37 Smoky how similar to the smokiness? Not as bad as the lobby um I remember it was a little bit clearer
02:18:46 but not a lot clearer. And how about illumination could you do you see any light? Um
02:18:55 um yeah there was a um a bulkhead on the wall I just remember seeing it on each floor just glowing
02:19:05 it wasn't I wouldn't say it was giving me any useful light it was just glowing. Okay. But yeah
02:19:10 so I wouldn't call it lighting. Did you at that stage chance to look at the the number whether
02:19:16 there was any numbering on the walls to tell you which level you were on? No not at that stage um
02:19:21 but we started descending the stairs and it wasn't too long before we I tried my radio and
02:19:28 I remember looking to try and work out where it was to give them a position fix it was also having
02:19:35 a bit of a break because it it was hard work going up the stairs so gives you a chance to get some
02:19:40 breaths in you and while you try your radio and I remember having a quick look and we I was like
02:19:47 completely unaware what floor we was on right there was no easy way of identifying where we was
02:19:53 and did did the conditions as you as you went up the stairs stay the same in terms of smokiness
02:19:59 or did they get better or did they get worse got worse right um and when you were looking for the
02:20:05 floor numbering what was it that made it difficult to to to find um or identify the smoke and um the
02:20:15 fact that there was no clear ladling of the floors um the floors were that were numbered
02:20:22 were kind of just written on you know almost not permanent marker almost like the residents have
02:20:28 done it themselves they know you know they've marked up the floors it didn't look like a
02:20:33 uniformed each floor had its own number stamped which is you know quite often you will find the
02:20:39 case um if you go up a a tower block on the stairs you know you'd normally have a number above the
02:20:44 door of something or on the wall um I don't remember there being any clear number in just
02:20:49 numbers like say that it looked like they'd been written on with a permanent marker
02:20:54 and how big were these numbers when you did they varied because they're all like say it was sort
02:20:58 of handwriting people I don't know who'd written them on and but so each one was a different
02:21:03 different size different shape different handwriting it's just like a scribble of each number
02:21:08 is that something you'd ever come across before inside a stairwell in a high-rise building um
02:21:15 I may have done but it's not something that I can recall seeing before so it's not it's not I
02:21:19 wouldn't say it's common no you say uh seven lines down from the top of page seven I tried to call
02:21:32 firefighter decent orbit on my handheld radio at some point to update him but he couldn't hear me
02:21:38 as we were out of range so just just describe if you could for us what that involved
02:21:47 um so that was me um I'd say stopping for to get some breath um and also I had a roll of hose
02:21:57 and to reach charm and they're really heavy I remember I kept stopping to give my arms a rest
02:22:01 and while I was doing that I was trying to update him on the radio rather than sit there and just
02:22:05 you know we're talking seconds it wasn't a long a long pause but I remember a couple of times I
02:22:11 tried to call him and I remember Chris Dorgo trying as well but none of us um were getting any joy
02:22:17 there's nothing coming back that's how you would know is it there would be something if you'd got
02:22:21 them if you'd got alex something would have come back from him yeah he would yeah he wouldn't
02:22:25 ignore us if he if he'd heard it he would have come back to us right so that's how you knew you
02:22:30 were out of range yeah I see and at what point on the climb did you uh try to reach alex
02:22:36 disson durbin on your radio in that way fairly soon after we got out of the lift right did you
02:22:41 try again as you went up tried two or three times on the way up okay did it surprise you to find
02:22:47 that you were unable to get anything from alex disson durbin on your radio as he went up the
02:22:53 tower um didn't surprise me no
02:23:00 why's that um because it's not unusual for I'll say you know our comms are great for the fire grounds
02:23:09 um but um they're notoriously unreliable uh for breathing apparatus wears you say notoriously
02:23:20 unreliable is that it's quite often to not get a signal you can't hear who you're talking to
02:23:26 or it's not all the time but at the same time it's not you know it's not that uncommon in your
02:23:35 experience is it a well-known problem in the london fire brigade that um I wouldn't yeah I
02:23:43 wouldn't say it's a problem it but yeah I guess yeah it is yeah well when a well-known feature
02:23:49 yeah yeah it's a well-known feature that the comms are a bit
02:23:54 yeah not as reliable as you know your handheld firebrand radio um
02:24:01 mr secret this is a very very you're talking about um yeah I'm referring to both I didn't
02:24:08 actually have a Barry sit on I had my handheld radio that's what I was talking on um but it's
02:24:17 not uncommon to go out of range it's it wasn't like a bolt out of the blue hang on none of
02:24:23 us wasn't expecting this it was just like okay no one can hear us now it's you know it happens
02:24:28 right um mr secret we've been going now for about 40 minutes I think perhaps a short break okay
02:24:35 might be a little bit idea we'll have a short break and um please don't talk about your evidence
02:24:42 to anyone else okay and we'll we'll resume at five past 12 okay all right thank you very much
02:24:57 right five past 12 please
02:25:12 you
02:25:42 you
02:26:12 you
02:26:42 you
02:27:12 you
02:27:42 you
02:28:12 you
02:28:42 you
02:29:12 you
02:29:42 you
02:30:12 you
02:30:42 you
02:31:12 you
02:31:42 you
02:32:12 you
02:32:42 you
02:33:12 you
02:33:42 you
02:34:12 you
02:34:42 you
02:35:12 you
02:35:42 you
02:36:12 you
02:36:42 you
02:37:12 you
02:37:26 before the witness comes back in can I just say that I'm very conscious that it's getting rather
02:37:31 warm in here uh anyone who wants to take off a jacket or anything else I suppose um
02:37:38 um should feel free to do so ties are not compulsory uh but more to the point I have
02:37:45 asked inquiries to be made about the air conditioning and I'm hoping that if not
02:37:50 straight away at least by the time we come back after lunch it may be a bit more comfortable but
02:37:55 I can't do any more than that right is uh it's a secret though
02:38:08 all right you happy to go on yes I'm ready very good thank you very much Mr Secret um can I just
02:38:23 go back very briefly over a couple of things that might appear to you to be old ground yes and I
02:38:28 think probably are a bit first of all when you left the bridgehead well before you left the bridgehead
02:38:35 uh what did you know of firefighter o'burn's visit to the seventh floor eighth ninth tenth
02:38:44 and eleventh or twelfth floors um
02:38:54 I was aware he was doing a sweep if I'm gonna call it that or information gathering um
02:39:05 I remember him saying that there was smoke logging on various floors um I remember him saying that
02:39:10 but I can't remember the specifics right about which floor but I was aware what he what he was
02:39:15 doing and the information was most definitely coming back through the radios right I'm just
02:39:21 trying to get a picture of how high the floors were that he was communicating about before
02:39:27 uh before you left the bridge I couldn't remember I can't remember the sort of specifics of right
02:39:32 I didn't have a specific conversation moving that sticks in my mind I just remember sort of his
02:39:36 voice on the radio sort of reporting smoke on various floors okay now you say smoke on various
02:39:42 floors do you remember whether he said anything about fires in in flats I can't remember I really
02:39:49 can't remember okay um at the moment when you and firefighters dogu and badio left the bridgehead
02:40:01 to go to the 20th floor and I've asked you this before well I just want to get clarity at that
02:40:06 moment did you tell watch manager O'Keefe we are going to the 20th floor from my memory yes did he
02:40:14 say anything to you in response no I I remember briefly telling him but I don't remember um
02:40:22 I don't remember an ex you know a conversation about it or an exchange of words
02:40:27 um almost definitely you know it was crystal clear with Alex decent orbit he knew where he was going
02:40:32 and he was on the entry control board um but from memory watch manager O'Keefe he had
02:40:40 10 different things going on he's a very busy chap at that point um he was a very busy chap
02:40:47 you know 10 different things going on he's a very busy chap at that point um yeah do you did you
02:40:54 think at the time and it's hard to call everything in detail I know but did you think at the time
02:40:59 that you had conveyed to Alex decent orbit when you told him I'm going to the we're going to the
02:41:05 20th floor that there was a possibility of fire and smoke on the 20th floor that was my assumption
02:41:12 because we had reports someone's trapped yeah um otherwise if it was clear they wouldn't be trapped
02:41:19 that was sounds obvious but that that was no one specifically told me there was fire and smoke up
02:41:24 there but I assume there was and that's why there's someone was trapped yes now in your statement
02:41:32 you say on page seven about a quarter of the way down the page when we got up to the 20th floor
02:41:43 um we came out into the lobby in the lobby area it was really hot
02:41:53 um before you come out into the lobby area could you describe for us the
02:41:58 air conditions in the stairwell at that level level 20 yeah it was um smoked out to the point where
02:42:09 um I remember Dave Bedillo when we got to the top of the stairs that's how I lost
02:42:16 um sort of situational awareness of what floor we're on I was just kept climbing um and I remember
02:42:22 Dave shouting like it's here and he was kind of holding the door but I wasn't I could hear him but
02:42:30 it wasn't I had to get to the door and physically almost grab hold of him to see him so that's sort
02:42:35 of how smoky it was right it's not that I could look up the stairs and see him I had to get like
02:42:39 right on top of him before I could see him and so it was fairly smoky yeah right and again difficult
02:42:46 but can you estimate how long it took you to get from the sixth or eighth floor where you come out
02:42:54 of the lift to the 20th floor um
02:42:58 um
02:43:03 probably realistically it would have been about 10 minutes possibly right and what about
02:43:10 firefighter Bedillo who I think is the firefighter who arrives before you sorry could you repeat the
02:43:18 question yes and what about firefighter Bedillo do you know how long it took him because I think
02:43:22 he arrived at the 20th floor before you he did um but from memory um he was holding the door of the
02:43:29 lobby open call us where it is so I should imagine that he he ran ahead and he was checking the
02:43:36 numbers as he went and sort of um making better ground than us um but when he got there he waited
02:43:43 for us to join him he didn't right he stopped at the doors of the flat and I think he was doing
02:43:49 that to make sure that we didn't go past the 20th floor
02:43:59 and in terms of heat in the lobby area can you just describe that for us um yeah I remember it being
02:44:08 um
02:44:09 um
02:44:12 hot but not to the point of um concern but also we were very hot um because our fire gear is not
02:44:21 or our PPE is not breathable um so we just sort of come up you know best part of 20 floors with
02:44:28 all I could was really sweating breathing hard breathing heavy um and I remember feeling right
02:44:36 I'm hot now um how much of that was the atmosphere and how much of that was my own
02:44:40 heat that I'm producing I don't know but at that point I remember thinking it's a bit warm um
02:44:48 but it wasn't a concern fires are hot um it wasn't enough it wasn't anything that rang an alarm bells
02:44:54 at that point no and in terms of making a comparison between the radiated heat you were feeling there
02:45:00 on the 20th floor and the radiated heat you would have felt on the sixth or eighth floor
02:45:05 where you exited the lift can you make a comparison of how much hotter it was on the
02:45:09 20th it was definitely uh hotter um the the temperature sort of continued to rise the whole
02:45:20 time was at the 20th floor when we first got there I remember thinking okay it's a bit warm
02:45:24 um or hot I should say um but like I say there's nothing of concern as we'll probably get to in a
02:45:30 minute as time went on the temperature was gradually increasing the whole time we was up there
02:45:36 and when you got into the lobby how what were the air conditions like in in there again it was it was
02:45:44 it was smoky I remember um I've got a distinct memory of putting down the length of hose
02:45:52 um that I was carrying um and when I put them down as I stood back up I couldn't see them again
02:46:00 so the visibility was less than from my face to the floor right how tall are you
02:46:07 just under six foot right and was that smokier or the the same smokiness is out in the
02:46:14 stairwell at that it was about the same about the same
02:46:21 and this is a forgive this next question it may be a bit
02:46:25 it's okay but is smoke visibility measurable vertically accurately as opposed to measurable
02:46:33 horizontally accurately or are they different um there there is a difference because smoke
02:46:42 tends to rise because it's hot and as it rises it will hit the ceiling it will creep down to what
02:46:47 we call the neutral plane so there is a point if you laid on the floor you might be able to
02:46:51 see a greater distance and if you were stood up um so there will be a difference in vertical
02:46:57 visibility as opposed to horizontal visibility and but there's no way of measuring that it's
02:47:02 just what you can see and when you came out of the stairwell through the door into the
02:47:10 20th floor lobby could you see anything uh opposite you for example the lifts or the
02:47:17 the opposite wall no right
02:47:23 now were there was there anybody else on the 20th floor
02:47:30 no just us apart from you you three not that we saw on your way up to the 20th floor did you
02:47:37 encounter any any residents or other firefighters for that matter coming down no we at that point
02:47:44 is very much on our own up there okay
02:47:50 then in the second paragraph on page seven of your statement you say i put the hose down on the
02:47:56 floor and asked firefighter chris doleby to find the drm to plug into and charge the hose with
02:48:01 water i was very aware that we were high up high without water uh did you know where the dry rising
02:48:08 main outlook was uh yes i think we was all aware at that point because well to a point the
02:48:16 assumption was each floor's got the same layout but you kind of so we knew where the stairs were
02:48:20 we knew where the lifts would be and we knew where the dry rising main would be in relation to that
02:48:24 of course chris doleby had already done the setting in on the third floor yeah so he so he
02:48:28 would have been aware of where it is yeah and then you go on to say firefighter vedio shouted out
02:48:36 that he'd found the flat i think it was number 176 and you say um he had the keys but i believe
02:48:47 the door was open anyway um did you say you believe it was open did you see it opened no i've got a
02:48:54 vague memory of dave saying that he's open it's already open something along those lines he made
02:49:01 reference to the door and being open he made reference did you see the door open for yourself
02:49:07 no because dave found the door for the flat and he kind of shouted i've got it it's over here and
02:49:12 i kind of followed where his voice was going because i couldn't see him and when i got there
02:49:16 he was at the door to the flat and he had it open and that's where we got onto the next bit
02:49:24 and you say uh we went inside the flat and i instructed the crew to start searching the flat
02:49:31 when you say we who went in was it all of you or no so um i asked um i've got dogu chris dogu to
02:49:40 sit into the dry rising main with the hose and the branch that we'd taken up so i was very aware
02:49:44 that we as i said in my statement we didn't have any water and it was hot and so i was i was uneasy
02:49:50 about that um so i left him in the lobby and to make a start on that me and dave went into the
02:49:56 flat and when i referred to the crew it was me and dave right so at the stage when you went
02:50:01 into the flat did you have any water or not no right how safe was that it's not but times of
02:50:09 the essence you know it was that atmosphere you couldn't breathe in it so if there was some
02:50:14 own we needed to find them quick and get out and on entry into the flat what was the first of all
02:50:22 what were the smoke conditions like really bad worse than in the lobby just just the same you
02:50:27 know i'm you're talking you know i wouldn't be able to see the the desk from here right
02:50:35 even less than that and what about the temperature in the flat when you at the moment you went in
02:50:40 is it when we first went in it was still what i would describe as
02:50:44 um it was it was hot but it wasn't overly hot it wasn't a concern we're used to heat so
02:50:53 maybe i'm underestimating that but it wasn't it wasn't a concern i don't remember it being a
02:50:57 concern to me right and you then went into the flat with dave video yes and you did a search as
02:51:06 you say just before i ask you about that did did firefighter dog who give you the the charged hose
02:51:14 and branch at any stage no no right why is that um i kind of left him doing that well me and dave
02:51:26 made a search made a start on searching the flat and the way it all panned out we was out of there
02:51:32 before he had chance to get it done right did he ever get the hose charged
02:51:36 i've never asked him i never got it and so i i i assume not right okay can i just interrupt to
02:51:43 ask about the door um i understand you couldn't actually see uh mr bodio open the door or use any
02:51:54 keys could you tell from what you heard or the manner in which he went in whether the door was
02:52:02 open in the sense of standing open or merely unlocked or or um i i couldn't dave would be
02:52:11 able to tell you that um because he found the door when i got there he was kind of stood in the door
02:52:15 with the open his hand on the on the handle and he said it's here it's here um so i'm not sure
02:52:21 how he found that door yeah i don't know thank you um and you did a search of the flat as you
02:52:31 as you described um were the lights working in the flat do you remember
02:52:38 no but i don't know if they're working there was no light in there there was no light in there
02:52:43 did you try them no it's not something you would do in a fire because if they did come on it
02:52:47 wouldn't give you any it would be of no benefit did you call out yes
02:52:54 um now you say uh two thirds of the way down page seven in the third paragraph i suppose
02:53:06 five lines down from the start i then went to the window and could see fire
02:53:13 um first of all do you remember whereabouts roughly in the flat 176 you saw the window was
02:53:22 where you saw the fire yeah so the the fires at the window of what i believe to be the living room
02:53:29 right perhaps we should do this by reference to your plan of the floor that you've exhibited to
02:53:38 your statement if you go to your second exhibit which i think we looked at the small
02:53:46 me earlier it's met 00015646
02:54:02 uh top right hand corner is the flat which are the which are the sixes
02:54:10 yeah by reference to that um plan could you just tell me which window it was where you saw
02:54:17 fire at the window yeah so from uh memory it's this where i've put the squiggle on the outside wall
02:54:24 yeah okay now thank you you can put that put that away that fixes that
02:54:33 when you say i could see fire could you describe for us what you remember seeing
02:54:39 yeah so that yeah so initially the flat was completely smoke-loved and i'd say um
02:54:46 you know i couldn't see my hand in front of my face um when i went me and dave had
02:54:53 both expressed a concern we couldn't find who was looking for um and we swapped over and when i went
02:54:59 into the room that dave had searched that's when i saw the fire at the window that's when things
02:55:03 started to change so things started to change what started to change uh my low pressure warning
02:55:10 whistle had gone off just before i'd gone in there i think right and the temperature started
02:55:15 increasing at quite a steady rate right and fire at the window just describe for describe it for
02:55:24 us you've got the window frame was the window still intact um it had crystallized um do you
02:55:31 explain what you mean by that so um if you have a double glazed window and it takes an impact it
02:55:41 kind of um not shatter but the the glass will break and it will kind of fragment into thousands
02:55:47 of pieces it was intact but i remember the window was just filled with orange flame and i remember
02:55:55 looking through it when i looked at it since the glass was all crystallized right told me it's
02:56:00 about to fail right and what about around the edges of the window what was happening there
02:56:06 don't remember anything about around the edges and what was the fire doing how was it performing
02:56:11 i remember it being very fierce um and it was it was a concern was there a noise could you hear it
02:56:19 i don't remember a noise there probably was so you know i'd say there was but i don't remember it
02:56:25 could you get any idea where the smoke in the flat had come from um
02:56:31 um no because like i said that the staircase was smoked the lobby was smoked and so was the flat
02:56:38 so it's just kind of that whole area had been smoked out um so yeah i'd you know as the window
02:56:45 was still intact i assume it's finding its way into the building from somewhere else
02:56:51 right and was the smoke in the room where you were standing when you saw the flames at the window
02:56:56 uh with the same thickness density as the smoke you've seen in the lobby i mean to give you an
02:57:02 idea i i say i believe it to be the living room that's how smoky it was i couldn't tell what room
02:57:07 i was in and if you walked into a room now you'd know straight away if it was a living room or
02:57:11 bedroom it was that smoky i knew i was in a room um but i was i didn't know if it was another
02:57:18 bedroom a kitchen a bathroom but i i believe it to be the living room now but that's an idea of
02:57:23 how little i could actually say right so you've got a flat on flat well sorry start again
02:57:31 was there any fire in the flat at all no so you've got a flat with no fire in it but with
02:57:39 very dense smoke as you've just described and what did that tell you about what was combusting
02:57:48 and how the smoke had got into the flat um at that point um i i was aware the building was
02:57:55 a light on the outside i still wasn't aware why or what was actually burning or how that's even
02:58:01 possible but i was aware it was happening so um yeah i didn't really have any thoughts i just
02:58:10 thought right it's up here now sort of thing right and just slightly following up on the chairman's
02:58:16 question you saw the smoke in the in in the flat did you have any thoughts about whether the smoke
02:58:21 was coming in somehow from the exterior or had come into the flat somehow through the interior
02:58:28 of the building no um i couldn't tell because it because it was smoked when we got there you know
02:58:38 if conditions had got worse while i was there maybe i'd have a better idea because i would have
02:58:43 probably seen where it's coming from but because we sort of it was like that the whole time
02:58:49 did you have any radio contact with anybody while you were in flat 176 no did anybody else you were
02:58:56 with dogu or badio did they have any radio contact no chris dogu was um i didn't know when i was in
02:59:04 the flat but when i came out he told me that he's been trying to breach and control on his radio to
02:59:09 let him know that we've been unsuccessful and but he had no joy right right
02:59:17 uh if the control room had been given fire survival guidance been giving sorry fire
02:59:25 survival guidance to somebody on that floor or higher up how would that information have reached you
02:59:34 it couldn't
02:59:40 good mr ziegler are you all right too to continue would you like a little break i'm okay okay all
02:59:47 right
02:59:57 don't push yourself too hard okay all right we can easily stop for five ten minutes whatever you need
03:00:03 i'm okay i feel all right now it's just a little wave thank you
03:00:12 was there any means by which the control room could have got a message to you
03:00:22 about the advice they were giving to somebody high up in the building or
03:00:29 of information they had about a caller no to a point we had a complete disconnection
03:00:35 from the outside world right one was up there
03:00:44 did you try to make contact with the bridgehead yourself personally no um i'd given up because
03:00:50 of my failed attempts on the stairwell um let's say chris dogu told me that he tried and failed so
03:00:58 there was sort of little point in keep trying
03:01:08 and you say your low pressure whistle went off while you were in the flat
03:01:13 now on the telemetry data i don't there's no need to go to it unless you want to see it in
03:01:17 which case we can but that happened at 0155 29 do you know whether the entry control board
03:01:26 picked that up at that time i have no idea no idea
03:01:34 when it did pick it up would it have been able to identify where you were in the building
03:01:38 or just the fact that your whistle had gone off um
03:01:45 no that they wouldn't have been able to tell where he was in the building from that information
03:01:56 um
03:02:02 and then at the top of page eight you say at this point the temperature just soared
03:02:12 it went from what i would call normal hot to unbearable i dropped to my knees and i think i
03:02:17 actually lay down on the floor could you just tell us where you were in the flat when that happened
03:02:22 so yeah so when i went into the living room my whistle was going
03:02:29 and i i was very aware um i was running out of air in normal circumstances that when if your whistle
03:02:39 goes off you've got 12 minutes of air remaining at breathing rate of 50 liters per minute
03:02:46 i don't know what my breathing rate was i should imagine it was a lot more than that
03:02:51 and so i i was very aware that we was in trouble and because we was high up um so
03:02:58 i've sort of i wanted to have a good look around the floor i laid down to sort of start conserving
03:03:04 my air um i wasn't on the ground for very long and but i was more sort of having to look around
03:03:10 the room before we sort of abandoned what we was doing
03:03:13 you say i crawled out and called to firefighter badia that we had to get out of out of there where
03:03:22 was he do you think when you called to him i know where he was he was in the bedroom that i'd searched
03:03:27 because we'd had a conversation about swapping over to sort of retrace each other's steps
03:03:33 i called out of the room and then stood up in the hallway and that's when sort of we met in the
03:03:39 hall and decided to write go and the stage when you exited the flat you say the temperature was
03:03:51 like nothing i've ever experienced before was there any fire in the flat by that point no
03:03:58 just at the window but the temperature soared from i think it was more the the shock of it
03:04:05 um at the time um because it it was a rapid increase in temperature which um like i say
03:04:16 kind of started going wrong at one all at once for us you know we couldn't find who was looking
03:04:19 for my ear was running out and the temperature raise it was like just get out of here sort of thing
03:04:25 yeah okay
03:04:31 and you also say we were we were we were also really high up in the building and no one was
03:04:35 coming to get us like i say i've very felt i remember having this huge wave of we've
03:04:44 come too high um there was no my whistle was going like say in a normal environment of
03:04:51 the consumption of 50 liters a minute you've got 12 minutes before your air runs out
03:04:54 and i knew i was i was over that breathing rate um so i i at that point i was very unsure if we
03:05:02 were going to get out or not um and we had no way of communicating that back to the bridgehead
03:05:12 and when you come out you came out into the lobby what were the conditions like out there
03:05:15 in comparison with how they were when you left the just the same they remained
03:05:20 and the same if possibly possibly a bit worse um right and what about the heat
03:05:28 he was hot hotter than before sorry hotter than yes in the lobby yeah the whole temperature of
03:05:35 that floor spiked quite quickly did in light of what you've been telling us this may sound a
03:05:45 strange question but did you knock on any of the other doors on that floor
03:05:49 uh no is there a reason why um because i was very doubtful at that point i was going to get out at
03:05:56 all on my own um and that that you know that the thoughts were to we would have been no use to anyone
03:06:06 you then go on a third of the way down page eight to say you remember one other low pressure whistle
03:06:12 sounding would you work your hope belong to do you have any recollection standing here now
03:06:19 who that might have been it was either one or other badia or the dog i suppose it would have
03:06:23 been one of them yeah i think it was dave's he thinks days why would you think dave's rather
03:06:29 than chris's because i can remember hearing hearing it going off constantly and at one
03:06:34 stage we lost chris on the stairwell on the way down so i don't remember being a break in the
03:06:40 noise i could hear so i assume it's dave's okay and did his his go off do you think while he was
03:06:45 still in the flat or or after leaving the flat mine went off in the flat the other one went off
03:06:50 after we'd left okay how long after you left do you remember no and you say we went to find the
03:06:59 stairs but ended up ended up in the bin store the temperature got even hotter was the temperature
03:07:05 hotter in the bin store than in the lobby or no it's a it was a from when i from when it sort of
03:07:12 rang alarm bells that it was getting hotter and while we was on that floor it just kept steadily
03:07:17 increasing so it wasn't specific to the bin store it's more the whole floor right
03:07:26 did the bin store have any lighting in it no if it did it wasn't any use okay
03:07:33 now you then go on to say
03:07:39 you struggle to get out of the bin store
03:07:42 hot disorientated and stressed and eventually we got out we've got to stairwell
03:07:48 are you familiar with the effects of heat stress yes looking back on it do you think that you were
03:07:56 suffering the effects of heat stress i think we all were
03:08:00 let's see things say the smoke was thick in the stairwell
03:08:07 uh and you couldn't see your hand in front of your face was that work was that how was that in
03:08:14 comparison with the conditions in the stairwell when you left the stairwell to go into they were
03:08:18 definitely worse right and and roughly how long do you you or did you think that you've been on
03:08:26 the 20th floor by that stage it didn't feel like very long but it's it's hard to give an accurate
03:08:33 time because it's when you're in a situation like that time just you know right you lose sort of all
03:08:41 and then you say we struggled to get down the stairs and it was a mixture of stumbling falling
03:08:44 and crawling trying to get down yeah so my um i remember my legs have
03:08:50 were wobbly um just from exhaustion i think getting up there and i tripped a few times
03:08:59 and at one point like i say we lost chris dawg so i sort of like crawled myself to the corner of
03:09:05 the lobby and asked dave to shout out for him because i didn't have the energy to
03:09:09 do the conditions in the stairwell change as you made your way down no there was smokey the whole
03:09:18 way down the whole way down and what about when you're near the bridgehead was it still as bad
03:09:26 um i think once we got to the bridgeheads they must have cleared up because i knew we was getting
03:09:32 out right we met i referred to it my statement we met a crew fairly near
03:09:38 the bottom of the tower um and it was they they had the same problem as us they couldn't identify
03:09:45 the floor numbers and i remember again we sort of stopped and i i sat down uh to conserve my air
03:09:52 on the step while dave showed him i can remember i could just about see dave and he had his torch
03:09:58 against the wall showing him where the numbers were so that gives you an indication of how
03:10:01 smoky it was you had to kind of get right up to it on the wall to see what the number was
03:10:06 you cover actually at the foot of page eight of your statement let's just jump to that we'll come
03:10:11 back to the stairs in a moment but just going forward then to that you say we got to one floor
03:10:16 i don't know which one where we met crews coming up one of the firefighter's crew was on the
03:10:21 bend to that you say we got to one floor i don't know which one where we met crews coming up
03:10:26 one of the firefighters asked firefighter badio how they knew which floor they were on and you
03:10:30 explain what happened
03:10:38 would might that have been the seventh floor do you think could have been yeah about that level
03:10:43 and firefighter badio has described meeting firefighter murphy yeah that's her right do you
03:10:49 remember firefighter murphy by name or or by station or is there any both both i know him
03:10:55 quite well right okay do you remember so you remember that encounter view yes i'm remember
03:11:01 seeing did you yourself say anything to firefighter murphy no was he with was firefighter murphy with
03:11:10 anybody yes he he was with his ba partner but i'm i don't know who that was right
03:11:20 you don't know who it was did you recognize the firefighter or you just just don't know
03:11:24 i didn't look okay just going back a little bit on your trip down sorry on your journey down
03:11:32 you did you meet any residents coming down no did you meet other apart from the
03:11:40 the murphy pair did you meet any other firefighters coming up no
03:11:43 no roughly at what level did the air conditions in the stairway start to clear before you got
03:11:53 to certainly wasn't before we met firefighter murphy so somewhere between the eighth and the second
03:12:01 right
03:12:05 i'd say fairly close to the second maybe a floor or two above it it started to clear
03:12:10 i just remember when we got to the bridgehead i knew he was nearly out and
03:12:17 so i'm yeah i can remember coming out and being able to see and stuff so
03:12:22 i guess yes around that sort of space it started to clear yes and let me just ask it this way then
03:12:30 did there come a point on your journey down when you thought i don't actually need ba no absolutely
03:12:37 really yeah
03:12:41 and what about the conditions at the bridgehead when you did finally arrive
03:12:45 what were the air conditions like there uh on the bridgehead they were fine but there's no way
03:12:50 myself or anyone else could have come down that staircase and survived without breathing apparatus
03:12:55 at that time that i was on the stairs and we have you tallying in at oh one fifty seven fifteen so
03:13:07 you say by that time essentially do you that the stairway was unusable without yeah breathing
03:13:16 apparatus all the way from the 20th to just before the second yes that was my experience with it
03:13:22 definitely right
03:13:25 right
03:13:28 where you had a moment on the stairwell where you lost dogu where you pulled your
03:13:37 phone out of your pocket i didn't take it out of my pocket um so we we um lost chris
03:13:45 um we was yeah we was about halfway down and i was fully aware that my whistle had been going
03:13:53 for a while and i had a momentary thought of if i should
03:13:59 send a message back but it was i put it in my statement because it's a thought that went
03:14:03 through my mind but i didn't do anything about that do you want to look at that bit in your
03:14:07 statement sorry would you like to look at that bit in your statement the page eight two-thirds
03:14:12 of the way down see you see i put myself in a corner of the stairwell because i did not want
03:14:19 to be in anyone else's way if i didn't make it out i tried to get my phone out of my pocket to
03:14:24 text my mum but i couldn't get the phone out yeah so that's when we lost chris dogu so
03:14:31 i said to dave can you call for him because i don't have the energy to and i remember he was kind of
03:14:36 draped over the banister with his head hanging down and he kind of just shook his head
03:14:41 and i just sort of sat in the corner and i thought maybe i should think about sending something back
03:14:51 and i put my hand to my tunic and that's as far as i thought i won't i'll leave it and that's as far as
03:14:57 i've got this sort of momentary thought is there anything else you want to say about about that
03:15:02 moment
03:15:12 uh mr
03:15:18 there's a secret i have only got a very few questions left for you but i'm conscious that
03:15:22 you've been going 45 minutes or so i'd rather finish if you're not if we're not too far to go
03:15:28 all right if you're happy how long do you think you've got this to about 10 minutes i suppose
03:15:33 um well as long as you've been finished by one o'clock can you do this i said i can yes i'm just
03:15:41 slightly conscious that there may be other uh there may be other follow-up questions which i
03:15:46 might be asked to ask well let's see how we go but detain us for secret any longer than i need to
03:15:51 do you feel all right i feel like i can yeah 15 minutes or so yeah you came out of the tower
03:15:58 um you explained can you describe what was going on outside when you came out of the tower um
03:16:06 yeah the the scene had completely changed from when i went in and the fire had intensified
03:16:14 um and there was a lot more people around there was firefighters everywhere um when we went in
03:16:20 it was yeah it was a different completely different scenario and did you notice something
03:16:26 about which faces of the building the fire was now on
03:16:32 um no the main sort of face that i saw was that the east elevation because of where we came out
03:16:39 and we went to land some wet grass or onto grass and we just stripped down and cooled off
03:16:46 and that that's the sort of face that we was looking at the east side right
03:16:53 right
03:16:59 i think you then go on to explain on page nine how you um
03:17:08 assisted with moving a number of casualties from the tower over to the
03:17:11 las holding center by the leisure center i'm summarizing your evidence there um did anybody
03:17:20 give you instructions to do that or was that something you did off your own bat
03:17:24 um so when we came out we was um not so we just laid on the grass for 20 minutes just
03:17:31 drinking water and just getting our sort of composure back and energy back and after we've
03:17:37 been there for a while um someone from the las the london ambulance service came over and explained
03:17:43 they needed help they had like an initial um point that was fairly close to the tower
03:17:51 and they'd set up another i don't know what their term for it is another sort of triage point over
03:17:56 by the leisure center and they said they needed help getting casualties from basically there over
03:18:03 to the um leisure center right and roughly what time was that do you remember how long after you
03:18:11 left the tower you think that was i'm trying i'm 45 minutes do you remember any of the casualties
03:18:21 you assisted um a couple yeah are you able to give us any details do you feel do you feel able to
03:18:33 give us any any details um yeah i mean so when i've got that information um i was unsure where the
03:18:43 las guy was referring to he kind of just said it's over there so we got dressed i think there's a
03:18:49 couple of us i think dave was still with us at that point um or maybe he'd already gone i'm not
03:18:54 sure um i sort of started walking over to where he pointed to and a crew came out of the tower
03:19:02 carrying a member of the public um and i went over and assisted them um with that casualty
03:19:11 um i'd say it was a male probably probably about my age probably mid-30s and fairly large build
03:19:22 um and yeah they kind of had an arm and a leg each and i just went and supported his head while
03:19:28 they carried him you don't know which floor or flat he was no they just came out of the tower
03:19:34 are you are you able to remember any of the any details about which casualties you assisted with
03:19:41 have come from particular flats or floors no we weren't getting that information it was no
03:19:49 um i just want to go back then to this question of lift keys and just asking one or two further
03:19:56 questions about lift keys um you told us at the start of your evidence that you've not been to
03:20:03 grenfell tower before um how did you think that the key you had would be the right one to use
03:20:10 at grenfell tower and i had been there before just on a call out i hadn't done a familiarization
03:20:16 quite right it's it's a standard key um
03:20:22 um yeah the it's called an express lift key and it's kind of an industry standard for sort of
03:20:30 fire service operations lift cars could be any number of keys but any fire service
03:20:38 insulation is generally an express key do all drop keys operate all fire no they don't
03:20:46 um how did you what did you see or feel anything that might have led you to think that the key you
03:20:53 had was just the wrong key um no because like i say that the fire service installations are
03:21:01 called like firefighter switches the correct key for that is the express key right and so i suppose
03:21:07 there is a chance it is a non-standard box that had been fitted but that wasn't something that
03:21:13 ran through my mind because i've never come across that right and is the possible would the
03:21:19 possibility of there being a non-standard box be something that you would expect to see on the ord
03:21:29 um i wouldn't expect to see that at all because if it if it was non-standard and it was known about
03:21:37 it would be actions would be taken to get it changed rather than have it noted down and just
03:21:43 leave it in situ if you know what i mean right and they're they're all they're all firefighter
03:21:48 express keys right like i say and if that knowledge had been known about that would have been actioned
03:21:52 rather than just putting a note on the ndt very good okay mr secret would you just give me a note
03:22:02 mr secret i've got no further questions for you mr chairman well you might need to
03:22:07 have a couple of minutes to consider whether there are any questions among us
03:22:12 i think maybe there may be one mr chairman well visual indication all right
03:22:20 i'm not sure i like doing it okay i would open out cry but
03:22:25 would you want to rise for a bit maybe we should write maybe i can if i can ask you to rise mr
03:22:29 chairman yeah mr secret you and i will leave the room for a few moments while they discuss any
03:22:34 further questions okay uh don't talk to anyone about your evidence but you don't have much time
03:22:39 okay thank you go with the usher and i'll be right behind you
03:23:09 you
03:23:39 you
03:24:09 you
03:24:39 you
03:25:09 you
03:25:39 you
03:26:09 you
03:26:39 you
03:27:10 you
03:27:11 you
03:27:11 you
03:27:11 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:12 you
03:27:13 you
03:27:13 you
03:27:13 you
03:27:13 you
03:27:15 you
03:27:15 you
03:27:38 yes i think mr secrets just coming i'm very grateful
03:27:45 for
03:28:00 mr secret i'm sorry to bring you back i've just had a very few questions and they're all really
03:28:05 about your trip back down journey back down the tower from the 20th floor first of all on your
03:28:12 journey back down did you encounter any any bodies or persons of persons on the stairs no the only
03:28:24 the only thing that we did encounter was some screaming coming from one of the floors
03:28:32 that was within a lobby i can't tell you what floor it was and we stopped and had a look and
03:28:39 i remember again and that wherever he was it was real thick black smoke i remember dave opening the
03:28:45 doors and it was we just couldn't see anything it was um and we was calling out but the the the
03:28:54 the cries for help had gone quiet um and we'd like to say we was dangerously low on air so we
03:29:01 didn't have time unfortunately to explore that and is that true generally of all the floors on the
03:29:06 way down as to why you didn't go into those lobbies and warn people that's exactly right if we had
03:29:13 you know time and air we would have you know tried to help everyone but we it you know really was in
03:29:19 trouble yes um your conversation with firefighter murphy and his colleague on the stairs do you
03:29:32 remember whether you or dave bodio or chris dawgu warned firefighter murphy and the other
03:29:41 firefighter about the conditions that you'd encountered above in the stairwell um
03:29:49 i don't know i certainly didn't um you know it was kind of evident because at where we were
03:29:57 showing him you couldn't see anything really the visibility was sort of next to zero right um so
03:30:04 he didn't need telling that he could kind of see that for himself i don't know if there's any
03:30:08 discussion about the temperature spike on the 20th floor um i certainly was in a position to
03:30:14 have a conversation at that point no uh and did you ever find out from firefighter murphy what
03:30:22 his mission was what he had been deployed to do uh no and finally in an answer you gave just before
03:30:31 we broke you essentially said that nobody could have made it down the stair stairwell at the time
03:30:36 you came down without breathing apparatus was that information something you passed on to anybody
03:30:42 once you got to the bridgehead um i really can't remember if we was um
03:30:53 i really can't remember my memory from finding the doors is really really hazy pretty much from
03:31:01 that point on i can remember it quite clearly up until my breathing apparatus where but afterwards
03:31:08 i can't even remember getting my tally out of the board so i can't recall any conversations
03:31:12 that i may have had we may have told them we may not have i couldn't answer that do you remember
03:31:18 having a clear thought in your head to the effect that nobody could make it down from the 20th
03:31:24 floor to the bridgehead yeah like i say i can remember coming down to the bridgehead and seeing
03:31:29 the doors and thinking you know we're here you know made it out um i think from that moment on
03:31:38 that that's when my i can remember bits but it goes hazy after that i can't let's say i've got
03:31:46 remember little bits and pieces of it i can't remember checking out the inch of control i know
03:31:50 i did i can't remember it so i'm unable to recall any conversations i had right so did you have
03:31:57 a debrief with watch manager akif at the bridgehead at that stage again i may have done um i can't
03:32:03 remember if i did he may sort of be better equipped to answer that question for you
03:32:08 i can't remember it if we did and would you remember whether chris doggie or dave bodio did
03:32:13 i don't know
03:32:18 thank you very much mr secret can i just say you've been extremely
03:32:22 um helpful to us and i'm very grateful to you for coming to the inquiry and helping us with
03:32:26 our investigations thank you very much yes i'd like to add my thanks your evidence to be really
03:32:32 helpful and i'm sorry it's been difficult for you at times giving it and it's gone on so long but
03:32:37 we really are very grateful to you for coming along and i'd just like to say that i've been
03:32:41 very impressed listening to your account this morning at the degree of bravery you demonstrated
03:32:47 on that night and complete disregards it seems to me for your personal safety thank you anyway
03:32:53 thank you very much for coming along you're welcome right would like to leave us now yes
03:33:02 well that's obviously a convenient moment for us to break yes and we have another witness waiting
03:33:07 to be called we do and that is watch manager o'keith from 331 kensington right and i know from my
03:33:14 my notes that he will certainly occupy the afternoon i i suspect will go into tomorrow
03:33:19 so there may be a conversation i need to have with other people about timetabling yes well
03:33:23 we'll we'll break now we'll resume at five past two to give everyone a full lunch hour
03:33:28 good i don't see where we get thank you thank you very much five positive please
03:33:37 you
03:34:07 you
03:34:37 you