Brien O'Keeffe, a watch manager who ran the bridgehead during the early stages of the Grenfell fire, describes the rapid escalation from a single flat fire to a building-wide catastrophe. His testimony reveals critical moments when firefighters realized compartmentation had failed, when burning debris began falling from the building, and when the 'stay put' advice became untenable as smoke filled stairwells and residents fled in panic.
00:00:05 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing we're going to hear further from mr. O'Keefe in a moment but before we do mr. millet has something he needs to deal with yes mr. chairman thank you
00:00:16 deal with yes mr. chairman thank you very much and yesterday I put - mr. O'Keeffe the response time for his appliance and I put to him that it appeared to be outside the average
00:00:28 appeared to be outside the average response times which I taken from the London Fire Brigades overview document which we got in May in fact that overview document is only describing
00:00:40 overview document is only describing average response times for the first and second responding vehicles and not any subsequent responding vehicles even though part of the same initial response as part of a predetermined attendance
00:00:52 as part of a predetermined attendance and so I just wanted to make it clear that it is not suggested that as the third arriving appliance mr. O'Keefe's
00:01:03 third arriving appliance mr. O'Keefe's appliance was outside the times for which we have evidence about average response times yes thank you very much but it's important to get that clear and I'm grateful to you for doing so well
00:01:16 I'm grateful to you for doing so well then we could have mr. Keefe in please
00:01:48 maybe good morning mr. Keith Maurice are you having to carry on I am happy to carry on yes thank you very much mr. millet destroy Keith good morning good morning thanks for coming
00:01:59 morning good morning thanks for coming back to us now last night I was attempting to show you some video a very short piece of video footage and the audio with it as well and I better
00:02:12 audio with it as well and I better repeat that suppose for everybody's benefit the trigger warning that I always give we always give with videos of the building on fire and the audio that goes with it what I'm about to show the witness is video and audio footage
00:02:25 the witness is video and audio footage of Grenfell tower on fire in the early part of of that night and so if anybody thinks they may find the images or the audio distressing then they should either leave the room here that they're in or else turn themselves away from the
00:02:40 in or else turn themselves away from the live stream as it's coming out perhaps I should just leave 20 seconds or so for people to yes we can do that
00:02:52 and the video should be queued up at 112 as we can now go to that so now mr. O'Keeffe what I get to show you is a
00:03:03 O'Keeffe what I get to show you is a short video clip and I'd like you to listen out very carefully for what is being said I'm allowing us to look very carefully at what is happening on the screen okay thank you very much right if you can play that
00:03:25 right now did you hear anybody calling or something sounded like Mike Mike yes right what was that I don't know actually
00:03:36 actually just someone calling the air watch manager in charge Mike totally right sure if we could just play that again and see if we can get anything a bit more clearly from it just listen out again but also watch what the fire is
00:03:48 again but also watch what the fire is doing at the same time
00:04:02 okay it's difficult to pick it up it's something about possibly a number yes like yes
00:04:10 like yes well um as I spoke to yesterday about when I sought to meet I might watch my dad Odin following our discussion about
00:04:24 dad Odin following our discussion about the increase of our pumps I told her on the shoulder - my pump operator of their firefighter Broderick to make it six in an area that could be that make it six in an aerial it it sounds I'd all just
00:04:38 in an aerial it it sounds I'd all just suggest this to you because we could all hear it but let me ask you my tics be Mike Mike
00:04:43 Mike Mike make it six now yes was it you do you think calling him to do that no because
00:04:55 think calling him to do that no because I might have been in hindsight I recall as me telling him you know advising as a
00:05:07 as me telling him you know advising as a fellow officer to make a six-night and as I said yesterday he said you think I should and I said yes and he said okay can you do that for me and the sequence
00:05:20 can you do that for me and the sequence that followed was me turning around and showing to my driver because as you can hear there's a lot of noise and that's the pump operating under fire engine pumping water it's quite load and it was
00:05:31 pumping water it's quite load and it was there was a lot of noise in the area as you will never leave on the initial attendance at any incidents there is a lot of action and a lot of noise associated with us so officers January
00:05:44 associated with us so officers January and far photo shout instructions to each other our communication we use our radios but more commonly at the very beginning we show them each other okay now yes and now in the video yeah
00:06:00 now yes and now in the video yeah we saw and we could play it again we saw the burning material coming down from the window yeah at that time so not very long after you'd arrived do you remember looking up at the window and seeing burning
00:06:12 at the window and seeing burning material coming off no I remember flames coming over the world there was no burning material coming off at that time right the flames just coming out the window there was energy behind me we
00:06:23 the window there was energy behind me we manage the energy there's when you have a compartment fire and it's and it's developing and it's growing it produces energy from the heat and it would it
00:06:35 energy from the heat and it would it would push flame out of any opening and pushes in the boat and that's what I saw with the flame that was it wasn't just wispy flame there was something burning the kitchen was on fire I would imagine and nothing burning that their material
00:06:48 and nothing burning that their material and falling down okay I wonder if we can then move the video on just to the next sequence and just tell just to see what we can see that there and to see whether or not that was something you saw so the
00:06:59 or not that was something you saw so the next sequence is I think it a one well actually yes a 115 keep going let's see if this is the right one yes that's the one who display that
00:07:11 yes that's the one who display that [Applause]
00:07:30 right now there are two things about that obviously the burning falling material and then the jet starting up it looks and then going on to the exterior of the building
00:07:41 of the building did you see burning material like that coming off the building and I don't recall seeing us it would have concerned me if I had seen that with that extent
00:07:52 me if I had seen that with that extent because it looks like there's a crackling with the material and you know there's a chemical reaction that I like the term of dynamic reaction going on which is unusual yes but the younger you're showing me is
00:08:07 yes but the younger you're showing me is opposite to where I was standing I was on the other site by the front of the building when I walked away to McDole him so he's obviously moved to in that direction to speak to the firefighters
00:08:18 direction to speak to the firefighters know when the original jet of order of the covering jet was put on was point early on was relatively early on and
00:08:31 early on was relatively early on and when they had knocked the jet off because as I said yesterday there be a crew had gone into the live flash yes that's when I went to go to take over the bridge oh I see okay so something
00:08:44 the bridge oh I see okay so something that would have been when it was put back on afterwards right that's what that's what I'll give you my understanding yes I see you think that the coverage that we saw just there to about 115 was the second of time the
00:08:56 about 115 was the second of time the covering jet was applied or do you not know I do not know okay but it's close by it's quite an instance close by so it's a difficult difficult for me to give you an accurate answer enough yeah
00:09:08 give you an accurate answer enough yeah time words so you have your conversation with Mike Dowden I asked outside the front entrance to the building where you discuss the makeup we and we know that he tasked you with going to run the
00:09:20 he tasked you with going to run the brigade you know taking Bridget is it in that same conversation that he did that yes I see
00:09:24 yes I see and so what happened immediately next what did you do immediately next I won't I said okay I will I ran I walked towards the front of the boom and I was siting on at the looking at think of you as a big glass big glass
00:09:36 think of you as a big glass big glass windows and as I walked towards I I notice said there was smoke in the lobby I was a lot of light gray smoke and there wasn't thick bad thick smoke and
00:09:48 there wasn't thick bad thick smoke and put loads and it was blowing out with force so I knew it wasn't a mechanical like a mechanical ventilation system pushing it out out the front doors so you see the lobby you mean the ground
00:09:59 you see the lobby you mean the ground floor and also building really register right and you you went to the lobby how did you get into the to the lobby I'm walking broadly the doors were open as
00:10:10 walking broadly the doors were open as far as I remember you notice walk straight up and at that stage did you try to get entrance into the lift lobby within the building not the lift as I
00:10:22 within the building not the lift as I because I just watched my shadow didn't if they if we had taken control of the fire or if he said it wasn't walking and as I walked by I could see a firefighter trying to get a walking still I don't
00:10:35 trying to get a walking still I don't know who the firefighter was I just looked to my left and then I went to go to the door to go up the stairs to the second floor or to the glass balcony or whatever image I see say how did you get
00:10:49 whatever image I see say how did you get into the lift lobby did you need a fob or no was open as far as I recall I just walked straight room right
00:11:02 and
00:11:07 Canada's ask you to look at a photograph which we looked at I think with an earlier witness mr. o'hanlan which is inq1 seven eight so five zeros one seven
00:11:19 inq1 seven eight so five zeros one seven eight city I just want to see if you can help me with her with the timing and the identity of firefighters this is a
00:11:33 identity of firefighters this is a that's what's known as a dog that's that's that right okay and do you know what did you see him do that did you see him come in two main entrances no no I didn't in the entire answer that incident
00:11:44 incident yes I didn't see what entire element in Vitara you didn't know I see okay I believe he was in the rest on stage but I didn't see him right and then if you
00:11:56 I didn't see him right and then if you go to inq1 84 this is a picture of you I think
00:12:08 they're like let me ask you that is timed at oh one 1403 subject - no need to juggle so yeah that's you you know you're wearing a white helmet that's
00:12:20 you're wearing a white helmet that's correct that's there I'm watching my interests my universe my normal right currently on the job so instead of unclear the white helmet is a watch manager helmet correct well boy cam is any rank above crew manager right
00:12:35 any rank above crew manager right for example that's a watch manager it's the band on me there's a band of the helmets stripe and just like like the army the more if the higher we've gotten the rank you get more stripes right and
00:12:46 the rank you get more stripes right and my trunk markings that's a single band a station manager which is the next rank above me we'll have a wider band a group manager would have a wide band and a single band and so on and so on and so
00:12:58 single band and so on and so on and so on
00:12:58 on I see okay and the incident manager incident command will have the white circle the circle the yellow yellow white circle - was a an insert in the
00:13:09 white circle - was a an insert in the rear of the store code indicating that he is the instant manly yet so he would be the go to going or she would be to go to person on the fire groans wearing
00:13:20 to person on the fire groans wearing that as a focal point for commands yes and if you go to one eighth the next photograph number one eight five this is
00:13:34 photograph number one eight five this is time 201 1444 or so now that's me that's you again
00:13:43 you again and there are ba wearers going in it seemed you know who they are
00:13:53 No okay and then the next one is time that oh one forty forty nine so just a few seconds later and your whole looks like you're holding the door open for them is that that's you is it that's me okay I thought I can't recognize the
00:14:09 okay I thought I can't recognize the firefighters from this angle okay no now just to get back to what you said a minute ago about smoke in the lobby and you said it was coming out as it were
00:14:22 you said it was coming out as it were being forced out yeah did that give you any cause for concern that that's mind concern you know it's not it's not entirely unusual to find
00:14:34 not it's not entirely unusual to find small travel in a building during the fire given the proximity of the fire which is on the fourth floor but
00:14:47 it's it's an indicator that you know of small trouble yes any compartmentalised building with fire adores and lobbies
00:15:06 building with fire adores and lobbies you would not narrowly get smoke travel unless a door has been opened while you was a crew we've gone from the bridgehead on the floor with a jet so
00:15:18 bridgehead on the floor with a jet so that would that would cause smoke to come out of the when a main entry to the flak to go into the lobby and subsequently don't to the bridgehead but Audino
00:15:28 Audino the idea of the bridgehead is that you're meant to be in a smoke-free environment because we don't wear a breathing apparatus the the officers and the and the firefighters walking in the bridge I don't wear breathing apparatus
00:15:40 bridge I don't wear breathing apparatus and I hope that explains it to unit that there would be trouble but it would seem to be a lot of smoke I like that it was
00:15:52 to be a lot of smoke I like that it was light but I took if that may be perhaps the ventilation system which never prepare to walk to move for beforehand had been repaired and it was just extracting smoke you say the ventilation
00:16:06 extracting smoke you say the ventilation system never appeared to work before it was kicking in a nose I mean that's that was signified to me that it was like an engine trying to start up and stopping that was the breathing you refer
00:16:19 that was the breathing you refer inhalation and exhalation okay now you then went up to the second floor where the bridgehead was and you describe that in your your witness statement on page seven in the middle of the paragraph when you say I walked
00:16:33 the paragraph when you say I walked through the lobby door and other stairs which sort of went round on itself to a glass wall balcony which was the second level yeah I got to the balcony and I spoke to crew manager secret asking what have you got he said it was a fire and I
00:16:45 have you got he said it was a fire and I think he said in a kitchen now you said you said a minute ago this morning that you've gone past somebody in the lift lobby still trying to work it was somebody trying to
00:16:58 to work it was somebody trying to because that's where firefighters are they're determined yeah maybe he was or she was details to try and get it to work right but I was focused on going to
00:17:11 work right but I was focused on going to Bridget okay and and the person you saw on the balcony was definitely Chris secret was there certain Gladius so you think that somebody else another firefighter was also trying to get the lift to work on the ground floor on the
00:17:23 lift to work on the ground floor on the ground floors that that's your recollections of collector right okay we will need to explore that do you do you know who that other firefighter was were they wearing BA no not wearing green okay were they
00:17:36 no not wearing green okay were they alone or were they with others alone we were alone right and any other distinguishing features about that far older than me any remember that tall so
00:17:47 older than me any remember that tall so tall right but we need to look for a tall firefighter fine and then you get up there can you explain at that stage
00:18:01 up there can you explain at that stage where the bridge head had been set up so much food should have been set up on a second floor level you had a glass how would you describe it a balcony I call
00:18:14 would you describe it a balcony I call evacuate
00:18:15 evacuate yeah and just inside that on the corridor and the lobby ba had been set up
00:18:21 up meaning breathing apparatus and to control board which I the firefighter sent oven right as the operator and Chris secret the commander of us in
00:18:33 Chris secret the commander of us in charge the Bridget okay now you say you spoke with mr. secret on the balcony was that where the bridgehead was on the bell tolls to us yeah places and where was Chris secret going was he was he standing there or was he coming away
00:18:44 standing there or was he coming away waist I know he was doing his job he was standing there okay how far away from the bridgehead was he he was in the blue Joe okay
00:18:51 Joe okay and it was the bridgehead on the balcony no no they balcony was quite close to the bridge chairs the way the way was situated right
00:19:02 the way the way was situated right I believe I've seen some photographs all of the the inside yes and I could quite if I if you could show me forward if I can explain more clearly to you yes I can show you a plan okay
00:19:15 to you yes I can show you a plan okay that's all right if I could do that
00:19:26 if you could go please will be shamed at five of the master docs bundle I'll just see if I can show you plan of the second
00:19:42 see if I can show you plan of the second floor this is is his NE t triple zero one two five nine three and if we just expand it this is I showed mr. secret this yesterday morning this is a plan of
00:19:57 this yesterday morning this is a plan of the second floor the straight key from you could see the the a tree or ground floor in the bottom right hand corner yeah
00:20:04 yeah and the stairs go up and then there's the walkway gallery which I think you're describing is the battle for galleries what I'm talking about so inside walk there gathering yes in there it sits in the communal Hall that's where the
00:20:15 the communal Hall that's where the furniture was set up right and where do you think mr. secret was when you saw him and had this conversation he was standing in the narrow section of young steps up so there yep I see so that say
00:20:29 steps up so there yep I see so that say you say you go out of the walkway gallery turn right into that that corridor and he may have been into this for adorably was in that area right I see so we need to put the little if so long I don't think we were by the lips
00:20:40 long I don't think we were by the lips buddy in the common hall he would have been right okay that makes that much clearer now can you explain to us what the bridge had looked like at that time in terms of town okay walking bridge said you know there's no to control
00:20:52 said you know there's no to control board set up right the BA where's had to be errors then one line of hall was walking right and that
00:21:04 line of hall was walking right and that was a that was it was there anything missing from that yeah what well it was the noisy C pack is missing which is the I mentioned to Chris Piron he was near
00:21:15 I mentioned to Chris Piron he was near braver hadn't been brought up well I asked for it to be brought to the bridgehead he did okay this is when I took over as the original commander yes and did you test the communications
00:21:26 and did you test the communications between the bridgehead and liked Adam yeah scope tomato he did and
00:21:32 okay I I'm sure we'd get to it but there was quite a lot of communication between the bridgehead and the incident commander motel there initially we will
00:21:43 commander motel there initially we will get to it
00:21:44 get to it final initially that was a problem was there perhaps loose yeah afterwards but no okay not significant now you say in the middle of page seven
00:21:58 now you say in the middle of page seven that you told him I was taking over from Hitler's bridgehead commander her desires were ranked senior to him and I have been detailed by the incident commander which I haven't put in there but that's right yeah did-did-did Cree
00:22:13 but that's right yeah did-did-did Cree manager secret give you a hand over briefing he did what does he tell em I asked them what he got which is how we speak to each other instead they did a job in the kitchen
00:22:25 instead they did a job in the kitchen what are you using he said we've got one lane of hose and there be a cool in there and how much is alive he said didn't we know but it wasn't it wasn't
00:22:36 didn't we know but it wasn't it wasn't that bad that they were making progress I said to him okay I'm taking over and
00:22:47 I said to him okay I'm taking over and I'm and then I said well I detail Jamal I said what I want you to do is get me a second line of holes will it would it be a prune to deploy a backup chess Gibby
00:22:59 a prune to deploy a backup chess Gibby no you see pack and I think we had there was one Florida crew in the lobby sorry metaphor to mention a forward a crew in
00:23:10 metaphor to mention a forward a crew in the lobby at that time which is a true manager Stern and far from a hippo from Kensington was standing boy there so he
00:23:21 Kensington was standing boy there so he went about he went to do that now you say that you say he told me and I realized it wasn't enough and the backup crews were required [Music]
00:23:33 [Music] is that standard practice for all pyrites fine I can explain to you yes it please the initial attendance to a high-rise fire could be one fire engine
00:23:44 high-rise fire could be one fire engine or it could be two fire engines depending on are the forced people to get there nothing is returned yeah yeah initial attendance that's little artistic that's not the same as
00:23:55 artistic that's not the same as predetermined no no no no no it's the first people to attempt right so it's like the first police car to attend to an incident trigger it's essentially the first fire engine Bela Rose puts in the
00:24:08 first fire engine Bela Rose puts in the building blocks for a successful attack on a fire
00:24:11 on a fire and what we first have to do is with the secure water supply so locate a hydrant locate the unless the dry riser are wet
00:24:22 locate the unless the dry riser are wet wet raising main if the wet resume we locate the Pump Room acceptable we secure water to the building which is what more tensed invades I sent for
00:24:33 what more tensed invades I sent for Brigitte the initial attack can be one lane of holes in our national operation guidance stipulates that when resources
00:24:45 guidance stipulates that when resources are low a second jet should be later in reality we don't to do it all at once to have two Jets up and running but it's
00:24:57 have two Jets up and running but it's not always possible right because of the dynamics of our firefighting life risk if we could put in a safe system of work
00:25:08 if we could put in a safe system of work with one jet initially to make an attack the other one should be if the pedia is walking correctly I have other appliances coming on as I was to provide additional resources and
00:25:22 was to provide additional resources and backup okay does that make yes and thank you for that explanation so that stage is this right crew manager secret had only deployed one correct
00:25:33 secret had only deployed one correct pair of PA wearers correct with one branch and I and you wanted a second backup pair correct and it's her and it's her well I I chose to put an alert accrued for a
00:25:44 I chose to put an alert accrued for a hose management as well right why was that because it's difficult to manage holes I suppose when its charge is unwieldy if YouTube Jets they kink
00:25:56 unwieldy if YouTube Jets they kink around corners they're very hard to move and what can happen if you've only got to be cool on the chest say 45 millimeter charged two or three lengths of holes it can be difficult because the
00:26:10 of holes it can be difficult because the PA crew would have to separate which we don't like where firefighters need to stand together for safety reasons and look out for each other so if i if I'm
00:26:24 look out for each other so if i if I'm going to a compartment fire I've only got two meters of hose in there and I need five meters of holes in there or you know I would have to go back as a firefighter and pull holes around the
00:26:37 firefighter and pull holes around the corner it's very labor-intensive yeah and if you're in a park apartments if you've got ponies backing you up to do that for you that makes sense right I see now I think you then go on to say
00:26:49 I see now I think you then go on to say that you committed the third crew I don't and do you remember who they were do so Hammersmith spare and BA they were on the second gen I believe and one
00:27:02 were on the second gen I believe and one of my firefighters is very experienced a firefighter Hipple he's done turkey years it's quite a switched on go and they he said to me do you think we could give a hand I said actually dad's you can I said go on and rare and had with
00:27:15 can I said go on and rare and had with homes management I see okay so you had the second crew back that first crew battle being brown second crew the Hammersmith yes Barton are they handle early yeah there's a barrier to protect the forestry yes and then you know the
00:27:28 the forestry yes and then you know the third crew is this right doing hose management correct Richard Hipple and another one Jamal sternal stone okay well we'll come back to what they do is later on yeah
00:27:39 back to what they do is later on yeah now if we look at the bottom of page seven of your statement use you received a message by radio from the be a crew that the fire was out correct how long after arriving at the
00:27:51 how long after arriving at the bridgehead interesting actually five minutes ten minutes I don't know that was it was pretty quick right okay five minutes ten minutes relatively quick there you know okay and who do you
00:28:02 there you know okay and who do you remember except that meant that crew manager Bob would be better be yes right and right was that by Barry radio or Barry really oh yeah I think I camera
00:28:13 Barry really oh yeah I think I camera exactly by contacted them the vehicle for a progress report all right and update right and instead fire zones so I thought that was a good a good swift
00:28:25 thought that was a good a good swift attack and then we got on top of it okay and then you say I asked Chuck is has four lines up to the bottom I asked Charlie possibly the crew manager from
00:28:36 Charlie possibly the crew manager from North Kensington Charlie is the fire out he said the fire is out yes say can I just thought why did you have to ask him that question that's always us look to
00:28:49 that question that's always us look to clarify is when you're at an instance there's a lot going on there are noise a lot of activities quite action centric as the watch manager or an incident
00:29:00 as the watch manager or an incident commander I would always doable sometimes triple-check issues regarding fire spread so when it's like a bit like police we repeat things twice I see toys characters discs our vacation on radio
00:29:13 characters discs our vacation on radio transmission right so I say is the fire anyway I said can you confirm is what I would say and he's confirmed the fire is oh he said answer yes which is how we speak okay say the
00:29:24 yes which is how we speak okay say the way you remember it did you radiate him and he told you and then you austere confirmation or did he radioed me but we had this conversation on the radio okay and did you have any difficulties with
00:29:36 and did you have any difficulties with communication on hearing him at that stage no no now pausing there we have in the incident log a message
00:29:49 we have in the incident log a message time or rather in the ORR a message time o 120 115 is the time of that message which is a well you could see it's about
00:30:01 which is a well you could see it's about eight minutes after you came into the building would that be about right in terms of your recollection could be okay now
00:30:11 now and we also know that batter be tallied in at o 132 11 so he that you then comes
00:30:22 in at o 132 11 so he that you then comes down do you say at the bottom of page 7 of your statement I asked the v8 crews
00:30:37 of your statement I asked the v8 crews to come and see me because that's my manner to make face-to-face contact correct I asked Charlie back to be the crew manager from North Kansas of Charlie as the fire out he said the fire is out was that effect we've discussed
00:30:48 is out was that effect we've discussed that a minute ago as if that's a radio discretion I'm just wondering whether in face to face I suppose that was a face to face discussion I see to say that the message that you've just been talking about was one over the radio on the
00:31:01 about was one over the radio on the radio and then I should come and see me over the radio is to come and come and see me again it's not uncommon for
00:31:12 see me again it's not uncommon for instant commanders to do that our sector from Anders right but okay I probably rushed rushed rushed you a little bit here let me just see how it's going to explain yes that there was radio this is
00:31:25 explain yes that there was radio this is let's take it slowly let's just so every fire we go to if it's extinguished just injustice very specific detail
00:31:37 I would say every experienced watch to man the wrong operational officer would ask for verification of details of the
00:31:48 ask for verification of details of the radial force and then face to face right because the community it is a very important communication if you say the fire is oak that's a big it's a big communication it's an important one
00:31:59 communication it's an important one yes understand so just to take it a bit more in stages than we were you have the discussion over the radio yes either he radios you or you radio here
00:32:10 either he radios you or you radio here miss he tells you the fire is out you ask him to confirm he says yes it had that radio message time today 120 115 he then comes down to the bridgehead is
00:32:22 then comes down to the bridgehead is this right and you then have a face-to-face debrief now he's still wearing breathing up around us you guys he's come to see me which is I've been polite over money maybe could have he could have gone to be able and shut down for us but he came straight to see me
00:32:34 for us but he came straight to see me because I want them to consume me I was standing to the right that be able and I just said to him face to face is the city can you confront fuzzy but he said yes I said good job
00:32:47 said yes I said good job okay and now we have him sorry invade our ski excuse me when you had that face to face the conversation how'd he get tallied back in no I see
00:33:00 how'd he get tallied back in no I see okay did he tally back in after that come after that conversation because I told him to go and do a fire ground their tests because things had gone wrong during the conversation right as I
00:33:11 wrong during the conversation right as I was speaking some things started to information start coming in with her shows and screams as we were talking yes and you say that in your statement at the end of page seven comes just before just before we do after that
00:33:26 just before just before we do after that conversation before he tallied in did you see him then tally ten or you didn't I told him to go do a fire ground a attest I had more arms and matters to
00:33:38 attest I had more arms and matters to attend to immediately and what about firefighter Brown didn't see him didn't see you know so you didn't have a debrief with him no my assumption is
00:33:50 debrief with him no my assumption is that Danny brought fire for LeBron went to the be able right I'm I was again it's an assumption I would say they had a conversation Charlie probably selling on at all to the watch manager yeah
00:34:07 yes and we have a we have Italian time for firefighter battle be of 130 to 11
00:34:18 for firefighter battle be of 130 to 11 so he did we know that he did tallien and just to just to go back and press a little bit do you think the conversation that you had for him with him about what
00:34:30 that you had for him with him about what he'd seen the fire being out was before he tallied it yes it was okay when you say tallied in this that's not the terminology we use shut down what we say
00:34:42 terminology we use shut down what we say you shut down your set is meaning after you've gotta wear each other down and you report when to control and you get you get your tummy back but you're using the terminal acknowledge Italian we don't use us okay we say well you put
00:34:55 we don't use us okay we say well you put a tally into the engine control board yes I don't be pretend to care but it's just it is that what you mean it is yeah we've got a number of times on our telemetry data what one of which is tally and bodyguard another is end of
00:35:08 tally and bodyguard another is end of we're time another is bodyguard switched off and then another one is logged off yeah well logged off you should be logged off immediately yeah once once you go back to get some control boards you shut your set down and then yeah you
00:35:21 you shut your set down and then yeah you didn't you were loved all for the edge patrol officer and we don't give you Italian back we don't all that we don't have times for looking off for that but we have in tallying it's bodyguard that I 132 11 end of where oh 1:29 a three
00:35:34 I 132 11 end of where oh 1:29 a three and his bodyguard switched off of a 29 for Joseon sakura's so yeah he is a factor
00:35:40 factor it comes from established telemetry data so anyway I've been using tally antibody go Italian that's why you know that's okay
00:35:48 okay all right you're not a firefighter so you need even though no not yet so that's the tally in time and you think the conversation was you have us before
00:36:00 the conversation was you have us before that okay they then say
00:36:11 well sorry nudists ask you this you had a face-to-face discussion with him yeah do you remember where the Charlie battered me during that discussion said anything to you about seeing falling
00:36:23 anything to you about seeing falling burning material no absolutely not right
00:36:29 it is oral evidence Charlie better be said that he did report to you that he had seen far on the exterior he didn't he didn't tell you know didn't tell me I
00:36:41 he didn't tell you know didn't tell me I know he saw me to fire of his own that was it that was it that was it right you clipped are you clearing how salutely certain of others okay then at the bottom of page seven you say and then in
00:36:56 bottom of page seven you say and then in what seemed like seconds that was probably a minute later it all changed there was consternation and shouting the atmosphere had changed very quickly and everything seemed immediately different
00:37:11 where was Charlie back to be at that moment couldn't tell if I would say well I could tell you but I don't know physically where he was but he was on the way back to doin a a test run he was
00:37:22 the way back to doin a a test run he was got it I've asked them to do an area test quickly because I needed more VA whereas I knew I was because I had information that the fire was jumping davin that I was about to ask you when
00:37:33 davin that I was about to ask you when you say it all changed could you just describe for us what changed we went from being a con good jobs well Joe you know as far as those two people screaming and shoving the
00:37:46 two people screaming and shoving the radio starts with my hands had really started going with a message saying the fire is jumping donor who was far far it was but was somebody said this fire on the fifth and the sixth are fighting
00:37:57 the fifth and the sixth are fighting this fire on the fifth I just fired on the fifth okay and he kept repeating us in an excited way so the first of all you say there was screaming and shouting
00:38:09 you say there was screaming and shouting it was shouting and a couple of screens upstairs I could hear it right it's just I'm sorry to consternation is why are they described so you standing
00:38:21 why are they described so you standing on the bridgehead second floor yes where you showed this could his screams yes a scream shouts and general commotion right and the radius of operation for
00:38:32 right and the radius of operation for the screaming shouting and general commotion was that coming from firefighters or from its others some of the shots are coming from firefighters right but from residents also right and
00:38:46 right but from residents also right and [Music]
00:38:48 [Music] did residents start coming down not immediately but very soon they did right well comfort will come to this shortly but let me clear it was Virtanen advert
00:39:00 but let me clear it was Virtanen advert as quite a lot happened at about and in that five minutes so much happened right different things everybody started moving pretty quickly the noise became elevated and the level
00:39:14 the noise became elevated and the level of alarm became elevators and let's just finish you like Internet I'll take this in in progress - so fifth floor you say I need
00:39:23 I need statement the crew transmitted that there was smoke on the fifth floor correct but who did you get that information I do it who did you get that from don't know a firefighter a
00:39:35 from don't know a firefighter a firefighter by which one was okay from your from your fire ground radio correct okay and was the firefighter who gave you that information inside the tower in Soetoro
00:39:45 Soetoro right did you know that a firefighter had gone up above the fire floor to know investigate no right me and the reason I
00:39:59 investigate no right me and the reason I don't know that is because we were the third machine to actual rise and if firefighter some more cases were inside at all which I would expect him to be to had there there are colleagues yeah then
00:40:13 had there there are colleagues yeah then I but I wouldn't know where they were exactly and at this stage Alex decent oven was up was running the beer and free water yes do you know whether he
00:40:24 free water yes do you know whether he said anything about knowing that a firefighter had gone up no he didn't say anything and did mr. secret did he tell you that someone had gone up into them no okay and too weak to be clear you say
00:40:39 no okay and too weak to be clear you say the crew transmitted there was smoke on the fifth floor hmm smoke or anything more smoke though so no reference to fire on the fifth floor though there was little
00:40:50 floor though there was little information and they seemed alarmed but I can't remember what it was but I said was smoke I mean they said heavy smoke logging right and then I had a VA crew
00:41:01 logging right and then I had a VA crew come to me which was commander Stern and fire for a hit boom came but they were on the rare they came down to bridge said name and they said to me Gardner
00:41:12 said name and they said to me Gardner someone said there's a fire on the fifth floor right I'm just gonna come back to that and that's just a moment before I do can I ask you when you heard a firefighter tell you by your fire ground radio that
00:41:25 tell you by your fire ground radio that there was smoke on the fifth floor did you communicate that to Mike Mike down I did job but I think I need like most certainly would ever would
00:41:36 like most certainly would ever would have done but I can't recall exactly what I said to him right how did you or do you think you communicated that to him by radio right did he did he respond
00:41:47 him by radio right did he did he respond do you remember I can't recall by cam room I can recall about a minute later recalling him on my radio and exactly what we said to each other what was that
00:41:58 what we said to each other what was that my other sense recruiter came down to me to investigate I must say I wasn't all very concerned because he will get small trouble you know as far as I was
00:42:10 trouble you know as far as I was concerned
00:42:10 concerned they had extinguished the fire but that's there in doing so some smoke had done and during the process smoke at
00:42:21 done and during the process smoke at traveling up to the fifth floor so again that's not unusual at four so I sense a be a crew to investigate yeah but you also said that you heard screaming and
00:42:32 also said that you heard screaming and yeah and general consternation our yeah noise yeah and I've sent the birria crew there and
00:42:43 and I've sent the birria crew there and they went there really quickly right if it seemed like seconds to me and they said it they actually reported to me that they they were on a sixth floor okay we're getting ahead just a bit o
00:42:54 okay we're getting ahead just a bit o bit too quickly cuz I'm sorry can I just think it's slightly more slowly yes because I know there's a lot to a lot never happened just sort of try and take it into piece you made it make you say
00:43:07 it into piece you made it make you say you had a conversation with my with Mike tauten by radio a minute later after being told but there was smoke on the fifth floor could
00:43:18 there was smoke on the fifth floor could you just tell me when I when there was smoke reported I would have said to him those smoke reporters that's the song thing you would say to where your colleague or innocent man okay did he respond to that I can't make it I do not
00:43:30 respond to that I can't make it I do not remember it was right while our radio traffic man and then you say you committed stern and Hipple to go to the fifth floor well when I say committed I retasked
00:43:42 well when I say committed I retasked them they were in BA already where were they standing they came down to face me in the liberal shows right you said they came down the stairs just stood at the entrance to the Asterius leave that to be totora for her baby had
00:43:57 leave that to be totora for her baby had they already been up yeah they've been Barrow hos management's I see okay how far up in the building had they gone to do house manager they have a look down the fourth floor they roll if they were
00:44:08 the fourth floor they roll if they were if you're hos managing you will be needed between the third and fourth at that time would they have been under air they ran away at that point yes
00:44:35 say they came back what would you know why they came back down to the bridge because I want to tell me it was a problem they could hear the radio just as well as I could possibly they possibly have seen something I don't
00:44:46 possibly have seen something I don't know exactly but there are experienced people know those two guys and they came and said to me quite clearly someone's
00:44:57 and said to me quite clearly someone's there the the this imported the course of fire on the fifth floor as opposed to smoke the radio transmission said smoke they said fire and smoke as a record I
00:45:09 they said fire and smoke as a record I see on the fifth on the fifth floor so I'm going to see if I can get this right that did you'd already tasked Hipple and stern to go to do hose
00:45:23 Hipple and stern to go to do hose management on the fourth floor and the fire floor is on the fire floor there between them you know to help over there holes yes and they were doing that under air correct so they would had already tallied out as I call it yes yes and we
00:45:37 tallied out as I call it yes yes and we have their times of tallying out at oh one seventeen that's not to the nearest second a one seventeen or so and then you say they hurt they heard the message
00:45:49 you say they hurt they heard the message over the radio there was [ __ ] hey they heard something they saw something I've they heard something so they kept down I'm starting enough to come and see me personally right and then they come to
00:46:00 personally right and then they come to the bridgehead and you then tell them to do what good now tell me what's happening on the fifth floor on the fifth floor right as quickly as banana as quickly as they can and then taking gang back to your stable they then go
00:46:11 gang back to your stable they then go out you say they went to the fit is this right they went past if they went to the fifth and it was there as I follow lady enough at that night they went to the
00:46:23 enough at that night they went to the fifth and they continue to the sixth did they stop on the fifth do you know I don't know they went to the safe and you saying a statement two lines
00:46:35 and you saying a statement two lines down from the top of page a I spoke to Jamal Stern violent fire on radio I can't remember exactly what he what he said that it was something like it's [ __ ]
00:46:43 [ __ ] it's going it's completely smoked out yes that's what he said that's what he said yeah more or less okay he's quite alarms really around okay
00:46:53 okay and what did you tell them to do when I immediately transmitted the message to the commander right I said it's jumping
00:47:05 the commander right I said it's jumping the fire is jumping Rick as I know it was right he said I know I know I can see it on the old Celica seen on the old side he said and he wasn't because he wanted me to understand what he was saying he was heightened our his senses
00:47:17 saying he was heightened our his senses were heightened I said it's jumping his jaw I said it's going on the fort and I'm the fifth and the sixth they said I know I can see it jumping on the old side it was happening happening simultaneously that he could see what
00:47:29 simultaneously that he could see what was happening outside whereas I could see or hear not see hear what was happening on the inside I see say when
00:47:40 happening on the inside I see say when you told him what you've been told by Jamal and Stern on the 6th floor you reported that to Mike Darden and you pay a compensation about that and he said I know I can see it's jumping on the outside I told him to make pumps is all
00:47:52 outside I told him to make pumps is all that I advised them to make promises okay I said make it and make it and he said I'm doing it I'm doing it okay then I said to you yes okay we'll come to that just just before we pour we do were
00:48:04 that just just before we pour we do were you concerned at that stage every extremely okay what were you concerned about fire spreading into other apartments right well I told we get on
00:48:16 apartments right well I told we get on top of us okay we've had fire spread before and white my plans to flood it with with the air and and firefighting equipment to get hold of it that's what we do now we got at that stage just
00:48:27 we do now we got at that stage just summarizing it we've got you at the bridgehead knowing that there's fire on the fifth floor and the sixth floor and I've got Mike outside you can see what's happening outside did you have a discussion with Mike
00:48:40 did you have a discussion with Mike Darden about in evacuation of the 5th floor 6th floor not at that time is is there a reason why that wasn't a subject for discussion
00:48:51 for discussion the reason was my understanding of it is that as a brigade commander I'm faced with Farah squared and possibly on a
00:49:02 with Farah squared and possibly on a persons involved and that the fire is moving really quickly I mean rapidly but it's all we get us so my my my communication with him was to give me
00:49:14 communication with him was to give me everybody he has spare on the fire ground nbno with fire fighting clips with fire it's okay you say I thought
00:49:25 with fire it's okay you say I thought we'd get it do you mean that you thought you'd be able to extinguish the fire without any evacuation yes what made you think that experience how
00:49:36 what made you think that experience how do you experience fire spread of this nature before not that quickly not like Viktor so in the light of the fact that you hadn't seen fire spread that quickly before how did your experience help you to decide that you
00:49:49 experience help you to decide that you shouldn't evacuate at that stage because I told and had jumped two floors we already had to be air crews with jets
00:50:00 already had to be air crews with jets and we have one one vehicle come out you know being a to charge Jetson there and if I ever had to have additional jets and crews I knew what we had on the five
00:50:12 and crews I knew what we had on the five own at that time I told we could stop us at least tried to stop him and you're asking me well we didn't discuss evacuation well we did of sorts in about 30 seconds after that what was that
00:50:24 30 seconds after that what was that discussion risky's rescued its type of evacuation but arrest you multiple rescues and who did you have that discussion with white
00:50:35 did you have that discussion with white Odin do you remember what you said to him well exactly and we had multiple calls for a sort of community the I wasn't aware of fire I was jumping up to
00:50:46 wasn't aware of fire I was jumping up to a building and calibrate it me acoustic oh
00:50:55 absolutely you don't take it well here's a call from a we will do that so 10 minutes yes thank you very much I don't discuss irrelevance please we'll
00:51:10 I don't discuss irrelevance please we'll come back at half past 10 G's
00:51:18 you
01:01:33 mr. millet while we're waiting for mr. O'Keefe I think it would be sensible if we ran for another say 40 minutes or thereabouts yeah and then headed on the break for your benefit I think so yeah
01:01:45 break for your benefit I think so yeah yes because we can have you back I think you Tommy's way
01:01:54 [Music]
01:02:07 [Music] have you comfortable to carry on I am certain mr. Keith yes I think we'll we'll all benefit from a few breaks during the morning so I've asked mr. millet to find a convenient time and
01:02:20 millet to find a convenient time and about 40 minutes do you think that you think that's all right ideal thank you do that mr. Keith thank you now I just want to I can just go back to what we were looking at just
01:02:33 back to what we were looking at just before the break which was a discussion that you had with my dad and about rescue yeah now my question is in the back against
01:02:44 now my question is in the back against the context of you having sent Hipple and stern up and they've reported to you do you think the discussion you had with Mike Dowden mcdabble about rescue was
01:02:55 Mike Dowden mcdabble about rescue was after you'd heard Jamal and stern report to you that there was fire on the sick not not immediately afterwards not immediately after how long afterwards do you think I can't exactly say but not
01:03:08 you think I can't exactly say but not long
01:03:08 long we started getting cause people in the building cause the fire was spreading okay and can you tell us what you said
01:03:19 okay and can you tell us what you said to Mike Darden about rescue I don't we were receiving I said that we were receiving calls for people from people
01:03:31 receiving calls for people from people saying they're their family members were trapped by smoke I've ever affected by smoke and and that would indicate to him that we need to start putting a rescue operation that's one that was the
01:03:43 operation that's one that was the conversation so you said that to him that you were receiving calls yes right and what did he say to you well they were also receiving calls outside right just just pausing there then where were
01:03:56 just just pausing there then where were you receiving calls on the way you I believe firefighters saved all burn got some information and like some fighting
01:04:07 some information and like some fighting some firefighters can't no I can't recall exactly was so much activity right and
01:04:17 crew manager Stern and firefighter hippo
01:04:22 reported to me that they have information if somebody was trapped on a 16th floor okay that I found very very unusual okay we've got that jumps ahead in time a little bit okay a little bit
01:04:34 in time a little bit okay a little bit fun will come but we've definitely come back to that out there it's important but just in terms of the discussion that you had with Mike doubt him so you were getting information you said I think through Alex decent Orban
01:04:46 said I think through Alex decent Orban do you know where he was getting that information about sounds radial on his radio do you remember him receiving it on his Rainier do you remember any firefighters coming at that stage at
01:04:59 firefighters coming at that stage at that - she was still early on to the bridgehead with pieces of paper know how a piece of paper that didn't happen back with me right and so and do you know where Mike Darden was getting his
01:05:11 where Mike Darden was getting his information from about mainstream radio but and then from his driver who was on the initial command phone okay thank you now going back to your statement sorry
01:05:22 now going back to your statement sorry before we do was your conversation with Mike Duggan and did you have a conversation with him about of evacuation or or no and was there a
01:05:36 evacuation or or no and was there a discussion for example about evacuating everybody on the fifth floor everybody on the sixth floor no can you help why was why didn't you discuss that I would say the
01:05:48 discuss that I would say the circumstances were exceptional right something that was happening was met where we've never seen this before or experienced it at the rate it was happening I think that was to the
01:06:00 happening I think that was to the forefront of might certainly to my thoughts and I wasn't looking at the building from the old side which I would imagine was quite dramatic right for want of a better word but it was quite
01:06:11 want of a better word but it was quite so severe probably a better word
01:06:16 yes now on page 8 of your statement you say after Jamal and Stern had reported to you what they found on the sixth
01:06:27 to you what they found on the sixth floor four lines down I knew then that there was fire spread did what did you think about how far further the fire
01:06:39 think about how far further the fire might spread as I said earlier on I told we could get us that's normally what happens if the compartment ation in the building is correct and functioning as it should do right it should stop the
01:06:51 it should do right it should stop the spread of fire occasionally you would get adaptions to a building where services are installed or for whatever reason is fired or is damaged that would undermine the integrity of the component
01:07:04 undermine the integrity of the component compartment ation so if it did spread that could be gave those to be the reasons I genuinely thought I was spreading on the inside but when Mike
01:07:17 spreading on the inside but when Mike watch nine of dome said to me I could see jumping on the outside and then I had firefighters very quickly running in telling me what's at what's actually happening also what did you think at
01:07:28 happening also what did you think at that moment about whether compartment ation was holding I told me I told me I thought it had failed internally just between a couple of flats you thought it
01:07:39 between a couple of flats you thought it inter inter spelled it possibly gone up the stairwell right there's something unseen had broken up that's not that is normally what happens you get hidden for
01:07:51 normally what happens you get hidden for our travel it's quite common in voids right and then had broken over and just went okay so your your your view just to summarize it I hope I've got this right is that you thought at that time the
01:08:03 is that you thought at that time the compartment ation had failed but it ended had failed in normally locally in okay and did
01:08:13 that prompt any thoughts about whether there was then a risk of further failure of complementation internally higher up the building than the sixth floor no
01:08:25 the building than the sixth floor no well not not to the extent of where it went backward Lee okay that's my honest answer and at that stage you think
01:08:42 answer and at that stage you think you've got internal compartment ation failure in the building far on two floors above the fire floor yeah what did you think was the correct procedure now to follow in order to deal with what
01:08:53 now to follow in order to deal with what you had in front of you bring in additional resources and extinguish the fire okay so fire Fighting's attack the fire attack the fire now you then go on to say in this fifth line down from the
01:09:04 to say in this fifth line down from the top of page eight some of the residents start itself evacuate they did they look frightened and had black smoke marks on their faces yes that's correct from that moment onwards we just started carrying out rescues now just in terms
01:09:16 carrying out rescues now just in terms of of residence were they coming past you at the bridgehead they were being escorted passed me by firefighters okay all of them also with some of themselves
01:09:28 all of them also with some of themselves some of them by themselves someone I'm we're being asked are firefighters they look confused and frightened what did the black smoke marks tell you about how the fire was behaving now the smoke was traveling there don't you smoke right
01:09:39 traveling there don't you smoke right didn't they being in smoke I walk I walk through smoke to exit the building did it look as if they were suffering seriously from smell not seriously but soot is significant and it doesn't take
01:09:50 soot is significant and it doesn't take much slope to either what's your injure somebody no do you know which floors these residents have knock down from did you speak to any of them I didn't speak to the resident I
01:10:01 them I didn't speak to the resident I mean I didn't speak to the residence just bother speaking to FOA foa's right and what did the fact that what did as you told us some of them were self evacuating what did that tell you about
01:10:13 evacuating what did that tell you about whether the building's stay-put policy which it was still a safe policy to pursue
01:10:21 pursue chuckling repeat the question sorry you could see some of these residents self evacuated yes what did did that tell you anything about whether they believe the building was the smoking they were frightened yes
01:10:33 was the smoking they were frightened yes but did that tell you anything about whether the building stay pop stay put policy was still a safe policy to pursue
01:10:41 right did that tell you anything about where the smoke was to be found on the higher floors what it told means that there was smoke there was two floors
01:10:55 there was smoke there was two floors involved and these people were possibly found those floors right and how long roughly after crew manager Bobby had
01:11:08 roughly after crew manager Bobby had left the bridgehead did you see sorry they also posted a different way did you see the residents coming down past you with smoke inhalation before or after crew manager battery had
01:11:19 before or after crew manager battery had left the brief absolutes afters next question how long afterwards do you think three or four minutes right thank you young and they then say in your
01:11:32 you young and they then say in your statement from that moment onwards we just started carrying out rescues will you say just well that's just the way I speak that's what we were doing
01:11:43 speak that's what we were doing we're firefighting and rescues I was going to ask you you say firefighting and rescue yes it wasn't only rescues it was no no was firefighting our rescues that I was still as a butcher commander
01:11:55 that I was still as a butcher commander I was still pursuing the Orthodox way of fighting our highways fire right I was all it was doing was increasing my resources are asking for additional resources right I was dealing with a
01:12:06 resources right I was dealing with a problem you know it's a dynamic situation of fire and it can change and well and you know we try to adapt or our procedures but we fight by employing a large by and large we stick with the fundamentals of highways firefighting
01:12:19 fundamentals of highways firefighting and did you prioritize firefighting ever rescue or rescue ever a firefighting all although for saying every cemetery news action that's what it was when our prime
01:12:31 action that's what it was when our prime R prime directive or porpoises said no so that would become for ending us absolutely and did you give firefighters who were coming to the bridgehead and being
01:12:42 coming to the bridgehead and being committed under air instructions as to rescue yes what were those instructions the floor
01:12:53 what were those instructions the floor number flat number and number of persons and the Commission's I mean smoke and fire provisions now so the the information is is quite sub synced in
01:13:05 information is is quite sub synced in that it will tell you where it was Florida for the year flat is on and the flat number and the number of persons in the flash and if available to care
01:13:17 the flash and if available to care clinicians right now I'd like to try and be as precise as I can about the timing of that in but when you started to receive that information roughly how long after you started carrying out
01:13:30 long after you started carrying out rescues that decision was made to carry out rescues did you start getting information about flat and floor number immediately actually from residents
01:13:41 immediately actually from residents people are telling us physically telling us stolen sores on this path power in this floor can you go get them and the information on the radio it was all happening at once very quickly you know
01:13:52 happening at once very quickly you know okay so and I'm sorry to be no that's fine no I understand to pick this a part of it say where their residents coming down who was stopping at the bridgehead
01:14:03 down who was stopping at the bridgehead and I'm saying to you so-and-so is on floor no the firefighters were telling us that they they were getting information from the residents as well bring them out and they were telling us right okay and just
01:14:16 they were telling us right okay and just in terms of that that information the VA where is coming down with residents communicating that to you was that being recorded on the bridgehead anywhere in any way so my understanding was on the
01:14:27 any way so my understanding was on the formal information boards which is a rare piece of it's something we use it's a template right and as was these four
01:14:38 a template right and as was these four separate parts by large both sides of this lectern actually and it's there's information for for plans
01:14:52 information for for plans high-rise map and locations of individuals requiring rescue all locations have been in the building of fire so what you do
01:15:03 in the building of fire so what you do is it's a it's just interesting at the copybook laminated copy okay and so you're recording information onto that who was doing the recording do you
01:15:14 who was doing the recording do you remember at the very beginning yes firefighter sent oven was recording it on the PA board I would imagine right I would guess because I I can't remember if we had the feel I know ask for a fydd
01:15:25 if we had the feel I know ask for a fydd affair forward information board both and after that after that was a firefighter or burn okay and that was on
01:15:37 firefighter or burn okay and that was on the board did the cover time when either Alex decent oven or firefighter Oh burn started recording information on the wall yes mine came when a full report of
01:15:51 wall yes mine came when a full report of shoulder to me so he was over by the lifts doors and I was over by I was committing people giving them information the firefighters up the stairs and he
01:16:02 the firefighters up the stairs and he said governor look he's shown it nice and it's fun and it was actually full which is highly unusual I was going to ask you have you ever seen that before never right okay so let's just pause
01:16:15 never right okay so let's just pause there with that I'm going to go back to the other source of information you were getting about about persons trapped in the building you said come from residence you've explained that but it
01:16:26 residence you've explained that but it also come from elsewhere I think you said through the radio also at this time was a put a well a good officer
01:16:40 Watson watch mental Watson from the hummus was right and I know you haven't asked me too much about the radio traffic yes I'm sure
01:16:53 traffic yes I'm sure we're watch magic watts and then the very calm individual recompose good officer he started giving me information he became my go-to going to pass information to watch manager Dogon and
01:17:06 information to watch manager Dogon and to get information from the fire on those side ok so what he was doing was running up and down the stairs and then he started to bring pieces of paper was a information on for supply of guidance
01:17:18 a information on for supply of guidance calls right yeah we've gone quite far ahead that's just a statue that's okay wait it's good we can capture it roughly what time did watch
01:17:29 capture it roughly what time did watch manager Watson appear on the bridge head I I can't give you time III and there was it long time after you'd started collecting the fire survival Gardens calls not a long time but too long for
01:17:42 calls not a long time but too long for me I was alone okay I said Officer Obispo know where I was I was all her tasks and when he did arrive well we can get the times perhaps another way but
01:17:53 get the times perhaps another way but when mr. Watson arrived where was he standing on the balcony okay and he was getting he was giving his information that he was getting to use it was to you
01:18:07 that he was getting to use it was to you not selectively right he we've been hunting that information to Justin Oberoi to a firefighter Albert I would imagine I say say hey say what the communication was Watson Auvergne was it Perrin the communication was between mr.
01:18:19 Perrin the communication was between mr. Watson and firefighter Rayburn and me and everybody else was on the bridge right at that time okay and was that by radio or verbally verbally face to face
01:18:31 radio or verbally verbally face to face a face it was he shouting no speaking he doesn't show and was where is he getting that information from from the fire guns from the fire ground and by walk method of communication
01:18:43 of communication I'd say face to face knowing him okay well we'll have to explore that a little bit later but just coming back then to page 8 and quite early on I
01:18:56 then to page 8 and quite early on I think in the in the incident you then go on to say it became very clear this is eight lines down from the top of page rate that there was significant smoke in the main stairwell yeah oh dude what how
01:19:08 the main stairwell yeah oh dude what how did you discover that my commander Stern and Farfalla nipple when they reported to me that there was they received a
01:19:19 to me that there was they received a forest survival guidance calls to the 16th floor I think it was a 16th floor I mean it's I think it's a my statement that when they went there they reported
01:19:31 that when they went there they reported to me I don't think it was by radio I think is when they came back this is the comms weren't really working when the firefighters went up higher that it was
01:19:42 firefighters went up higher that it was on fire right I see okay so that that information came down to you by radio from him yes I really left to it I think every I know I got that information too actually I did really to watch much
01:19:53 actually I did really to watch much delay and that's when I said to make it 10 make Poms 10 like okay they said I'm doing it I'm doing this right okay where you're about five minutes ahead of me which is so I saw them but
01:20:04 ahead of me which is so I saw them but is good no it's that's fine say you radio you radio down to Mike doubtin you say as I realized that we were very quickly realized we required much more
01:20:16 quickly realized we required much more VA to respond to what was happening in to conduct risk rescues and then you say I told him pumps eight on the radio to increase attendance and he said I'm doing it I'm doing it I made pumps a now we have a time for pumps eight but I
01:20:29 we have a time for pumps eight but I just want to be clear that about the smoke in the stairwell do you think that you've got the information from Hipple and stern about smoke in the stairwell before the discussion about pumps eight or on those are afterwards I see okay
01:20:43 or on those are afterwards I see okay right now on pumps eight doing our best to remember when you spoke to him had he already made pumps eight or was he telling me I think he
01:20:54 eight or was he telling me I think he was any you know great minds think alike I mean he was he's an operational watch manager like myself rack and we caused walking backwards what I'm speaking to them on to debark me to look to try and
01:21:05 them on to debark me to look to try and see what was going on so indeed I saw a big sheet of flame falling down I said the building right and I saw him running on the radio so two things unusual yes a
01:21:16 on the radio so two things unusual yes a big sheet of flame falling down and the watch manager actually running which we don't see what you shouldn't do I don't me that's because we're lazy so you know yes we can remain calm and composed and
01:21:27 yes we can remain calm and composed and taking information it's command and control if a watch manager is running this something seriously wrong yeah now in terms of timing we've the
01:21:40 yeah now in terms of timing we've the short incident log has the make pumps eight message time 201 1908 okay and we've looked earlier all that the
01:21:51 we've looked earlier all that the message coming down to be entry control about the flat in firing flat 16 put out at 1:21 so that's out tallies in with the with the next information from the
01:22:05 the with the next information from the back room and a 16 right just in terms of the order of things they looks as if the message to make pumps 8 over the the
01:22:16 the message to make pumps 8 over the the decision to make pumps 8 that you discuss that Mike Duggan actually happened before you were told that the fire in flat 16 was out okay that's Thailand that's the time issue III K you
01:22:27 Thailand that's the time issue III K you know it was just for me it's quite compressed that be that moment okay and throughout the night the only I don't know mining I couldn't I didn't turn I didn't look at my watch once
01:22:39 turn I didn't look at my watch once actually no no I didn't have time to understand now just in terms of that they
01:22:47 they I think you're saying correct me if I'm wrong about that you wouldn't you wouldn't disagree with that if I think if I was to put those times to you it seems like it's out of sequence but you
01:22:59 seems like it's out of sequence but you know that's how I remember us yeah the mate pumps it went when I found out the fire had jumped to the fifth and sixth
01:23:10 fire had jumped to the fifth and sixth it mate pumps ten would have been when we started getting FS cheese our first
01:23:21 we started getting FS cheese our first about the goings corns elsewhere in the building yes now in your statement on page eight you say in the middle of the page as I was speaking to Mike dad and I
01:23:33 page as I was speaking to Mike dad and I walked out onto the glass balcony I could see flames falling down yeah outside the building and I thought that's odd just just pausing there was that the first time that you'd seen the lately material coming off yes
01:23:44 material coming off yes what were your thoughts about that we had a problem a big problem was it something you thought it wasn't just a particle it was in there it was like so the front of the desk here it was that
01:23:57 the front of the desk here it was that size and it was on fire and it was falling and it was a diagonal I can remember it no so yeah right so just I'm
01:24:08 remember it no so yeah right so just I'm trying to get an idea of the size that's quite significant was five by three on fire or falling from the building yes when I walked into the building was a flat fire had you ever seen anything
01:24:20 flat fire had you ever seen anything like that before yeah building that's been fully involved they fall apart right so not not I mean I've seen that I see that just to be
01:24:33 I've seen that I see that just to be specific here have I ever seen any may pass at the beginning of an incident or were that where I didn't know that the building of his art was on fire outside no had you ever seen bits falling off a
01:24:50 no had you ever seen bits falling off a flaming bits falling off so early on an incident number right and what did that tell you about how the father's developing dad was developing rapidly did he tell you anything about
01:25:02 rapidly did he tell you anything about what it was that was not burning before before his event I had me everyone knows about caring know we we we didn't have that whereas it wasn't our reality then
01:25:15 that whereas it wasn't our reality then I know you've been new building materials are being developed constantly but the majority of the floors that on the forum you get attends are in
01:25:26 the forum you get attends are in traditional structure are have been previously I think that's changing right but while we're on that subject I just ask a question now at any time in late
01:25:39 ask a question now at any time in late 2016 early 2017 really in the months leading up to ground fills how do you remember ever seeing or hearing about a letter the London Fire Brigade had written to London local authorities
01:25:53 written to London local authorities about tall buildings and the risk of fire spread on the exterior no
01:26:02 now you then go on in the next paragraph to say on page 8 seconds later when I realized that we were losing the fire
01:26:14 realized that we were losing the fire all of the fire was getting away from us I transmit it make pumps 10 Nick make pumps 10 and he said I'm making pumps tendon sounds very excitable now the
01:26:31 short incident log has us with that message at oh one 24:29 make pumps 1001 yeah
01:26:38 yeah 24:29 and you say I realized we were losing the fire did you discuss that
01:26:53 losing the fire did you discuss that thought with my tauten yeah what what James frantic remember the exact words mean his frantic traffic do you hate him annoying I was I suppose was a priority
01:27:06 annoying I was I suppose was a priority message I sent from the bridgehead for everybody
01:27:08 everybody invierno is actually what I said right I said everyone you've got square I wasn't
01:27:18 completely they just happened so quickly sure and the message that message went to Mike down did it yes it did did you think that pumps 10 would give you
01:27:29 think that pumps 10 would give you enough resources to cater for what you were seeing in front of in this in the in the 60 seconds out it was none right did you think about going straight to 25
01:27:41 did you think about going straight to 25 I wasn't no soiled I couldn't see what he was saying he did no events he made it up really quickly fun from that moment on were some made pumps 10 that's who actually would be a good idea when
01:27:53 who actually would be a good idea when fire Paul Watson the manager told them yes and I couldn't get in contact and watch manager Doulton after that it was
01:28:04 watch manager Doulton after that it was great difficulty after what after the pumps tend immediately out was either the the radios just went full of traffic and I just couldn't transfer any more any more information right that's said
01:28:17 any more information right that's said after pumps 10 that's one 24 29 say that's when you lost contact with might so we had difficulty that's when I begun okay and after that one 24 29 how soon
01:28:32 okay and after that one 24 29 how soon after that did watch manager Watson appear on the scene at the bridgehead pretty pretty soon afterwards okay you can you can find those if I can offer
01:28:44 can you can find those if I can offer just one bit of information by looking at God through six one booking status thrill at the incident he was the officer in charge without their plans I would imagine he I there I could look
01:28:58 would imagine he I there I could look around for himself to see what was going on and then spoke to the instant commander watch manager dog them and then being tasked to come and see me yes and we've got we've got juice 361 and
01:29:11 and we've got we've got juice 361 and Status 301 2506 to say just to give you a time fix on press only about a minute later so that would make does that is
01:29:22 later so that would make does that is that consistent with your recollection consistent Joan
01:29:30 and you say also you called for additional VA and additional VA control boards do those arrive they did I asked for additional VA boards additional RUC
01:29:41 for additional VA boards additional RUC parks additional holes breaking in case everything we need us to try and stop the fire and you don't go on to say at the middle of the last paragraph on page
01:29:54 the middle of the last paragraph on page eight at this point conditions of the building were deteriorating very rapidly
01:30:03 are you talking about smoke spread or yeah yeah fire straight and flat spread as well when the FSG cause were saying that there was firing on multiple floors
01:30:14 that there was firing on multiple floors yes and we see that at the top of page nine that will come to that in the main room you then go on to say there was some light smoke on the second floor but it was accurate which stung my eyes and
01:30:25 it was accurate which stung my eyes and freight i've never a cup i have never encountered it in my life now just just pause there this is light smoke at the
01:30:36 pause there this is light smoke at the bridgehead is it when the doors were open a drafted in it worked a lot of our loop otherwise afterwards i see i've never encountered in my life was the police interviewer I think filtering
01:30:48 police interviewer I think filtering what I'm saying but but I didn't really say that I've never in coal because I felt it most types of smoke right in in my 25 years in the fire brigade but the dust dust is a bit dramatic from the
01:31:02 dust dust is a bit dramatic from the police officer she's a very good interview of her I hasten to add purchased a police officers filter sometimes went to what you say yes and I know I had an opportunity to review my
01:31:14 know I had an opportunity to review my that document but I didn't pay any great attention to these there are in a placebo the doctor but they're not significant but then just to get your
01:31:28 significant but then just to get your recollection as you stand here was there anything about the smoke that you've got that in your memory actually good smoke is often accurate what did that tell you if anything about what limit but what was burning well
01:31:42 what limit but what was burning well normally with that was small could say it's plastic or rubber based which I just I know we get to but that's where that's what you get from plastics you
01:31:57 that's what you get from plastics you know as you know there are many types and Robert the oh I base but there are two chemicals in them toxic chemicals are byproducts that like hydrogen cyanides and and so on yes so as soon as
01:32:09 cyanides and and so on yes so as soon as that gets in your trolls or your eyes it did sting you because it's poison right and that was that what you were experiencing briefly and I'm used to that sort of thing yes I've never experienced this in my life is alright
01:32:21 experienced this in my life is alright it's a slight exaggeration okay well you can take that because we find it then now you then say at the top of page nine
01:32:40 besides before we go on did you communicate to anybody that you could now smell even a small amount of acrid no it's where it's not a structural fire
01:32:51 no it's where it's not a structural fire right you say at the bottom of page eight three lines up from the bottom of course what I couldn't see was the
01:33:02 course what I couldn't see was the outside the flames have gone up outside the building and did you at that stage will you will make PUMS ten is that
01:33:13 will you will make PUMS ten is that right because ready but no time so you know so what mate okay did you have any clue at that stage that the exterior of the fire exterior of the building was on
01:33:24 the fire exterior of the building was on fire yes the firefighters told me right okay so you knew it but you couldn't see it yeah it's not only if will be the code for each other so we will pass
01:33:35 code for each other so we will pass information there's a constant stream of information it's very important so if something changes on the fire ground it is communicated I mean the textbook will say the incident commander must
01:33:46 say the incident commander must communicate any changes you instead man was busy doing or is commander trying to control the firefighters communicate each other really well yes so if they notice that some hazards
01:33:57 yes so if they notice that some hazards it was in a you know any incident can't tell each other so they don't you don't get caught with hello players and injured so the firefighters coming up to me or telling me that had jumped up or
01:34:08 me or telling me that had jumped up or saleability and I was going up towards the roof right now at the top of page 9 you say at the bridgehead we then began to receive multiple requests of rescue
01:34:19 to receive multiple requests of rescue from residents and at the same time I began to receive fire survival guidance FSG calls
01:34:28 just to be clear on timing again if I can was that before or after the make up to ten pumps before before long before I would say not very long before belong
01:34:41 would say not very long before belong for you that's why I mean making pumps 10 as a high-rise fire wouldn't be that unusual if the fire spreading but yes
01:34:54 unusual if the fire spreading but yes yes it was before and you use the expression for survival guidance calls could you just and you go on to say fast survival guidance called is where a member of the public and has a fire in their building calls fire brigade
01:35:06 their building calls fire brigade control and we're going to explain the advice that is that is given these fast survival guidance calls you were getting
01:35:18 survival guidance calls you were getting is that what we discussed before the information that you are getting either from the BA where is coming down with residents or through the communication
01:35:30 residents or through the communication correct and people coming back into them are trying to get back as easily from the fire grab and people coming back and trying to get access to movement right so when you say you were getting calls that's not from control that's information not be directly from control
01:35:42 information not be directly from control or where the system we use serves the the instant command prompt and receive for survival guidance from all control and transact to the transmitter to use
01:35:53 and transact to the transmitter to use the commander or somebody's helping music commander yes and that's transmitted to the fire sector yes and you explained it in fact exactly that just halfway done the first paragraph or page 9 you say the information is then
01:36:07 page 9 you say the information is then transmitted to the either the Brigade appliance in attendance or a command unit stating location flat number floor number of persons involved their location within the building
01:36:19 that's how it gets to the command unit and the command unit is either a is either the incident command pump is this right or a full-blown see you fully
01:36:30 right or a full-blown see you fully belongs to you it's the initial command the command prompt so as soon as control here's that we're making first of all it
01:36:42 here's that we're making first of all it control of multiple cards you get a command you'll anyway they're on a PDA or I think make comes for and lots of triggers
01:36:48 triggers you know rehearsals of all you will always get a command use so the command unit will be there pretty quickly I think
01:36:54 think right if you say come on unit is on a PDA foot there are triggers right it
01:37:07 PDA foot there are triggers right it depends on the level of command requires yes and communication systems required so that's what they are and what it's a mobile command center yes and yes a so I
01:37:21 mobile command center yes and yes a so I think your are you saying subscribe place this in policy when multiple calls are received their command unit is order that automatically yes right
01:37:32 we think for those who are interested that's that's in Polish that's in the I mobilization policy for 12 there is more Verizon positive let me know what the number is offhand but yeah I've read it
01:37:43 number is offhand but yeah I've read it okay this paragraph 2.14 for those who are just to do it but that that is what you that is what you know is it yes so you have the initial command pump which is the is the go to focal point for the
01:37:55 is the is the go to focal point for the incident which is the so you have for example involved two seven one two seven two one of those appliances would be humping and the other appliance would be used as a command Eunice staff by your
01:38:09 used as a command Eunice staff by your command Support Officer which is could be a firefighter and so if that's where people book in when they come like the roll call board and that's where all the way in your trap that comes true okay
01:38:20 way in your trap that comes true okay it's it's a temporary but mostly a temporary command post and we're gonna have a break in in just a few minutes and other mystery kit but before we do can I ask you how when you have multiple
01:38:32 can I ask you how when you have multiple multiple calls does the information the FSG information normally go from the command unit to the bridgehead what's the normal route of communication I don't know the rules of communication
01:38:43 I don't know the rules of communication would be by radio direct if it's possible so see you a radio channel they get that they get the information from
01:38:55 get that they get the information from there they have a dedicated emergency line which we used for FSG calls and then you have it's staffed by the officers additional officers and that information is recorded but it can
01:39:06 that information is recorded but it can be brought to the bridgehead physically which is probably better and it's recorded on the forward information board and it's used to so you'd have the
01:39:17 board and it's used to so you'd have the information logged on with what it's a FSG poster which is a large format that could be brought to the bridgehead but it's recorded in quadruple I think quadruple forms yes and so the
01:39:30 I think quadruple forms yes and so the forms have be handled to various people pardon me but it will be transmitted as well
01:39:37 well which others as well say that's what it was that was happening at the very beginning of love the foreign blood photography right it said the very beginning it was coming by radio was it
01:39:48 beginning it was coming by radio was it radio and verbally and verbally and pieces of paper right but we'll pursue that a little bit more okay later on I want to where the men now baby good we went for a break yes well have another break now mister
01:39:59 yes well have another break now mister okay thank you sir we all have a bit longer we'll have poor from our back at 25 past eleven and please don't talk to anyone whatsoever thank you my shoot right 25 past please
01:40:26 you
01:57:05 [Music]
01:57:25 or it mr. Keith pacer nice thank you very much
01:57:33 yes so we were discussing before the break mr. O'Keeffe the consistent normal system of communication and I was want to get from UV system of communication
01:57:44 to get from UV system of communication of faster Bible guidance information from me see you who come on unit to the bridgehead during the various different stages of the incident while you were at the questionnaire just just first of all at
01:57:55 questionnaire just just first of all at the very start what was the method of communication and fire fire survival guidance information very start of a very hand on the radio right and there
01:58:07 very hand on the radio right and there afterwards it was pieces of paper right as I recall okay and where would the who would bring the pieces of paper to the bridgehead you remember various people
01:58:18 bridgehead you remember various people as the incident progressed for US Marshal Watson was the guy who was facilitating supporting us in the bridges and what what do you do with the
01:58:29 bridges and what what do you do with the information all the pieces of paper they were destroyed went on to the formal information board and when that became too full I instructed fire fire burn the
01:58:40 too full I instructed fire fire burn the world I used was sing it put on information upon the wall okay in general terms when you had information which from inside the
01:58:51 information which from inside the building from firefighters either coming back down to the bridgehead or by radio it was there a way of recording that well the information they would bring to
01:59:04 well the information they would bring to me they gave me a fat man where that would go on to the I would send them to the PA guys to give that information they'd have to give that information any room there when their clothes and other
01:59:16 room there when their clothes and other assets right so the they would they would give out information to the to the I suppose FSG recorder and the
01:59:27 I suppose FSG recorder and the tall officer and what would happen to that information after that point it would be recorded and the next crew to come will be given that information and assigned that if there was a known area
01:59:39 assigned that if there was a known area where someone needs arrest me and you would immediately assign the cruiser okay well that's what I was doing and supposing firefighters came down just in general terms at the moment came down
01:59:50 general terms at the moment came down and said to you well we've gone up to flat X and can't find anybody in there or gone up to flat X and can't get in or can't get onto that floor and have come down so that it was an unsuccessful
02:00:02 down so that it was an unsuccessful deployment just happened yes with that information be recorded first of all it would be recorded where would that be recorded where's the core on the wall as far as I know as far as I'm
02:00:14 wall as far as I know as far as I'm aware and with that with the information about with that information then be fed back to ultimately come our brigade control well I was reading the
02:00:27 control well I was reading the information to watch module Watson because I couldn't use a radio any longer enable two transmitters and my understandings that he would bring out any impart information back to the to the fire going outside to the fire ground say to your recollection
02:00:40 ground say to your recollection information about successful or failure deployments would be fed back through the method of communication various methods of communication and could you just describe those for us
02:00:51 could you just describe those for us verbally face-to-face can you pass this information on right all written down I didn't write anything down myself that I was too busy I got time to Roy's right but I did speak to watch manager Watson
02:01:04 but I did speak to watch manager Watson quite a lot actually insolent right and he would go where with that information I'm stares he kept going back up back up and down he did a lot of walking right and where would he come in or to would
02:01:15 and where would he come in or to would he communicate the information a squatch matter what's in there that's for a sir all right did you have any discussions with Mike Darden or any later incident commanders about particular failed deployments that you were learning about
02:01:26 deployments that you were learning about who group manager Welsh right okay we'll come to him now
02:01:46 do you remember watch manager Watson setting up a be a staging area on the mezzanine hmm I do what sort of point in the night was that
02:01:58 what sort of point in the night was that how long after he arrived perhaps pretty immediately after you right because I told him why we have nothing left and I was on the radio asking for resources I wasn't getting any response I was getting frustrated
02:02:10 any response I was getting frustrated because I'd committed I had multiple multiple calls for rescue and I couldn't commit anybody else had nobody else left and and that was that was if I could
02:02:21 and and that was that was if I could just explain why it was just after watch manager Tony was making me up the instant as quickly as he could what the resources having the right Jess and we had committed pretty much solve
02:02:36 and we had committed pretty much solve our equipment and people not everybody of course was we had to have support on the phonogram and elsewhere as many as we could possibly and what was he
02:02:49 we could possibly and what was he recording at this forward post the staging area obviously what what was he recording was he recording information quite possibly no no he was listening to
02:03:02 quite possibly no no he was listening to me quite loved okay he seemed quite cerebral go you ask them for something he understands us readily and he was trying to get me while I the bar get us
02:03:13 trying to get me while I the bar get us what we needed on the bridgehead right
02:03:21 and was he communicating with anybody in the lobby of the building on the ground who was that June I don't know there are a lot of people there's a lot of activity on the lobby right all the
02:03:32 activity on the lobby right all the times I look down the stairs run to the lobby was well quite a bit of activity firefighters and so on do you know where he was that Watson was getting the information that he was passing to you
02:03:43 information that he was passing to you for Ireland from the fire he would have been getting that farm we will assign a as many as we can spare to manage the information coming in right and he was
02:03:54 information coming in right and he was bringing slips of paper in to you and the information subscriber right and you know way do you know where he was getting the information was that he was recording on these slips of paper from me
02:04:06 yeah exact location I don't know because I was inside cause he will be getting from people who were getting D who were getting the information from our brilliant control right we're Manning
02:04:17 brilliant control right we're Manning the phones and they were given this this precise information to officers on the fire ground he was then getting the information I needed bringing himself or sending
02:04:28 needed bringing himself or sending people with preparation to us right and did you know whether that information had been prioritized so that what you were getting was course to be the priority not his daddy is the priority
02:04:39 priority not his daddy is the priority okay FS gol when you have an FSG incident it becomes the priority right but I think you you're saying you don't know exactly where Watson was getting
02:04:50 know exactly where Watson was getting the information are you going to ask damn so sir right you know whether Watson was receiving pieces of paper from somebody else or creating the pieces of receiving who's received do know that he was received so he was simply essentially a
02:05:02 so he was simply essentially a back-and-forth Messer a runner he was the right man those that would be disingenuous the sames a runner but laws it's a rude word a space but no it's no it's okay he was a runner right and and
02:05:13 it's okay he was a runner right and and they had run an instant he with you even though he's watch Madrid he was a runner yes right now it page 9 you describe
02:05:25 yes right now it page 9 you describe five lines down stay put advise you say in this case the advice would have been to stay put this is because high-rise buildings are generally meant to be constructed so
02:05:36 generally meant to be constructed so that fires will be contained to the fire floor Maris correct so it's far safer for residents of high-rise blocks to stay in they're supposedly protected apartments until firefighters can come and rescue them when you first started
02:05:53 and rescue them when you first started getting fire survival guidance calls did you know what advice was being given by the control room operators to individual residents who were cool no I didn't and on that point I asked at one
02:06:09 didn't and on that point I asked at one point when crude manual boats had arrived and one of those as many discussions within that place was governor has had they lifted the policy yes I stay put advice and he said I
02:06:20 yes I stay put advice and he said I don't know yes you you cover that in your in a statement did he when he
02:06:31 your in a statement did he when he arrived looking ahead did he agree with you that the staple policy should should be changed you know we didn't have that type of discussion we had a different discussion when he write you want to know about the scope when I first saw
02:06:42 know about the scope when I first saw him yeah up the stairs against the include manager run is unusual and he said I can't recall the exact words he said be using initials my name he's
02:06:53 said be using initials my name he's obviously fond of Who I am what are you doing which is normal you know what what tactics and it just was is it working and I said no right and he said why not
02:07:06 and I said no right and he said why not and I said the duration of their Oh standard duration if guys couldn't were either in danger of being getting killed themselves I couldn't reach the upper
02:07:19 themselves I couldn't reach the upper floors then running out of air really quickly that was the problem that you communicated terms might be problem and he said okay and he said what you need I know what we
02:07:31 he said what you need I know what we needs I said II DBA extend the direction breathing apparatus and he said how much and I said all of us they said we can't
02:07:42 and I said all of us they said we can't do that I said governor we need all of us I said we needed no less and everything and I elaborated like I was going to sell the idea to him I said you know I said I'll get all the air for use here get the CBO and I said as I said as
02:07:54 here get the CBO and I said as I said as laws of guys was a within EDB a ticket as I have which is a qualification in London I said we need them here in other ways we're not going to reach these people right that's why that was the and
02:08:08 people right that's why that was the and he taught I could see him thinking he's listening and he said okay we do that and he ran back downstairs [Music]
02:08:23 okay well he also said I'm taking over as far as sector progress I have as a person he said okay in fact we we have that we have the first deployment of IDI
02:08:37 that we have the first deployment of IDI be a wearers there's no need to look at the telemetry data but we have their first deployment of around 156 Paddington yes Paddington of a five-on-five firefighter
02:08:49 Paddington of a five-on-five firefighter crew from night rescue crew Elaine ops crew yes I remember crew manager weekly the commander wig there now was that before or after group manager Welch
02:09:01 before or after group manager Welch arrived at the bridgehead before those before so you did have some needy VA available did you earlier on I'd said to Victor watch much darkness a gift gets a needy beer here and he said doing it
02:09:12 needy beer here and he said doing it anyway he was already thinking like I was and I think you're a couple of ff4 use put for lane for lineups as far as I understand yeah and he had a plan to use
02:09:25 understand yeah and he had a plan to use them for something no just getting back to the question we'll come back to group manager wealth later on but just going back to my question about advice being given to the control room you say you
02:09:36 given to the control room you say you didn't know what it was no what assumption did you make did you make an assumption about what the advice was being given by those calling I would say the assumption do you want and it is just an assumption at the advice was to
02:09:47 just an assumption at the advice was to stay put did you have any thoughts about whether that at least gonna be safe I'd have thoughts I taught nobody would make it on the stairs so it was a good view any advice the stairs were smoke fell
02:09:58 any advice the stairs were smoke fell completely and my beer crews were suffering and they were wearing be a yeah and I knew that it wouldn't it would be dangerous for anyone not in greening up around us to be in that stairwell right I was the only means of
02:10:10 stairwell right I was the only means of going up and coming go escape me from the building and it was an assumption and that's why I asked your manager was
02:10:22 and that's why I asked your manager was there was an assumption that people have been told to stay put okay was there a way in which you could communicate with the control room about what you or your BA wearers were seeing
02:10:34 what you or your BA wearers were seeing an experience singing in the stairs all that information was fed down to earth at the instant command of truth watch Michael Watson another officer so that's the link you had we could not just him but other officers and the firefighters who
02:10:47 other officers and the firefighters who are coming who had been committed yeah and they were being battered so now just to come back to Richard Welch halfway down page nine and you say I think it was about 2:00 to 2:30 hours I had a
02:10:59 was about 2:00 to 2:30 hours I had a conversation with Richard Welch as regards to the change the change you say in advice for the staple at policy I can't really recall the exact details of this conversation it was a question okay
02:11:14 this conversation it was a question okay did kind of just show you what your evidence up there yeah I can't recall the exact details of this conversation but it wouldn't have changed our search-and-rescue tactics but would have added an element of potential
02:11:25 added an element of potential unpredictability to our operations yeah we wouldn't have know where people were just taking this in in stages Richard Welch when he arrives what status did he have was he incident commander or or what I was a bit
02:11:38 commander or or what I was a bit confused about that because he told me he was fire sector commander which was my job and it's bridger commander and you're a fire sector commander but he's quite a senior officer to me so I was
02:11:51 quite a senior officer to me so I was under the impression that he'd taken all the entire incident now to put it in timing turns we have him arriving at oh one status three I'm sorry of oh one 5721 we also have your deployment of
02:12:05 5721 we also have your deployment of this five personal five firefighter Paddington EDB a crew at about the same time yeah how soon after that might help you remember how soon after that that
02:12:18 you remember how soon after that that deployment do you remember Richard Welch coming to the bridgehead and you very soon afterwards right not not immediately but I mean he when he would have turned up he would have had to make his assessment of what was going on
02:12:30 of what was going on and it was a lot going on so he would have had even gone to the command jewelers booking he would have spoken to officers you know collecting information trying to formulate a plan
02:12:42 trying to formulate a plan that and that's what he would do and you say I had a conversation with Richard Welch
02:12:47 Welch as regards ver change in advice for the state yeah see I can't remember the exact time that was well say he comes to the bridgehead and is this conversation about stay put at that stage when he
02:12:58 about stay put at that stage when he first comes to the bridgehead to talk to you as I said it no no no that's enough that wasn't when he came first it was what are you doing right is it working no what do we need okay I'll do that
02:13:09 no what do we need okay I'll do that that was the EPA said did he then go away and come back yeah you have 12 tonight he run downstairs come back and then you have this conversation
02:13:20 then you have this conversation as regards to the change how did that conversation go how did the subject of changing the state book policy come up I brought it up what did you say I asked him a question what was the question
02:13:32 what was the question as is the state policy I can't know the exact question but it has the state policy be lifted or is it or what is it going to be lifted something like that why did you ask that question because
02:13:44 why did you ask that question because the fire was out of control did you just try to get your thought process is too far being out of control why did you think that it might be
02:13:55 why did you think that it might be necessary to change the safer policy it's a big question because the four isn't army therefore I know strips the event and I've stripped our ability to
02:14:06 event and I've stripped our ability to to rescue everybody on the information all you had at the time yes and so changing from stay put what would what did you think at the time the advice
02:14:18 did you think at the time the advice should be changed to I didn't have an opinion or than if people started to evacuate they would become multiple casualties in the MV stairs and that we
02:14:30 casualties in the MV stairs and that we would have great difficulty in fighting aware people war yeah because when you have an MSG you know what person one is and if they're protected you know even you know you have a destination X or Y
02:14:41 you know you have a destination X or Y flat number of people but if people start evacuating when the entire buildings on fire I'm foreign the entire the only way dull
02:14:54 I'm foreign the entire the only way dull is impossible and that would have been well a huge catastrophe for well it would have really impedes our rescue operation yes and that's the sense we get from the platform and if I didn't
02:15:06 get from the platform and if I didn't know if my guys didn't know where people who are I couldn't say we're going to go to this floor you just have as we did afterwards people deceased in the stairwell and at various parts of them
02:15:19 stairwell and at various parts of them and at the stage you're having your conversation with group manager Welsh were you in favor of changing the stay-put policy or against no I didn't I was in favor I was wondering was a
02:15:31 was in favor I was wondering was a question I needed to know what was going on I start important for me to know what kind of movement is happening in the building what advice has been given I see saysay do I understand your evidence
02:15:42 see saysay do I understand your evidence to be that your conversation with him as was exploratory you just wanted to learn yes I see
02:15:47 yes I see did he tell you when you had that conversation what the status of the state put you know at that time it was a question and an answer it wasn't a conversation per se nothing disrespectful here but it was just that
02:15:59 disrespectful here but it was just that was it was a very short exchange between you know which we had many many truths I'm sure and that was the exchange he
02:16:11 I'm sure and that was the exchange he said I don't know he said I don't know right and did he get did he do you know whether he went and discussed that question with anybody else I haven't asked the manager well shuttle right sir
02:16:26 at that stage terms of priorities you've had this discussion with question and answer with group manager Welch where you're prioritizing firefighting or search and rescue or were they the same
02:16:38 search and rescue or were they the same social rescue social rescue
02:16:42 and
02:16:57 jumping ahead a little bit a little bit or on page 11 of your statement in the
02:17:08 or on page 11 of your statement in the middle of the page you were to refer to a time I think quite early on in the incident yeah well you come to me I am registered sweaty palms yeah well that's okay I think it's everybody in the room so I think you're right I just want to see if
02:17:27 think you're right I just want to see if I can get the time on this and then we get back but in the middle of page 211 just after you've discussed a deployment and and information you got from Murphy
02:17:38 and and information you got from Murphy and Cornelius this is floor 14 they say by this time the situation had deteriorated even further this was very early on in the incident of the fire was developing so rapidly that VA crews are
02:17:50 developing so rapidly that VA crews are finding it difficult to get beyond the 12th floor correct was that before or after you had this question and answer discussion with group manager Welch about changing the
02:18:01 group manager Welch about changing the statement advice before before okay
02:18:09 now I want to just look if I can and a number of particular deployments see if you can help me with them the first one
02:18:21 you can help me with them the first one and is that all right I mean I've been absolutely fine it's okay the first one is about a rescue a trip to the 20th
02:18:32 is about a rescue a trip to the 20th floor
02:18:32 floor yes were you at the bridge head when crew manager secret and firefighters video and dog ooh left the bridge head to go to the 20th
02:18:45 left the bridge head to go to the 20th floor to perform a rescue I would have been but I wasn't aware they went her you weren't aware so okay were you aware that a an FSG call had was in progress
02:19:00 that a an FSG call had was in progress with a twelve-year-old girl on the 23rd on the 33rd floor most likely because we had multiple we had multiple calls at
02:19:13 had multiple we had multiple calls at that time so if you ask me the number of a floor or flat I didn't be able to tell him right so they went to see if I can get a time on this if you go to the
02:19:24 get a time on this if you go to the operational response report and turn to page 59 and 60 59 first of all we must have that on the screen we see an o1
02:19:37 have that on the screen we see an o1 3524 operations manager norman she's in the control room at Stratford rings the team leader watch manager
02:19:50 rings the team leader watch manager Marik on cu8 yes there's a conversation she she has and then over the page we have a summary here of the information that is passed to see you ate and the
02:20:03 that is passed to see you ate and the source of that is the admin call and vision and you'll see that the floor number at the fourth entry down is number 23 and there there are two adults and eight children remarks smoke going
02:20:15 and eight children remarks smoke going into the flat now that's at that time it is do you remember getting information at the bridgehead whilst you were in
02:20:26 at the bridgehead whilst you were in charge of it after well just after that time about a number of people on floor 23 can you just remind me of the time
02:20:38 23 can you just remind me of the time well that information comes in at oh one thirty five twenty four not specifically worth there was no I know was the answer as with the be a who's ever going up
02:20:51 as with the be a who's ever going up again I wouldn't be able to keep tabs on them because I'm not on the enter control officer although I was briefing people well I didn't have I clearly can't recall any specific numbers on
02:21:02 can't recall any specific numbers on flats well maybe one or two
02:21:10 and
02:21:13 did
02:21:21 do you remember having any discussion about or discussion with firefighters secret Padilla and dog ooh as they went up the tower no human did you learn from
02:21:38 up the tower no human did you learn from them while they were up the tower about the conditions they discovered once they got to the 20th floor no all conditions in the stairwell and not me personally but they may well have
02:21:49 not me personally but they may well have briefed the edge of the phone officer on the torrent which I would suggest they did right just to pin this down in time we have the dispatch time with the the
02:22:01 we have the dispatch time with the the tally out time for secret dog ooh and video at about 133 is to be clear for
02:22:12 video at about 133 is to be clear for firefighter secret we've his telemetry data shows that the tally out time for him is a 133 57 and the others a 13333
02:22:28 him is a 133 57 and the others a 13333 and a 1 3501 so that's the time they tally out but I think you told us that you didn't have a discussion with them what about what they were doing when they went up I don't know that's correct
02:22:40 they went up I don't know that's correct I didn't I don't I can't recall it but there were a lot of be air crews what everybody available at that time was going up and I don't specifically remember speaking to any of that crew do
02:22:53 remember speaking to any of that crew do you think sorry do you remember whether Alex decent oven spoke to that crew you'd have to ask for another state officer do you remember whether there
02:23:04 officer do you remember whether there were be a cruise going up into the building up the stairs from the bridgehead who weren't telling you or Alex decent Alban where they were going on that it happened it did happen it did happen the incidents throughout the incident
02:23:16 the incidents throughout the incident and a few points were where I was
02:23:23 maintaining control command and control and I remember one specific incident where a crew from hammers well went past the intercultural point
02:23:34 well went past the intercultural point which there are tallies in their assets which are observed and I sent a crew manager after commander Tinsley from Paddington to get them back into
02:23:48 from Paddington to get them back into booking correctly right it was that long it was at how far into the incident I couldn't tell you and and just focusing on this trio of firefighters going to the 20th floor we have leaving the
02:24:00 the 20th floor we have leaving the bridgehead at O 133 also 33:57
02:24:11 do you remember whether after that time when they've gone any further FSG information came to the bridgehead but about floor 23 it rings a bell rings
02:24:25 but about floor 23 it rings a bell rings a bell yeah but I can't put 23 dozen about any particular flat number no look I wouldn't say that numbers of flats
02:24:39 I wouldn't say that numbers of flats floors times throughout the insolence except with one exception where I kept FSG notes in my children and retrieve
02:24:50 FSG notes in my children and retrieve them the following week that's the only time stamp that I have from the entire instance all of them were lemon tin and came out with the terrible right can you
02:25:02 came out with the terrible right can you help us with when the FSG call came in about a flat on the 23rd floor no sir I
02:25:14 about a flat on the 23rd floor no sir I don't
02:25:16 don't what about a call in relation to a flat on the 20th floor 175 to range so possibly I don't know I do you know when
02:25:31 possibly I don't know I do you know when that I remember my first beer crew though I think they know they went as a sixteenth oh sorry it was very different okay I'm gonna come to that yeah yes I'm gonna come to the 16th floor in a minute but just on just on that on there are
02:25:43 but just on just on that on there are two that there are two calls that are in progress yeah I tell you after 1:30 and after 1:30 and then I've shown you the cu8 information about about the flat on
02:25:56 cu8 information about about the flat on the 23rd floor flatten on the 20th floor 175 you say that's FSG information which rings a bell do you know
02:26:07 rings a bell do you know we're having would you remember having received FSG information about flat 175 what you did with that information I can answer by saying they're all information
02:26:18 answer by saying they're all information on FSG information sorry received at the bridgehead was acted upon was recorded on recorded and acted upon by committing the entities
02:26:29 the entities do you remember whether the information about flat 175 of the 20th floor was received by you at the bridgehead before the trio secret video and dog ooh had
02:26:40 the trio secret video and dog ooh had left the bridgehead no I don't remember having received the information about flat 175 on the 20th floor did you and then instructor be a crew to go to that flat at that time yes if I
02:26:53 go to that flat at that time yes if I had a crew but most likely at that time we're gonna write do you remember the
02:27:06 we're gonna write do you remember the trio of secret video and dog food coming back down to the blue head you don't know do you remember any discussion with a trio but police not again do you drive
02:27:17 a trio but police not again do you drive a discussion with with career manager secret about trip that he'd made to know exactly knows what about video no what about dog you know your clip are
02:27:28 no what about dog you know your clip are you clearing your recollection clear yes we did nothing I can recall I mean I got quote the recall on events generally speaking I don't recall that because I think yesterday you were quite clear
02:27:40 think yesterday you were quite clear that you would your practice would be to have a face-to-face debrief with any be a where they've got the possible yeah if it was if there was important information certainly right which is what I tried to do to a point where I
02:27:53 what I tried to do to a point where I became overwhelmed by the amount of people giving me information and fortunately for me it was another watch manager at the syllable was a detail to come to the bridgehead to assist and she took off that I'll that she took all the
02:28:06 took off that I'll that she took all the FST but I detailed her to take over the efest you how soon was that after you'd started well you'd have to look as when God three for one stays through and then if I would say a
02:28:20 stays through and then if I would say a Titan ups of minutes was by the watch manager the silver was been briefed by our you know on the forums and then she was escorted up to the bridgehead by our
02:28:32 was escorted up to the bridgehead by our company I should say by watch Nigel Thompson from Watson sorry yeah Paul Watson when she came I I was very happy
02:28:43 Watson when she came I I was very happy to see another watch manager and so I I teach and her to get a grip as well as word a news on the PA procedures and the FSG right now we have crew manager
02:28:59 FSG right now we have crew manager secret coming down to the bridgehead and with an end of where time of o157 we have the do with an end of we're tag of
02:29:12 have the do with an end of we're tag of about the same and also dog ooh so just before two o'clock a trio of ba where has come down to the bridge in and that you say you didn't have a debrief with
02:29:23 you say you didn't have a debrief with any of them do you remember any firefighters around that time coming down to the bridgehead dangerously low on air yeah right that's the way it
02:29:38 on air yeah right that's the way it became initially you know do you remember the firefighter coming down with with metabolic heat stress no okay
02:29:52 with with metabolic heat stress no okay do you remember firefighters coming down dangerously low on air and going out of the bridgehead without debriefing you know that was I wouldn't know that to
02:30:03 know that was I wouldn't know that to happen you wouldn't allow that to happen no not if I was aware of what was happening I was going to say because we have this this trio of firefighters they go up to the 20th floor to perform a rescue they don't succeed because they
02:30:15 rescue they don't succeed because they can't find anybody in the flat they run out of there we've heard evidence about this and come to come down a smoky stairway well at least one of them very low on air and then leave the bridge
02:30:28 low on air and then leave the bridge heavy and not do a debrief with you I mean I'm just trying to get it right and see them that was something they remember I don't remember seeing them at all they may have spoken to the people
02:30:39 all they may have spoken to the people on the VA boards which I wish I would say definitely happened right do you okay thank you do you recall any
02:30:50 okay thank you do you recall any firefighter coming down to you before two o'clock and saying the stairwell is completely smokeless yes who was that far father Murphy and firefighter communist far far a commander Stern and
02:31:05 communist far far a commander Stern and far from a hippie but they're particularly far for a Murphy for my boy who was one of my guys are saying yeah some can see didn't fire fire corniness okay now we're gonna look at that deployment did some detail in a moment
02:31:17 deployment did some detail in a moment okay when they when they did come down to you and tell you that did that indicate to you the residents in the building needed to be told by the
02:31:29 building needed to be told by the control room about about those conditions certainly and that them and that BA
02:31:40 certainly and that them and that BA whereas going up to perform rescues and evacuations needed to make sure that they could get those residents down the stairwell in some way Widodo put the
02:31:54 stairwell in some way Widodo put the issue of three at this time I still we don't have any facilities to bring people true smoke without injuring them see I thought that
02:32:05 without injuring them see I thought that I took that smoke of that intensity and don't act that degree of small blogging right because otherwise my guys would be wearing breathing apparatus you know and this is a highly highly arrest little
02:32:16 this is a highly highly arrest little atmosphere toxic and you want you want you know he won't get very far and if the conditions on the 20th floor that secret dog over deer had discovered sick
02:32:27 secret dog over deer had discovered sick smoke in the flat that one flat one seven six six making the lobby smoke fix make of the stairway right down to just before the bridgehead as they took as
02:32:39 before the bridgehead as they took as crew manager secret told us yesterday in the light of those conditions that were there as he said before two o'clock what what advice should the control room be
02:32:50 what advice should the control room be giving to callers who are trapped in their flats a description of about Oh aye description of the of the collisions right was it important for control room themselves to know precisely what was
02:33:01 themselves to know precisely what was happening inside the building I'm suggest that that crew went to the incident commander who was there officer anyway if they didn't brief me they would have spoken to the Ender and
02:33:12 would have spoken to the Ender and control board they were certainly I would say yeah certainly spoken to their watch manager right now we're gonna take a break in just a few minutes can I just
02:33:24 a break in just a few minutes can I just ask you just one about a particular deployment do you remember the first deployment of EDB a yes and that was a
02:33:39 deployment of EDB a yes and that was a deployment of a five personal fire firefighter paddington team the remote yes patents man Korea and we have them leaving well we have a tallying out of the bridgehead at 156
02:33:52 tallying out of the bridgehead at 156 and 157 also would that be about right in terms of yeah what do you I would say in terms of your reckoning do you remember where they were tasked to go over tasks to go to the roof right
02:34:05 to go over tasks to go to the roof right whose idea was that instant commander who is that at that stage watch bunch of toes and I believe right and what were they going to do on the roof set up a line drench for system or less of a series of lines with their
02:34:18 or less of a series of lines with their special skills they set for a trencher right you say special skills did that particular crew her particular drama chef brief was to go several air and
02:34:29 chef brief was to go several air and line and their system of lines to secure people are just clear away equipment under on the roof you say lines we great moving ropes ropes yeah sorry we call
02:34:41 moving ropes ropes yeah sorry we call them lines in the fire brigade ropes here the Rope specialists right okay and how would how would that work well how is it supposed to work to do I don't know right I think I didn't give the it
02:34:53 know right I think I didn't give the it wasn't my plan I didn't give the instruction do you think it was a feasible strategy no where's that why as far as I was concerned at that time of a
02:35:05 far as I was concerned at that time of a multiple seats of firearms and the 16th floor all available and that they wouldn't made it I told him that I don't I said I said to them from my
02:35:17 I said I said to them from my perspective and said it's all right Donnie it's a good idea I I didn't believe I didn't believe was a good idea but I can understand the logic of it right and what the the actuality was I
02:35:28 right and what the the actuality was I said to them to the crew man crew mantle Rigby I feel I said I think it's a great day I don't I don't think you're going to make it right did you tell him
02:35:44 to make it right did you tell him well did you think there might have been a better use for the EDB a wasn't using it to go to the roof nor his rescue for rescue did you tell Phil Wiggly that yeah along those lines and then he said
02:35:57 yeah along those lines and then he said to me well I've been stopped abundance tomorrow so well fair enough so I knew getting a long travel distance so I told him not to start up
02:36:08 so I told him not to start up immediately which is cause I'll say policy our be a so I'm suggesting some water in this one and he had some young
02:36:22 water in this one and he had some young firefighters with him so they were less experienced I knew it was a very hazardous journey so I said some looked stacked up when you see thick smoke not know so give me your tallies get as many
02:36:34 know so give me your tallies get as many floors as you can have open to the building if you aren't going to get to the roof and then start to only look after each other right and did they did they go did they start off up to go to they didn't start up there and then they gave me their tallies and then they
02:36:47 gave me their tallies and then they walked as far as the curbs and so on right what equipment how far did they get do you know you'd have to ask them that I don't know I can't recall well I know they they carry or the rescue instead they've never made it to the roof they wouldn't go into anything
02:36:59 roof they wouldn't go into anything there's never one did that were you able to stay in radio contact with them no did you try I tried you at you it would be good to ask the enter control officers these questions
02:37:10 officers these questions I think watch manager the server might have been there a lot of time although I don't know okay mr. chairman may be appropriate now if I have another transparent right mr. Keith
02:37:23 have another transparent right mr. Keith will come back at 20 past 12:00 all right okay thank you no discussion of Eurovision thank you very much good ten spots 12
02:37:38 thank you very much good ten spots 12 G's
02:37:48 you
02:50:55 I think this keys to something
02:51:19 all right mr. kief yes sir
02:51:24 mr. kief thank you for coming back to us you've given us a very clear picture of the development of smoke in the stairwell yes and survivor say of other witnesses did you know well let me show
02:51:41 witnesses did you know well let me show you first of all can you please be shown page 87 of the operational response report
02:51:58 and if we just focus on oh one fifty-eight the time there it says that between oh one thirty-nine and oh one
02:52:09 between oh one thirty-nine and oh one fifty eight which is the time when you were managing the bridgehead the following residents have either been rescued assisted out or self evacuated from Grenfell tower and then there's a
02:52:20 from Grenfell tower and then there's a list of 20 individuals and the source of that is various different notes but I
02:52:31 that is various different notes but I just want to ask you given that 20 individuals come out between 139 and 158 how did they manage to get through the
02:52:43 how did they manage to get through the lobbies and down the stairs if they were so completely smoke logged what was the method by which they were there they were in a carrier our assistant right and what about their breathing they
02:52:54 and what about their breathing they would have been given that smoke inhalation right was there any way of being able to assist residents who are being evacuated with or breathing through smoke and the firefighters
02:53:06 through smoke and the firefighters started doing that taking off their own masks and putting them on people right
02:53:13 voice there in the smoke okay given what you told us earlier about the conditions of the building by about two
02:53:24 conditions of the building by about two o'clock in terms of smoke logging how safe would it have been for individuals to evacuate from their flats and come
02:53:35 to evacuate from their flats and come down the stairwell it will be unsafe dangerous right and what would that what would that mean to your way of thinking at the time about stay put help the
02:53:46 at the time about stay put help the stay-put policy and whether it should should change so can you really young ask me I question again yes of course did that have any did that fact the fact
02:53:57 did that have any did that fact the fact that it would be unsafe have any impact on how you viewed the safety or otherwise of the state of the state of policy I wasn't thinking about the state policy
02:54:08 policy for most of the time I was in there I was thinking about rescuing people right and how would one rescue a resident on it in them in the middle of the tower at
02:54:20 it in them in the middle of the tower at that time a great difficulty bressant it physically take the personnel and then and hope they hopefully even get downstairs with them I know from
02:54:32 downstairs with them I know from firefighters who wore rescuing people that people were collapsing while they were being rescued and they had to be carried the rest of the way so they were taken out into the smoke because it was no other option and then they would lose
02:54:44 no other option and then they would lose consciousness and then they would be carried on carried on by the firefighters rescued now I'm going to ask you in a moment or two about
02:54:55 ask you in a moment or two about specific some specific rescues before I do I just I've just got a few more general questions about information flows at the bridgehead first of all did you brief firefighters
02:55:07 first of all did you brief firefighters before they were committed not all the firefighters know and I didn't till watch my little ludus over turnabout yes
02:55:19 watch my little ludus over turnabout yes and what kind of information were you able to give those firefighters you did Britt you did brief the number of the floor number of the flash number of
02:55:32 floor number of the flash number of people requiring their rescue and the conditions believed and if known conditions in the in Florida and we're just to be clear where would you get Indian firm at that
02:55:44 where would you get Indian firm at that information from what are the firefighters versus some FSG some of the situation where a resident would open the door as he smoke and then that would
02:55:55 the door as he smoke and then that would be because before survival guidance or operators stay on the line with a person indefinitely and that person will relay the information back to our controller
02:56:07 the information back to our controller we wear that back to the command or who'll read that back up to be the fire cetera our search and rescue sector right and in each case whenever you
02:56:21 right and in each case whenever you brief the crew to go up into the tower you did you make it clear for what purpose he was sending them far far away yes and you know what was it in okay well initially as I stated I used
02:56:34 well initially as I stated I used committing crews with firefighting equipment on somebody ran out of us didn't we we just and additional to that yeah it's not a simple answer of
02:56:45 yeah it's not a simple answer of addition to that firefighters was becoming compromised I mean they were running out of air they're carrying a lot of equipment which can be up to 50 kilograms including a beretta be a
02:56:56 kilograms including a beretta be a stand-in for our kids and so an individual be carrying out upwards vertically traveling up to you know conditions they were in and the everything else so the brief would be
02:57:08 everything else so the brief would be pretty much used upon a firefighting equipment rapidly would we do search and rescue right extraction or whatever you
02:57:19 rescue right extraction or whatever you want to call it was a point find the location locate the person and bring them out and when firefighters returns to the bridgehead we've had a little bit of this specifically with the secret the
02:57:32 of this specifically with the secret the Dillo Dogu trio did when they came back to the bridgehead in general terms did they did they debrief with you no it didn't I cannot write for that speaking
02:57:43 didn't I cannot write for that speaking to the locations but what about other crews did you generally debrief with other
02:57:50 other if I had your opportunity well quite often if there being only casually you won't stop to speak to her someone on the bridge said every casually that was brought on was bought straight a little
02:58:01 brought on was bought straight a little bit as rapidly as possible for medical treatment where they came back to the bridgehead without having carried out a rescue or whether deployment has not been successful yes for the purpose for
02:58:12 been successful yes for the purpose for which they've been sent did you debrief with them they would come and seat me over there ordinarily and tell me that which happened quite a lot and they couldn't make it to the
02:58:23 lot and they couldn't make it to the fire flats did they give you an information about what the conditions like that they did encounter yes and what did did you recall that information it would have been recorded on the DEA
02:58:35 it would have been recorded on the DEA board okay and on the favour of the war the be a board being the forward information board yes okay and then on the wall and but is that then
02:58:46 the wall and but is that then information then communicated back to the incident commander well as I said my point of contact was watching over Watson for quite a lot of the so I was
02:58:57 Watson for quite a lot of the so I was feeding him an information and he would take it back right okay and were you confident that that information about the conditions in the tower was there confidence back up the chain I wouldn't say confidence I was been transferred
02:59:09 say confidence I was been transferred okay and did the information that you were getting from fire fighters who'd come back gone into the tower and had come down as it were without empty-handed without having carried out
02:59:20 empty-handed without having carried out their mission did that information make you consider firefighting tactics and any change you needed to making it yes what I told those to stop starting off
02:59:31 what I told those to stop starting off with the bridgehead and to travel as far as they could to extend the duration of their sets right now how far did you discover how far up into the tower they could get without breathing I have one particularly when
02:59:42 breathing I have one particularly when seven floors but that was later on when the fire advantage but initially I don't know right and were you monitoring what flaws firefighters were able to reach
02:59:53 flaws firefighters were able to reach him not able to reach his you went he had a general sense of what of the limitations of what they were doing oh how far like the travel right and after the first of half an hour or
03:00:07 and after the first of half an hour or so of your being on the bridge head were you able to continue to maintain contact with the relevant incident commander no right so at what point do you think you lost reliable radio contact with the
03:00:21 lost reliable radio contact with the incident commander just out the Poms town you said before just doctor pumps 10 and do you know why you lost reliable radio contact at that stage well I would
03:00:33 radio contact at that stage well I would say that the radio traffic was considerable right and watch manager of dogs in whom one stage was managing a
03:00:47 dogs in whom one stage was managing a twenty five pump incident was entirely occupied without incident it would have been very difficult for him to take time
03:01:00 been very difficult for him to take time to to use his radio when he had this unfolding in front of him okay so also just to finish the sorry just to finish
03:01:11 just to finish the sorry just to finish the please when there's a lot of radio traffic it's very difficult to transmit any information or to get a say it's just overwhelms us now you've given us a
03:01:23 just overwhelms us now you've given us a lot of information about the use of the forward information board and sources of that information and me and the wall do you know or did you know at the time about a firefighter a crew manager and
03:01:36 about a firefighter a crew manager and doing the exercise of collating and cross-checking fast Survival Guide this information that he was getting on the car bonnet on the fire I heard about him
03:01:47 car bonnet on the fire I heard about him yesterday I didn't make an inquiry in the yesterday it was yes I don't know where exactly was you said you made an inquiry I was informed of orders when
03:01:58 inquiry I was informed of orders when was that
03:01:58 was that early on the incident right did you say you made an inquiry did you you asked about what what made you make the enquiry just what was going on
03:02:10 the enquiry just what was going on outside you know I was thinking there was that I mean we were speaking to each other constantly and I think I was in the Torah for about 800 or so in that eight hours window there's such an
03:02:26 eight hours window there's such an amount of information that I cannot recollect a individual conversations some I can some account the really important ones like the right things were important I can because I stamped
03:02:37 were important I can because I stamped on my mind euros no okay did there come a time when you understood that the chain of communication from the command unit so the bridge headed to have changed yeah
03:02:52 the bridge headed to have changed yeah in a degree when I started getting pieces of paper coming up I knew that the radio transmissions were becoming difficult right and it was more expedient to have
03:03:03 and it was more expedient to have someone to deliver the information person did you ever talk to Daniel Egan naturally instant I know what down the only you know reasonably well station
03:03:16 only you know reasonably well station manager but I didn't I didn't see the foot of page 9 of your statements you refer to people residents coming up to
03:03:30 refer to people residents coming up to you and giving you information and you have to stop them physically yeah that was very early on I was at the very beginning I was going to ask you it's the statement seem to jump the police
03:03:42 the statement seem to jump the police statement jump surrounded I was at the very beginning of the any sense yeah that's helpful thank you and the information that you got from residents you say at the very bottom I took flat numbers from two of them but
03:03:55 took flat numbers from two of them but the other people just threw their keys at me
03:03:57 at me they had no numbers on ruisseau I didn't know which flats the kids were in that's wrong and crews physically took them out of the building just just in terms of that information did you recall that information anywhere not me personally no did anybody else I
03:04:09 not me personally no did anybody else I I don't know I think the the III directed them information towards one of the firefighters that was able to be able but I can't recall exactly so I
03:04:20 able but I can't recall exactly so I cannot give you props paralysis left right my concern at that very moment and it was in a moment was preventing people
03:04:31 it was in a moment was preventing people from going back into the fire and they come up the stairs in a state of anxiety and I had enough of my plate dealing with what I was doing what was unfolding so I turned around to them and said no
03:04:42 so I turned around to them and said no he can't come in and we had this discussion where they were one lady was trying to she's quite upset she wanted to go back here and I just tried to persuade her in there in the gentlest way I could but she what it wasn't
03:04:54 way I could but she what it wasn't possible right so I asked it became to overwhelm me this not emotionally at that time it did lay her was are you
03:05:06 that time it did lay her was are you right dealing with this no I took a break once I'm up here to have a pause
03:05:18 so I asked us there's some firefighters to escort the residents back down the stairs tell them and that's what happened it happened very quickly went over how long does it take to persuade
03:05:31 over how long does it take to persuade someone that they can't go back into the routine yes just a just a couple of questions about something you gave evidence about earlier on about a record escutcheon with Richard Welch about EDB a yeah at
03:05:44 with Richard Welch about EDB a yeah at the bottom of page 11 you have you say you have a discussion with the incident commander this is six miles up from the
03:05:56 commander this is six miles up from the end of page 11 about EDB a is that the discussion you were referring to that you had with group manager Welch or is that it is that a different discussion
03:06:14 no that's a different discussion that was the area unfurl our air earlier on in the incident right that's not the discussion having a good manager works okay and they're just pursuing this a
03:06:25 okay and they're just pursuing this a bit more okay at the bottom of page 12 and this is just in time where you say that Andy Walton had appeared you say I
03:06:38 that Andy Walton had appeared you say I continue with my team as before at some point group manager Richard Welch arrived at the bridgehead and stated he was taking over i briefed him and discussed the current situation with him I told him that if DBA crews were unable
03:06:51 I told him that if DBA crews were unable to reach persons on the upper floors and said that this was a job where a DBA was required that discussion is that the
03:07:02 required that discussion is that the first conversation you had with Richard Welch correct there's the very first that's the very first conversation rather than that night so that was the question a lot as many but that's the first write I said and you then go on to
03:07:13 first write I said and you then go on to say Richard Welch asked me how much II DBA was required and I said all of it and he said that wasn't possible I said we needed all of the idibia in London we
03:07:24 we needed all of the idibia in London we had to have it he said really and I say I replied saying everything he said okay I'll get a DBA he's a good officer Richard Welch I've never worked with him before but he seemed like a very practical man and I communicated quite
03:07:35 practical man and I communicated quite well with him he let me carry on doing what I was doing he's is that the discussion you gave evidence about a little earlier on that morning about the first as it were the question-and-answer matters correct okay and is it at that
03:07:48 matters correct okay and is it at that point do you think that he then went off and summoned all of the EDB a he could get his hands on he wouldn't have done that personally you've got someone to do it for him right I just just want to be able to get
03:07:59 right I just just want to be able to get a time fix on that if we can if you can please be shown to have 23 the short incident log we think we have a time for this but I just want to see if you can help me with it
03:08:10 help me with it if you turn please to
03:08:18 page 24
03:08:27 well no in fact I'm so sorry 23:23 Oh to 4203 there is an informative message
03:08:41 which says halfway down major incident declared high-rise procedure implemented etc and then toal PEDV a main control
03:08:54 etc and then toal PEDV a main control FSG now that i think is the first reference we've seen here to IDI be a
03:09:05 reference we've seen here to IDI be a would that be about the time when you've had your discussion with Richard Welch no I don't think so that's that's an informative message as you can see and
03:09:16 informative message as you can see and when you send a description of of it of an incident you have got to include the equipment being used currently we're at
03:09:27 equipment being used currently we're at that time but we've seen an early deployment to VB be a with the paddington five-man crew that's correct two o'clock yeah so there was there was clearly idibia equipment on the fire
03:09:38 clearly idibia equipment on the fire ground at that stage can I just ask you would it be necessary specifically to order a DBA or would some pumps from some stations have a DBA in where you have to order you have to order it right
03:09:49 have to order you have to order it right occipital so hard say do you know how the Pennington five-man crew came to heavy VBA with them by 157 was there a specific yeah the watchdog incident
03:10:01 specific yeah the watchdog incident commander the questions to wear for use of you look for previously for an assistant message sent earlier you would have seen a request for - I think was to
03:10:13 have seen a request for - I think was to fire rescue units that's so and that's why that there in fact that they were being used would be included in the
03:10:24 being used would be included in the informative I don't know what time there and I spoke to Richard Welsh and had that conversation with him and I don't know what time the I would have guessed priority message for additional leverage a Adva right but
03:10:37 for additional leverage a Adva right but we haven't and we have a message of day one 2946 make pumps 20 FRU times - there you go
03:10:43 you go is that right
03:10:48 watch manager Dalton is asking for a 420 pump attendance and 2f for use right we use the term lodging make pumps 20 + f4 use - that's how we speak
03:11:00 use - that's how we speak yeah it's later it's radio discipline right and how many EDB a sets would there be on one FRU I think fall right so - - fr use 8 yes which would have which would account for have five there were five e DBA where
03:11:13 have five there were five e DBA where this might have been five on there for you that nice III couldn't go into the detail of understand alright so that's helpful know what's it so when an informative message comes EDB a what
03:11:24 informative message comes EDB a what does that tell us does it tell us what does it tell us about how many DBAs are on order what does it just tell you the message merely stage status we in use okay now how many
03:11:35 stage status we in use okay now how many okay
03:11:36 okay you think the first message I got with anything like oli DBA sets is I may be
03:11:47 anything like oli DBA sets is I may be wrong about this but there's a turning out message which starts at Oh 355 turning out with message for e DBA would
03:12:00 turning out with message for e DBA would that reflect would that reflect a general call for all evey be a turning out as a mobilization this time never in turns out yes but what would the hands of a community what you need to find sir
03:12:12 of a community what you need to find sir easiest the assistance message well father when it was requested from the fire groans to increase ETA attendance yes well let me just show you I'm sorry
03:12:23 yes well let me just show you I'm sorry to labor this a bit no page 24 of the short incident log very top of the page at 305 51 that says
03:12:34 at 305 51 that says [Music]
03:12:35 [Music] our PE unit with idibia aprox one hour these are being ordered there's the VA support units what that's that's a bulk carriers that's not a for use there so I
03:12:48 carriers that's not a for use there so I forget the actual terminology or we have units in the fire brigade with Edie is beer support units will bring scent
03:12:59 beer support units will bring scent fresh PA sets to the fire groans right in a pot right okay and what does that tell you about if anything about whether the discussion you'd had with mr. Welch
03:13:12 the discussion you'd had with mr. Welch group manager were about getting all the EPA sets have been actioned and I would though the I said that would be after they were requested right so you have to go before that to find the moment were a
03:13:23 go before that to find the moment were a priority message was sent to request makeup for you so many and the CBRN team which was the the chemical biological
03:13:36 which was the the chemical biological relation of nuclear team very DBA that's what they usually give you in that in that in that department they would have gone on at the same time I think right
03:13:47 gone on at the same time I think right would look at that okay over lunch car then start them by asking you about a specific briefing and this is Hipple and Stearns of the 16th yes
03:14:04 now at page 10 in Paris and in paragraph 3 on that page you describe it's about a
03:14:17 3 on that page you describe it's about a third of the way down the page that you committed one crew Jamal sterling firefighter Hipple to the 16th floor because I had information that there was somebody who needed rescuing up there
03:14:32 first of all what was that information do you remember resident had told guy I believe had informed the crew that there was a stoma near the forum the crew that
03:14:44 was a stoma near the forum the crew that it was a resident had approached them and that the somebody was believed trapped on that in that area Russ smoke
03:14:55 trapped on that in that area Russ smoke and we looked at the telemetry data for hits Hipple and stern earlier and we have them tallying out of entry control
03:15:07 have them tallying out of entry control at a 117 was saying so is it right that the information that there was somebody on the 16th floor who needed rescuing was before that yes and when they
03:15:20 was before that yes and when they tallied out did you give sternum Hipple a briefing no they were on the rail already
03:15:28 already they were they were originally committed as the [ __ ] Management Group right and in fact you said earlier on in this morning and that they were the hos management crew and in your statement on
03:15:39 management crew and in your statement on page 8 at the top that you say it already sent them to the fifth floor and then they went to the sixth floor so the information about rescue on the 16th floor came to you did it while they were
03:15:51 floor came to you did it while they were under air in the building correct right and what you then able to communicate with them yes well I go ahead would call the exact communication but they were redeployed because I didn't believe
03:16:04 redeployed because I didn't believe there was any 516 oh I wasn't aware of any fire on the front of 16th floor at that time because I was so instantaneous yes well while I was going on so I see so they didn't come back down to the
03:16:15 so they didn't come back down to the bridgehead they were in another building and you communicate which of the firefighters did you communicate over the radio and with do you remember crew Manchester I believe Stern and a cab know for certain which channel were you
03:16:28 know for certain which channel were you on that will be 6th I was switching between 1 and 6 did you have any difficulties getting hold of him afterwards yeah no man but afterwards that when he went to the toilet come
03:16:39 that when he went to the toilet come come I personally couldn't committee here anyone where were they do you think in the building when you first told them that you had an FSG for a rescue on the 16th
03:16:51 you had an FSG for a rescue on the 16th through I couldn't turn right was it before or after they told you that it's [ __ ] it's going Adam was and they were on the 6th floor of that stage and I was
03:17:03 on the 6th floor of that stage and I was very well before watch area they were they were you utilize recognizer of that area I depart as much earlier on though there were
03:17:16 as much earlier on though there were just I was before I should say they were detailed to go and then check for forest way that had been reported something right and we just see if I can get the chronology then they were on page eight at the top they they tell you a by radio
03:17:28 at the top they they tell you a by radio that it's completely smoked out on this floor yeah I think you said that was the sixth floor that was a sixth lawyers said when you briefed them to go to the
03:17:39 said when you briefed them to go to the 16th floor having had the FSG information was that after Stern had come back to you and told you it was smoked out on the sixth floor yes right how long after did you I couldn't tell
03:17:50 how long after did you I couldn't tell you
03:17:50 you long short minute right so we can point that pinpoint that a bit better and and you tell him to go to the 16th floor
03:18:02 you tell him to go to the 16th floor does he respond Jamal stones I don't record and you say in your statement that you had information that there was someone who needed rescuing
03:18:14 needed rescuing there I'm sorry I'm back to back on page ten a third of the way down you say I had information what form did you have that information in I don't recall them because I was getting so much
03:18:26 because I was getting so much information at that time do you remember whether it was a piece of paper or it would be either verbally or a message to me raiga all right
03:18:38 verbally remember whether it was verbally from somebody coming up from the lobby horse or a firefighter coming I don't recall right okay
03:18:54 now
03:18:57 what about communications with Justin a burn is it possible that the information you gave us - Justin a burn who passed it on to Hipple and sternal possibly
03:19:09 it on to Hipple and sternal possibly right
03:19:18 when you deployed firefighters hipper than Stern did you give them the flat number I don't recall the location I don't recall actually said so when you
03:19:32 don't recall actually said so when you say you had information on the 16th floor was that all of that is that the dog like Jenny Monique Allen over the details of numbers very very very very
03:19:43 details of numbers very very very very much
03:19:44 much than they were I knew they went to the 16th floor right and you know ruff roughly we're in the building of the
03:19:56 roughly we're in the building of the flat that they were games he was know which which which side of the building no maiden were you aware at that stage at the fire had spread from the East facade no okay all right
03:20:16 did you learn sorry did you did you had communications with hip Allen Stern as they went up I think we said before it went yes before they went and then when
03:20:28 went yes before they went and then when they came back down but okay I mean I made misunderstood you know it's my fault did one when they were in the tower they were in the tower I thought
03:20:39 tower they were in the tower I thought you'd tell us earlier that you told them to go to the 16th floor once they were up in the tower they wrapped they were stood on the rear yeah they hadn't saw was done yeah every
03:20:50 yeah they hadn't saw was done yeah every deploying them because I have information you as far as small sorry on 16th floor right right let me just go back then I they and they've confused you I'm sorry if I had when you gave them the instructions to go to the 16th
03:21:02 them the instructions to go to the 16th floor where were a hip Allen Stern I don't know they were in the top they were in the tower but they weren't at the bridgehead no there were another bunch I say you communicated them with the by radios you've yes right that's what I thought when you did
03:21:13 right that's what I thought when you did that did you know that they were with a resident no did you know that they were with the son of the man that hippler Stern were going to rescue on that would make sense but did you know that no okay
03:21:27 make sense but did you know that no okay do you remember hits turn and Hipple coming back down to the bridge head after going to the 16th floor yes do you remember a debriefing I remember what dick people said i Richard firefighter said to me what was
03:21:40 Richard firefighter said to me what was that it was on fire he was shocked what was on fire the 16th floor does the Holy Smoke it was to be smoked oh and he said he didn't see flame but he can feel intense ease do you know how far into
03:21:52 intense ease do you know how far into the 16th floor Richard Hipple went no I can't recall actually but did it do you think he told you probably did knowing to knowing Richard is quite an exact okay you know
03:22:05 Richard is quite an exact okay you know were you satisfied that you've got us full a debrief from Richard Hipple not a full know that you could have done it wasn't a calm environment at that time it was
03:22:16 it was there were multiple rescue operations just commencing in process and I was trying to manage that at the bridgehead so when firefighters will come to me and
03:22:27 so when firefighters will come to me and give me information I wouldn't be oh you know you know a very complex long description it would be the required
03:22:39 description it would be the required information is there is fire on the system so much for commenting that right and did Jamal Stern tell you about what
03:22:51 and did Jamal Stern tell you about what he had experienced I don't recall what
03:22:57 impression did you get from the debrief that Richard Hipple gave you about the success of the rescue was unsuccessful I believe he was shocked that the fries
03:23:08 believe he was shocked that the fries before that the sixteenth floor was on fire did you record anywhere the information about the deployment I don't recall I don't remember right is it
03:23:20 recall I don't remember right is it something you would have recorded on the forward information board it would have been it or on the wall it would have been recorded but not by me because they would have to go to the den to the entrance hall officer I have just know
03:23:33 entrance hall officer I have just know born there as well there are no people assisting and they would have got that information and put it on the wall at the stage right and and do you know what happens with that information that the deployment had been unsuccessful after
03:23:45 deployment had been unsuccessful after after it had been debriefed to you by Richard hippo not not precisely but it would have been it would have been when
03:23:56 would have been it would have been when I was known about this and the use of I live in the fall also but I was unable to communicate with you sir planet at that time well I did I did briefly telling the floor there was a foot of
03:24:07 telling the floor there was a foot of the that the sixteenth floor was on fire unless that's when I learned to make bombs ten right so you okay did you indicate to the incident commander that
03:24:22 indicate to the incident commander that there was a failed rescue on that floor one of many yes I can't remember that one specifically but I was indicating to watch manager Watson who was
03:24:33 watch manager Watson who was transporting their information others say your communication to the incident commander was via watch manager and other officers okay which other officers I don't know I don't right but so far as
03:24:45 I don't know I don't right but so far as you're concerned you passed on back up the communication chain the fact that the rescue mission to the to the 16th floor had not succeeded yeah because I deployed another NBA team there but a
03:24:56 deployed another NBA team there but a more or less immediately I was about to ask you that the necklace my next question having discovered that this deployment with HIPAA let's turn have not been successful - yes the floor did you deploy another team I did
03:25:07 did you deploy another team I did immediately us whenever they became a very I think was ear Ealing as far as I know feeling you think I believe so and just before we break I wonder if we could just identify that indeed you say
03:25:21 could just identify that indeed you say the name of the officer in charge I could probably identify as Emma tree data you think it was evening possibly okay well we have Hipple and stern DD
03:25:33 coupling from the bodyguard
03:25:40 well they're dead it's a bit difficult because the times are all over the place but the end of the where there where time we have as oh one 38 yeah would that be about right
03:25:51 one 38 yeah would that be about right recollection they come down would be about right and they there's a rebreathing at around that time of a Kensington them to from Hammersmith
03:26:03 Kensington them to from Hammersmith Broderick Broderick and Sefton then okay they passed that wasn't they were in the cool I went there right they would possibly come to another FSG right fire
03:26:16 possibly come to another FSG right fire flavoring we don't I think have an Ealing deployment we have an active deployment to pay 152 so I'm eating the doors were the cruise and evening well
03:26:27 doors were the cruise and evening well perhaps I'll look at this able over the lunch break and come back to you okay I can't at the moment let's see a kneeling crew until well I don't know if it was evening was I remember I remember the crew committing you know the crew to
03:26:39 the crew committing you know the crew to that to that flat okay well that's we can press we can chase that up officer to turn me and come back to you all right after the break is now median time for a break yes yes we'll have a
03:26:50 time for a break yes yes we'll have a break now again please don't talk and we'll resume it to talk okay very much thank you very much [Music]
03:27:06 thank you all very much - atop peace
03:27:17 you