RBKC contingency planning manager testifies on emergency response arrangements, TMO relationships, and lessons from Adair Tower fire incident in October 2015.
00:00:26 would you ask Mr Carrie to come back in please
00:00:38 all right Mr kry you ready to carry on I hope yes thank you very much yes yes thank you Mr chairman Mr Kerry I'd like now to ask you some questions about ader Tower in a bit more detail and the trior
00:00:50 Tower in a bit more detail and the trior humanitarian assistance board um as as we know Adair happened on the 31st of October 2015 the same month as the exercise responder exercise and just
00:01:01 exercise responder exercise and just before exercise Babel the following week as we've covered can we please go to your second statement at page 36 now and let's look together at paragraph
00:01:14 now and let's look together at paragraph 16.6 on that page I starts at the page before in fact page 35 if we can just pick it up there and you say this in the uh first
00:01:26 uh first sentence um you refer there to the um minutes of the tribe a humanitarian assistance board meeeting on the 10th of December 2015 which I attended and then you say this is a board comprising senior Managers from adult social care
00:01:38 senior Managers from adult social care children's services and housing amongst others it is a board assembled to oversee how the local authorities were dealing with humanitarian issues and then it goes on the ad Tower
00:01:49 issues and then it goes on the ad Tower fire was reported to them as a matter of routine and was discussed at this meeting
00:01:55 meeting um is it right that the the board you're referring to there is a board um which sits uh under the lrf no this was an
00:02:06 lrf no this was an internal um Council board the humanitarian board This was um rbkc Westminster and ham and Fulham right I see can we go to rbk30
00:02:19 see can we go to rbk30 48069 where we will find the minutes of of this uh meeting
00:02:36 uh and you'll see there from the top of the screen it's it's uh U the minutes date of the 10th of December 2015 as they're there uh and you can see that
00:02:47 they're there uh and you can see that Laura Johnson was present and you were present you see that yes uh and if you go to the paragraph at the foot of page one to page two you can see it says report on humanitarian assistance
00:02:58 report on humanitarian assistance developments yes and then it says emergencies since the last meeting and it go and then it as an introduction uh the fire in adir Tower rbk andc in October was not included in appendix 1
00:03:10 October was not included in appendix 1 this raised the issues of finding suitable local temporary accommodation to meet disability needs and the availability of petty cash to meet other immediate needs such as travel food and clothing Tony would clarify the access
00:03:22 clothing Tony would clarify the access to Temporary accommodation issues in two other Burrows action Tony David will discuss with RB KC's Director of Finance and prepare a business case for the provision of petty cash do you see that
00:03:33 provision of petty cash do you see that yes um what was it about the Adair Tower fire incident that reveal those
00:03:43 problems the kenon Chelsea tenent management organization were unable to meet all of the needs of those displaced so the council's housing
00:03:54 displaced so the council's housing department stepped in at that point and both Laura Johnson and and TMO people were at the at the fire ground and and and responding to people there and I think what um from memory came through
00:04:05 think what um from memory came through is that none of those officers there had either sufficient corporate credit cards purchase cards I should say or or cash withdrawal ability to actually promptly
00:04:19 withdrawal ability to actually promptly give people some immediate support where they
00:04:22 they were um and so the direction to me as as we see in the minute was to see how that might be resourced in future and I can tell you what we did if you like um
00:04:34 tell you what we did if you like um well
00:04:35 well uh we'll come to the follow-up note on the incident which may be a bit better focus for that but can I can I before we go there can I just pick something up with you you said at the start of that answer that the TMO were unable to meet
00:04:48 answer that the TMO were unable to meet all of the needs of those displaced so the council's housing department stepped in do you mean by that that there was a role for the TMO in the early stages of
00:05:01 role for the TMO in the early stages of an incident involving occupants of TMO properties who were displaced by an incident such as the Ada Tower fire yes my understanding is that for this
00:05:14 my understanding is that for this typical incident the burrow would have had previously where one or two tenants may be displaced that the TMO would find them alternative provision but it became apparent with the Adair Tower fire Laura
00:05:27 apparent with the Adair Tower fire Laura Johnson identifying that um where there were more than perhaps two or three the TMO didn't have resource for that and that's where they needed support from the council's housing
00:05:38 support from the council's housing department well let me just just break that down a bit more do you accept I think that the do you accept that the TMO is not a category one or Category 2 responder I do where in the rbk's contingency
00:05:50 do where in the rbk's contingency planning arrangements pursuant to the the legislation and the regulations and the guidance did TMO sit if anywhere I don't think they sat anywhere within
00:06:03 I don't think they sat anywhere within that Arrangement they sat as the arms length management organization for the authority with its relationship with the housing
00:06:13 housing department and my whole ex understanding from when I arrived at rbkc in 2005 is that the TMO dealt fully with
00:06:25 2005 is that the TMO dealt fully with the housing stock including any responding to to issues that were there was there any Criterion or set of rules or principles which governed the circumstances when the TMO
00:06:39 governed the circumstances when the TMO would um arrange alternative accommodation for those displaced by a fire a flood an accident of some kind uh and when that responsibility would pass
00:06:50 and when that responsibility would pass to the housing department at the council I don't have that detail um I assume no more than that that whatever Arrangements there were
00:07:02 that whatever Arrangements there were were the arrangements that the housing department would have set up with the TMO but I don't know what those were was it your understanding that all that in the context of contingency
00:07:13 that in the context of contingency planning for a major emergency it was rbkc the council and not TMO that were responsible for dealing with displaced
00:07:26 responsible for dealing with displaced persons I was fully aware all ways that the council had a responsibility to anyone made temporarily housing homeless because of an incident regardless of
00:07:37 because of an incident regardless of whether that was TMO accommodation rented private housing whatever so that's across the board so therefore any incident involving evacuation or
00:07:48 incident involving evacuation or homelessness the borrow would expect to to to have its category one respond response my understanding also was that in terms of looking after Council 10
00:08:00 in terms of looking after Council 10 through the TMO the TMO would primarily deal with that unless they needed support and I believe that's encompassed in the tmo's emergency
00:08:14 plan and what TMO emergency plan are you referring to the one dated 2004 the one that started in 2004 and says it was updated in
00:08:25 says it was updated in 2016
00:08:27 2016 right uh now um we'll come to that that in a bit more detail in a moment before we do um let's look at the follow-up note incident followup note on this incident that you
00:08:38 followup note on this incident that you prepared that's at rbk 30 rbk
00:08:48 44838 and it's entitled ader Tower fire 31st of October 2015 TMO followup response from contingency planning manager did you draft this I think you did yes and it says TMO colleagues have
00:09:01 did yes and it says TMO colleagues have acknowledged that there was a degree of liaison and partnership working between their staff and the council's emergency responders during the morning of the fire and it is clear that opportunities exist to enhance that relationship in
00:09:12 exist to enhance that relationship in response to their request David Kerry will set up a meeting in January 2016 with TMO staff to fully outline and explore the emergency planning procedures and the role of bur duty officer and
00:09:23 officer and local Authority liaison officer um now um if you go please to page three of this
00:09:33 document uh agreed actions for improvement uh you can see uh there are three of them there uh um but if you look at um the first one that that's um
00:09:45 look at um the first one that that's um about proactivity calling in the housing department in any emergency that might result in
00:09:51 result in homelessness uh was that because ad Tower had shown that um it was delayed that calling in rbkc was delayed I don't think so I
00:10:05 rbkc was delayed I don't think so I think my understanding as I say from what I joined the authority through was that if any TMO residents Council housing residents were displac because of an
00:10:16 of an incident that the TMO and the out of if it was out of hours the out of hours um housing service would deal with those what was discovered at a dare
00:10:30 those what was discovered at a dare Tower fire was that there were more numbers for that and housing said you know that that that service is not appropriate in these circumstances and whereas previously we
00:10:43 circumstances and whereas previously we had no um role within our call out procedures for the housing department in the review that you're going to go on to that followed this meeting it was then agreed that um
00:10:55 meeting it was then agreed that um housing now wanted to be in those call out procedures and that they would then take a role right and in the second paragraph there you it records that there was an agreement by the triber
00:11:06 there was an agreement by the triber humanitarian assistance board chaired by Stella Bailey ASC and attended by Laura Johnson that the council should enable its bur Duty Officers and some senior managers to deal with accommodation and cash needs for evacuees in evident need
00:11:19 cash needs for evacuees in evident need through increased limits on their corporate credit cards and be able to Source cash held securely in the burrow to be funded corporately David K Kerry will deal with this did you deal with with it yes how did you deal with it I
00:11:31 with it yes how did you deal with it I got in touch with our finance department I forgot the name of the individual but one of our finance managers uh the response was certainly yes to the corporate and that should be corporate purchase cards not credit card that's my
00:11:43 purchase cards not credit card that's my error then uh corporate purchase cards uh and that not only would my card have increased limits but also the cards for Keith Robbins who had one as a b duty
00:11:54 Keith Robbins who had one as a b duty officer and also a card to be then given to Rebecca Blackburn as an emergency planning officer and that Laura Johnson through her Finance team would also then get purchase cards with increased limits
00:12:07 get purchase cards with increased limits for herself and her senior managers a designated number and that would deal with our ability on the spot to use purchase cards to buy whatever might be needed for people at the time the cash
00:12:20 needed for people at the time the cash was more of a problem the purchase cards were did not have a facility to withdraw cash from
00:12:25 cash from them um and my request to finance then was that there be money somewhere in the borrow um to that that could be accessed
00:12:36 borrow um to that that could be accessed if cash was needed uh if memory serves me right the response was that it would be possible to have some cash in a safe somewhere and that some Finance officers would be able to be called out in order to access
00:12:49 able to be called out in order to access that and I believe we then did get a few Finance officers names added to Annex one the call out list was there a system put in place after this event where by cash could be handled in an organized
00:13:02 cash could be handled in an organized and transparent manner so that each applicant for cash knew where to go knew what to ask for and knew how much they were getting I know nothing of what Ser what Arrangements Finance would have been put in place let's turn then to the
00:13:13 been put in place let's turn then to the TMO um as as we've seen the adir tower fire was an incident in which the TMO and rbkc operated alongside each other dealing with those residents from that Tower who were displaced by the fire um
00:13:26 Tower who were displaced by the fire um is it correct that concerns were raised by the TMO about that
00:13:34 response I think sorry the answer is yes I'm trying to recall precisely how they express that because it did lead on to the meeting that we then dealt with various issues let me show you a document rbk30
00:13:47 document rbk30 58037 this is um your exhibit 65 which is a memo from within the TMO sent I think to Stuart Priestly on the 26th of November we have
00:13:59 Priestly on the 26th of November we have the email for that but um if you um look at this document and go to the foot of the
00:14:05 the page um
00:14:07 page um do did you know who wrote this memo was it
00:14:10 it you no I think this was a Barbara somebody from the TMO Barbara Matthews that rings a bell right um she was head of health and safety at the time I think
00:14:21 of health and safety at the time I think she'd only just become head of health and safety right in the summer of that year um but uh if you look at the foot of the page it says in the penultimate paragraph it was felt that TMO staff
00:14:32 paragraph it was felt that TMO staff should have been contacting the emergency planning officer to provide updates on the situation as things changed but also say that emergency planning officer should have provided TMA staff with updates from his point of view during the
00:14:44 view during the day there were some concerns from TMO staff at the scene that they were not sure what their role was in the provision of food and later funds for evacuated and displaced residents at the time and subsequently this had been
00:14:56 time and subsequently this had been provided by the TMO whilst residents had been in temporary hotel accomodation until they were able to collect clothes and effects from their evacuated homes see that and uh and then um over
00:15:09 homes see that and uh and then um over the page TMO staff were unsure what the role of the emergency planning team is in respect of the trigger for Activation of the emergency process when a rest center would be opened is this based on
00:15:20 center would be opened is this based on a number of residents affected and where this would be Expediting temporary accommodation organizing transport providing meals and refreshments and funds for urgent necessi for displaced residents a full review of the incident
00:15:32 residents a full review of the incident and the role of all involved parties would be appreciated as TMO staff would welcome the opportunity to assist rbkc to improve the emergency response process now um did it surprise you at the time well first of all did you see
00:15:44 the time well first of all did you see this message at the at the time this note uh when it was sent through to St prly he sent me a copy were you surprised that the TMO were not completely on top of or o with the rbkc
00:15:55 completely on top of or o with the rbkc contingency planning Arrangements I was surprised to an extent I could except they might not all know all of the details but I'd had a long relationship when I say I I and B Duty Officers on
00:16:07 when I say I I and B Duty Officers on call had had a long relationship with the TMO because we've had incidents at TMO properties a number of times over the years and if as a bur juty officer we got a call via the police or the fire
00:16:18 we got a call via the police or the fire brigade and it was a TMO property or if we thought it might be a TMO property we would get straight in touch with the tmos out of ours line and through them excuse me um we would end up leasing
00:16:32 excuse me um we would end up leasing with the on call duty officer for the TMO usually one of their senior managers and sometimes they would say we've got this we'll deal with it occasionally we might assist by providing a rest center
00:16:43 might assist by providing a rest center or something along those lines so there was a d a direct relationship with the emergency Duty Officers of the TMO I can accept there might well have been other people that didn't know but in terms of
00:16:55 people that didn't know but in terms of management matters we've had a relationship as borrow Duty Officers with the tmo's Duty Officers who whose responsibility as far as you are concerned was it within the TMO to be
00:17:06 concerned was it within the TMO to be familiar with ob KC's contingency management plan and related
00:17:12 procedures I would have expected the team that performed their role of Duty Officers in responding to TMO emergencies to be aware of us and I
00:17:24 emergencies to be aware of us and I believe they were aware I don't have a reason to think that they weren't aware now you can see at the foot of this uh note that a full review of the incident and role of all parties would be would
00:17:37 and role of all parties would be would be appreciated did it happen was there a full review and the role of the TMO and rbkc this was the meeting that we subsequently had with some Tio people myself and some of our housing people
00:17:48 myself and some of our housing people and I believe sir you have a note of that yes now I think that's at rbk30 and tell me if this is wrong rbk 30's uh 5888
00:18:03 eight it's a summary of a meeting on the 11th of April 2016 with contingency planning housing and KCMO to follow up on the ad fire is is that the meeting you're referring to it is right that
00:18:14 you're referring to it is right that happened some six months or so after the fire why the delay I don't know okay uh and if you um look then at uh the list
00:18:26 and if you um look then at uh the list of at ands first of all you're there and then from how Amanda Johnson Robert Shaw and Celia kisan and from the TMO Theresa Brown and Janice Ray we had a very positive and constructive discussion about the Ada
00:18:38 constructive discussion about the Ada Tower fire and about our respective service roles in major incidents that involve TMA managed properties and evacuations uh now in the event of an emergency at an rbkc property operated
00:18:50 emergency at an rbkc property operated by the TMO what would the role of the TMO and this is as at June 2017 perhaps as a result of these discussions I would have expected them
00:19:02 expected them to be able to provide information about the building that if required by the emergency services to provide technical details of the building to be able to do so I would have expected them to be able
00:19:14 so I would have expected them to be able to assist with lists of who residents or vulnerable residents might be if that was asked of them I would expect them to have their staff out to be working with the tenants of whom they were our
00:19:25 the tenants of whom they were our managing agents I would have expected on a on an incident of that size that the authority would be providing the emergency rest center but I would have expected some T some TMO staff to be at
00:19:38 expected some T some TMO staff to be at that Center in addition to other Council people directly dealing with some of those issues but I would also expected at that point the a direct and dynamic relationship between TMO staff
00:19:50 relationship between TMO staff responding and the housing management staff whom we had Now put on our list right now the list of expectations that you've just given us in that last answer sir um was that ever reduced to writing
00:20:02 sir um was that ever reduced to writing so that it formed the basis of a clear understanding by the TMO it certainly was discussed at this meeting and I was told that they had an emergency plan and I asked for a copy of
00:20:13 emergency plan and I asked for a copy of that and I was sent a copy of that emergency plan and I think that is pretty much enshrined in the opening statements and parts of that emergency plan what did you think of the emergency plan when you saw it um I didn't study
00:20:27 plan when you saw it um I didn't study the entire document because of course the nor lot of the documents is details about various blocks I was aware that they had information about blocks uh what I looked at particularly was there
00:20:38 what I looked at particularly was there um the the part of the plan at the beginning which deals with their arrangements for responding to an emergency in TMO housing the fact that they have the 247 number they have emergency Duty Officers to respond they
00:20:50 emergency Duty Officers to respond they have the Cascade system down to their um teams or what have you and that also now within there we're referencing is to me and emergency planning for the authority
00:21:02 and emergency planning for the authority and for the housing department so that expressed that there would then be links um my belief is from what I saw there that their role as responding as
00:21:14 there that their role as responding as the land lord was enshrined there our role as the authority both from our relationship through housing to TMO but also as a category one responder the local Authority was
00:21:26 local Authority was there um and that that would give us that duality of response if there was an incident required us to be assisting the
00:21:39 required us to be assisting the TMO now you say in your statement it's paragraph 16.12 of your second statement we don't need to go to it that on the 22nd of June 2016 so some two months or
00:21:50 22nd of June 2016 so some two months or so after this meeting you received a copy of the TMO emergency plan um which had been revised in February 2016 so just before this meeting from Janice Ray
00:22:01 just before this meeting from Janice Ray that's what you say in your statement now let's go to the document you received it's at rbk30
00:22:13 58031 uh uh it's a document that the panel has and everybody else has seen a number of times in this inquiry both in Phase One and in module three of phase
00:22:24 Phase One and in module three of phase two um there's the first page of it um if we go uh to the second page well no well um third page you can see the
00:22:35 well um third page you can see the revision history version one August 2004 and then revised three times thereafter last in February 2016 I'm I take it that this is the document that you've been referring us
00:22:47 document that you've been referring us to it is yes yes and and then um if you go to page five you can see uh the generic elements of it in the index from
00:22:58 index from page one down to uh page uh well page one down to page 26 could Cascade one Etc down to checklist Mains water
00:23:09 Etc down to checklist Mains water loss um and then the rest of it part two is property details small blocks and individual houses starting with adir Tower because that's the first in the alphabet but did when you got this
00:23:21 alphabet but did when you got this document in June 2016 did you study the whole thing or did you just concentrate on the first part of it I concentrate on the first Parts I had a glance at the second part but I concentrate on the
00:23:32 second part but I concentrate on the first part did you notice glancing at the second part there aspects of that aspects of it were some 15 years out of date certainly in the case of of grenfell tower that isn't something I noticed at the time it's certainly
00:23:43 noticed at the time it's certainly something I've noticed since but it's been the subject of evidence since the phase one uh phase one of this inquiry when you looked at this document did you have any any views one way or the other
00:23:55 have any any views one way or the other about its
00:23:56 about its utility I saw for I thought well written out their trigger point their contacts their Cascade system um that to me looks
00:24:08 their Cascade system um that to me looks like a normal emergency set of Arrangements you say normal would um in comparison with what well perhaps I shouldn't have used the expression nor what I meant sir was
00:24:19 the expression nor what I meant sir was that I could I could see a set of emergency arrangements and I understood that did you have anything to compare it with by which I mean were you able to
00:24:30 with by which I mean were you able to take this document as a TMO document and compare it with other documents produced by in other Burrows by other equivalents of those carrying
00:24:41 by other equivalents of those carrying out the functions of the TMO on behalf of the relevant local Authority I did not why is that I didn't think there was any need to at the point I looked at a pro set of procedures and I they looked
00:24:54 pro set of procedures and I they looked I I understood what I was looking at so therefore I thought well they got the job done there and to what extent if any was the TMO emergency plan here on the screen intended to operate alongside the
00:25:05 screen intended to operate alongside the rbkc
00:25:06 rbkc emergency plans this was the TMO plan this is not a plan that I would have envisaged opening and looking out to do anything with an an emergency my purpose
00:25:19 anything with an an emergency my purpose and asking for a copy of it in the context of the meeting that we had was just so that I had some assurance that they had got it there and I received that Assurance they there was a document there was a plan and there was an emergency procedure in there um which I
00:25:32 emergency procedure in there um which I noted as you've noted today February 16 before the meeting but it had all the elements about me and our service as B duty office service was already in there so it does rather say that these matters
00:25:43 so it does rather say that these matters were were understood by the TMO or certainly by those who wrote the plan um it was not my role and I don't think it was my role at all to have been an
00:25:54 was my role at all to have been an auditor of their emergency plan and I didn't take that attitude with it so I didn't compare it what I saw at the beginning of it was a set of emergency callout Arrangements Cascade arrangements and the involvement of the
00:26:06 arrangements and the involvement of the local Authority at the appropriate point and I took that as an assurance excuse me over on page 14 if we go to that please excuse me page 14
00:26:19 we go to that please excuse me page 14 um you could see um a list of headings there one of which towards the top of your screen says vulnerable residents information on numbers of known vulnerable residents are incl UD on the Block stroke property details which form
00:26:30 Block stroke property details which form part of this plan did you read that when you read this
00:26:36 document I assume I did I don't recall specifically but I assume I did um did you therefore assume uh that the block stroke property details which formed part of this plan were up to
00:26:48 part of this plan were up to dat not just up to date as of February 2016 but up to date in June 2016 so that the list of known vulnerable residents per block or property was
00:27:00 per block or property was accurate No I don't ever expect a list of vulnerable people to be accurate on the day that you look at it the particularly in a Teo situation we have
00:27:12 particularly in a Teo situation we have residents changing frequently people's conditions change frequently um I did I mean the plan says I have to accept I noted at the time that the TMO had
00:27:24 noted at the time that the TMO had information about vulnerable residents I think that's as far as I would have taken
00:27:29 taken that and well did what assumption if any did you make about the accuracy uh or Up to-date character of that I can't remember at all what I
00:27:41 that I can't remember at all what I would have thought when I saw it if I look at that today as I am my experience of these things would say that no l survives the day beyond the day that you
00:27:54 survives the day beyond the day that you actually write it and particularly when it comes to vulnerability of residence in in in any establishment um local Authority private tenden head or or home people's disabilities change the people
00:28:05 people's disabilities change the people who are there change there may be people staying overnight who have a disability that noten on anybody's list we have residents in the Royal bar of kington Chelsea who are able to afford private care and therefore aren't on the lists
00:28:16 care and therefore aren't on the lists of the statutary services who become vulnerable in an emergency and there are no lists at all there is guidance from the cabinet office about vulnerability
00:28:27 the cabinet office about vulnerability and identifying people people which sounds great as a piece of guidance but the practicalities of trying to maintain fully accurate lists of this nature are
00:28:39 fully accurate lists of this nature are are I don't think have ever been solved which is why we have then the lists of lists where we go to the people who might have lists of people so in this instance TMO it could be the gas board
00:28:50 instance TMO it could be the gas board it could be the electricity board with their vulnerable people it could be the NHS so the concept more is understanding that if want to get details of any group of residents for whatever purpose one
00:29:02 of residents for whatever purpose one needs to go to the various agencies that might between them have some information but always accept it is unlikely ever to be complete simply because of the nature
00:29:13 be complete simply because of the nature of this now um let's go then back to the to page one of the meeting note please and add
00:29:20 and add Aire the April meeting note at rbk30 58091
00:29:28 I'm sorry that's the wrong reference rbk30
00:29:33 rbk30 5888 if we get back to that page one of the
00:29:37 the document um you can see that uh there's a a heading um local Authority leaz On's officers at the
00:29:48 Authority leaz On's officers at the scene uh
00:29:53 and uh in the last sentence of the first bullet point there it says however it is apparent that the Halo role that day fell short of Ideal and this impacted heavily on my subsequent
00:30:04 heavily on my subsequent actions uh and and you stated as an action that you will review the training content and if need to set requirements for actions cards stroke Aid memir to be created and determine a training and
00:30:16 created and determine a training and refresher regime is that right I certainly said that at the time yes yeah did what was done in relation to that we took a decision
00:30:28 that we took a decision in terms of who would be Lelo to actually reduce the role of the parks police officers more to that of Park of of Lelo support officers the note takers the runners and what have you because it was Apparent from the well intentions
00:30:41 was Apparent from the well intentions but nevertheless um short actions of the two people we sent on that day that despite being lelow qualified they pretty much stood there and said yes no no thir three bags
00:30:52 and said yes no no thir three bags Fuller to the emergency services and were not dynamically assessing the situation for the local authori and then feeding the information back that is why I sent Keith Robbins later on the day he
00:31:03 I sent Keith Robbins later on the day he wasn't on the rotor he happened to be at home he answered the phone and he went along to give me an emergency planning view of that clearly that couldn't be allowed to sorry continue um so we we
00:31:14 allowed to sorry continue um so we we did then review who might be on that list as to their suitability of the type of person and so a few of the parks police officers were of that ability the parks Police Inspector clearly and his
00:31:26 parks Police Inspector clearly and his sergeants however I think I not able to satisfactory answer the second part of the question which is the aid Memoirs and what have you uh I think we got I
00:31:37 and what have you uh I think we got I got not we I think I got into the post exercise unified response all sorts of things were coming out and I think I probably didn't inact this bit about
00:31:49 probably didn't inact this bit about Cascade cars and Aid Memoirs to the degree I should have done right thank you was there a training and refresher regime set up
00:31:59 from memory uh forgive me if I get this wrong Keith Robbins handled this bit for me
00:32:07 me we there were a few events each year exercises where the authorities could send local author relation officers too certainly we did our best to advertise those to our local author
00:32:18 to advertise those to our local author Elation officers and encourage them to go to
00:32:21 go to that I don't think that we had a specific training module as this paragraph might imply right now in the last answer but one you said I
00:32:34 in the last answer but one you said I probably didn't enact this bit about Cascade cards and a me Aid Memoirs did given that Nicholas Leighton on the night of the greld tower fire did not have an aid memir or a prompt contained
00:32:45 have an aid memir or a prompt contained in an incident log book whereas others like Lamberth did do you consider now that this was a missed opportunity to put in place that kind of support yes
00:32:56 kind of support yes yes now uh if you go back to page three of the minute or back to the minute and go to page three um you can
00:33:05 see uh that
00:33:11 um uh uh 2third of the way down the page it says action DK ajt W TB stjw in a future incident involving more than a couple of rbkc stoke TMO dwellings the
00:33:23 couple of rbkc stoke TMO dwellings the Lelo or contingency planning team will attend the site and form a scene Incident Management group along with housing and TMO reps now is it right that the rationale for that was to enable better liaison
00:33:35 for that was to enable better liaison and cooperation at the scene of a future incident yes yes and why was that not delivered I can't answer it's obviously something that didn't get
00:33:47 something that didn't get delivered sorry I can't answer I don't know why that wasn't and again a missed opportunity when it came to Grenville yes yes
00:33:58 yes yes let's turn to MSL minimum standards for London uh
00:34:04 London uh and you explained in your first statement on that topic that as at June 2017 rbkc was subject to those standards which had been set by the lap that is that correct
00:34:15 been set by the lap that is that correct yes
00:34:16 yes yes uh let's go to the document lfb1 9219
00:34:39 lfb1
00:34:53 9219 thank you yes now this is the draft of 2016 version one as you could see drafted by the lfb is this what you're referring to as the minimum standards
00:35:04 referring to as the minimum standards current at the time of the Grandfield Tower fire yes yes uh and we can see document control at page two um it shows that at the foot of the
00:35:15 two um it shows that at the foot of the box there did start it had started life as version 3 in May 2013 uh and this is the last Edition as of August
00:35:23 of August 2016 can we take it that this was the final version before the fire I think we can I I would accept that um now um very generally it's right I think that isn't
00:35:34 generally it's right I think that isn't it that the minimum standards include an assessment of the operational response at part one and contingency plans as part two yes and if we go to page seven of this document section
00:35:48 nine um there's a heading MSL assessment and it says these standards will be assessed by a combination of self assessments peer reviews surveys
00:35:59 self assessments peer reviews surveys and Sample Audits and then under 9.1 regular assessment the MSL sections one and two will be assessed every year these will be conducted in in the form of a self
00:36:11 be conducted in in the form of a self assessment in odd and a peer review in even years so to be clear um um a peer review was then due in
00:36:23 um um a peer review was then due in 2016 I would assume so from from yes yes now um let's dig a bit deeper into the structure of of the Machinery can we go to
00:36:33 to rbk30
00:36:39 36770 now um what will come up uh is a spreadsheet if we can go to the native version
00:37:01 and these things take time to come up because they're they're heavy um this is uh the minimum standards for London self assessment results for rbkc for 2016 in
00:37:12 assessment results for rbkc for 2016 in the form of a spreadsheet um first do you remember who created the spreadsheet uh the London Fire brigades andion planning department or the London resilience Group whatever they were called at the time so this is
00:37:24 called at the time so this is essentially a standard form across London across all 33 Lo local authorities yes now if we go to U we are on the first worksheet here we can see the key for capability
00:37:36 we can see the key for capability there's green operational Amber operational but requires development and red not operational yes yes uh and um we can then work our way into it if we use
00:37:47 can then work our way into it if we use column
00:37:48 column A can we scroll down please to row 1.4b
00:37:59 there training provided by burrowers you see that yes that's section one of the minimum standards of London and you've ranked two agreed standards as a for Amber yes yes yes now for the standard
00:38:14 Amber yes yes yes now for the standard all a the first one all Burrows will undertake a training needs analysis based on local priorities to determine frequency and content of training for the
00:38:23 the following you can see that and you've note in column e training analysis is currently being updated was that correct if I wrote it I would say it was
00:38:35 correct if I wrote it I would say it was it wouldn't have been training analysis been conducted by me but by my team did you but you're the person I but I wrote this if I wrote that then then I would have meant it yes of course now um
00:38:49 have meant it yes of course now um uh looking then at uh the next one down initial and refresher training to all staff with specific response roles including the local impementation of pan London plans and awareness of their
00:39:00 London plans and awareness of their civil contingency duties you note there initial and refresher training has in the past been provided to staff with specific roles training is currently being reviewed and a new training analysis being
00:39:13 a new training analysis being undertaken was that done by the time of the Grandfield Tower fire in June
00:39:19 2017 could you remind me please what date this submission was uh um uh it's the I don't know the date in in 2016 but it was for 2016 2416 that
00:39:33 in in 2016 but it was for 2016 2416 that is what the document um I I can recall I can recall
00:39:42 that Rebecca Blackburn had put forward the set of training that was going to be required for Beck staff particularly and that was much more detailed than we
00:39:54 that was much more detailed than we provided in the past I but I can't recall a formal training analysis being published I think this was more us looking at it thinking about
00:40:05 was more us looking at it thinking about it and people saying right we need to do this that and the other but there wasn't a formal analysis produced right what was the what was the upshot was the training analysis undertaken was it
00:40:19 training analysis undertaken was it completed I think I have to say wouldn't have been completed because otherwise we would have had a published document I think so I think the answer was it wasn't completed why was is it not completed by the time of fire a year
00:40:32 later I can't properly answer things that I'm afraid um it should have been do you accept that it should have been I think certainly we should have done so
00:40:46 yes uh and if we go to rbk 347524
00:41:14 uh this may take a little time but I can take this more shortly um do you accept that the the specific standards in the equivalent document for the following year remained ranked as as Amber
00:41:28 year remained ranked as as Amber yes call that yes now let's then go let's then stick with this document the 2016 self assessment let's go down then to the next row which is Row
00:41:39 to the next row which is Row 1.5b in column a row 1.15 B column a thank you burrow level exercising uh and there again you can see that the the following agreed
00:41:51 see that the the following agreed standards were ranked as Amber the first one um is exercises to test staff in their specific emergency response roles at a frequency commensurate to local
00:42:02 at a frequency commensurate to local needs and then next to that it's noted that the Barca exercises are held annually but need to be improved scenario specific responses are not exercised
00:42:12 exercised sufficiently and then the next one Dan I want to show you after the green is the next Amber exercises to validate specific response plans on a frequency based risk based on risk not all plans
00:42:24 based risk based on risk not all plans stroke capabilities have been exercised you see that and then the third standard ranked as Amber for exercises was Burrow will was Burrow Burrows will ensure the appropriate numberers number of staff
00:42:36 appropriate numberers number of staff are available to support the delivery and participate to meet expected outcomes in the above exercises and the comment there is recent reductions in Beck staff insufficient refresher
00:42:47 Beck staff insufficient refresher training
00:42:49 training provided now um again given that you wrote this as you say um we can take it that that was the position at the time is it I believe so um now to whom in the lrf structure
00:43:04 so um now to whom in the lrf structure was this document provided was it the lap uh no sorry I beg your pardon yes um this document the 33 borers would sent
00:43:15 this document the 33 borers would sent in to the London resiliance group who would collate them and a uh uh the results were presented to the local authorities panel uh with a report with some narrative and and with some lists
00:43:28 some narrative and and with some lists showing the various responses across the 33 Burrows and and identifying those 33 Burrows and their responses and what did the lap do where
00:43:39 responses and what did the lap do where they saw an Amber or a red did they come back to you and no my recollection is because of course I was attending those meetings as the practitioner advisor so I'd have been sitting in the room
00:43:51 been sitting in the room um I don't really recall any um
00:43:59 decisions from the panels that sort of said right we need to get out and we need this or get an update or whatever I think the information was more noted and they were looking at the generality um there may have been
00:44:11 generality um there may have been discussion against some of the Reds that were there but I I I don't my Rec now the minutes may show differently my recollection is that I don't recall any comeback from the center after putting
00:44:23 comeback from the center after putting this in I see did the position identified in the Amber boxes I've shown you under 1.15 B here remain Amber at the time of the Greenfield Tower fire uh
00:44:34 the time of the Greenfield Tower fire uh yes they did the staffing issues we've identified were a problem and therefore the training with that right and that was something given the way in which this ex this document was treated was
00:44:45 this ex this document was treated was known to the lap presumably uh it was certainly the information was presented to the local authorities panel yes and given that it was information presented to the local authorities panel can we
00:44:56 to the local authorities panel can we take it that it was known to the highest echelons of
00:45:04 rbkc I think at that point certainly my managers would have been aware of it I don't know whether at that point we were yet providing it to the chief executive was there a report that you would
00:45:17 was there a report that you would provide regularly or irregularly to the chief executive or the senior executive board on the council no about the defects which this exercise throws up
00:45:28 defects which this exercise throws up not on this no um they had my report on staffing issues and and attached and Allied the training but there wasn't a report on this was there not a system though in place in the council whereby
00:45:40 though in place in the council whereby you as um head of contingency planning could report to the the senior decision makers in the council and tell them that the council was in the Amber and red respects failing the minimum standards
00:45:52 respects failing the minimum standards required under the London contingency planning Arrangements my report line was through my line manager and from him to his line manager I didn't have a direct line to the corporate management board
00:46:04 line to the corporate management board uh I reported to my line manager I occasionally got a slot at the management board when something was such as the staffing issues when that was
00:46:15 as the staffing issues when that was necessary but I was not routinely at my level you didn't you go through your line managers and it's um part of my overall management system
00:46:36 can you help us with the
00:46:39 answer to the question what was the system you say you reported to your line manager but was there a system in place to your knowledge whereby Nicholas Holgate as the chief executive or town clerk could become informed of these
00:46:52 clerk could become informed of these Amber and reds on this particular exercise I don't believe there was a system for that do you know why there was no system for that I don't think there had ever been a system for that does that tell us that structurally rbkc
00:47:05 does that tell us that structurally rbkc as a body and its Senior Management and decision makers had no system in place whereby they knew that the that the council was in these respects failing to
00:47:17 council was in these respects failing to live up to the minimum standards set by the
00:47:20 the lap I think that must be the case is there a rationale for that
00:47:37 I just don't think there had ever been that sort of structured process from The Authority at the top level I think it was all left down to the local managers
00:47:51 down to the local managers so I I'm not aware of that being structurally the case previously when you had your well made your report and we've seen the evidence already this morning to to Nicholas Holgate and the
00:48:03 morning to to Nicholas Holgate and the senior executive body within the council about staffing issues within your uh area of influence uh did you tell them
00:48:15 area of influence uh did you tell them that this was having a knock on effect because it would it would adversely un would adversely affect the ability of the council to comply with the minimum standards
00:48:27 the minimum standards cannot record at all so the level of any discussion or chat I may have had about that now the third area of this self assessment in 2016 is plans and capabilities let's go to to tab two
00:48:40 capabilities let's go to to tab two please MSL 2 which is on the bottom left hand part of the screen col a um reference 2.3 if we scroll up to that
00:48:53 please humanitarian assistance there's the there's the heading and we can see the following plan or capability specifications under column c um they're all marked as Amber well
00:49:06 c um they're all marked as Amber well well say that sorry they're all marked as Amber as a as a color um but some of them are marked red one of them is marked red and one of them is Mark green um uh looking at the documented burrow
00:49:19 um uh looking at the documented burrow capability it it it it referred to um first detailed options well you got you've got documented bur capability of the following requirements detailed options
00:49:31 following requirements detailed options of the humanitarian assistance capabilities the burough can provide as detailed in the menu of options from the London humanitarian assistance plan that was Amber and then um uh also
00:49:43 plan that was Amber and then um uh also Amber was the appointment of a humanitarian assistant assistance lead officer Halo including current contact details and support Arrangements I.E Secretariat
00:49:54 Secretariat HG that's the humanitarian assistance support group I think and then that's red and then identification of local partners for the establishment of a
00:50:05 partners for the establishment of a local humanitarian assistance response that's a Amber and then the one the one that gets a green think is identification of suitable locations to open a community Assistance
00:50:16 open a community Assistance Center now unlike previous examples there's no text in colum setting out the comments do you know why the ones I've read to you marked Amber were marked
00:50:32 Amber our humanitarian assistance plan or our burrow counterpart of that was out of
00:50:40 out of date part of it was up to date in terms of a particular venue and the arrangements for that the part relating to the management and the Strategic Management of that bit were out of date
00:50:53 Management of that bit were out of date we' had a plan um Keith Robbins very much the person for me dealing with this um I can recall at some point that we
00:51:04 um I can recall at some point that we did not get the response we wanted from the two departments concerned and I think it kind of went a little bit into a bance we were aware that there was the regional plan with the regional guidance which was
00:51:15 the regional guidance which was continually being improved and would probably be a much more suitable document to pick up and use when we needed it um and I think it just got into the two difficult box at one point
00:51:27 into the two difficult box at one point now in relation to the first documented humanitarian assistance capability um as I've sh I've read to you um let me help if you could help me
00:51:38 you um let me help if you could help me with this in your second statement um you refer this is page three of your second statement to Annex 16 which is the humanitarian Assistance Center plan
00:51:49 humanitarian Assistance Center plan issue 4 dated the 15th of April 2008 is it correct that that was part of the contingency management plan for rbkc in June
00:52:04 2017 I no I think that that document had outlived its purpose by that point um and really Ren needed restarting again
00:52:15 and really Ren needed restarting again why was it still part of the plan
00:52:22 then part of that document the bit relating to the potential use of Kensington town halls and the proceedings for it and the Manny way of of of putting that into become a humanitarian Assistance Center those
00:52:33 humanitarian Assistance Center those were still relevant what was no longer relevant in there were the Barts about the management of that plan and who would deal with that so that part was out of
00:52:47 date um and then if you look at the screen again please uh and look at the penultimate entry identification of local partners for the establishment of a local humanitarian assistance response
00:52:59 a local humanitarian assistance response that's also marked Amber there um if we go to the third worksheet in this
00:53:08 spreadsheet and open that up ml3 um if we go to row 3.2 that's where we see the heading Community under column B Community
00:53:19 Community under column B Community resilience for emergencies uh and uh if you look at the request or requirement documented strategy in place for Community
00:53:31 strategy in place for Community resilience detailing a program of multi- agency collaborative work with emergency responders members of the public voluntary and Faith sectors the answer is no there do you see that I do why was there no such documented
00:53:45 strategy you have to forgive me while I struggle a little bit simply because I'm looking at a document from a long time ago and I'm I'm I'm trying to give you my best answer to to to give you that I
00:53:57 my best answer to to to give you that I need to think that through as to what we were
00:54:05 doing I I'm struggling I'm sorry I'm struggling to give you a composite answer here and I know you want one um I apologize I don't think so there are all sorts of strands
00:54:17 think so there are all sorts of strands of work across all the multitude of matters for the resilience some we were doing well some we were doing a bit some we were not doing in occasions part of
00:54:28 we were not doing in occasions part of the role of the minimum standards for London was to put some aspirational stuff in there all of it to eventually be done it was accepted that no Authority would have everything on the ball however there's a ball no here to
00:54:41 ball however there's a ball no here to this one that's a little bit different from something which is in going and waiting to get better um I think it just hadn't at that point been a part of our Authority team work program to develop a
00:54:54 Authority team work program to develop a formal Community resilience strategy I think that was yet something yet to be got to so the best answer I can give you I think is it wasn't in our work agenda
00:55:06 I think is it wasn't in our work agenda at that
00:55:07 at that time we did have elements in the contingency planning team's annual work plan that pointed to work that we could be doing about Community resilience some
00:55:18 be doing about Community resilience some of that involved um leasing with the faith sector some of the volun sector in the Bor and matters like
00:55:28 like that um we had attempted to do work of that over years and and encountered problems in the B so I and Keith Robbins
00:55:40 problems in the B so I and Keith Robbins together had certainly attended one if not two meetings of the burough Faith forum for example attempting to get buyin to work with us in advance of emergency um we didn't get that people
00:55:52 emergency um we didn't get that people were very much of well we're there when you need us Keith on the team's behalf had visited a number of Charities and voluntary organizations in the Bor including Crews and some others the
00:56:04 including Crews and some others the answer always was well we're there when you need us but we can't commit to the planning process because there's only three of us and we're only part-time or we volunteers but do call us you've got our
00:56:15 our number um so that was over a period of time I mean I had been to the dases group of the Church of England Keith had been to the Catholic
00:56:27 been to the Catholic equivalent so we knew of the numbers and we knew of the organizations but in trying to get people who would say let's work with you in advance it was a
00:56:38 work with you in advance it was a continual we'll be there if you call us if we can which is why we resorted really to relying on British Red Cross the Salvation Army and in the days when
00:56:50 the Salvation Army and in the days when they did these things the women's Royal voluntary service their role has changed since as basically the main charitable organizations to get through and you know with that experience yeah we did
00:57:02 know with that experience yeah we did not have a comprehensive Community resilience program that that that would meet the the needs of that hence the no do you accept that you should have done
00:57:14 do you accept that you should have done even if the document um I accept that the authority in time will have should have done in terms of the workload that we had and our ability to do all of
00:57:28 we had and our ability to do all of everything you know we we we we concentrated on those elements that we we could deal with and that means meant necessarily that some things weren't the top of the agenda and having
00:57:41 top of the agenda and having attempted you know this wasn't the the current priority for us at that time let's go to B rbk30
00:57:50 36562 um
00:58:02 this uh is a business plan 2016 to to 2017 for the B burrow resilience Forum uh for the B uh and it's the
00:58:14 Forum uh for the B uh and it's the latest iteration is the 8th of June 2016 as you can see there final it says agreed at brf meeting 8th of June 2016 you see that yes um H and uh do you know
00:58:25 you see that yes um H and uh do you know who draft this document I drafted the document um it was the borrow resilience Forum that agreed its content and if we go to page
00:58:41 11 the last page there's a work plan do you see that yes and uh it included a work plan to engage with Category 2 responders this is the second
00:58:53 Category 2 responders this is the second entry local voluntary agencies local face groups and local business forums uh and the requirement there is to host for the brf to host an engagement session to involve potential
00:59:04 engagement session to involve potential local responders to explain the role of the statutary sector in the emergency response to discuss the role of local support agencies and to Foster greater sharing of information and cooperation and there are six steps recommended
00:59:16 and there are six steps recommended there to be carried out do you see that yes uh but the plers marked in red are in other words not operational or or if you look at the key at the bottom will
00:59:27 you look at the key at the bottom will not be completed by the original Target date and is likely to impact on overall delivery of objective that's right is it that as at the date of the Grandfield Tower of fire that box stayed red yes
00:59:40 Tower of fire that box stayed red yes why is
00:59:43 that again I can't recol let a precise answer this clearly was at the beginning of the year for the brf an aspirational Target we what we would do is sit down
00:59:54 Target we what we would do is sit down and say well with the meetings we have what might we do there was a from memory quite a wide view that we were aware together across the partnership locally
01:00:07 together across the partnership locally that we didn't have a formal Arrangement agreement with local things so that was something we aspired to deal with why it didn't get done I sorry sitting here today I don't know um it could be
01:00:20 today I don't know um it could be because we didn't have time it could be because people didn't respond I I really don't know um all I can say is that's what the group aspired to do
01:00:33 is that's what the group aspired to do we did we met some targets we didn't meet them all why because this wouldn't have been my work personally by the way you know this would have been the work of others in the group I'm sorry I don't have a recollection here today I don't
01:00:45 have a recollection here today I don't know whether we have a minute or not do you accept that category run responders such as rbkc when performing their statutory duty to maintain plans under section two one C or D of
01:00:57 plans under section two one C or D of the 2004 act must have regard to the activities of the voluntary sector yes and through our relationship with British Red Cross Salvation Army and the wrvs we had those links there the
01:01:10 wrvs we had those links there the Salvation Army had a role in London for at an emergency coordinating the activities of other Faith groups the British Red Cross had a role in London of coordinating the activities of a
01:01:22 of coordinating the activities of a number of other voluntary sector agencies in in in those areas so although we did not have a direct documented pre-planned um relationship with local voluntary
01:01:34 um relationship with local voluntary organizations doesn't mean to say that we were not aware of the role of voluntary organizations and what we did was the best that we could do um to to to to have that aspect in our plan well
01:01:47 to to have that aspect in our plan well let's look at the guidance the statutory guidance emergency preparedness cab 4 4597 please
01:02:02 this is chapter 14 the role of the voluntary sector in the October 2011 revision as you can see uh and if you go please to page two of this you can see paragraph
01:02:13 of this you can see paragraph 14.1 which says I no doubt you would agree category run responders second bullet point category one responders who include the voluntary sector in their local planning Arrangements will make
01:02:25 local planning Arrangements will make the overall response more accessible and effective throughout the community this is not just good practice the regulations require category one responders to have regard to the contribution of the voluntary sector
01:02:36 contribution of the voluntary sector this includes considering how the voluntary sector can be involved at every stage including training and excising to respond to emergencies paragraphs 14.4 to 14.8 and that's where
01:02:47 paragraphs 14.4 to 14.8 and that's where you'll find the detail uh now if if we look at
01:02:52 look at um
01:02:54 um uh well one could look at the detail but taking it shortly do do you accept that that rbkc did not have as at the date of the grandell tower fire a strategy or an approach which actively considered and
01:03:06 approach which actively considered and engaged the voluntary sector during the planning process or in training or exercises I would say we did not have a process that involved the voluntary sector at every stage we did have
01:03:18 sector at every stage we did have recognition of the role of the voluntary sector as far as we were able to at the time um well is that an answer to the question that I'm putting it to you that rbkc didn't have a strategy or an
01:03:29 rbkc didn't have a strategy or an approach which quotes actively considered and engaged the voluntary sector because of the ambers and the Reds I've been showing you in the minimum standards document we had an approach where we had attempted to
01:03:41 approach where we had attempted to engage with the local voluntary sector and had not made met with
01:03:47 success what would make rbkc different from any other of the the other 32 Burrows in that respect I don't believe we were that different from a lot of the other burs in that respect so is it your
01:03:58 other burs in that respect so is it your evidence that that this bullet point here is really a thing written on water as an aspiration only and really in effect incapable of being carried out in any pragmatic and sensible way I would
01:04:09 any pragmatic and sensible way I would agree with that I think it's a great aspiration don't get me wrong but as with the vulnerability and recording people of vulnerability lists there are a lot of guidance aspirations that come out that on the day
01:04:21 out that on the day are not
01:04:24 are not achievable and and so certainly you we did not have that strategy that isn't to say that we hadn't made an attempt did you or to you knowledge anybody else within the lap ever go to central
01:04:35 within the lap ever go to central government the cabinet office and tell them that the regulations require Amendment because they are placing on councils far too great a burden in requiring consideration of involvement of um voluntary organiz I'm not aware of
01:04:48 of um voluntary organiz I'm not aware of the lap doing that now um let's go back to the spreadsheet then I want to ask you some questions about Halos next can we go back to rbk30
01:05:00 can we go back to rbk30 36770 uh and I'd like to open m msl2 go back to that spreadsheet uh and look at row 2.3 humanitarian assistance we were there
01:05:12 humanitarian assistance we were there earlier we look I read this to you about the Halo it's the third entry down uh and it has an R next to it which means that there's no operational capability of plan in place um a a a Halo is a
01:05:27 of plan in place um a a a Halo is a humanitarian assistance lead officer
01:05:31 officer uh do you agree that that somebody appointed by London um local Authority gold and would be a director normally a director responsible for adult social
01:05:42 director responsible for adult social care yes yes and that the role would be to bring together Partners including Health police voluntary and Faith sectors to oversee the humanitarian assistance effort yes yes yes and they
01:05:53 assistance effort yes yes yes and they would form part of is this right the humanitarian assistance steering group yes and it's governed I think and I think accept this on the documents by a framework document called the London humanitarian assistance framework yes
01:06:05 humanitarian assistance framework yes which I think at the time of the Grandfield Tower fire was version five yes I'd accept that right well it's at rbk30
01:06:13 rbk30 111313 and we will come to it uh in in due course if need be certainly with other Witnesses but um would you agree that the Halo role is a pivotal one in in the event of a significant emergency
01:06:24 in the event of a significant emergency such as the Grandfield fire yes uh and it's a role where the holder requires knowledge of the council emergency plans and The Wider London resilience humanitarian assistance framework in order to be effective yes do you know
01:06:37 order to be effective yes do you know why there was no identified Halo at the time of this MSL assessment in 2016 for rbkc when we were devising the annex for our humanitarian
01:06:50 the annex for our humanitarian assistance plan as you've seen and as I said part of that plan was the physical part that was the easy bit frankly the second part was identifying people for various
01:06:59 various roles at that time Keith Robbins and I met with and they weren't in post by the time of the fire but the the the time we did that work the then executive
01:07:11 did that work the then executive directors of the Departments that dealt with adult social care and with children's services and talked to them about this and put it through I'm afraid the response from
01:07:23 through I'm afraid the response from them was less than satisfactory the the response from one was after we finished speaking what isn't there somebody else who can do this such as British Red Cross and the response from the other
01:07:34 Cross and the response from the other was the chief executive needs to understand we are very very busy as executive directors and it really is too much to ask us to take on these extra roles who were the executive directors the two of them that you just referred to uh one was Jee danth and the other
01:07:46 to uh one was Jee danth and the other was anarie
01:07:50 carry and there was also a member of the Town legal team with them I can't remember that person's
01:07:59 name and we well to say that we were gobsmacked would be an understatement I have to say and we had a conversation for a while
01:08:10 and we had a conversation for a while and got absolutely nowhere and that was the end of that meeting and I'm afraid at that point that rather knocked us for six and I don't think we ever recovered
01:08:21 six and I don't think we ever recovered from that
01:08:27 so cutting to the the chase does this mean that there was no effective Halo Arrangement or operational capability or plan for a Halo Arrangement at the time
01:08:38 plan for a Halo Arrangement at the time of the Grandfield Tower fire no we would have sorry the answer is no there wasn't and we would have relied on the London framework and I would have relied on Mutual aid for that right so you had no
01:08:51 Mutual aid for that right so you had no in-house Halo you would have to go out to other burrow from on the under the mutual assistance ARR um possibly out to other bars for a trained Halo or using
01:09:02 other bars for a trained Halo or using the framework that was there to use one of our executive directors who I think would have had the capability to pick that role up right but that but the former at least would have required activation of LLG
01:09:15 would have required activation of LLG would it
01:09:17 not not necessarily Mutual Aid can be provided without um activation of the London Gold Network um you know if you ask another bur can you come and assist you that that's perfectly achievable
01:09:29 you that that's perfectly achievable without that uh I think of the scale of Grenville by the way that that quite clearly that was so astonishingly awfully big that that that that there should have been Regional stuff in much
01:09:40 should have been Regional stuff in much much much earlier uh but the point is that you know you could ask a neighboring borrow can you do this for us and they would do that and there was no requirements to actually enact anything formally for it
01:09:53 anything formally for it um is it fair to say that leading up to June 2017 the absence of well well the absence of an operational um Halo appointment was a significant deficiency
01:10:04 appointment was a significant deficiency in RB KC's ability to deal with the aftermath of the Grandfield Tower fire but any serious emergency I think I would agree that with that statement yes can I then turn
01:10:17 with that statement yes can I then turn to vulnerable persons sticking with the spreadsheet please um can we go back to MSL 3 this is still the 2016 assessment of the minimum
01:10:29 of the minimum standards um and under that tab minimum standard
01:10:33 standard 2.6 we scroll
01:10:40 up uh to that for 2.6 if you click on the tab 2.6 at the bottom that should that is that is that's very helpful thank you that is
01:10:52 is that's very helpful thank you that is what I was after and here you have 2.6 in ENT or ident of vulnerable persons we can see if you scroll across to column F there um that um there's an amber color
01:11:04 there um that um there's an amber color highlighting uh which represents the combined scores for a number of substandards I think that's correct isn't it yes uh and two is Amber uh one is red as we can see from
01:11:16 Amber uh one is red as we can see from the RG column at the top um and if we go to worksheet 2.6
01:11:28 at 1.2 there validation do you see that yes uh it says evidence that plan capability was tested via exercise or other appropriate testing event with relevant
01:11:40 appropriate testing event with relevant stakeholders and that's red yes yes uh and linked to that I think it was 1.5 incorporation of lessons identified evidence that lessons
01:11:52 identified evidence that lessons identified from a training or exercise or incident event as part of the general plan maintenance procedure were incorporated into the plan straight capability document that was also red wasn't yes I think the one follows the
01:12:03 wasn't yes I think the one follows the other yes now we've had a look at the ex at exercise bable which took place on the 6th of November
01:12:13 November 2015
01:12:15 2015 um um and we've seen in the the exercise report or post exercise report for that um and we looked at it earlier that
01:12:27 that um and we looked at it earlier that the triber adult social care had requested a multi- agency exercise concentrating on the issue of identifying the vulnerable remember that yes um and that was to take place before
01:12:39 yes um and that was to take place before the end of April 2016 can you confirm looking at this document that at the time of the creation of this document in 2016 that had still not been done I
01:12:50 2016 that had still not been done I don't recall it being done why had it not been done I don't know the answer to that as sitting here I wasn't the only person involved and I can't recall whether I had responsibility or whether
01:13:01 whether I had responsibility or whether it's my team and it would be unfair to say it was anybody else's I can't recall that
01:13:06 that but a lot of this work was done with other people across the three burs some of it I did some of it I didn't I can't remember on the exercise B bit if we
01:13:18 remember on the exercise B bit if we scroll
01:13:20 scroll down please to 3.3
01:13:25 we can see under implementation and records and this is part of what is part three embedding you can see just to the left of that under column D it says
01:13:36 left of that under column D it says evidence that training and exercises are scheduled and conducted on a regular basis for all staff necessary to activate the plan capability and that's marked Amber and
01:13:47 capability and that's marked Amber and there's a comment you can see in column F accessing data of vulnerable people is business as usual for ASC that's adult social care and CS that's Children's
01:13:58 social care and CS that's Children's Services I think staff however out of ours access to data not certain and work is something I think if you click on that box that might reveal the rest it
01:14:09 that box that might reveal the rest it might it goes on to say currently in progress to confirm this we can if we if it's clickable on can we click on it to see if we can get the rest of the text there it is yes
01:14:21 the rest of the text there it is yes currently in progress to confirm this what was being done at the time to progress that topic um I can't think of any detail this was a task with one of
01:14:32 any detail this was a task with one of my staff Keith Robbins who was dealing with our vulnerability uh plan who was dealing with the draft and was dealing with any discussions and I can't recall at the stage what the detail of that was
01:14:43 at the stage what the detail of that was at this at this particular point and how far had that got as it the 14th of June 2017
01:14:57 14th of June 2017 we were at the list of lists of the other organizations or people within them with whom we could telephone to ask for details of vulnerable
01:15:08 for details of vulnerable people Mr chairman I'm I'm in the middle of this topic really certainly too far from the end to ask you to stay sit a bit longer so I can complete it there's now a convenient moment well if it suits
01:15:19 now a convenient moment well if it suits you yes I think we'll stop there thank you um Mr Kerry we have a break during the afternoon and this is is a good time to have it so we'll stop now please we'll resume at halfast 3 and again
01:15:30 we'll resume at halfast 3 and again please don't talk to anyone about your evidence while out all right thank you very
01:15:45 much thank you very much half three
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01:32:26 would you ask Mr Kerry to come back in please
01:32:40 I all right Mr Carri ready to carry on I hope thank you thank you very much yes Mr um Mr Cary can we continue with the theme but I want to ask you about the relevant plan for vulnerable persons can
01:32:51 relevant plan for vulnerable persons can we please go well I I think I perhaps take this shortly do you recall that um Annex 18 to the contingency management plan um had U heading vulnerable persons
01:33:03 plan um had U heading vulnerable persons yes yes um now in your statement your second statement you tell us that there was no Annex 18 but there was something called Annex 21 which was a framework for identifying and contacting
01:33:15 for identifying and contacting vulnerable persons in an emergency yes yes do you do was that the plan that you were referring to in the MSL 2016 submission
01:33:27 I'm sorry without seeing it I a difficulty we had a draft plan that was intended to be how we dealt with the list of vulnerable people right uh well um let's go then to rbk30
01:33:46 589 I think this is annex
01:33:51 21 um can you confirm that I think is yes uh and if you go to page well H I'm not sure we can dat it
01:34:02 page well H I'm not sure we can dat it are you able to date this document uh not from on the front cover no look at page two I don't think it helps us there either it's draft version one so you may not be able to tell
01:34:13 us no and this document was drafted um this is the work of my colleague uh Keith Robbins I'm sorry I've misled you if you go to the foot of page four we do have a date April
01:34:26 have a date April 2012 at the foot of the page did you see that yes um and you tell us in your second statement that the plan unfortunately remained in draft format
01:34:37 unfortunately remained in draft format uh and you go on to say in hindsight more could have been done to produce a final version do you accept that yes and what should have been done more okay so this was within the work of my
01:34:52 okay so this was within the work of my team member I'm the manager of course so I have the responsibility uh and and don't choke from that um but this was a work stream for Keith um the intention from this was
01:35:03 for Keith um the intention from this was following the publication of cabinet office guidance about um identifying vulnerable people of trying to deal with that uh I know that he did look at some
01:35:14 that uh I know that he did look at some other bur's plans to see what they might have done the L B of harop plan rings a bell for some reason I think they had got on and dealt with one um from gosh this is a long time ago from
01:35:27 gosh this is a long time ago from recollection we struggled to get our head around the cabinet office guidance and thought that it was unachievable um what we wanted or what I wanted to
01:35:39 um what we wanted or what I wanted to see was a the list of lists in other words to make sure that we knew who had lists and why they had them and what we might
01:35:47 might achieve I seem to recall I might need to see the documentation but I can recall that there was something in somebody plan whether it was the national guidance or the Haro plan that had some
01:35:58 guidance or the Haro plan that had some Matrix which started to link the types of information you might get from different information holders to different types of of people who are vulnerable uh and if memory serves me
01:36:09 vulnerable uh and if memory serves me correctly that would sort of assist with you know gas board for this electricity company for that water company for the other I may have got that wrong but I I as I say I wasn't doing this work stream although I was ultimately responsible
01:36:21 although I was ultimately responsible for it um and I think there were sort of intentions around that at the end of the day I think I just think with the workload we had it was one of these things that was always just kept
01:36:32 things that was always just kept dropping off and um the the the essential thing we needed was to know that we had the phone numbers of those that we needed to call um the intention of the Govern cabinet office
01:36:44 cabinet office guidance was that in an emergency a local Authority would be able to access the list of lifts put all of the data into a spreadsheet and then share that
01:36:56 into a spreadsheet and then share that out frankly fantasy that within an emergency you could go through to a dozen or more agencies and get emailed or facted across a whole load of information and then compile it into one
01:37:08 information and then compile it into one data sheet to then send out um given what I've already said about the difficulty of knowing exactly who is vulnerable in any location at any particular one time um so for a local Authority
01:37:23 time um so for a local Authority using our colleagues in adult social care and Children's Services of course for them to interrogate their lists was of key importance to a local Authority because those were the people that you know as an authority we were looking
01:37:34 know as an authority we were looking after as far as this document is concerned I'm not sure that there isn't a later version of a draft at some point um I don't know why I think that but for some reason I look at this it looks a
01:37:45 some reason I look at this it looks a little bit oldfashioned and I think Keith may have been working on something more recent at the time I'm sorry I can't remember in detail um it was just one of those ones where
01:37:57 um it was just one of those ones where it was like would you know what we've got our lists of lists we're never going to achieve more than that so it's kind of don't sweat it on the detail of this document right let's then go to rbk30 is
01:38:14 58010 this is an email exchange of the 21st of March 2017 just 3 months or so before the fire in June between you and Tony Andrews from to city council and it
01:38:26 Tony Andrews from to city council and it involves a query about the current state of play with humanitarian assistance board
01:38:32 board issues uh if you um uh go to the email here in front of us items three and four um you can see um
01:38:44 items three and four um you can see um item three deals with emergency rest center staff and you right we have very few Council staff trained as emergency rest center managers and staff we will of course call called upon the British Red Cross under the mou for ERC Staffing
01:38:56 Red Cross under the mou for ERC Staffing but this is of course not a guaranteed service our last recruitment Drive using KCET did not result in any new volunteers training for Council staff volunteers would be carried out for us
01:39:07 volunteers would be carried out for us by the British Red Cross under the
01:39:11 M now is it right that there was a real risk of rbkc not being able to meet its duties as a local Authority category one responder in respect of opening and
01:39:22 responder in respect of opening and operating emergency rest Cent certainly we were factoring in as you can see and relying upon British Red Cross staff coming out through there had they had we called them for some reason
01:39:34 they had we called them for some reason they said we can't meet you out then we would have had to go straight to Mutual Aid requests for other authorities for their staff and if you look at item four identifying vulnerable people it says this remains a considerable concern at
01:39:47 this remains a considerable concern at rbkc as discussed at the last meeting of the humanitarian assistance board rbkc does not have a system for accessing details of vulnerable people out of hours unlike lbhf we do not have a
01:39:59 hours unlike lbhf we do not have a welfare bronze on rotor unlike WCC we do not have a Tony Andrews on 247 call you will recall that the last HB meeting agreed that Liz Bruce would raise this with the chief exec or management Boards
01:40:12 with the chief exec or management Boards of all three authorities or possibly at the Shared Services Board Liz was to have raised the risk that this presents rbkc and also WCC for the lack of resilience in in the current Reliance on
01:40:24 resilience in in the current Reliance on you Liz was to raise the question of rotors for rbkc and WCC and the possibility of a tri Barrow welfare bronze rotor and of course the funding for this I've not heard of any of
01:40:35 for this I've not heard of any of results from this and assume that it has not yet happened I would be grateful if you would please raise this with Liz and seek some action if not by her then by a deputy now is it right that this was
01:40:47 deputy now is it right that this was this issue was something that was to be raised at a senior level but at this stage March 2017 you had heard anything about that or had hadn't know anything back I assume not and this would have
01:40:58 back I assume not and this would have been very much about accessing details of vulnerable people from the council's list as opposed to The Wider list of lists yes but do do you accept that your view at the time is clear from this this
01:41:10 view at the time is clear from this this part that so far as identifying vulnerable people was concerned um rbkc system was materially inferior to those of its neighbors lbhf and
01:41:22 of its neighbors lbhf and WCC lbhf had a welfare bronze on a rotor on a paid rotor um Westminster city council had Tony
01:41:34 um Westminster city council had Tony Andrews as a person who did emergency planning for the um people Services departments there 24/7 full stop which is why related to the lack of resilience to
01:41:45 related to the lack of resilience to that sort of system um what we needed was access to people who could interrogate I forgot the name of the system but the software system that social care were using um so our way of
01:41:57 social care were using um so our way of doing that at that time would be in CMP Annex one to call those people we had identified for those departments and see if we could get hold of them and if we
01:42:08 if we could get hold of them and if we did this is all nonot of course to then see whether they could actually produce those lists so hence the vulnerability of that so we had the ability if we could get hold of the people what we couldn't guarantee was getting hold of
01:42:20 couldn't guarantee was getting hold of the people hence the vulnerability to us of not accessing through that uh and I think that's why we were saying well look something needs to happen yet again of course no paid rotors at all in rbkc
01:42:34 of course no paid rotors at all in rbkc or for that matter in in Westminster ham fham having a paid rotor did have the resource on rotor and in fact it was that person who contacted us on the morning of Grandfield and came into the Beck and actually performed that role
01:42:46 Beck and actually performed that role for us on that morning is that Sue Redmond no um an Stewart right do you accept my the answer to my question is yes that that in comparison with certainly with LH lbhf possibly WCC
01:43:01 with certainly with LH lbhf possibly WCC as well as identified here uh the system in place at rbkc in respect of identifying vulnerable people was materially inferior yes yes thank you now drawing all the threads together
01:43:13 you now drawing all the threads together so far Mr Kerry um before June 2017 um do you accept that there were the following problem areas um W within
01:43:25 the following problem areas um W within its contingency planning first the lack of uh sufficient numbers of trained staff to respond secondly the adequacy of the training exercises to test plans and processes yes third the areas
01:43:38 and processes yes third the areas identified as Amber that we've seen in the 2016 minimum standards for London including Beck exercises and the need for improvement there and the insufficiency of refresher training yes uh and similarly in relation to
01:43:51 yes uh and similarly in relation to humanitarian assistance and the red ENT for the absence of a Halo yes yes and also the considerable concerns that you've expressed in this very email here uh about emergency rest center staff and vulnerable persons yes yes looking at
01:44:04 vulnerable persons yes yes looking at all of those things in the round do you accept that at the time of the Greenfield Tower fire rbkc was Ill prepared to meet its duties as a category one responder in an e in in a major
01:44:16 major emergency having heard all of this I'm in no position to say anything other than yes why is that
01:44:38 I don't have a short one sentence answer for you
01:44:46 um elements involve frankly the lack of corporate management support for for the issue of Staffing and training despite over many years saying the same old problem we
01:44:58 years saying the same old problem we never ever got the answer resolved on that so therefore we didn't have those Staffing in there if you haven't got the staff you can't really do the amount of training and exercising you do so that one follows the other um in terms of
01:45:09 one follows the other um in terms of some of the other elements um team of three there are certain things you can do in any one year you don't get everything done so therefore there are some some gaps there under the MSL um I think if you looks across all
01:45:22 MSL um I think if you looks across all of the Rondon Bur you would have found certain aspects and certain buroughs not there at any one time and I don't say that in any way at all to excuse anything that's just a daily reality uh I think that
01:45:36 um we did what we could with what we had but limited with perhaps some lack of corporate management action and some actual lack of management scrutiny to ex
01:45:47 actual lack of management scrutiny to ex be really aware of these items you put that in the bigger picture of 33 Bur was all trying to do some of these things 33 ways at the time I would suggest there's something systemically
01:45:59 suggest there's something systemically wrong there in terms of the Capital City's Municipal resource being fragmented in that way in some of these responses not all of them um I think that's probably still the case today frankly and I wonder
01:46:12 the case today frankly and I wonder about the learning from Grenville about how London could better call out and resource some social care and humanitarian assistance for issues of
01:46:24 humanitarian assistance for issues of that size I don't I've not been there for two and a half years I don't know what's currently in place but I I would wonder that I think if you take a combination of our limitations as individuals the
01:46:37 of our limitations as individuals the limitations of the management support for this the limitations of a London structure on some of these items it paints a very Unpretty picture um I will take responsibility
01:46:48 picture um I will take responsibility for certain parts but I will say the authority should take responsibility for others I'm certainly involved there my name was on the door in a sense but I wasn't the key decision maker on some of these
01:46:58 these matters all I can say is to the people of Kensington and
01:47:06 Grenville I am painfully aware The Authority could and should have done better on the day I still stand by the fact that this was an incident from word
01:47:17 fact that this was an incident from word go that was Far bigger than anyone local Authority in London could deal with um I still will say that despite the deficiencies in some of the backgrounds that have been correctly
01:47:29 backgrounds that have been correctly pointed out here today that nevertheless people were called and did turn out and did do quite a lot of work that day even just in rbkc
01:47:40 a lot of work that day even just in rbkc that Mutual Aid at a local level did work to a large extent you will I'm sure be wanting to go on and talk about the bigger structural matters of that response and I won't prejudge that now
01:47:52 response and I won't prejudge that now um but I will say to the people of Kensington yes of course looking back now looking at those experiences would I have done some things differently of course I would have done with the
01:48:04 course I would have done with the bang but you know we were what we were we did what we did sorry that's stupid I'm sorry um
01:48:26 I don't think I have anything else to
01:48:29 say let's then turn to the response to the grfl tower fire on the night um and I'd like to start a little
01:48:40 night um and I'd like to start a little break Mr car thank you can we try and I'll see if we can move on because I'm conscious of the time and um I wish to don't feel you've got to try and solder on if if a few minutes break would help
01:48:51 on if if a few minutes break would help you
01:48:53 you it's it is a natural break so if you'd like a break for five minutes or however long we need just five minutes then yes of course than you we'll we'll you go with the Usher thank you and we'll
01:49:04 with the Usher thank you and we'll expect to be back in five
01:49:13 minutes right just a minute um I'll ask the user to get us in in five minutes time thank you Mr
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01:57:34 you ask Mr carer to come back in
01:57:44 please thank all right Mr Kerry thank you yes that's not all yes Mr V yes Mr chairman Mr Kerry I'd like now to turn to to the night of the 14th of June 2017
01:57:55 to to the night of the 14th of June 2017 or rather the early hours of that day uh and to start with the activation of the RB KC contingency management plan um can we go back to the plan please rbk40
01:58:07 we go back to the plan please rbk40 4396 and go directly in it to Page
01:58:14 33 and you can see well you can't see but you will see there under paragraph or section 4.4 initial call out of office hours and there's a flow plan there uh which sets out that once a call
01:58:27 there uh which sets out that once a call has been received by the out of hours contact service the duty silver is contacted is that correct yes and and I'm assuming that this um flowchart here was as it was on the night of the fire
01:58:39 was as it was on the night of the fire yes uh now we know from your statement that you were the duty silver on duty on that night weren't you no
01:58:48 you no um I had a borrow duty officer on duty on the rotor so I wasn't on call we didn't have any Silvers on call at that time it was just a list of names in CMP
01:59:00 time it was just a list of names in CMP anx one the burrow duty officer who responded to all sorts of Highway all sorts of minor things just routini um we had put in as the on call
01:59:13 routini um we had put in as the on call person to start the silver process if you like and for smaller incidents the bur duty officer May would have dealt with that uh for something of this scale quite rightly the B duty officer then
01:59:25 quite rightly the B duty officer then phoned me um I was at home I was in bed I was actually on booked annual leave for for for that Wednesday um so but he phoned me as the
01:59:37 Wednesday um so but he phoned me as the emergency planning manager and I took that call and you know took that responsibility on at that point but I wasn't on call um now at two I think 221
01:59:48 wasn't on call um now at two I think 221 you you got a call from the the bur duty officer Nicholas Leighton I think I think he was the one who initially got contacted yes that that's the detail and then he told you there was a fire at Greenfield Tower there were casualties and people trapped I think yes yes and
02:00:01 and people trapped I think yes yes and you kept a manuscript Notebook on the night as as you went didn't you yes and you have that we do it's at rbk30 60425 can we look at that
02:00:12 please uh and uh if we go to the first page there it is it's a spiral pad with your name on it uh and if um you go to page two which is the
02:00:24 if um you go to page two which is the first page of the book uh in manuscript it says gemfield Tower w111 TQ police call 0203 and then it
02:00:33 it says
02:00:35 says uh
02:00:36 uh um could you could you read that something trapped yes evacuees ah evacuees trapped trapped casualties expected 25 pump
02:00:47 casualties expected 25 pump plus yes yes and then rendevu point right who gave you that information was it Nick Leighton or was it the police I got that from Nick Leighton he would have been given that from the
02:00:59 would have been given that from the police now um if we go back to the flowchart the previous document rbk40 is
02:01:07 4396 uh there um you can see that that indicates that the duty Council silver has to evaluate the level of response required yes yes uh and and that's taken from I think
02:01:19 yes uh and and that's taken from I think take this from me that it's taken from section 4.1 of the contingency management plan now it's it appears that there are three levels of response yes level one level two and level three I think level one is minor
02:01:32 level three I think level one is minor is it yes level two is medium yes yes and level three is Major yes uh and that's on the right hand side of the chart at this stage at 2:20 in the
02:01:43 chart at this stage at 2:20 in the morning what was your assessment as as Council silver of the level of response that was
02:01:49 that was required well I didn't quantify the response in terms of level two or level three at that particular Point um I wasn't you know thinking in terms of one two or three it clearly was a serious
02:02:00 two or three it clearly was a serious incident uh and and so I dealt with it as as a serious incident um but I can't say that I Quantified it either two or three now in your statement at page 49
02:02:11 three now in your statement at page 49 paragraph 49 page 14 we don't need to go to it you tell us that you became the Beck you say I became the Beck um at that stage uh did that mean that as soon
02:02:23 that stage uh did that mean that as soon as you were called by Nick Leon at 221 you became the be yes
02:02:29 be yes effectively plan was that if you're the person that gets the call
02:02:36 call um you are effectively doing all of the things that a Beck would do if you if if you had a Beck there so so I mean the Beck has a room at the Town Hall but frankly could be set up anywhere but the
02:02:48 frankly could be set up anywhere but the Beck for a lot of incidents as in D Tower fire you know was was me and um so I described myself as the Beck because
02:02:59 I described myself as the Beck because there wasn't a Beck somewhere else so in the absence of that you know I was the default for for for the Beck role but in fact did you mean you became the B you became the controller yes and and I think I may
02:03:11 controller yes and and I think I may have described earlier that we had this transitioning of controller Council silver going on at the time um so yeah in fact in the previous iteration of a
02:03:22 in fact in the previous iteration of a plan you would have seen borrow controller rather than juty silver for example now as such um looking at the flowchart becoming the controller um meant that it was at least
02:03:34 controller um meant that it was at least a level two response is that is that fair oh Fair yes certainly right it it was not a minor incident not a minor incident but were you proceeding at that stage on the basis of level two or level level three act as it says Duty silver
02:03:47 level three act as it says Duty silver to remain at home acting as controller until Becca is opened and staffed could we just scroll down the page please I'm so sorry you're quite right if you go down to there yeah thank because level two response Duty silver become
02:03:58 two response Duty silver become controller working from home level three response due to Silver to remain at home acting as controller until Beck is opened and staffed at 220 which was it at that point I it was the level two
02:04:10 at that point I it was the level two right slot there um at that point and and and I moved to the level to what we would see here as the level three a bit later on right so at that stage you did you can we take it you called out
02:04:21 you can we take it you called out Department strict service managers to respond yes I mean you'll have to help me you've got my log there but you you'll see sequentially which Services I called at that particular Point yes but
02:04:33 called at that particular Point yes but you were going down the level two route rather than the level three route to begin with yes yes um now and do you remember off the top of your head when that changed and you decided it was a level three
02:04:45 response I think a sort of without declaring one or the other I think mentally I got into that at the point where a bit later in the morning it became quite apparent just how much more
02:04:57 became quite apparent just how much more of an incident this was because when I first heard of it you know you're thinking a tower block fire we've had those and this sounds like a bit more serious but then later on of course the the it became so much more aware and at
02:05:09 the it became so much more aware and at that point when um I spoke to Stuart Priestley as my line manager and as one of our designated Council Silvers um at that particular point the
02:05:20 Silvers um at that particular point the first call I made with it was still me carrying on with it but then a bit later on he um said I'm coming into the town hall and when he got there he became Council silver and I became his
02:05:31 Council silver and I became his emergency planning adviser so not clearcut this is level two oh now at this time it's level three it side of kind you know it morphed from one to the other as as it became more awareness of
02:05:44 other as as it became more awareness of it and and on the flowchart it says that um as you can see in the box that we've just revealed it says call out Department service managers to respond to incident what what would what would that
02:05:56 that involve what did that involve on the night so that would have been calling out the particular departments that might be involved so in this instance um
02:06:07 might be involved so in this instance um calling out housing uh first so clearly following the DAT fire and all those principles there this is a TMO property so I knew
02:06:18 there this is a TMO property so I knew did I know that TMO were already there I can't
02:06:22 can't remember um but certainly I called Laura Johnson from the CMP Annex one the housing list she was the first at the top of the list um so she took that call um and so that she would then take
02:06:34 um and so that she would then take responsibility for calling out any Housing Services and chair moas at that particular point there okay now if you go to your statement please your first statement page 14 paragraph 52 you tell
02:06:49 statement page 14 paragraph 52 you tell us that at 250 you call at Priestley because he was your manager and a council silver and You' just confirmed that and you say that you say at this point we still didn't appreciate the scale of the incident so is it right
02:07:01 scale of the incident so is it right that you didn't know that at this stage it was a major incident or had been declared as a major incident at least by the
02:07:07 the MPS I don't think I was aware of a declaration but I think I would mentally I would have accepted it was a major incident from word go because it was it
02:07:20 incident from word go because it was it was described to me the number of people that Nick Leon said on his first call I was aware at that point this was a serious incident but I wasn't aware of just exactly what was going on at that point now is it right that the position
02:07:33 point now is it right that the position with Stuart Priestley was left on the basis that he would operate the backck from home and would monitor it until further information was available uh no I was still the back from home
02:07:44 I was still the back from home monitoring and dealing with it um at that point I'd let him know and we'd had a conversation as I think I relate there but he hadn't taken on coun silver at that point I was still that combined silver Beck roll at
02:07:57 still that combined silver Beck roll at that point I see um let's so there may be a confusion about at what point that happened can we go back to your log please rbk30
02:08:17 13318 and this is not the manuscript version this is a that's Stuart priestley's log that's um yes that's Stuart priestley's log quite right this is it's his exhibit and if
02:08:28 right this is it's his exhibit and if you go to 310 phone call from David kery to inform me of a fire at Grenville Tower Lelo dispatched to the scene unclear as to the scale at this point DK operating as backck from home agreed to
02:08:40 operating as backck from home agreed to monitor until further information available so I think you're right it was you operating from Beck at this point until further information yes yes
02:08:59 um so did you know about the scale of the incident on the first call from Nicholas Leighton or or later when he rang you and told you that there were fatalities and and that the top of the
02:09:10 fatalities and and that the top of the building was on fire oh that was later I think when he had been there as leelo the first call was a fire and a tower block it sounds a bit serious but um you know I I didn't think I I wasn't aware
02:09:22 know I I didn't think I I wasn't aware of what it was becoming right was it the position that you initially under underestimated the scale of the emergency response
02:09:30 required I think from the information I had I made the response that I thought appropriate so so so yes is the answer but in good faith I made the response that I thought was appropriate at that
02:09:43 that I thought was appropriate at that time at that stage did you think that the backck in the town hall Town Hall should have been opened and staffed in accordance with the MP flowchart I had a difficulty around this
02:09:54 flowchart I had a difficulty around this one I've had a difficulty ever since in trying to work through that out um I was conscious that it was very early on in the incident and we had not a great deal of information and I was
02:10:05 of information and I was cons aware of that time you know 3:00 in the morning type of thing I think I should have called a Beck
02:10:17 Beck earlier I don't think it might would have made that much of a difference but I should have called Bea earlier I was conscious that there was going to people were going to be needing to put in a long day and there's that balance do you
02:10:28 long day and there's that balance do you call out the resource you've got now and exhaust them early or do you wait a little bit longer and enable them to go through a full day and that was the the path I
02:10:37 path I took to this day I beat myself up as should I have done this or should I have done that or should I done the other the fact of the matter is on the information we were getting Low's on scene housing
02:10:48 we were getting Low's on scene housing on scene TMO on scene British Red Cross called out to go to rest centers the knowledge that that that that Community shelters were opening and were there but
02:11:01 shelters were opening and were there but I didn't I still I never turned the television on at
02:11:06 at home didn't occur to me to turn the TV on at home so I wasn't seeing what was going on in that
02:11:16 that respect um so I think had I seen the image
02:11:21 image I would have taken more action earlier but from the information I was getting you know we've got a fire we've got an evacuation There Are Places there are people at the scene and then we're dealing with
02:11:32 dealing with that and it then started rapidly getting more information and it was like you know and and and we're there but now let's just try to work it out
02:11:43 but now let's just try to work it out from the documents can we start with project Athena which I think is the code name given to the interview process that you and others went through in uh March well the early part of 2018 after the
02:11:57 well the early part of 2018 after the fire yes yes now um if we go to rbk30 28996 this is the first page of the interview
02:12:11 record uh yes on the 2nd of March 2018 and you are in attendance uh with Council and um others well and other uh and you can
02:12:24 um others well and other uh and you can see the list of acronyms and if we go to page five in it please if if you look at page five fifth paragraph down you say or it it
02:12:36 down you say or it it says
02:12:40 uh this is after the discussion of
02:12:46 leelo uh you say in the third line after the reference to 2:50 a.m. he said we didn't have second line sorry I didn't have much information at that time except that there was a major fire
02:12:57 time except that there was a major fire at grenfell we not aware of the scale at this point we had had fires and tire blocks before and they had been contained at this point we were still dealing with it in the normal way his response was that he would inform the
02:13:09 response was that he would inform the ward counselors as a matter of courtesy but said he would call them at 6:00 a.m. was too late to call then the scale was not known at this point had it been known we would have been on the phone to
02:13:20 known we would have been on the phone to all sorts of people at at that point and would that have meant activating the Beck at the Town Hall at that point right now were you aware that Stuart Priestley was trying to contact you
02:13:31 Priestley was trying to contact you shortly after you first spoke at 250 did you know that no on the phone a lot if we go to your log sorry the um if we go to your log at
02:13:42 log sorry the um if we go to your log at rbk30
02:13:46 13926 we can see that at
02:13:52 3:31 oh that's not
02:13:59 right no I'm afraid there's a Mis reference there
02:14:08 um um do you
02:14:12 um do you recall that he called you at 330 um I'm happy to accept that from you certainly he called me at some point um I'm happy to accept that Mr did you want
02:14:23 I'm happy to accept that Mr did you want the notebook yes that that's it it's come up you've got it uh yes well um the one on the screen is is not Mr Ker's
02:14:34 one on the screen is is not Mr Ker's notebook no this is Mr priestley's notebook that's what you want that that is that's what I've got my help it's not actually what I want no not if you want Mr Ker's notebook it may be at rvk
02:14:49 Mr Ker's notebook it may be at rvk 60425 uh
02:14:51 60425 uh um I it it may be but it may not be because there are three versions of that document uh and I'm I'm only trying to help I know um and it's very helpful um do you remember when it was as CH
02:15:02 do you remember when it was as CH Priestley confirmed that he would go to the town
02:15:06 the town hall oh I can't remember off the top of my head if I look at the log I can certainly confirm what I note um well I left home at 5:30 so he must it must have
02:15:18 it must have been before 4:00 I'm guessing now I I really sorry I'm sorry Mr M I need to see the log for for the precise timing no it's my fault for being um
02:15:29 being um um um closed-minded and not accepting the Chairman's invitation let's let's do what the chairman suggested and go to rbk30
02:15:37 rbk30 60425 see we see if we can find what I'm looking
02:15:43 for this is your notepad now um if we scroll down please to page two
02:15:52 uh we
02:15:56 can
02:16:00 uh a second yes sorry page five is what we're after page five top of page five there is a there is a a type version of this there's a transcribed version of
02:16:11 this there's a transcribed version of this which is what I think I was after but I'm grateful to the chairman for reminding me that this is probably a good source at the very top of the screen it says a331 Stuart Priestly calls and can you read the rest to
02:16:26 us um call that might be press counselors and Tony redpath I'm not entirely sure what the f call Press by the look of it
02:16:38 what the f call Press by the look of it counselors CLS Tony redpath I think that he was telling me he he would call right um if we could find my my my my typ up
02:16:49 um if we could find my my my my typ up one I think I was better able to read my own handwriting then than I am now right if you give me a second I can I think I can do that
02:17:00 um if you go then let's try rbk30 is 13296 I think was what I was after in the first place 1
02:17:16 13296 thank you and that's I think the document you were after and I was after and if we go to the foot of page one you can see the call at 301 from Lelo uh and
02:17:27 can see the call at 301 from Lelo uh and it says there now emergency services RVP you see that yes in bore Street bodies were being taken to Kensington Ledger Center the top half of the building was on fire was it at this
02:17:40 building was on fire was it at this point that you realized that the backck needed to be opened at the Town
02:17:45 Hall
02:17:49 I I can't recall call whether I had that thought of that thought or not may I look at my next log yes exactly if we turn the page then to
02:18:00 turn the page then to um page two we can see the information and events as they follow down you've got the the call to Belushi uh you've got the the call to
02:18:11 Belushi uh you've got the the call to the Red Cross 314 319 Nick Holgate telephones you briefing given and then at 3:31 telephone call from Stuart Priestley asked if I contacted the council press officer I had not I think
02:18:23 council press officer I had not I think at that point to ask you to answer the question you asked me a moment ago was it at that point that I appreciated the scale of it and and CAU out the back not at that particular point I think it's on the following page that that I got to
02:18:35 the following page that that I got to that point I see I see do do you remember where the Stuart Priestley told you on that call that he would would get ready to go into the town hall no he called me when he I think went to tell
02:18:48 called me when he I think went to tell me he was in a cab on his way but um he did didn't say anything about coming to the town hall at that particular time not that I recall now we've seen the reference to Tony redpath in your manuscript uh a and also indeed in this
02:19:04 document um but certainly in the manuscript what was his role at this stage he was of course director of local strategy but what was his role at this stage of the
02:19:15 what was his role at this stage of the night at that stage of the night um we're looking as far as um my log number nine at that point he Stuart was about to call him so I suspect at that point
02:19:26 to call him so I suspect at that point he would have been unaware of it and he had no role as such at that point because he hadn't yet been called out what was his role generally in an emergency such as this in an emergency
02:19:37 emergency such as this in an emergency such as
02:19:39 such as this he I would have expect Tony redpath to be a strategic advisor to gold or possibly a council silver if we needed him as a council silver and who was
02:19:50 him as a council silver and who was responsible for contacting
02:19:55 him I think we can see that Stuart said that he would call Tony at that point I think we were diving up the work between us now the contingency management plan at page 37 and take this from from
02:20:07 plan at page 37 and take this from from me uh refers to the facility to text alert Council emergency responders and partners you remember that yes um I'm I'm kind of remembering
02:20:20 that yes um I'm I'm kind of remembering that there was that the Press office had that
02:20:23 that facility right um let's just let's go to it then I don't want to have any doubt rbk 4 4396 page 37 under
02:20:39 communication ah you see that and Communications text alert to cancel emergency responders and partners and other teams as you can see
02:20:50 partners and other teams as you can see there mhm was that facility the texting facility used to inform Beck volunteers no why
02:21:02 not I
02:21:07 don't I certainly I I didn't use a text alert system to deal with that uh why not I think under the circumstances it would have taken far too long to actually put it together because this
02:21:19 actually put it together because this wasn't something which was ready go and press this would be enter numbers into a system and then send that it was part of the council's Comm system I can't remember the precise details of it but certainly it wouldn't have occurred to
02:21:30 certainly it wouldn't have occurred to me at the particular point I was at in dealing with that to take the time to use that text alert system could you not preset the text with all the the numbers prefixed in it and then just send out
02:21:42 prefixed in it and then just send out like a text burst send out a a text alert to all people on the list at once with one single text I absolutely can't tell you what that was I can't remember
02:21:53 tell you what that was I can't remember it this pass of time I dare say somebody the B might be able to recollect what system we have I can't remember the detail of that now um in relation to when you first contacted staff who could
02:22:05 when you first contacted staff who could have assisted with the operation of the Beck um I wonder if you can help us confirm um if you go to rbk 30 13296 your emergency log typed
02:22:16 your emergency log typed version uh at entry 17
02:22:25 rbk30 13296 um on page four entry 17 I Tel it say
02:22:32 say 0409 um I telephoned Keith robbin's contingency planning officer to get him involve no answer uh was that your first call to him
02:22:43 him yes now you'd known about this incident for almost two hours hadn't you yes why had you not called him earlier
02:23:11 I can't remember whether he was on leave that day or booked for the next I something lurking in the back of my mind that he might have been away he lived in the burrow so therefore at
02:23:23 he lived in the burrow so therefore at that time it was worth giving it a go to see whether he was home
02:23:29 home um I'm you'll have to forgive me I'm struggling with the detail of that memory now let's go to a different
02:23:38 document uh sorry same document different page page five entry number
02:23:46 23 um this isn't in your manuscript log but here it is in this document uh entry 23 at
02:23:55 23 at 4:13 you left a message for elain chamary who I think is this right was a trained Beck supervisor she's in our list as a Beck supervisor but I've recently been told
02:24:07 supervisor but I've recently been told by our side that um she has pointed out she wasn't trained as a Beck supervisor she was trained as a Beck officer but she was on our list as a Beck supervisor right and you called her left a message
02:24:21 right and you called her left a message and she called you back at 449 as you can see under the same entry yes yes she asked and agreed to attend the Beck in the town hall to support Stuart Priestly yes yes and again why so late why call
02:24:32 yes yes and again why so late why call her so late two hours after the incident had come to your attention by this time I'm realizing it's much more serious than I'd originally thought and it's
02:24:43 than I'd originally thought and it's like right let's now start getting this kicked
02:24:46 kicked off um get some I think when Stuart said or whatever time it was that he was going to the to to to to to the town hall it was right let's get somebody in now to join him and then they can start
02:24:58 now to join him and then they can start activating the hole of the back to meet whatever the needs might be and if you turn to page seven you can see under entry number 29 at 0523 I telephoned Rebecca
02:25:09 0523 I telephoned Rebecca Blackburn yes rbkc contingency planning officer and advised her of the incident uh and uh you
02:25:21 and uh you say under action stroke response stroke outcome I asked Rebecca Blackburn to attend the bur emergency con um control center at Kensington Town Hall at 8:00 to take over from me yes yes why did you
02:25:33 to take over from me yes yes why did you not contact her until 5:23 almost well 3 hours after the incident had come to your attention because I didn't need her at that time I knew I would need her in
02:25:45 at that time I knew I would need her in the daytime Rebecca lived in Kent and I knew that I would be expired by early you know the start of
02:25:57 expired by early you know the start of the morning you know I'd be up the entire previous day I'd had two hours in bed before I got called out and I was working at this absolute common sense says I'm going to crash at some point and I need an emergency planner in the
02:26:08 and I need an emergency planner in the back so therefore I specifically waited until calling her at that time and I asked her to come in at 8:00 I think she actually got in at 7 uh but I purposely
02:26:19 actually got in at 7 uh but I purposely wanted that Resort to be there for the rest of that day because I knew that I would get to a point you know at some some point in the morning where I would have to
02:26:29 have to finish if we go please to your first statement at page 17 paragraph
02:26:44 78 that's rbk 30 33579 page 17 paragraph 78 you say there I made the I made a decision not to call everyone
02:26:56 made a decision not to call everyone into the Town Hall in the early hours of the morning as I knew people were going to have to do a very long full on day at work and I thought it was best if as many people as possible were well rested for that I called all of the people who
02:27:07 for that I called all of the people who I felt needed to be called at the time that's correct is it yes and I think you told the project into Athena interviewer when you were interviewed in March 2018 that there was there was Prof Prof
02:27:20 that there was there was Prof Prof criticism of that on the day yes there were all sorts of people in the council saying why didn't you call me I would have come right well they would have done but at 3:00 4:00 in the morning at
02:27:31 done but at 3:00 4:00 in the morning at that point we wouldn't have been able to deploy them effectively and if they had come in at that point well they'd have been finished by lunchtime and in common
02:27:42 finished by lunchtime and in common sense by then was saying we need who we can get to do a sustained day's work so that there comes a point where you have to make some decisions based on other people's experiences and you hear in
02:27:54 people's experiences and you hear in training and lectures of other people's disasters that everybody rushes straight out at the word go and then it all collapses because there aren't people to sustain it later on and that's something I had in my mind um and it was like you
02:28:08 I had in my mind um and it was like you know you need to be able to use the resource you've got my project Athena response reflected the torment I've had ever since
02:28:20 the torment I've had ever since backwards and forwards and backwards and forwards as did I do the right thing the wrong thing the right thing the wrong thing and as soon as I tell myself you should have called them all out into hell with it I then rationalize it around and say yeah but that would have done exactly what you wanted to avoid
02:28:32 done exactly what you wanted to avoid doing and then you get around to oh God when you realized eventually just how phenomenally awful this was it was like human nature is you should have got everybody out and then you come around and say yes but hang on a minute that's
02:28:45 and say yes but hang on a minute that's the decision I made at the day I have to stand by that decision uh I had a reason for making that decision and the decision I took was to
02:28:57 decision and the decision I took was to try and
02:28:58 try and think that this is not the typical emergency that was going to be over by lunchtime because clearly by that point even I knew that it wasn't going to be that um and it's you know what would we
02:29:10 that um and it's you know what would we have done with loads of people at 3:00 or 3:30 in the morning frankly we would have wasted that resource because we wouldn't have been able to Target it we didn't know enough
02:29:21 able to Target it we didn't know enough at that particular point but I did know enough that this is starting to develop that you know we need people in during the day my emergency planning resource because I was pretty sure that Keith wasn't going to be around was Rebecca
02:29:33 wasn't going to be around was Rebecca Blackburn I needed her to do the day because I knew I wasn't going to be there so she needed to replace
02:29:45 me and do do you agree that as a result of that approach there was a delay in setting up the back and indeed in ascertaining the locations of rest centers and supporting
02:29:57 centers and supporting them a bit but not catastrophically so you know we were getting information as it came through this was an incredibly fast moving event on the ground because
02:30:08 fast moving event on the ground because clearly community centers were opening wonderfully and dealing with that that's the experience around the UK in any disaster community centers are the first to get open long before anybody else that does we were getting information
02:30:21 that does we were getting information and they were going British Red Cross were on their way we redeployed them to where we thought they were going to go yes if we had a fullback we might have had more information being noted down
02:30:32 had more information being noted down perhaps but I think it was moving so fast that we would probably have been tail chasing anyway we'll never know that because I didn't call out the Beck that
02:30:43 that earlier um but and I can't say any more than that I did what I did right or wrong yeah thank you very much Mr chairman is now a convenient moment yes it is thank
02:30:54 now a convenient moment yes it is thank you Mr milet well we call a halt at that point for the day Mr Kerry I'm afraid we've got to ask you to come back tomorrow for some more questions but I think you're expecting that yes yes so
02:31:05 think you're expecting that yes yes so um we'll resume please at 10:00 tomorrow and uh overnight please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything relating to it all right thank you thank you very much would you go to the Usher please
02:31:28 thank you Mr milet we'll res you at 10:00 tomorrow thank you Mr chairman