Grenfell Tower Inquiry - Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Evidence - Wednesday 27th April 2022 (1/2)
00:00:32 good morning everyone welcome to today's hearing
00:00:35 hearing today we're going to continue hanging evidence from mr david kerry formerly of rbkc so i'm going to ask mr kerry to come back in please
00:00:51 good morning good morning mr kerry i'm sorry do sit down make yourself comfortable thank you and ready to carry on i hope thank you yes good thank you very much
00:01:02 thank you yes good thank you very much yes yes thank you mr chairman good morning good morning members of the panel mr carrie good morning to you um may i take a step halfway back to something that we discussed together you
00:01:13 something that we discussed together you and i yesterday about the minimum standards for london in 2016
00:01:18 in 2016 under the topic of the voluntary sector and i asked you why there was no documented strategy in place for community resilience detailing a program of ultimate agency collaborative work with emergency
00:01:29 collaborative work with emergency responders and i was asking you that for our purposes reference reference wise at 264 page 156 line 19. now your answer and i'll quote it to you but if you need
00:01:40 and i'll quote it to you but if you need to see it in the transcript we can look at it
00:01:43 at it was it
00:01:43 was it page one five seven day two six four one five seven thirteen to eighteen and what you said was i think that was something yet to be got to so the best answer i can give you i think that was something
00:01:55 can give you i think that was something yet to be got to at that time do you recall giving that evidence i think so yeah yes
00:02:00 yeah yes and what you did then was to go on to describe unsuccessful efforts to engage buy-in with certain community partners and you named the diocese church of england uh and keith robbins going to the
00:02:11 uh and keith robbins going to the catholic equivalent and that the outcome was only promises to assist if need if if need be yes have i summarized your evidence accurately do you think yes now first question
00:02:23 now first question as a result of all of that is is did you approach other faith groups for example the almana cultural center
00:02:31 we keith certainly visited and approached that center in terms of getting them um successfully on board as a potential emergency rest center and a good relationship there
00:02:42 good relationship there in terms of the community engagement plan type of engagement we i don't think we met them specifically on that what we had been to both keith and i was to a meeting of the
00:02:54 both keith and i was to a meeting of the borough multi-faiths forum at which all of those faiths were represented where we presented and talked about community resilience and engagement what have you
00:03:06 resilience and engagement what have you my recollection of that meeting is that we came out of there with no real sense of of wanting to follow on in any concrete terms but i
00:03:17 follow on in any concrete terms but i believe
00:03:19 believe that keith then did actually go and speak to some of those individual organizations and i think that was my reference to people saying you know well we're small we can't engage i i can't recall whether that included that
00:03:30 can't recall whether that included that discussion with the center probably not but certainly the the successful relationship with the center was in terms of their willingness to be an emergency rest center when was
00:03:42 to be an emergency rest center when was the meeting you've just referred to oh i'm sorry i can't recall that um it was held in the mayor's parlor there were about 50 odd people there
00:03:56 it wasn't the year before the fire i it was i'm sorry it was some time before very well it was some time before did you engage with the various non-faith community organizations such as the rugby portobello trust uh or the clement
00:04:09 rugby portobello trust uh or the clement james center i think dynamically only in respect as being potentially for rest centers and their role in supporting us as a rest center so the engagements there was very much our request and they're saying yes they
00:04:20 our request and they're saying yes they would be happy and getting their contact details for call outs for rest center purposes but i don't think it was in terms of any defined community resilience plan did you ever have a plan
00:04:32 resilience plan did you ever have a plan a fixed plan as to how systematically you would engage with a range of community groups both secular and faith and resident groups for that matter no we didn't have a fixed plan for that do you accept that
00:04:44 a fixed plan for that do you accept that there was a failure to involve local groups who might be more likely to understand the local community
00:04:52 well in the sheer black and white of the statement i would say we didn't have that strategy but i think life is not quite as clear-cut as that and i think i have described you know the fact that we
00:05:03 have described you know the fact that we were aware of the value we did make some attempts over quite some time um i'm quite sure our experience was no difference to an awful lot of local authorities around the uk and i can say
00:05:15 authorities around the uk and i can say that because i've chatted to some other local authorities at various events about the difficulties of community resilience so the strict answer is no we didn't have that engagement plan
00:05:26 no we didn't have that engagement plan but i would invite you to consider that it's not quite as simple as that statement
00:05:31 statement right
00:05:33 right and can i just show you something and see if you agree with it um cfv
00:05:43 66050 please
00:05:47 and what i'm showing you here is a statement from andrew langford about who's from cruz cruz bereavement care
00:05:58 cruz bereavement care and if you go please to page five in this document this is his inquiry statement page five um look please at paragraph 24
00:06:09 um look please at paragraph 24 under the heading 13b your observations on the official response between 14th june and 20th june 2017. he says
00:06:17 he says the early coordination meetings on the 15th 16th and 17th of june 2017 seemed to demonstrate that there was an unsureness on the part of the local authority as to what the official voluntary sector partners and wider and
00:06:29 voluntary sector partners and wider and the wider community could offer in terms of support this was clearer later in the proceedings as the mutual aid and coordination from central government commenced which was extremely beneficial however a clear understanding of what
00:06:41 however a clear understanding of what the voluntary sector could offer at an earlier stage by the local authority would have in cruz's view hastened further support to people affected by the incident
00:06:52 affected by the incident uh and then he goes on to say um
00:06:57 uh he goes on to say a little bit later in his statement uh
00:07:06 that um there needed to be more of an understanding about how the voluntary sector could be utilized in order to assist the relief effort but just on what i've shown you would you agree with what he says there
00:07:19 would you agree with what he says there i would agree with that statement as as has been made but cruz was one of the organizations locally that keith robbins had visited as part of that attempt to engage pre-emergency
00:07:30 pre-emergency and my recollection is that was one of the organizations that said we'd be delighted to assist if we can but we're a small organization we're not really here during the daytime and he came away
00:07:41 here during the daytime and he came away without
00:07:42 without any sort of dynamic working relationship on that we have the contact numbers for it yes the statement as written there yes that that statement is correct but again i think there is context here
00:07:54 again i think there is context here and if you go to page eight in this same statement please and look please paragraph
00:07:59 paragraph 35.
00:08:04 he says that as i said to you it was very much left to cruise to initiate how he could be involved and this had to be driven by crews to a great extent there needed to be more of an understanding about how the voluntary
00:08:15 an understanding about how the voluntary sector could be utilized in order to assist the relief effort this would include voluntary sector organizations officially involved as well as those smaller groups in the local community that were assisting people anyway as part of their work in that community
00:08:27 part of their work in that community would you agree with that yes
00:08:30 yes i would get back to the context i gave earlier but yes there's a statement that's a correct statement yes and then if you turn the page to page nine um he identifies
00:08:42 um he identifies uh so far as he's concerned the adequacy of the response and lessons learnt from it
00:08:47 it uh and
00:08:49 uh and uh he says at 39 in particular let's pick it up at 38. there needs to be there needs to be further clarity as to what the voluntary sector can offer in the wake of a major incident this is
00:09:01 in the wake of a major incident this is specifically in relation to what formal voluntary sector partners can offer um when they can best add value a dry run or two of different major incidents may well assist in understanding this
00:09:13 well assist in understanding this and then he says paragraph 39 further understanding about how local authorities can engage local community groups and resources will be useful there was much capacity to support people affected through local community
00:09:24 people affected through local community groups however there seemed to be no links between the local authority and those community groups in the north kensington area just post incident it would have been beneficial for there to be a protocol or mutual agreement in
00:09:36 be a protocol or mutual agreement in place between community organizations to support
00:09:39 support should there be such an event now clearly this is his opinion based on the experiences he had but would you share his opinion in those two paragraphs
00:09:51 his opinion in those two paragraphs that he's expressed yes i would share that opinion and i think that would be if an outcome one of the many outcomes for this inquiry could be that local authorities concentrate on this engagement and if
00:10:02 concentrate on this engagement and if local organizations are aware of that that would be a terrific outcome and would you agree with what rbkc have said in their opening that a greater level of pre-fire liaison would have
00:10:13 level of pre-fire liaison would have meant that the council was better placed to coordinate and direct local community organizations when they were most needed yes indeed that would have been the case thank you now i'm going to come back to
00:10:25 thank you now i'm going to come back to the question of rest centers um very shortly but before i do can we then turn to the ev the events of the night and the opening of the beck after your 331 call with mr priestley
00:10:37 after your 331 call with mr priestley and you spoke to him again i think if we go to rbk three zeroes one three two nine six
00:10:53 uh and if we go please uh to entry 25 which we will find on page five at the very bottom of the page at 4 52 a.m you called stuart priestley
00:11:05 at 4 52 a.m you called stuart priestley and there was an update he was on his way to the kensington town hall um now
00:11:10 um now first of all can you confirm that yes yes now he's exhibited an email he sent to you which tells you that he was in a cab we don't need to look at it but he provides specific times in his statement
00:11:21 provides specific times in his statement for when he left home and then arrived at the town hall he says he arrived at the town hall at 0-4 38 according to his his his statement um do you think that that might be right in that your log might be wrong
00:11:34 in that your log might be wrong [Music]
00:11:36 [Music] i can only say that um i'm assuming because i've got a precise time i can only assume that's what i wrote in my my notebook i can say i can't say whether that was
00:11:47 i can say i can't say whether that was correct or incorrect now after this amount of time but that would have been the notes that i had if his time says something else i'm entirely happy to accept that he thinks that was the time
00:11:59 accept that he thinks that was the time you know i can't say other than that i'm afraid can i just ask you in that connection what was the source material from which you compiled the emergency event log sheet it was my notebooks that you have and my memory as such as it was
00:12:12 you have and my memory as such as it was right i see no other documents no right in your first statement and again we don't need to go to it at page 17 paragraph 77 you say that at 0.535 you left for the town hall in kensington
00:12:25 you left for the town hall in kensington and arrived there at 0 5 50. is that right yes
00:12:28 right yes and you also say that at that point a number of people were there already is that right yes uh can you remember who they were
00:12:36 they were uh from emory stewart priestley elaine chumnery and stuart
00:12:44 i'm trying to think what's laura johnson there
00:12:48 there can i see my log please for that because i think i may have noted down uh [Music]
00:12:55 [Music] well which log this the log we're looking at the next page perhaps you can uh but i'm not sure which page i'm not sure but yeah let's try page seven and see if that helps
00:13:08 oh 5 35 i got to i got to a guy left home got a taxi to kensington town hall and then in the action response column you see i arrived and so i can see a list of the four people i've just
00:13:19 list of the four people i've just mentioned um was the beck up and running at that point
00:13:29 as a fully functioning back with everything fired up and and thing no not at that point at this point it um some computers were on some people were answering phones
00:13:40 some people were answering phones information was starting to be gathered and people were having a discussion about the events and where they were going it wasn't a fully staffed beck it wasn't fully fired up in that respect so
00:13:51 wasn't fully fired up in that respect so it was in in the process of transitioning into the back i see can we just clarify this through stuart priestley's statement because he was there as we see from this document can we go please to rbk3035672
00:14:07 that's the first page and if we please if we can go please to page five in it paragraph 22
00:14:14 he says when i arrived at the town hall i was initially delayed by the town hall security systems uh in accessing the first floor where my laptop was located and then the holland
00:14:25 laptop was located and then the holland room in the basement the night watch officer assisted with access the holland room is a regular meeting room which can be which can be configured into a back there is a portion of the desk which rises to make beck phones and computers
00:14:37 rises to make beck phones and computers available to enable this and to access other items such as paper versions of the emergency plans or needed access to a locked cupboard the key was locked at reception but i found it to be lost after some time trying to locate it this
00:14:49 after some time trying to locate it this led to delay in setting up the room and configuring the dedicated bet computers at 5 25 am i emailed david kerry to say that we could not open the cupboard and asking him to come to the town hall
00:15:02 asking him to come to the town hall um
00:15:04 um now clearly you were not with him at that time but so far as you can tell us do you agree or disagree with what he says there he told me that experience about the lost cupboard
00:15:15 about the lost cupboard later on when i got there so i can agree with what he's saying in fact he did more i think can we go to rbk three zeros three five six six one
00:15:26 this is an email from him to you at 05 25
00:15:30 25 with no text in it other than the subject line can you come pdq we cannot get into the cupboards
00:15:39 cupboards now presumably you were on your way were you at that stage or had not quite let i think you hadn't left in fact had you if i hadn't quite left i was presumably that point of getting everything together to leave
00:15:51 getting everything together to leave right
00:15:53 uh okay and um is it it's right is it that he couldn't find the key but you had it
00:15:59 had it so i had a key and so did my staff a key for use by other people in the back for security purposes we had i had arranged with our 24 hour staffed
00:16:12 i had arranged with our 24 hour staffed reception desk known as civic reception quite some time previously when we acquired this equipment um the key
00:16:23 um the key in an envelope with instructions on to be kept securely by them to be signed out to people on receipt of their security badge should there be need to open the back that was not untypical for key holding
00:16:34 that was not untypical for key holding for various parts other departments had arrangements with security for that so the idea was rather than having loads of people with keys and not those people being there on the night when you needed them the key was
00:16:45 night when you needed them the key was at security securely held and could be signed out apparently it could not be found the key wasn't there
00:16:56 the key wasn't there so that delayed [Music]
00:16:59 [Music] as a result of that afterwards we got a key box which we glued to the outside of the cupboard with a keypad number on system
00:17:08 system so that all of the resilience people would know the keypad number and that therefore there would not be this risk of another part losing a key again so with the best efforts we could put in
00:17:20 so with the best efforts we could put in what we thought was a secure system of making a key available whenever it was needed to the right people there was a failure in that system because at some point that key had disappeared and the security officer couldn't find it
00:17:31 couldn't find it but you had a spare i had a key and my staff had keys right um for daily use you know because we would be in and out at times you know putting stuff updating things or what have you did stuart
00:17:42 things or what have you did stuart priestly not have a key given that he was your line manager no not at that time because we had we thought the secure and appropriate method should he have needed it or anybody else needed
00:17:53 have needed it or anybody else needed out of hours did you ever get to the bottom of why this supposedly robust system for making sure that the key was there when needed failed on the night no the answer was just simply nobody could find it nobody knew why it wasn't there
00:18:05 find it nobody knew why it wasn't there but i mean that's most people regard that as hopeless i can only tell you we put in what we thought was the appropriate security system with the security staff and i can only tell you that very unfortunately
00:18:17 only tell you that very unfortunately that key was not there at the time it was needed was it possible for you to set up the beck remotely from home at that point no we were sorry i beg your pardon
00:18:29 we were sorry i beg your pardon do you mean the physical back in the town hall could i set that up remotely from home yes no i couldn't do that so what needed to be there physically to do that right and what was it in the cupboards that was so critical
00:18:41 was so critical for which the key was required so if i may describe the beck there was a large what you would look at and see that of our large boardroom style table in the center of that was a
00:18:52 style table in the center of that was a portion that would rise up within that bit rising up were the screens the keyboards and the mice of the computers that
00:19:02 that were the bec computers in the cupboard were the devices to raise electronically the the part of that thing to bring the the computers up
00:19:13 the computers up so they couldn't get to the computers without getting into the cupboard
00:19:18 right there's simply physical access to mechanical hardware yeah
00:19:25 yeah um were you aware as the bec was being set up that there were i.t issues with some of the beck systems that prevented people logging on no you weren't aware of that um
00:19:36 um are you aware of something called the vims or vims or i think it's called vanessa's information management system by that time it was the ios i think the information logging system um it's um
00:19:49 information logging system um it's um [Music]
00:19:51 [Music] that yes that was our i've described earlier our logging system on microsoft sharepoint and um that that was the name of it the information logging system previously yeah vims vanessa's
00:20:03 previously yeah vims vanessa's information management system it was a nod to the extraordinary work that one of our temporary colleagues somehow previously had done in devising the system for me she interpreted what i wanted and did it we called it an
00:20:14 wanted and did it we called it an information management system we laid to change that because actually it wasn't managing information it was logging information and of course after vanessa had gone it was rather silly to keep that name it was a sort of a nod to
00:20:25 keep that name it was a sort of a nod to vanessa's extraordinary work but that was rather time expired so it's these days as the ins information logging system which i think is much more descriptive of what it is but it was that microsoft sharepoint system that i
00:20:36 that microsoft sharepoint system that i described yesterday right
00:20:40 right now let me just show you what rebecca blackburn says in her statement rbk3058170
00:20:46 page 14 paragraph 9.9
00:20:53 that's rbk3058170 there it is paragraph 9.9 she says firstly there was a delay in access to the bec computers which caused a backlog this meant that it was not until
00:21:05 backlog this meant that it was not until 300 hours that a back officer lorna platt became available to open the beck log
00:21:10 log did you know about that no
00:21:13 no because i had opened a backlog before i left that morning so before i left that morning the computer systems were up and they were working i went into the ils system and created a back log so it was
00:21:26 system and created a back log so it was open i didn't do anything within that but i had opened that for the team to use
00:21:30 use and at that point i think i was left and called away to other meetings and then left
00:21:35 left [Music]
00:21:37 [Music] at 1300 it appears that lorna platt then went in and created another log so if you look at the system you'll see my earlier reference with nothing in it
00:21:48 my earlier reference with nothing in it you will then see around about 1300 1303 i think it was that lorna created that second log and that got populated from there on in right can you explain what d do you know whether from your own recollection what
00:22:00 whether from your own recollection what uh rebecca blackburn is saying here in the first part of paragraph 9.9 is correct
00:22:07 it is correct that lorna platt opened abec log at around 1300 i
00:22:13 i i don't recognize the delay of access to the computers other than the bit of raising the table by the time i got there that table was up and there were computers open and
00:22:24 computers open and i sat at one of them at one point and created a log for their use did you tell those in the room that you had opened an ils a lot a log the backlog
00:22:37 you know i can't i don't know i may have said i might you know i just don't know i created a log for it to be used right um i was then hurried away to a meeting but it was there on the system and the
00:22:48 but it was there on the system and the computer was open and it was there
00:22:54 can you explain how how it could come about then that rebecca blackburn would would think that there was no backlog until lorna platt had to open a further one at one o'clock i don't know right look at paragraph
00:23:06 i don't know right look at paragraph nine something so before we go on can i can i just um ask your help on this when when you left having got the system up physically and electronically and having
00:23:17 physically and electronically and having created a log um who was in charge of the room so stuart priestley was there having taken over as council silver elaine chumbury was there as one of our trained beck
00:23:29 was there as one of our trained beck staff so they were the two people that um well relaying particularly familiar with the tavern systems and stewart in charge and there were also the other people there at the time but but it was stewart as council silva and elaine as
00:23:42 stewart as council silva and elaine as the as the back officer and the primary means of obtaining and transferring information and logging information would be the computers i assume would they or the
00:23:53 computers i assume would they or the telephone so at that point telephone emails coming in people writing things on notebooks or what have you the idea would be ideally you would try and then when you've done
00:24:05 you would try and then when you've done something you would make an entry in the log about that if that was something that was perfect yes and the emails would come in on the bet computers yes the bec had its own email address
00:24:17 own email address i'm just trying to understand you see how it could be that those who were in charge following your departure
00:24:24 departure didn't populate your information log and apparently well
00:24:30 well if ms black was right didn't realize you'd open one i i don't know um i do not know why there was no logs created until that's a time
00:24:43 i opened it i did leave the room at that point because i was going on to the meeting which i'm sure we'll discuss with mr holgate and others and i then i left the the the town hall without going back to the back
00:24:54 back to the back all i can say is at that particular point there was a beck there but they were the first staff there um we had got the computers up and opened and i did create a log i'm sorry
00:25:06 opened and i did create a log i'm sorry mr millet i cannot remember did i say i've opened this or not i just can't remember
00:25:12 remember um
00:25:14 um all i can tell you is what i've said and at that point i think i probably left the room
00:25:19 the room one last question then should it normally be apparent from the computer
00:25:25 computer that a log has been opened i think that on each of the individual computers the person would have had to then opened that system and then would see the log so it doesn't it
00:25:36 then would see the log so it doesn't it didn't pop up automatically on all of the computers each computer would have had to be fired up and then you would have clicked on and opened that log and you would have found the entry and you would have gone into it and opened it so
00:25:48 would have gone into it and opened it so it did require that manual getting there by people it didn't automatically pop up on the screen just because on one computer it had been opened all right thank you
00:25:57 thank you all right yes yes looking at paragraph 9.10
00:26:00 9.10 rebecca blackburn says that it wasn't possible to access the vims ils to start the log due to an i.t technical issue that prevented logging in to vims ils
00:26:11 to vims ils when the bet computers were accessible vims ils was not accessible the problem with access had to be resolved by its support did you know anything of that no
00:26:21 no because at the time i was in there i did successfully open the ils i did successfully get into it and i did successfully create a log right
00:26:31 was it possible for you to set the log up from home it would have been possible through the laptop i had and it's sim card i would have been a and i think for office 65 365 i think i would have been
00:26:43 office 65 365 i think i would have been able to do so why didn't you no time
00:26:47 no time at that point um that's why i was recording everything in a dedicated notebook for it quite simply calls in calls out i did not have the time to switch on a laptop
00:27:00 not have the time to switch on a laptop fire it up go into the systems start creating matters what have you it takes a little bit of time yes uh and we've seen that you've made some hand you've had made some handwritten notes
00:27:11 you've had made some handwritten notes starting at about 2 20.
00:27:14 20. did you hand those over to stuart priestley
00:27:17 priestley uh in the
00:27:19 uh in the um in the back when you left to go to your meetings no i carried on using the notebook um through i think i used two notebooks in over the first four days and which you have
00:27:30 and which you have so i
00:27:31 so i you know through my phone contacts with him and then speaking to him when i arrived um hand over if you like of information or knowledge at that point but i did not give him my notebooks yes
00:27:42 but i did not give him my notebooks yes do you agree that in setting up the bag and and in its first hours of operation on the morning of the 14th of june 2017 some at least
00:27:53 some at least of the shortcomings from previous training like the 2015 exercise responder exercise were repeated i can only speak in terms of what was in there up to the point that i was in there um in the mayhem of that morning
00:28:06 there um in the mayhem of that morning what i can't do is speculate about what happened after i left that room exactly but so far as you were concerned is this before you left there were no i.t problems in the back i was not aware of
00:28:17 problems in the back i was not aware of any i.t problems in the back at that time i was aware that there was beck staff in and that we were starting to use the systems i was not aware of any problems right let's go to rbk 30s 58194
00:28:30 let's go to rbk 30s 58194 this is your email two days later
00:28:37 sorry um two months before your email to tony redpath if we go to the foot of page one um
00:28:46 um 16th of may 2017 one month before forgive me from you to tony redpath tony and then over the page to page two um
00:28:56 um it
00:28:57 it uh
00:28:59 uh it says as with our ppu leadership group meeting discussion i believe that the age and increasingly limited capability of the computers in the borough emergency control center holland room freeman suite presents a corporate risk
00:29:12 freeman suite presents a corporate risk and then you explain in the next detail in the next paragraph the detail of that and you can see that for example in the third line new operating systems and software used by the council now run
00:29:24 and software used by the council now run very slowly on these machines recent training and exercises in the back have shown that this impacts on the efficiency of the beck and the machines are not able to deal with gis something we would want to use in a beck the
00:29:36 we would want to use in a beck the recent migration of email accounts to office 365 was very problematical requiring keith rebecca and isd colleagues spending a number of hours to make them work and for a couple of week we were a we were without a fully
00:29:48 we were a we were without a fully functioning bec it is necessary for a bec to have computers permanently installed there where the pc or laptop is immaterial so that they're ready for use have a back identity identity it should be and not
00:30:00 identity identity it should be and not an individual officer's identity as would be the case where beck staff to arrive with their own laptop and to ba and to map to the bec servers and files etc and then there's
00:30:11 and then there's some data in the box there and then recommendation in bold capitals the existing bet computers be replaced with machines that will fully fit in with council's current it provision
00:30:23 council's current it provision now um
00:30:25 now um and you can see i think from page one of this um email chain if we go back to that
00:30:31 that uh tony redpath responds to you um on the 19th of may copying in stuart priestley and nicholas holgate saying david thanks i mentioned this
00:30:43 saying david thanks i mentioned this issue to nicholas earlier in the week and he agreed that the computers ought to be replaced it is probably simplest to carry the cost of doing so on a suitable code in your budget i'm sure nicholas will find a way to make good any end-of-year deficit in the units
00:30:54 any end-of-year deficit in the units overall budget if that proves necessary i'm copying to kevin so he's aware and to brighty um who i think was brydie green um so it looks as if that
00:31:05 brydie green um so it looks as if that was agreed to yes
00:31:09 how long would it have taken to upgrade the i.t system that you'd recommended so
00:31:15 so having got the approval that then went to the it team the the upgrades team the order was placed um i think from memory that it used to
00:31:27 um i think from memory that it used to take about four weeks or so from ordering new i.t kit for it to come and arrive
00:31:34 arrive certainly at some point after the fire the equipment did arrive and the new laptops were all installed but
00:31:42 but so
00:31:43 so this was an order in progress at that time
00:31:47 time why had the i.t system in the bank been allowed to become so old and slow and outdated okay
00:31:56 okay old computers all slow we will all at times in the past when we've got a new laptop or a new computer realizes a little bit quicker than the old but you know
00:32:07 know from taking 60 seconds to fire up to taking 33 seconds to fire up in the scheme of things we all appreciate we've got a faster computer but it isn't actually
00:32:18 faster computer but it isn't actually earth shattering so these computers were doing their job up to that point we had got to the point where we were exploring as a team wouldn't it be great to get gis the mapping system actually in the back
00:32:30 mapping system actually in the back rather than just having to rely on somebody remotely to do that at that point we needed to get newer computers and in the scheme of things it's a good thing anyway the authority was no longer issuing fit
00:32:42 was no longer issuing fit fixed permanent computers in staff were all given individual computers laptops to carry around i didn't want staff coming in with their laptop into a control center hence my
00:32:54 laptop into a control center hence my remarks the control center needed to have its identity the computers need to stay beyond different people coming in we couldn't have people walking off with their computer at the end of their shift so we had this provision of good computers as they were
00:33:07 provision of good computers as they were at the time they were put in like anything there comes a point you need to do the changes we actions that identified that put the report in we got the funding for it and then the computers are ordered later on
00:33:19 then the computers are ordered later on those computers were installed before i left the authority we've done another revision of the computers in the scheme of things
00:33:25 of things [Music]
00:33:28 [Music] slow doesn't mean it took forever to do something it's our experience you get a new computer it's faster than the old one that doesn't mean to say the old one is that much of a problem we couldn't do
00:33:39 is that much of a problem we couldn't do the gis but we had the telephone numbers of the people to call from gis who could actually do that your ice work for us but isn't it the case that you are sending you are flagging this issue to your senior tony redpath
00:33:51 your senior tony redpath not not because it would be nice to have a quicker computer but because it was because it was affecting the functionality and efficacy of the bec if needed in an emergency because of the new systems that were now coming in so
00:34:02 new systems that were now coming in so this wasn't something that was an issue six months previously you know but so we've identified the issue and and and acted upon it
00:34:11 and what was the existing state of the existing computer stock the i.t stock a factor which contributed to the delay in setting up the back on the night i don't believe so in my experience
00:34:23 i don't believe so in my experience while i was there we were opening the stuff up and i got straight into the um and into the ils system and i created that log so my experience in the short period i was in the back was not being aware of any i.t problems
00:34:36 was not being aware of any i.t problems i can't comment on these problems because i wasn't there i was only in the back a short time that morning did rebecca blackburn not report to you that there had been i.t problems in the first hours of setting up the beck after you
00:34:47 hours of setting up the beck after you left i'm not aware of those problems so the answer has to be i believe not right um let's then turn to a different topic rest centers and the early stages in relation to the their establishment for
00:34:58 relation to the their establishment for those displaced by the fire now um
00:35:04 uh
00:35:06 we um we touched on uh the cmp yesterday and the provision of survivor reception centers
00:35:15 centers um do you i think you agree that one of the authorities uh local authorities roles and responsibilities in the immediate aftermath was the establishment of
00:35:26 aftermath was the establishment of something called survivor reception centers and friends and relative reception centers i agree those were metropolitan police responsibilities to which the authority might assist yes and so you said at page 33 lines 13 to 34
00:35:38 so you said at page 33 lines 13 to 34 line 1
00:35:40 line 1 of yesterday's evidence day 268 now i just want to see if we can clarify a number of things there first of all let's have your answer up on the screen it's day 268 page 33 line
00:35:54 on the screen it's day 268 page 33 line 13.
00:36:05 and i put to you at line 13 was it right that one of the local authorities roles and responsibilities in the immediate response was the establishment of survivor reception centers and friends and relatives reception centers and your
00:36:17 and relatives reception centers and your answer was no the responsibility for establishing those was the responsibility of the metropolitan police service the role of the authority would have been that if the met police said have you got
00:36:28 the met police said have you got anywhere where we could house one of these centers if we were able to provide either our own premises or from our rest center premises knowledge of somewhere which could be used we would do that but the responsibility for all of those
00:36:39 the responsibility for all of those centers in that particular paragraph were the lead responsibility was the metropolitan police service now i just like your i would like please your your help with the terms survivor reception center and rest center
00:36:52 reception center and rest center can we start please with the aha the huma the humanitarian assistance framework documented gaol four zeros one two five six please
00:37:14 and this is the humanitarian assistance framework document published by the lrp or under the umbrella of the lrp and if we go please to page 24 in that
00:37:25 and if we go please to page 24 in that document
00:37:26 document we can see at 8.3 what a survivor reception
00:37:31 reception center is
00:37:34 uh at
00:37:37 at 8.4 and 8.5 under overview under the heading survivor reception center it says it may be set up following a major incident
00:37:48 be set up following a major incident it can be either a predetermined venue or whatever is suitable and available depending on the location of the major incident its function is to provide survivors who do not require hospital treatment a place to be directed to where they can be met by police or and
00:38:01 where they can be met by police or and other services to obtain initial information and support in the immediate aftermath of the incident and give witness statements and evidence to police investigating officers in the early stages of an incident where those are involved those involved are
00:38:12 those are involved those involved are leaving the scene it may not be practicable to establish an src because of other more pressing primary responsibilities eg life-saving or clearing the public from danger and then there's the purpose of the reception
00:38:24 there's the purpose of the reception center then set out underneath that at 8.6 and if you go over the page please to 8.8
00:38:31 to 8.8 um it says this the src will be set up immediately at a location as near as practically possible to the incident site as determined by police tactical commander
00:38:41 commander at the time of emergency the police are responsible for opening an src supported by the local authority in accordance with the arrangements in the london emergency services liaison panel leslip manuel
00:38:53 leslip manuel an src is likely to be run initially by the police who will be first on the scene until the local authority becomes engaged in the response to provide additional support the police should deploy a documentation team to the src
00:39:05 deploy a documentation team to the src who will pass on details gathered from survivors to the central casualty bureau a police security team should also be deployed to the src
00:39:15 and then at 8.10 the police should consult the local authority on a suitable location for the centre if time allows as the local authority may have access to a suitable building where it is not possible for the local authority
00:39:27 is not possible for the local authority to provide a suitable location either within the proximity or time frame the police will have to consider other options
00:39:34 options now what contact did you have on the 14th of june 2017 uh if any with the police at the mps in relation to the opening or classification of re of those centers survivor centers
00:39:47 those centers survivor centers i not aware of any approach by the police that i received either from them or through my liaison officer so i don't recall i don't record anything for that i think
00:39:59 i don't record anything for that i think later on and i'm sure you'll come to that later on in my state in my in my um event log
00:40:06 event log i was telephoning in to various strategic or tactical coordination group meetings and there was talk then about rest centers that were opening uh i don't recall any specific requests
00:40:17 don't recall any specific requests coming to me about a survivor reception center
00:40:21 center right but but it's not the case is it that the responsibility uh
00:40:26 uh for
00:40:27 for uh set for um arrest center or this kind of center is only engaged once um there's a request made by the police
00:40:38 made by the police as per this document and as the within the london emergency services liaison panel's major treatment procedures manual all specifically states that the survivor reception center if put in
00:40:49 survivor reception center if put in place at all would be something that the metropolitan police would lead on and take responsibility for initially but then once engaged then it would be the council's responsibility if such a place had been
00:41:00 responsibility if such a place had been set up in the first place right it wouldn't be i don't have any awareness at all in my experience there was an expectation that the local authority at some point would set up a survivor reception center if the police hadn't
00:41:13 reception center if the police hadn't because by that point we would have either an emergency rest centre in place or we would be looking to community support center or there would be other centers at that time survivor reception center
00:41:25 center my belief of that from my experience was always intended to be a quite short-term place
00:41:32 place if the particular incident enabled survivors to be sent to a particular place where they were able to go and the police could do their first engagement with them that might happen in an awful lot of
00:41:44 that might happen in an awful lot of incidences survive reception centers wouldn't happen either because the circumstances of the event were such that people didn't disperse widely from the scene or because of the public safety issues so
00:41:56 because of the public safety issues so it was a tool there for the police if they had the capacity or the circumstances enabled it to happen um it wasn't for the local authority to come and do if the police hadn't but
00:42:08 come and do if the police hadn't but certainly had the police done one that would be our responsibility to to put some people into a system there were you aware of whether there was an src
00:42:20 an src set up on the 14th of june i'm not aware right one then let's turn to a separate question which is rest centers and they're covered on
00:42:31 covered on in this same part of the aha framework uh under the heading rest center 813 and it says explains what the purpose of a rest center is
00:42:43 a rest center is it's to provide immediate shelter for persons who've been evacuated from an area or otherwise in need of emergency accommodation following an incident initial light refreshments for evacuees to enable details of evacuees to be
00:42:54 to enable details of evacuees to be maintained in the center for reference to provide for the well-being of the evacuees and to officers support services and information on a wide range of welfare related subjects and provide evacuees and survivors with updated
00:43:06 evacuees and survivors with updated information about the incident and its possible effects upon them directly and then if you go to 8 15 the responsibility for the setup and running of rest centers lies with the local
00:43:17 of rest centers lies with the local authority supported by voluntary agencies who would activate arrangements as outlined in their rest center plan the decision to set up a rest center will be made by the local authority often at the request of the police or
00:43:29 often at the request of the police or fire brigade i should say
00:43:34 how would or how did you distinguish in your mind at the time between a survivor reception center and a rest center so i didn't think in terms of survivor
00:43:45 so i didn't think in terms of survivor reception centers i thought in terms of there are people being evacuated there will need to be rest centers so my focus was around the rest center part i wasn't i personally wasn't
00:43:56 part i wasn't i personally wasn't thinking of a survivor reception center why not
00:44:01 why not one they're clearly different in the in the scheme they're different in the las llp
00:44:06 llp so survivor reception center as we've established a metropolitan police lead if they
00:44:12 if they decide to do that um
00:44:15 um that is as i've said very much dependent on the scene and on what the police are dealing with and the circumstances and i think we're looking here at
00:44:28 pages that describe in nice neat terms a variety facilities it's all guidance it's all the good thing to do if you can and in some
00:44:39 thing to do if you can and in some incidences you have time to do all of them in others the circumstances compress everything so if we take if you will humor me for a moment sir if we take a a much lower key incident
00:44:52 we take a a much lower key incident where there are people affected by an incident there's an evacuation
00:45:00 it's not a huge number of people it's not going to go on for days there is time very often for an a rest center to be established over here if the police want to survive reception center for a couple of hours they may or
00:45:11 center for a couple of hours they may or may not do so usually not later on if there's going to be longer term community or humanitarian assistance center a few days later there is the time to have put that into place
00:45:22 is the time to have put that into place the scale and nature of this incident just compressed everything into one go the survivors were also the bereaved but also the community were also the evacuated and the homeless all in one go
00:45:34 evacuated and the homeless all in one go and that's actually quite rare and i think that's what caught us all out on that particular occasion if i go back to an incident in kensington before i arrived there but while i was still an emergency planner elsewhere the ladbroke grove train crash
00:45:47 elsewhere the ladbroke grove train crash i mean 31 people killed in that crash and several hundred injured but it happened on a site which was contained
00:45:55 contained most of the survivors got themselves out and came up the banks there were spontaneous community-led receptions if you like on either side the sainsbury's cafe on one side and a school sixth form center on the other
00:46:07 school sixth form center on the other nobody opened those those those spontaneously dealt with most of those people if they weren't injured then disappeared they either went to work believe it or not or they
00:46:18 went to work believe it or not or they went home back down the line to cheltenham they were not local residents so there was no formal survivor reception center because they weren't there to be fitting for it there was no
00:46:29 there to be fitting for it there was no formal emergency rest center because there was no population evacuated the assistance that was there that was provided was fairly low and the main job for the local authority i believe
00:46:40 for the local authority i believe afterwards was sort of liaising with other local authorities about sort of ensuring people could access their local services for ongoing humanitarian support so there's no humanitarian support center a vastly different set of circumstances
00:46:52 circumstances and as with all of these things incident by incident we have fantastic guidance that says in an ideal world all of the various things you can do um
00:47:03 um i don't think i'm talking now as an individual professional not as a previous employee of the borough but as somebody that's been in the profession when i look at what happened at grenfell
00:47:15 when i look at what happened at grenfell and the sheer
00:47:19 awfulness of that and the fact as i say the survivors were also the bereaved were also the evacuees were also the homeless were also the community and the impact around that of that scale
00:47:31 impact around that of that scale this is the neatness of these arrangements and we'll put this here and you'll put that there and you'll put this over here three days later on it all got compressed within that
00:47:42 all got compressed within that um and
00:47:44 um and i
00:47:45 i i think going forward my hope is that there is now recognition of london that there are the potential for this type of incident which hadn't been planned for
00:47:57 incident which hadn't been planned for to that level before i question as i did after the event and i still question today if it's still the case that the welfare support for people in this type of
00:48:09 support for people in this type of incident is dealt with initially by one local authority why do we not now have sub-regional teams trained and on-call to come in at the word go because the concept that our
00:48:21 the word go because the concept that our 133rd sliver of london's local authority resource should be expected to respond to and to manage capably that level of disaster clearly has been exposed as
00:48:32 disaster clearly has been exposed as completely ridiculous um i don't know now whether
00:48:38 whether that has been picked up in london properly i hope this inquiry will push strongly for a look and approach for that because this plan looks great it is great
00:48:50 great for a lower key incident but on the day everything was so compressed there that
00:48:59 that fantastically local venues before we could even get around to the phones were just opening up as shelters and we're providing that support but we did end up later in the day i wasn't there at the day of course but
00:49:11 wasn't there at the day of course but i'm aware that during the day at one point the survivor reception center concept seemed to be operating in the main rest center that should never happen in by the book but i think belatedly
00:49:22 but i think belatedly that sort of thing was happening um humanitarian assistance center seamlessly came in through the longer term emergency rest center there wasn't by the book this nice separation of
00:49:33 by the book this nice separation of discrete
00:49:36 discrete parts of that process and i think we do need to just understand that in the context of what happened well the reason i asked my question is because the answer you gave us yesterday was that it
00:49:49 answer you gave us yesterday was that it was the metropolitan police's responsibility to set up whatever it was that was set up what was set up were they survivor reception centers or were they rest centers and the reason i ask is because
00:50:00 centers and the reason i ask is because according to the this guidance the responsibility the initial responsibility for setting them up is is different depending on what they are yeah my
00:50:11 depending on what they are yeah my understanding is that the venues that did open up spontaneously in the community to bring people in i would look at those as emergency rest centers survivor reception center implies the
00:50:23 survivor reception center implies the police there meeting people recording information and taking information uh my understanding is that the various centers that did open were providing that shelter and support for people in
00:50:34 that shelter and support for people in need right and therefore if it was an emergency rest center it would follow that it was the local authority's responsibility at least according to this guidance at 8 15 to set it up and i'll try again and give a bit of
00:50:46 and i'll try again and give a bit of context if you'll hear me to do so the book says yes a local authority would open up a rest center where you've got time particularly if there's a pre-planned evacuation or there's a bit of time a local authority
00:50:58 there's a bit of time a local authority can come in advance first in my experience
00:51:04 it is the local community
00:51:06 community who actually open up first before the local authorities can get there because the community's on the doorstep we had that at the dare tower fire although i actually put a council established rest centre on standby in
00:51:18 established rest centre on standby in the staffing for it the community had already opened up a place and that was an appropriate and safe place for people to be
00:51:25 to be and my knowledge of the of the of of of of the grenfell tower matter is that during the course of that wednesday the 14th of june the local authority did
00:51:36 14th of june the local authority did start planning and putting into place with westway what became the definitive consolidated emergency rest center but one would never come along to community centers and simply say oh you're not the local authority you're
00:51:47 you're not the local authority you're not there you everybody must now come to here
00:51:50 here you know the community is fantastic the first responder and and and again it's the difficulty of a printed page that suggests you have the responsibility therefore did you do it
00:52:01 responsibility therefore did you do it or not
00:52:03 or not the reality is that rest centers in the community will almost certainly in most incidents be opened first by the community and the local authority will either come along and say for the small duration of a small incident that's
00:52:15 duration of a small incident that's great and fine or in a longer incident will then start organizing a more appropriate rest center for the longer term and then persuade people to come from those other
00:52:26 persuade people to come from those other community centres into the establishment when it has been established now you give me two very very long answers very rich and and detailed and interesting and thank you for that but in short do you consider based on what you've just
00:52:38 you consider based on what you've just told us that in the resilience field at the time there was confusion regarding these terms
00:52:43 terms breast center survivor and reception center and any other centers i'm not confused i don't believe my colleagues were confused we understood the survivor reception center was a center established by the police for mainly their purposes of evidence of who
00:52:56 mainly their purposes of evidence of who was around and getting information about that they might pass through onto the casualty bureau i am quite clear we were aware that an emergency rest center was not about
00:53:06 not about survivors just the survivors this was the provision of temporary shelter from the elements and the first the first parts of some humanitarian assistance at quite a low level and i'm quite aware
00:53:18 quite a low level and i'm quite aware that we're all aware that a longer term humanitarian assistance center which by the book would be in two or three days hence by the time of which the longer term humanitarian needs have been
00:53:29 term humanitarian needs have been identified and resources could be lined up from a multitude of agencies to come through
00:53:35 through now let's go to a slightly different topic or back on track perhaps with the initial deployments and if we go back to rbk3013296 this is your typed emergency
00:53:48 rbk3013296 this is your typed emergency event log sheet
00:53:59 and if we go please to um entry number five at the foot of page one
00:54:05 one uh this is your conversation with mr layton at 301 and he told you that belushi's bar which i think you've recorded as the lucius hotel um rather grandly well that's the name i was given i thought yes i can understand
00:54:17 was given i thought yes i can understand why you've written it the way you did it offered to give shelter to 100 people and the metropolitan police had two buses on site to take people to alternative accommodation
00:54:28 alternative accommodation you see that yes and also if we turn the page to entry number six on page two uh you say that i telephoned the bellucias hotel spoke to ryan tegan i
00:54:40 bellucias hotel spoke to ryan tegan i confirmed we would accept his offer of being a rest center you see that yes and then item number seven
00:54:48 seven just a little uh below that i telephoned the british red cross emergency duty officer john putner and asked for his british red cross support at the rest center at the hotel this was agreed
00:54:59 this was agreed and why did you consider it appropriate for belushi's bar to be used as a rest center given that it wasn't on the list and next to the contingency management plan as as indeed it wasn't
00:55:12 the plan with the premises that we pre-identified were a resource to call upon if they were available or appropriate but we would use anywhere appropriate as a rest center if it was immediately
00:55:24 a rest center if it was immediately available to provide that first shelter we had done that in in as i've described in other incidents we weren't fixed to we could only use the ones in the plan this hotel had made itself available and
00:55:37 this hotel had made itself available and it was immediately available and therefore it was the quickest way of actually having some premises open rather than starting to go through and starting to phone through and other people then getting key holders out and going through so it to me it was
00:55:49 going through so it to me it was absolute common sense to say thank you very much here isn't a community offer there is some transport available it's immediately available it provides those basic shelter elements and i can deploy a team to it right it was just
00:56:01 deploy a team to it right it was just common sense now it wasn't contained in annex 15 of the cmp oh no um say was it the practice that you would you would use those which were identified in the annex but also
00:56:12 identified in the annex but also anywhere that offered their support immediately um yeah we would use anywhere that might be appropriate the value of the annex because we then knew that those premises what they were and what their capacities
00:56:23 what they were and what their capacities were and their accessibility were all that type of thing meant that if we had an opportunity there was time to
00:56:32 to nominate a rest center usually before evacuees have gone anywhere then with the police we might say oh yes we'll get in touch with the whatever would ring them up and do so that's a more slower paced type of evacuation
00:56:44 more slower paced type of evacuation that's more your block being evacuated because there's been a fire in one corner and everybody else is now on the street outside and we've got a couple of hours to do that however anywhere that's appropriate on a
00:56:57 however anywhere that's appropriate on a subsequent incident that i dealt with um on the scene post the fire we had a a a fire in some housing association flats early hours of the morning around the
00:57:10 early hours of the morning around the corner was a hotel the hilton hotel in up in holland park road um that was around the corner a quick word with the manager was yes we have the the space here and that was the
00:57:23 have the the space here and that was the most appropriate place to put evacuees in right now i could have gone to the annex and we could have found somewhere you know down there you know whatever and then waited to get key holders out so common sense says if you've got somewhere which is open
00:57:35 somewhere which is open use it
00:57:36 use it this was open they were offered thank you very much now apart from the red cross volunteers uh no one actually attended belushi's bar uh and in the end it was closed yes
00:57:48 uh and in the end it was closed yes because it was too far away um
00:57:52 um the question is how come it got opened as a rest center to start with and is that as you've described simply it offered its services it offered its services
00:57:59 services i mean he wasn't that far away but i could imagine if i was a resident i wouldn't be straying terribly far either um so it was a it was there and there was some transport
00:58:10 was some transport so exactly as i described it was the sort of decision i would have made at other times and made subsequently to use what was available you also decided is this right to close it because your decision was it was my decision when i
00:58:22 decision was it was my decision when i got to information that nobody was going there and by that time i had heard that other community area centers were opening and people were at them it's like common sense again says responds to the situation that's in
00:58:34 responds to the situation that's in front of you at the time yeah now sticking with the document on the screen in front of you looking at entry 10037 telephone call from lelo nick layton following a silver meeting at the scene
00:58:44 scene and then you can see that there are fatalities and then underneath that harrow club in preston road had offered to be a rest center you see that yes um again is it right that the harrow club
00:58:55 again is it right that the harrow club had opened of its own accord not by rbkc right at this point if i can say all of the centres and the community that opened in those early hours open spontaneously i didn't call any of them
00:59:06 spontaneously i didn't call any of them because or became aware that all of these centers were opening right now
00:59:12 right now according to the brc log two minutes before 10 minutes before the this in this call
00:59:20 this call uh you contacted the british red cross and and requested volunteers and indicated the second rest center was due to be opened because of the scale of the incident yes
00:59:31 incident yes yes um
00:59:32 yes um [Applause]
00:59:37 now we know that the harrow club is a set of premises in annex 15 of the contingency management plan yes you can look at it if you like no it is it is um is it the case that there were
00:59:49 is it the case that there were agreements in place with each of the organizations identified in annex 15 to provide rest centers which included harrow club and the clement james center yeah yes and
01:00:00 the clement james center yeah yes and those were oral agreements they were they were
01:00:02 they were yes those were keith robbins visiting those premises talking to them getting the agreement doing an assessment he would do an
01:00:13 doing an assessment he would do an assessment for their suitability as to whether they would be suitable to be a rest center so that means access the amount of space are there toilets of sufficient number and things like that and then getting the
01:00:25 and then getting the names and the telephone numbers of the key holders who would agree to be called should they need it right did rbkc provide any additional support or training to enable the premises listed in nx15 to fulfill their role as rest
01:00:38 in nx15 to fulfill their role as rest centers no our view of their role was to be the premises managers to open them to be responsible for the heating and the lighting and put the urn on and we would put the british red cross staff in to do
01:00:50 put the british red cross staff in to do the staffing from the rest center part that was that was the two parts that we would have done for that place they put the urn on is that for tea oh yes you know all these places have a kitchen so um
01:01:01 all these places have a kitchen so um you know it's like the first thing you do is put the urn on and um and get the kettle boiling right okay um uh right thank you
01:01:11 so is it the case that so far as personnel training is concerned you would rely on the british red cross under the mou yes to provide trained rest center staff yes right
01:01:22 rest center staff yes right then let's turn on in time to the first scg meeting the strategy called strategic coordination group meeting at 5am uh
01:01:32 uh and i think you attended that by telephone yes and
01:01:36 and correct me it's right isn't it that the strategic coordination protocol allows for varying levels of multi-agency coordination yes and an scg meeting is the highest
01:01:47 yes and an scg meeting is the highest level yes
01:01:49 level yes um and and do you agree that to fulfill its role the core function of the scg is to create and maintain a shared situational awareness yes yes and
01:02:00 and uh
01:02:01 uh it it also i think is the case and again correct me if i'm wrong that that the maintenance of shared situational awareness can help the coordinating group get ahead in a crisis and exert greater control
01:02:13 in a crisis and exert greater control under another in an unfolding and complex situation yes that's certainly the concept now um if you tell us in your statement and i don't think that there's a need to go to it
01:02:23 go to it it's page 16 paragraph 68 that you were notified by telephone at 0.435 of the first scg meeting uh in relation to the grenfell tower
01:02:34 uh in relation to the grenfell tower fire to take place at 5am and that's on your typed log um if we go to page four could you could we just just pick that up while we go page four
01:02:44 page four uh and there it is
01:02:48 uh oh yes yes uh
01:02:52 uh at item 20 entry 20. who did you understand was required to attend the scg meeting from rbkc
01:03:14 so if we'd had by that point in the town hall gold then gold would have attended that meeting
01:03:25 meeting and
01:03:26 and hopefully silva would have listened in i think at that particular point um i can't remember i cannot remember whether i discussed that with stewart or priestly or not um obviously he goes on to show that i
01:03:38 um obviously he goes on to show that i did attend that meeting on behalf of the authority now you were already in touch as we can see from the previous entry entry 19 at a4 33 with nick holger nicholas holgate town clerk and chief executive did you
01:03:50 town clerk and chief executive did you ask him to attend given that he was or would be council gold no i didn't why is that
01:03:56 that do you know i don't know um clearly i didn't um i'm happy to accept that i didn't ask mr holgate to do that uh i'm sitting here in the cold light of day there is a logic that would suggest
01:04:07 day there is a logic that would suggest i should have phoned him and said mr holgate there's this meeting please attend it i didn't possibly because mr priestley and i were the people that were absolutely fully involved at that particular point and
01:04:18 involved at that particular point and would be better able to feed information too or listen to information from the group
01:04:24 group but you know honestly i can't say why i didn't phone him at that point i i suspect it didn't occur to me to phone mr holgate at that particular point because of the way in which i was dealing with the incident at the time let's look at the minutes for the
01:04:36 let's look at the minutes for the meeting at lfb 3061273 please
01:04:48 and that's the first of three pages and we can turn you can see the time of the meeting but we can turn to page two
01:04:57 and it goes straight in after any urgent business and introductions see attendee list for more details and the attendee list is on page three let's quickly have a look at that
01:05:09 quickly have a look at that and you can see who was there and you could see that from
01:05:15 from uh
01:05:15 uh you can see who was there from the lfb but you can also see who was there from our bkc
01:05:22 you and stuart priestley and mark sawyer who was from london resilience yes yes
01:05:28 yes yes he looms large a little bit later in the story
01:05:32 story i think it's right isn't it as you told the project athena that you joined at 507 a little bit late because you'd been on the phone to the lelo at five o'clock okay right um
01:05:44 um now um
01:05:46 now um if we go
01:05:47 if we go to
01:05:49 to um page two please of this document
01:05:54 um under situation brief and if we scroll down to the middle of that chunk of text and look at paragraph three point
01:06:00 point eight
01:06:01 eight shelter and care including access to medication to be provided for evacuated people our bkc adult social care arrangements be to be developed two rest centers open further three premises to be open to shelter people likely to
01:06:13 be open to shelter people likely to consolidate later in the morning do you know who said that during this meeting i don't know who said that it would either have been stuart priestley or me i
01:06:25 priestley or me i i don't know who said that right i don't think i don't think i've noted but it would have come from one or other it would have come from either mr priestly or from me it wouldn't have come from mark sayer he wouldn't have known that he wouldn't have had that knowledge no
01:06:36 he wouldn't have had that knowledge no now we've heard about the two rest centers so far belushi's and the harrow club
01:06:41 club um
01:06:43 um were those the two rest centers that you or mr priestley said were open as is identified there in the second line of paragraph 3.8 may i check my log of that meeting
01:06:54 may i check my log of that meeting please
01:06:55 please my log entry of that meeting yes we can go back to that if we can go back please to the log at rbk3013296 page
01:07:06 page uh five
01:07:12 i'm sorry i'm sorry sorry page for set page yes uh page it's just jumped in page six entry twenty eight
01:07:31 no i was wondering whether i had noted in there the names of these centers involved and really i don't you haven't which is why i'm asking you do you remember um can you confirm that the two rest centers identified
01:07:42 rest centers identified in the note 3.8 we can go back to that please page two of lfb triple zero six one two seven three
01:07:51 three page two thank you
01:07:55 at this stage 5 a.m i cannot confirm the names of that that we may have given that point clearly i've mentioned something but i i'm sorry i can't recall what particular centers i refer to at that
01:08:06 particular centers i refer to at that point well so far we've covered balochis and the harrow club um the further three premises
01:08:12 premises um
01:08:13 um to be opened to shelter people which were they at that stage i am i'm really sorry if i haven't got a written note of it i certainly haven't got it in my memory at this point right
01:08:26 got it in my memory at this point right would you agree though that the reference to up to five locations as rest centers would indicate that there was that significant resources would be required to support
01:08:37 resources would be required to support them
01:08:39 them yes yes
01:08:40 yes yes now after the meeting uh if we go back well um
01:08:47 well um actually we won't see this in your log so to anticipate your question it isn't there or and it's not in your statement
01:08:55 statement um but we do have something from toby gould can we go to lfb triple zero six one two six eight and toby gould was there as one of the attendees from the london resilience
01:09:07 attendees from the london resilience group he was on page three in the attendance list that i showed you here's his statement um if we go to page six in his statement please paragraph 17
01:09:18 please paragraph 17 he says
01:09:20 he says that at
01:09:21 that at um
01:09:23 um at uh
01:09:25 at uh in the third line at 0.537 i spoke to david kerry rbkc about rbkc's response including that their chief executive would participate in the 0630 scg in person at the mps
01:09:38 in the 0630 scg in person at the mps special operations room sar all would dial in at his discretion i subsequently emailed david kerry with the details for the a600 lrcg teleconference
01:09:51 lrcg teleconference and and he goes on about the details of that now do you remember speaking to toby gould at that time 05 37 it's as i say it's not in your log it's not in your statement he recalls it
01:10:03 your statement he recalls it um i
01:10:05 um i can't record it i'm entirely happy to accept his statement but i i apologize again but there was a vast amount going on at that particular time and
01:10:16 and i really regret that if i don't have the written notes of it because phone calls are coming in backwards and forwards i wasn't noting every single thing i apologize for that but it's a fact if toby says this in his email i'm
01:10:28 if toby says this in his email i'm entirely happy in his his witness statement i'm entirely happy to accept that now if we go to paragraph 20 of his statement on page seven a little lower down he says i also spoke to david kerry who confirmed that the
01:10:40 to david kerry who confirmed that the rbkc chief executive would dial in to 630 scg
01:10:46 630 scg uh and he sent an email to matthew hogan and the lrg team confirming that do you recall that um i i don't have the memory of it i'm entirely happy to accept that with a phone call that i got i'm not sure from
01:10:58 phone call that i got i'm not sure from the timeline of this whether i was still at home or whether i was at the town hall at that particular time but certainly i'm happy to accept that this was being discussed and talked about okay now the minutes of the next
01:11:11 about okay now the minutes of the next scg meeting so we've had one at five the next one is at 6 30. let's just look at the minutes to that it's at mol 6015.
01:11:22 it's at mol 6015. i'll show you the first page and then i'd like you to look at page three of it there's the first page you can see the time six thirty if we can go please to page three you can see the list of attendees there toby gould's there again
01:11:35 attendees there toby gould's there again from lrg
01:11:36 from lrg we've got um uh you again and stuart priestley but also the coroner now on on the call or at the meeting um
01:11:45 um but no nicholas holden no do you know why no i don't um again i'm sorry at that point um i was definitely at the
01:11:56 at that point um i was definitely at the town hall
01:11:58 town hall i had relinquished um council silva that was now stuart priestley and i was acting to advise to him and setting up logs that nobody used and things like that i'm afraid i have no
01:12:11 things like that i'm afraid i have no idea
01:12:12 idea what the circumstances were with mr holgate at that particular point right now by this time this is uh
01:12:19 uh 06 30. you were at the town hall you'd set up the back well the beck had already been set up but you had you had produced the key open the cupboards
01:12:28 cupboards and got the got the kit up and running yes
01:12:31 yes yes yes
01:12:33 yes yes and
01:12:34 and presumably it was is this right it was running smoothly so far as you were concerned at that point at that point i wasn't aware of any technical problems and um mr priestly and i would have been in an adjacent
01:12:45 and i would have been in an adjacent room for a teddy conference i've got to tell you i can't remember off the top of my head with whether we both sat there and listened to it together or whether we're in separate places um clearly we were both listening in on the meeting
01:12:57 were both listening in on the meeting and if you go back to page two of this note or minute please you can see that it says under item seven recovery recovery issues will be discussed internally at rbkc an update
01:13:09 discussed internally at rbkc an update should be available at the next scg um the humanitarian resistance process will be established within rbkc with the possibility to to open an hac uh at some point that's the humanitarian
01:13:21 uh at some point that's the humanitarian assistance center they will seek advice from andrew meek if required do you remember who said um either of those things there was it you or stewart priestly i don't remember
01:13:32 or stewart priestly i don't remember which of us said it i expect it likely that stewart did but i can't rule out that i did i'm sorry i can't remember at that particular point um you know
01:13:43 at that particular point um you know just hammered dealing with things and i am afraid that afterwards if you know i can't recall the detail of everything i'm really sorry about that but um that was just the circumstances yes i
01:13:55 was just the circumstances yes i understand mr chairman is that a convenient moment yes i think it is thank you very much well mr kerry we'll take the morning break at that point uh we'll stop there we'll come back please a tough fast 11
01:14:06 please a tough fast 11 and as before please talk to anyone about your evidence while you're out of the room thank you right thank you very much
01:14:19 thank you very much mr millett our faster level thank you
01:32:53 would you ask mr kerry to come back
01:32:58 [Music]
01:33:08 all right mr kerry thank you good thank you yes mr miller yes mr chairman thank you um now the transition to mr priestley he took over from silver at about seven o'clock according to his
01:33:19 about seven o'clock according to his recollection would you recall the same i think it was earlier um my recollection is that um mr priestley was silver when i arrived at the town hall
01:33:30 silver when i arrived at the town hall which was just before six o'clock right his recollection is that he took over at seven you think it's earlier my belief is that um he was silver that when i arrived and that i then went into
01:33:42 when i arrived and that i then went into the advisor role right let's look at his statement then please if we can at rbk3035672
01:33:50 this is his first statement and if we go to page six paragraph 24
01:34:00 it's got a long statement um he uh says that between 6 30 and 7 he had a meeting with you nicholas holgate laura johnson and robert black and then he says david kerry as council
01:34:12 and then he says david kerry as council silva
01:34:14 silva gave an update as to what had been fed back to beck which was which was still him at this point from the on-site lelo and via various teleconferences he dialed into robert black reported on his first-hand experiences having been at
01:34:25 first-hand experiences having been at the site earlier in the morning this was brief in nature that he had attended the site the building was fully alight people were in the street and the blue light services were attending nicholas advised that he'd spoken to the leader
01:34:36 advised that he'd spoken to the leader and that we had a blank checkbook to fund anything we required in response to the fire nicholas confirmed that the priority should be to offer support to those directly affected food shelter clothing money emotional support and
01:34:47 clothing money emotional support and emergency accommodation for those displaced
01:34:50 displaced david advised nicholas of the mutual aid agreement via london gold and of the other local authorities ceos who could support him nicholas indicated that the decision to invoke london gold mutual aid would be
01:35:01 invoke london gold mutual aid would be considered when the council's response was deemed insufficient and it goes on and on what i've read you so far of that paragraph is that in general an accurate account
01:35:12 is that in general an accurate account of what happened at that time i'm happy to accept that yes right did you have a handover
01:35:21 person to person there was no written formal handover but so having arrived and clearly i've already been slightly bullied because of my recollection of when did i actually give over silver or not
01:35:33 give over silver or not um but certainly it was in person talking with each other uh it wasn't a written handover if you go down the page to the foot of the page please
01:35:45 the page please if we can scroll down you can see paragraph 27 which i put to you earlier but he says at approximately 7 00 a.m david and i met and he provided a brief verbal handover to me as council silva
01:35:56 verbal handover to me as council silva we agreed he needed to remain in the town hall to provide support until such time as other officers arrived do you agree with that um i know it's not quite what i said a moment ago but i am happy to accept this
01:36:07 moment ago but i am happy to accept this if that's mr priestley's recollection i'm happy to accept it do you recall anything of the handover do you recall what you told him key points to bear in mind i can't recall as such i know it will have been
01:36:20 recall as such i know it will have been the ongoing conversations we've been having and i would have updated him about any information i might have had at that point if we hadn't talked about it already but i mean it was a sort of a fairly seamless transitioning in it
01:36:31 fairly seamless transitioning in it wasn't i'm here he's there now we change over it this was all part of a transitioning continual process right now let's turn to rest centers um if we
01:36:42 now let's turn to rest centers um if we go please to stuart priestley's log this was his log we looked at it yesterday rbk30 is one three three one eight
01:36:54 uh and uh we can see that it starts at 310 and if we go to page two in it at the time mark 7 30 about a third of the way down your screen um
01:37:03 screen um he says there and that it was there was a handover meeting from david to me brief update in regards situation on ground
01:37:14 uh who and where layla's are rest centers rugby portobello trust harrow club clement james center westway sports center and other locations in the area such as small churches just pausing
01:37:25 such as small churches just pausing there is that something you told him
01:37:32 that certainly looks like the sort of thing that i would have said to him little information as to who is present and none have been opened via the council's ept processes and again is that something you told him do you think i i can certainly imagine that that's
01:37:44 i i can certainly imagine that that's the sort of thing i would have told him need for rest center managers to attend the centers and provide management david advised that lbhf can provide a rest center manager issue of insufficient number of back officers discussed
01:37:56 number of back officers discussed again do you remember saying that to him um i don't recall it as we're sitting here but i'm entertaining happy to accept the statement that's written there very good and it agreed we would need to seek volunteers from across the policy and
01:38:07 volunteers from across the policy and partnership unit do you remember that um sitting here today i don't remember it but again i'm entirely happy to accept it and with that that's volunteers is that is this right within rbkc or was this yes the policy and
01:38:20 rbkc or was this yes the policy and partnership unit was the wider team title of the team that tony redpath was director of and which we were within and there were a number of sub-teams within that
01:38:30 that um and
01:38:32 um and so that was our immediate access to people right now it's right i think as we've seen that the british red cross had already contacted you at 5 30 when the decision to close belushi's was made
01:38:43 the decision to close belushi's was made asking where the rest center managers were
01:38:45 were um do you recall that request it was the first one was at 5 30 we saw that before again i i really don't wish to be sitting here saying i can't recall all the detail all i can tell you is that
01:38:56 the detail all i can tell you is that i'm happy to accept what is people's logs because for that morning incredibly tired by then and all sorts of things going on and you know i'm the last thing i want to do is sit here
01:39:07 the last thing i want to do is sit here saying i don't recall i don't recall i just have to ask you to accept that um i'm very happy to accept other people's statements unless i see something that clearly doesn't agree
01:39:19 clearly doesn't agree but there is a lot of detail of that warning that i just cannot remember uh
01:39:25 uh very well can you let's go then to uh brc6051
01:39:34 which is the brc log pages four to five we saw these before just to pick the point and you can see at
01:39:44 at the very foot of page 4 5 30
01:39:51 checked in with rw and still nobody at the rest center contacted back at our bkc and advised nobody at the rc suggested it was too far away
01:40:04 suggested it was too far away community reluctant to leave area decision made by rbks to close this center and the brc team were directed to the harrow club to assist there asked where rc managers
01:40:16 assist there asked where rc managers were but did not get an answer um now that's what this records do you um do you accept that um i accept john's log um i don't recall it but i
01:40:28 john's log um i don't recall it but i absolutely accept if he's put it in the log i totally accept him were you surprised at the time do you think that there was a request for rest center managers from the brc
01:40:38 again i don't recall the incident i wouldn't be surprised at that request because i think that's something that i would expect them to make so again i'm happy to accept what the vlog says yes was it clear to you in general terms
01:40:51 yes was it clear to you in general terms that you had a shortage of rest center managers which is reflected in this document but also in the uh the priestly log we looked at yes i i have some sort of recollection
01:41:03 yes i i have some sort of recollection of standing in the back at around about that time and we were talking about hammersmith and fulham by borough colleagues being asked to provide rest center managers now i can't remember the specific detail and i don't
01:41:14 remember the specific detail and i don't know what the action of that was but i i have a recollection that we were certainly focused on seeking under mutual aid from next door managers did you go out and ask next door as you put it
01:41:25 door as you put it forward um no i didn't at that point i think i was preparing to go into the teleconference but um did anybody i don't know we had elaine chambery we
01:41:36 i don't know we had elaine chambery we had ann stewart in there i don't know what the action of that was this is a very very fluid situation at that point was the provision for rest center managers sufficient and sustainable over the over the days that then followed
01:41:49 the over the days that then followed no and even if we'd had 10 rest center managers that wouldn't have been sustainable over the days that followed where there would have absolutely been a need for mutual aid anyway was that obvious to you from the outset
01:42:00 obvious to you from the outset i think instinctively i was aware you know by that point fully aware of the sheer scale of this and you know a common sense view would have been this
01:42:11 a common sense view would have been this is not going to be over and done with in a day or two and
01:42:17 and um you know i i was very aware that this was far bigger than we could deal with um there's evidence later on i'm sure you'll come to when i said that at a later stage but um it was clear to me
01:42:28 later stage but um it was clear to me that we needed mutual aid in some of these aspects and
01:42:32 and is it
01:42:33 is it is it the case i would
01:42:35 i would put it to you on the basis of the documents that it was that it was clear to you at that stage by
01:42:41 by 7 a.m certainly by 8 a.m um that the experiences of grenfell so far had exposed the lack of capacity of trained rbkc staff
01:42:52 trained rbkc staff to deal with this emergency yes yes let's then turn to the second scg meeting at 6 30. um
01:43:02 um you and stuart priestly dialed into that we've seen the minutes of this
01:43:07 of this moment ago but let's go to let's go to it again mol 6015
01:43:19 and under any urgent business you can see that it says some various hospitals are receiving numerous affected people in search for support and accommodation the hospital requires support from our bkc to deal with these people
01:43:30 bkc to deal with these people and the location
01:43:33 and the location and address of rest center to sign pace people rbkc to contact the hospital
01:43:39 hospital and to deal with this rbkc are in the process of consolidating their open rest centers into only one which will be located at w11 1pz now first on the relation to hospitals
01:43:51 now first on the relation to hospitals how did the information that mary's was receiving numerous affected people in search of support and accommodation come to the scg
01:44:04 i don't know and then minutes doesn't say who made that report no it doesn't what was the established route what was the norm
01:44:11 the norm um okay in any event where people are casualties i would expect the london ambulance service to be the primary organization to deal with casualties and information for that
01:44:22 casualties and information for that um
01:44:24 um and in this instance i would expect either the london ambulance service or the nhs to be the likely people that talked about what was happening at some areas
01:44:33 areas right do you remember what was done to action that um i don't know but looking at the minutes that talks about the consolidation of centers at w11 1pz
01:44:45 at w11 1pz that's not something that i was conscious of discussing at that point so i'm assuming that would have come from mr priestley and i'm assuming that would have been dealt with by the beck at that point right certainly i was not involved
01:44:58 point right certainly i was not involved myself in whatever those discussions were right uh and it looks as if the hospital didn't know where and what the rest center was and indeed nor did you because you were
01:45:09 and indeed nor did you because you were in the process of consolidating the rest centers uh is is that right again we're now talking about something here which somebody else was dealing with um i i'm quite aware that i wasn't
01:45:21 with um i i'm quite aware that i wasn't aware at that particular point of the actions that clearly the beck or mr priestly or somebody was taking to talk about that consolidation a very proper thing by the way but all i can say is that i don't know the
01:45:33 all i can say is that i don't know the answer to that by this point was 6 30 in the morning i was
01:45:40 i was exhausted by then i was sitting in and i think at that point although the the log says that mr priestley became council silver i think at seven o'clock after that meeting
01:45:51 at seven o'clock after that meeting i think at that point i was very much more in the listening mode and supporting steward because i was on the way to being done by that point now if we turn the page please to 3.5 page 2 paragraph 3.5 you can see
01:46:04 page 2 paragraph 3.5 you can see just there that it says rbkc are in the process of consolidating rest centers into only ones into one center only this will be located at w111pz full contact details to be shared asap
01:46:17 full contact details to be shared asap there are two layla's on scene these will be relieved within the hour rbkc beck is open and will remain so for the remainder of today rbkc gold will meet at 11 today in relation to full contact details to
01:46:29 in relation to full contact details to be shared asap is that right at this point 6 30 the rest centers were being consolidated into one but the details had not yet been
01:46:39 been um decided on or were yet known again we're now dealing with the matter that i wasn't dealing with at that point so i i'm not able to answer well let's try something slightly
01:46:50 well let's try something slightly different then can we look at your emergency event log let's have both up because i think we need both rbk three zeroes one three two nine six
01:46:59 nine six page eight if we could have that up and at the same time please your handwritten log at rbk30604
01:47:11 you can see
01:47:20 uh you um 45 and on sorry page 48 in the document on the right hand side of the screen you can see
01:47:34 uh in the
01:47:43 uh certainly on the left hand side under action response outcome consolidated emergency rest center three cent marks close w11 1tz you see that address yes yes
01:47:57 let's use that for the moment um do you know who the question i have is who provided that address do you know i don't know you don't know as i say we're now starting to deal with
01:48:08 as i say we're now starting to deal with matters that i i wasn't even with myself at that point do you know what it was uh threesome marks close i think was i think was a council building i think it was some sort of
01:48:20 building i think it was some sort of center i may be wrong and i believe it was in it may have been in our annex for rest sentiment things but forgive me off the top of my head now i can't remember but i do recognize that mark's
01:48:32 remember but i do recognize that mark's close as being something um right okay i'm afraid i've given you the wrong reference to your manuscript but um
01:48:40 um but i don't think it would help given your answer um let's look then at the brc call log brc6051 please page five
01:48:58 you can see on that page at five the entry for 530 towards the top of the screen
01:49:04 screen uh it says direct it says essie arrived directed to get people to come to the harrow center it became apparent that a spontaneous rce rest center had opened at the portobello rugby trust se
01:49:15 at the portobello rugby trust se attended and assessed how many people there approx 50 jp returned to harrow club mps now present outside and two mps dc's assisting with registration um
01:49:27 were you spoken to by brc british red cross about that no it wasn't were you aware of it in any way i i wasn't aware of you weren't
01:49:38 uh at 5 45 in the next entry down it says fed back above to the back and went to the rpt contacted beck again decision made by rbkc to move people from the harrah
01:49:50 rbkc to move people from the harrah centre over to the rpt to be in one place and easier to provide support rbkc spoke to the rpt management to agree this
01:49:57 this do you know anything about that i think i was in the cab on the way to the town hall at that point i see well you had left the house at 5 37 i think it arrived at six so you were in the cab yeah but and you still had your
01:50:08 the cab yeah but and you still had your phone with you were you involved in any of these decisions or discussions i was not
01:50:13 not so who would have been do you know would it have been stuart priestly um it was whoever was in the back at that time um when you arrived were you told that this was what had happened
01:50:24 i cannot recall what i was told i mean i know i went to the back i know we were dealing with the sort of the machinery i know
01:50:33 know but that but frankly my mind is a world at that point and i cannot tell you what i was told on arrival right then if you look at the next uh entry down um
01:50:44 um it says jp returned to harrow club at 5 55
01:50:47 55 and then lower below that uh
01:50:50 uh six o'clock um
01:50:53 um three
01:50:54 three uh red cross uh
01:50:57 uh staff arrive at harrow club director to rpt and then at 6 15 brc team now at rpt and then at 6 30 most residents now at rpt
01:51:06 rpt and then underneath that at the 645 marker harrow club now empty did you know any of that did you know that there'd been this shift from harrow club to rpt i i don't
01:51:17 shift from harrow club to rpt i i don't have that awareness don't sit here no would you agree looking at this at least that the actual position was that the rugby portobello trust rpt was by the time of the 6 30 scg meeting the
01:51:29 time of the 6 30 scg meeting the location in effect being used as the main or consolidated rest center yes i accept what's in champions log right um but if we go on
01:51:40 um but if we go on to the to the next meeting of the scg the next one was at 8 30. that's at mol 6014
01:51:54 there's the first page there's the time page three
01:52:01 are you able to help us um it says under local authorities provided an update two rest centers were set up in the early hours and this is now reduced to one address which will be available all day
01:52:11 day uh portobello rugby trust 221 walmart w114ey
01:52:16 w114ey british red cross are in attendance yes um
01:52:20 yes um but we still see a hundred persons are in attendance at harrow road club and 150 at the rugby trust a combination of evacuees and those affected by the fire so what was the position was the harrow
01:52:32 so what was the position was the harrow club open or or being used or was it not
01:52:38 i by that point you can't help was not running these matters i obviously was in the building i was assisting mr priestly um i
01:52:49 um i i think i was listening in on this call but i was not apart by this point of the people that were managing these matters and making these decisions so i would
01:53:01 and making these decisions so i would accept what is in people's logs and minutes of meetings as an outsider at that particular point i'm sorry i can't help you i'm sure there are others who can
01:53:09 can um very well you were you are right that you were an attendee at this meeting because you're listed as such a long time priestly on page three which i should have shown you but you were there but you can't help us i think is that
01:53:20 but you can't help us i think is that right i'm sorry either because i don't have a memory but i think in this particular one this level of detail i'm quite certain i was not involved in which means that clearly people in the back or mr priestley were engaged in
01:53:32 back or mr priestley were engaged in that matter and that to my mind means it is most likely that mr priestley gave this information and do you know the reason for consolidating residents into one
01:53:43 for consolidating residents into one rest center at least that being the plan i can make an assumption because i wasn't a part of that playing but i can make an assumption about good practice now
01:53:54 now you you were i think getting exhausted as you told us by this point in the morning and you told the project athena that at this point you were getting chattered and emotional and you'd seen the tv
01:54:03 the tv yes yes
01:54:05 yes yes uh
01:54:07 uh and i think you went into it you say you went into an adjacent room to do the telephone conference yes
01:54:15 and you told the project athena interviewer that you didn't know what you were doing i think by that time i was both physically exhausted i'd only had two hours sleep that night and we were now sort of you know several hours
01:54:26 were now sort of you know several hours in
01:54:27 in i was also getting quite emotionally affected as well now who was making the decisions at this point such as the decisions that we can see in this part of this 8 30 seg meeting that i've referred you to well i can't
01:54:38 that i've referred you to well i can't say for certain certainly stuart priestly by that time was council silver so therefore would have been a decision maker but at the same time there were other people from social care and housing within the back so i would
01:54:50 housing within the back so i would expect that they would have been a part of that discussion they were all senior people
01:54:55 people um so i can't tell you precisely because i don't think i would i was not sitting in the back at this point so i can't tell you precisely but um yeah right now let's go back a little bit in time then to the 6 30
01:55:07 little bit in time then to the 6 30 meeting again mol falls ml6015
01:55:11 ml6015 page two
01:55:14 page two and if we can look please at section seven under recovery we looked at this before as you'll recall um and and it says um
01:55:26 um there that recovery issues will be discussed internally at rbkc my question is do you remember whether there was a discussion between the 6 30 scg meeting and the 8 30 scg meeting i
01:55:37 scg meeting and the 8 30 scg meeting i don't know you don't know you don't know or you don't recall i don't know right so therefore i wouldn't have been involved in that aspect right
01:55:47 right now the suggestion of uh opening an hac and seeking advice from andrew meek do you remember whose suggestion that was um certainly i gave suggestion um about
01:56:00 um certainly i gave suggestion um about who could help us on that andrew meek was our london emergency planning guru if you like on on on on humanitarian assistance and had been very heavily involved in the development
01:56:11 very heavily involved in the development of the london brazilian humanitarian assistance plan and to my mind he would be the go-to person to get advice about that and what plan would be used to establish that process um might be the
01:56:22 establish that process um might be the framework document i would have expected the london framework documents to be the guide of that right and one can quote from that a a facility
01:56:33 one can quote from that a a facility um
01:56:34 um is where bereave family survivors and anyone else directly affected by an incident can receive information and appropriate support from all relevant agencies without need for immediate referral elsewhere that's how hac is
01:56:45 referral elsewhere that's how hac is defined is that what you had in mind yes and we are talking in that respect of the facility you would expect to be creating over the next couple of days to come in after that at that point
01:56:57 come in after that at that point the the humanitarian assistance center isn't something you would expect to establish immediately that's what the rest centers are for and the ongoing support and then the plan
01:57:09 the plan the london plan was that you know over those couple of days as the totality of the needs of people would be accept understood you would then provide not only the physical premises but you would
01:57:22 only the physical premises but you would also bring in the various agencies local governments central government and others so that the idea was that people would not be had to go trotting to different establishments or phone numbers to get support but the support
01:57:34 numbers to get support but the support would be there so that's a longer term type of thing and i think you would accept that the responsibility to set up a humanitarian assistance center or hac was the local
01:57:45 assistance center or hac was the local authorities yes yes and was this also a reference here can you help to identifying and appointing a halo humanitarian assistance liaison
01:57:56 halo humanitarian assistance liaison officer
01:57:57 officer um i don't know from this statement whether we were discussing literally that detail at that point i i suspect it was more that we were saying we're going to need to set up a humanitarian assistance center
01:58:09 assistance center i i don't have any recollection of this talking starting to talk about the granular detail of that at that particular point and what practical steps would be required in order to get a halo in place for that um
01:58:21 for that um see
01:58:22 see again following the guidance from the central plan would be seeking somebody at a senior level a strategic manager probably from a social care setting uh who would provide a strategic lead
01:58:35 uh who would provide a strategic lead and who would then form underneath them the relevant disciplines and people and bring those through to start populating a structure to start identifying who what needs were
01:58:46 to start identifying who what needs were needed needs were needed and you didn't have one readily trained within rbkcc not an rb case you would have to look at the triboro arrangements yes yes
01:58:57 the triboro arrangements yes yes let's then turn to a different topic which is the arrival of rebecca blackburn
01:59:01 blackburn and you say in your first statement that you believe that she arrived at about 7am that's paragraph 76 of page 17. is that correct um that's what's in my log
01:59:13 well it uh well um i mean again right let's look at your statement paragraph 76 page 17.
01:59:37 and that's where you see you say in the last sentence she arrived around seven okay
01:59:43 okay that's the basis of which i'm right just putting this back to you and that's your own evidence and now she says uh in her statement paragraph 18 page four we don't need to see it that she arrived about 720. now
01:59:55 see it that she arrived about 720. now there may not be much between you um but is it right that i on any view you saw her after the 6 30 scg but before the 8 30 scg i would expect so
02:00:06 before the 8 30 scg i would expect so right do you recall providing her with an update
02:00:10 an update not a written update i don't recall whether i had a conversation with rebecca or not or whether stuart previously had the conversation or not i simply don't recall you don't recall um now her recollection let's let's do look
02:00:21 now her recollection let's let's do look at this please it's her statement rbk303 five three six four page eighteen sorry page four paragraph eighteen
02:00:32 sorry page four paragraph eighteen so first statement to the inquiry and she says here at paragraph eighteen she says i arrived at ktii sorry kth at 720 the bec was already in operation there were 15 to 20 people inside i did
02:00:44 there were 15 to 20 people inside i did not know most of them and you were david elaine laura johnson and anne stuart some members of laura's team were there also there too david came over to me and said we had two maybe three rest centers open and
02:00:55 two maybe three rest centers open and that the tmo were on scene however nobody from our bkc was at the rest centers mike and nick layton the other lelo were at the scene now is is it correct that you told her
02:01:07 now is is it correct that you told her that rbkc had two maybe three rest centers open no i don't recall the conversation again it's the sort of thing that i probably would have said so i'm i'm i'm happy to accept this statement
02:01:19 accept this statement now she goes on to say paragraph 19 in the middle of the third line there middle of the paragraph david did not know how many rest centers were open and how many people were at each he said
02:01:30 how many people were at each he said that the red cross were at one but confirmed that no borough staff had been deployed
02:01:35 deployed therefore the first people that the survivors met were red cross staff and local councillors i think that is a likely situation at that time right
02:01:50 is it right that although the tmo were at the scene nobody from rbkc was at the rest centers apart from the lelo's i think that likely to be the case yes was there a discussion as to what her
02:02:01 was there a discussion as to what her role was to be in particular her role after you left um no i can't recall whether they had discussion or not my expectation would be that she would carry on doing what i was doing by that point which would be
02:02:13 was doing by that point which would be the emergency planning advisor to council silva and therefore the emergency planning professional in the room that would know our systems and and other plans right if we turn the page in rebecca blackburn's first statement to
02:02:24 rebecca blackburn's first statement to page 5 paragraph 20 she says at around 7 45 david told me that he was planning to go home soon he had been up from two from 2am and needed a rest he asked me to join the strategic
02:02:36 asked me to join the strategic coordinating group scg meeting at 8 30 and then continue as the beck lead for the rest of the day i questioned why i should be the lead since i just arrived and i was not a senior officer this meant that i lacked
02:02:47 senior officer this meant that i lacked decision-making capacity he simply replied that i would be the lead he told me that he had not called out any further back officers he did not see the need to disturb others since they would be coming into work shortly
02:02:59 be coming into work shortly um now is it right that you did insist that she'd be a bec lead despite her protest that she wasn't a senior officer i have no recollection of the conversation but i don't dispute that a conversation obviously took place um
02:03:13 i can make an assumption that at that point
02:03:17 point if that's what i said the reason would have been that she would have been the person the best place to know what the beck was doing and to be able to lead on that so i can i can see a logic to that right but i i i regret
02:03:29 i regret i am in a bit of a whirl at that point in the morning in terms of my memory later on and my memory today i don't watch to bite away from anything i i have got a problem remembering this
02:03:40 i i have got a problem remembering this um i was you know exhausted by that point i would have been saying all sorts of things i hope they were professionally appropriate at the time but the fact is i'm sitting here today
02:03:51 but the fact is i'm sitting here today at a loss not being able to absolutely confirm everything i'm sorry about that was stuart priestley still there i don't know whether he was in the room or whether he was out of the rooms doing
02:04:03 or whether he was out of the rooms doing something else he was in the town hall at that point to whom would rebecca blackburn have been um
02:04:11 um responsible in in line management terms in in immediate line management terms i was her line manager in terms of the lead as as the beck lead um
02:04:22 lead as as the beck lead um that would have been to stuart priestley right
02:04:26 right so
02:04:27 so even though if it is the case that she lacked decision-making capacity as she says here in her statement was that a problem given that she could
02:04:39 was that a problem given that she could always obtain authority from stuart priestley
02:04:42 priestley i would have think that would be appropriate yes stuart priestley was the ultimate decision maker there at that point both as our line manager and also as the council silver right was it the case that you didn't you
02:04:54 was it the case that you didn't you hadn't called any further back officers in because you didn't want to disturb them
02:04:57 them because they would be coming in shortly anyway
02:05:00 anyway um i don't recall saying that i'm not saying i didn't certainly i hadn't called other back officers in i'd called in elaine chennary as the start and i think the intention probably would be we'll work you know go from there afterwards so i
02:05:13 you know go from there afterwards so i hadn't personally called in other back offices
02:05:15 offices um by that point of the morning we're talking now what's 7.45 well actually the common sense says that people would be arriving at work if they
02:05:26 people would be arriving at work if they weren't already coming in because of this incident so that kind of is a sort of us i can understand why that might have happened
02:05:36 but i can't i can't recall the conversation but i'm absolutely not saying it didn't take place
02:05:43 yes um rebecca
02:05:46 rebecca blackburn describes the beck at that point as complete pandemonium is that a description you would align yourself with no there's an awful lot of chat a lot of
02:05:57 there's an awful lot of chat a lot of talk people comparing information you can walk into any situation and see something that might look like pandemonium um but there were an awful lot of people there who were as we've seen already from the log of other meetings we're
02:06:08 from the log of other meetings we're making decisions about consolidating rest centers and thinking about halo so i would say it wasn't pandemonium probably looked like it though it would certainly would have been noisy right
02:06:19 certainly would have been noisy right now i want to ask you some questions next about your contact with nicholas holgate
02:06:23 holgate we've seen already that from your emergency event log that you he phoned you at 0319 that's entry eight and again at 0 433 entry 19
02:06:35 and again at 0 433 entry 19 is it right that you were in telephone contact at that time at an early stage in the incident on those two occasions we spoke that i've logged yes yes did you remind mr holgate either during
02:06:48 did you remind mr holgate either during those calls or at a later stage of the need to keep a written record of his decisions and actions both inside and outside meetings i don't have a recollection of saying that do you know
02:07:01 right well um let's look at the contingency management plan rbk3028631
02:07:08 page 42.
02:07:17 this governs the role of the of the gold strategic coordinating group gold or scg and
02:07:25 and lower down the screen it has a heading composition of the strategic coordinating group and you can see the chief executive is on it
02:07:33 on it and then underneath that it says uh
02:07:39 uh in the second paragraph the chief executive will chair meetings of the scg and then it says a minute taker logist should be appointed to keep a record of decisions taken at meetings and to keep a log of the actions and decisions of
02:07:51 a log of the actions and decisions of the chief executive outside of meetings uh
02:07:56 uh did do you remember whether you advised him or reminded him that anything he did he should log i don't recall whether i did or didn't say that
02:08:09 do you consider that as the emergency planning advisor and specialist in this field and particularly the governor if you like of this of this plan that you should have reminded him of
02:08:20 of that i think sitting here today that sounds like a fair statement um let me try it slightly differently it's maybe the first statement sitting here today
02:08:30 today at the time did you expect him to be reasonably familiar with this part of this document given that if there were a major incident it would be
02:08:41 there were a major incident it would be him
02:08:42 him assuming the gold roll yes because we had dealt with that in the gold training and he would have received similar guidance and advice in the london local authority role particularly
02:08:53 london local authority role particularly london local authority golden rota
02:09:00 now we know that mr holgate was at the scene before he returned to the town hall
02:09:04 hall and he tells us that in his statement at paragraph 20 on page four do you remember did you have any meetings or discussions with him before the ten o'clock meeting that you refer to in your log and in your statement i don't
02:09:16 your log and in your statement i don't believe so but i may have i may have encountered him at the back because i think at some point he came into the deck but that would have been earlier on um if i was in the room when he was in
02:09:27 um if i was in the room when he was in the room clearly we would have met and spoken um i don't have a particular recollection of that but that might have been the case right let's just explore that a bit a bit further you you you say you might have encountered him
02:09:38 you say you might have encountered him but you don't have a recollection let's see if i can prompt it um can we please go back to rebecca blackburn's first witness statement please that's rbk3035364
02:09:49 page five paragraph 21
02:09:56 and she says there by 810 nicholas holgate and tony redpath were inside the beck david and i had a meeting with them
02:10:05 do you disagree with that i don't disagree with that and and uh she says
02:10:12 she says uh in her second statement where she elaborates a bit more on that let's go to that
02:10:17 to that um it's rbk3058170 page 17.
02:10:31 uh and if you look at paragraph 14.9 three quarters of the way down your screen she says i attended a meeting in the beck chaired by nicholas holgate i believe this was on the morning of the 14th of june 2017. nicholas holgate
02:10:43 14th of june 2017. nicholas holgate mentioned he'd received a phone call from the ceo at southwark council who dealt with the lack of fire with the offer of assistance i recall that nicholas holgate told persons at the meeting that rbkc was coping that outside help was not required at that
02:10:55 outside help was not required at that time do you recall that no i don't recall a meeting a formal meeting in the back i know that i was in and out and would have bumped into people but i don't
02:11:07 have bumped into people but i don't recall a meeting and i don't recall that those statements so i must assume that i was not there continuing on the theme of nicholas holgate let's revisit the third scg
02:11:18 holgate let's revisit the third scg meeting which took place at 8 30 the minister which we saw earlier this morning
02:11:23 morning if we can get back to that please mol 6014
02:11:28 6014 uh and
02:11:30 uh and i think i mentioned to you but didn't show you the participants page page five if we can look at look at that please you can see
02:11:41 you can see that uh apart from you as the last entry there and stuart priestly and rebecca blackburn nicholas holgate was also present
02:11:51 um i'm i'm going to assume that that's correct unless you tell me otherwise i'm going to assume it's correct as well do you recall whether this was a long meeting lasting up to an hour and a half or was it or was it shorter i'm
02:12:03 or was it or was it shorter i'm i've no idea at this point i'm sorry right do you remember what time you went home
02:12:08 home uh my log says that i departed the town hall at around about 20 past 10. yes
02:12:15 which was almost two hours after this meeting started do you remember whether there was any period of time after the end of this meeting and your departure from the town hall
02:12:27 departure from the town hall no no
02:12:28 no no right now um do you remember whether at this meeting any consideration was given to whether um
02:12:38 um the beck was being fully manned in the period of this meeting i don't have any recollection of that right
02:12:47 right was any did was there any discussion about who should be running the back during this meeting given that given that you
02:12:54 that you uh blackburn priestly and hold great were all on it i don't know i know that elaine trumny was in there one of our trained people i'm not saying that she would be running the back but we certainly had a trained personal staff in there
02:13:05 personal staff in there i can't answer your question about who was running the back at that point um right do you recall the name chumnery more than once coming into the room where you were having the meeting asking for help in running the back i don't
02:13:16 for help in running the back i don't recall at all my memory i'm not disputing it i'm happy to accept that that was the case i i'm sorry i'm in this stage where at this point i'm not really recalling right rebecca blackburn recalls that she wanted um to assist
02:13:29 recalls that she wanted um to assist elaine chumnery but you asked her to stay on the call or at the meeting it was a call i i say i don't record it i can i can accept that happens because rebecca would be to be the continuum
02:13:41 rebecca would be to be the continuum across the rest of the day so i can imagine that um from a you know structural point of view that would have been an appropriate thing for me to say
02:13:49 me to say um clearly that meant that elaine chambery didn't get rebecca's assistance but i think at this point you know if i said it at all and i'm happy to accept somebody else's word for it my logic would have been that she needs to
02:14:01 logic would have been that she needs to be fully in touch because she's going to be dealing with this carrying on right now um if if we look back at what we looked at earlier page two sorry page three under the local authorities update
02:14:14 we've covered this already uh the scg wanted to know as you can see from you
02:14:21 from you where the rest centers were and how many people were at them uh
02:14:26 uh but
02:14:29 it is do you agree that when rbkc was asked for the update during that meeting you looked to rebecca blackburn who was left to answer the question
02:14:40 you don't remember i don't i'm sorry i'm really sorry i just don't remember
02:14:49 do you know why there was no reference here
02:14:52 here to the other locations which had been opened spontaneously by the community by this time for example the clement jane's center the latimer community church the
02:15:04 center the latimer community church the notting hill methodist church i don't know i don't know if we were aware of that at the time i simply i'm sorry i don't know no and would you agree that the reference to the 100 people in attendance in attendance at
02:15:15 people in attendance in attendance at the harry road club was not the current position because it had been in it had been emptied at around about 6 30 or before that if other people's records say that and was accepted i don't know you don't know and
02:15:27 accepted i don't know you don't know and if we go back to the we'll stick with the minutes of um action eight
02:15:36 if we um go to the bottom of page three very bottom it says action 08 mps and rbkc to confirm arrangements for friends and family
02:15:47 arrangements for friends and family looking for information do you know who it was from rbkc who took charge of that no
02:15:53 no now do you accept one one arrangement that could be utilized is a friends and family reception center we talked about survivor reception centers and rest centers but there's something else isn't there called a
02:16:04 there called a friends and family reception center yes yes
02:16:08 yes um
02:16:11 let's just look at the definition of that so we're clear about what we're talking about can we go to the las lp guidance document at rbk3013294
02:16:22 page 35
02:16:30 paragraph 9.8
02:16:35 friends and relatives reception center and it says where demand warrants it consideration to establishing a secure comfortable area where friends and relatives of casualties and missing persons can be directed for information
02:16:49 and then it identifies uh
02:16:54 uh at 9.8.4 the purpose of a friends and relatives reception center or ff or frrc to help reunite friends and relatives with survivors
02:17:05 with survivors to provide a place for the police to record missing persons inquiries and to collect information that may aid their investigation to provide friends and relatives with a safe area to gather away from media attention
02:17:17 attention to provide friends and relatives with up-to-date and accurate information on the response arrangements that have been put in place to provide access to practical and emotional support to those friends and relatives affected
02:17:30 now um
02:17:33 is that what you understood at the time as a friends and family or friends and relatives reception center yes
02:17:41 yes did you agree to establish one with the metropolitan police i have no recollection of that discussion happening i don't i'm not aware that there was a discussion about
02:17:52 aware that there was a discussion about that
02:17:56 um
02:17:58 if you go to page 70 of this document
02:18:04 there's a glossary and
02:18:09 and at the foot of the page you'll see a definition of friends and relatives reception center frc and it says an frc is likely to be set up within first 24 hours of the
02:18:20 set up within first 24 hours of the incident occurring and should be a safe place for friends and relatives to gather where they can receive up-to-date information about the situation and response
02:18:29 response what provision had been made up to this point by which i mean 8 30 a.m on the morning of the 14th of june 2017. for the establishment of an frc i'm not
02:18:41 for the establishment of an frc i'm not aware that there was anything in place at that time why is that
02:18:46 i think just the scale of what was going on
02:18:49 on again slight context as intended by all of the plans up until that grenfell tower fire an ffrc
02:18:59 an ffrc was always envisioned as something entirely separate from an emergency rest center
02:19:03 center and particularly for incidents such as the
02:19:07 the july 2005 bombings in london and other matters you very often in london of course get an event where there were people not from that locality but from many other parts and
02:19:18 locality but from many other parts and friends and relatives might then from their communities come to find information about was their relative or their friend involved in this particular incident
02:19:27 incident so the purpose primarily of a friend's relative center was to say that's where we can or the police can look at people there and the police start recording information from the casualty bureau to add for the identification of people
02:19:39 add for the identification of people and separate from the emergency rest center which would be for the people evacuated from the particular incident area and may well be of a different community
02:19:48 community we come back to the that unique totality of the grenfell tower matter uh i'm aware that later in the day uh family and friends reception center i believe
02:19:59 and friends reception center i believe was set up in the salvation army yes and i think later on that might have even been subsumed into the overall center of the west way now that wasn't by the book by the way because the book said you keep these things separate but again
02:20:11 keep these things separate but again these are all guidances from which you can do your best under a particular incident to make that happen i just think nobody was thinking of an ffrc at that particular point because
02:20:23 ffrc at that particular point because you know we had you know everybody was coming out to the rest centers and again we have the situation of the survivors also being believed also being the family and friends uh obviously there are other family friends from elsewhere all i can say to
02:20:35 friends from elsewhere all i can say to you mr melissa is that i just think in the totality of what we were dealing with that early in the morning that hadn't yet been a consideration do you know anything about the establishment of what came to be the establishment of
02:20:47 of what came to be the establishment of the um frc at the salvation army by about 3 00 3 p.m that day that all happened after i had left the town hall for that day and what about the decision do you know anything about the decision
02:20:58 do you know anything about the decision uh
02:21:00 uh to set it up earlier that there is some evidence
02:21:03 evidence from the police that they were told by rbkc just before noon that the salvation army would be the frc from 12 30. do you know anything about that no again this was all after i had left the building okay then um let's then turn back to
02:21:16 okay then um let's then turn back to nicholas holgate um can we go to your first statement please
02:21:20 please for first witness statement page 18 paragraph 81
02:21:29 and you say here that around 10 o'clock 10 a.m i attended a meeting with laura johnson robert black of the tmo nicholas holgate and stuart priestley at the town hall that's right is it yes yes what was the
02:21:40 that's right is it yes yes what was the purpose of that meeting um it was a gathering in a room it wasn't an agenda meeting of that nature so we describe a meeting four of us met my recollection is that it was nicholas
02:21:52 my recollection is that it was nicholas wanting to gather what is the latest state of play for matters because he was having a gold group meeting later on right and you say this was effectively a handover meeting for me and a pre-meeting for before the council gold
02:22:03 pre-meeting for before the council gold meeting
02:22:04 meeting yeah i was aware that um i was there to say any last things i had before i left for the day and you left at 10 20. so this tells us that the 8 30
02:22:15 at 10 20. so this tells us that the 8 30 scg meeting cannot have lasted longer than 10 o'clock no than an hour and a half
02:22:20 half into your time and you say it was effectively a handover meeting for me in a pre-meeting before the council gold meeting um go to your emergency log please typed version rbk3013296
02:22:33 version rbk3013296 page nine
02:22:35 page nine we'll see the 10 o'clock time mark
02:22:44 i think the next page yes you are right page 10. o'clock
02:22:51 o'clock meeting with david kerry chief executive nicholas holgate director of housing laura johnson robert black council silver stuart priestley and if you look at the actions
02:23:02 and if you look at the actions it says
02:23:03 it says uh nicholas holgate council gold gold group to be convened later this incident is bigger than anyone local authority in london can manage
02:23:15 local authority in london can manage and consideration should be given to asking for mutual aid for the beck you see that yes was that your advice that was my advice right what led you to form that view and to give that advice
02:23:27 form that view and to give that advice at that stage the claire understanding that we didn't have sufficient backstaff to maintaining three becks 24 7 for what was going to be an extended period uh and that there would be a need to use
02:23:40 uh and that there would be a need to use mutual aid now you say in your in your statement at paragraph 81 lower down we don't need to go back to it that nobody at rbkc had ever dealt with anything of this scale no and you also say in a paragraph 104
02:23:53 no and you also say in a paragraph 104 on page 23 and again there's no need to look back at it but you say i believe that none of the 33 la's could have coped with the scale of the grenfell tower and the response on their own no that's right is
02:24:05 response on their own no that's right is it yeah absolutely i believe that then i still believe that today um there's guidance about this isn't there and you'll see mp at nx10 and let's look at that rbk3032334
02:24:20 and this deals with the mutual aid arrangements if we go to that
02:24:29 this is rbk3032334
02:24:34 this is annex 10. yes dated
02:24:38 dated uh 28 december 2016. so this was this must be right still relevant up to date the date of the fire go to page four please paragraph 1.1
02:24:48 1.1 background planning assumptions the need for mutual aid and it says uh
02:24:55 uh in the third line however the scale or size of an incident may overwhelm certain aspects of the council's response either people or material and it may be appropriate to seek support from other local authorities
02:25:06 from other local authorities and it goes on mutual aid is most likely to be needed in the event of a long duration when the resources of the local authority and its contractors have been exhausted and when there is limited or no easily obtainable other resource this
02:25:18 no easily obtainable other resource this might be a large-scale incident involving many council departments and services it might be a single service issue where a particular resource or starting skill is in very short supply
02:25:29 starting skill is in very short supply that's a fair summary of the matters to be considered is it yes yes and did you have that guidance in mind when referring to mutual aid when advising nicholas holgate at the 10 o'clock meeting
02:25:38 meeting mutual aid was something that from us emergency planners was regularly discussed and exercised and i didn't need to refer to the plan to remind myself of what mutual aid arrangements were
02:25:50 arrangements were mutual aid was often informal um but there was also a formality if needed so
02:25:56 needed so in all sorts of events and incidents across london over many years a local authority might need a little bit of assistance and very often it was ringing your friends or neighbors or people you know that would do that that was
02:26:07 know that would do that that was entirely informal nothing to do with the london gold protocol or anything like that that was just business as usual about mutual aid for
02:26:17 for a london-wide situation so for example in severe weather national fuel shortages winter gritting issues and what have you where it might become necessary for a
02:26:28 where it might become necessary for a number of authorities to support a number of other authorities you've got the more formal parts which is in the latter part of this um annex where the london local authorities coordination center the lack on behalf
02:26:41 coordination center the lack on behalf of london local authority gold could undertake the collection of who's got what and who needs it and then diving that through that's the rather formal part
02:26:52 part and
02:26:53 and you can bring that in so mutual aid can start literally from the word go if necessary by speaking to your neighbor it can develop or it can become formalized later on what was clear to me
02:27:04 formalized later on what was clear to me at that particular point was this is massive
02:27:09 massive and it's appalling and we don't have the resources to deal with this nobody would have had and that is exactly why we had mutual aid arrangements in london well understood and well practiced and when
02:27:20 understood and well practiced and when you spoke of mutual aid in this context at 10 o'clock in the morning on that morning were you referring to seeking mutual aid from different local authorities on a piecemeal basis or activating the london
02:27:31 activating the london local authority gold resolution so i didn't say anything formally about activating the london gold i was at that point saying we need mutual aid i think i identified three or four areas and i
02:27:43 i identified three or four areas and i named some people who i thought might be a good resource for the authority to speak to because they were people who either got experience or were experts in those fields so at that point i didn't
02:27:55 those fields so at that point i didn't say activate the london gold arrangements did you have that in mind i don't think i had that in mind at that point at that point you know we're still right at the beginning of this
02:28:08 it is very much a responsibility of a chief executive looking strategically to determine these matters and the training had been there and and the london gold arrangements were all about that
02:28:20 arrangements were all about that um i certainly knew we needed or should be looking at mutual aid i said we needed mutual aid in certain areas at that point i didn't say that we needed formal london local authority gold but
02:28:33 formal london local authority gold but was it not obvious to you by that point this is 10 o'clock now you know there are fatalities you know there are mass displaced people we've already seen numbers in the hundreds you've got at least by now five rest centers or
02:28:45 least by now five rest centers or centers of some kind in operation was it not obvious by that point that london the london gold resolution should be triggered as opposed to seeking mutual a piecemeal from other boroughs
02:28:57 not in the same i mean i understand you're asking me a very clear question not i didn't get that sense yet at that point of the full london gold part parts and that's what the
02:29:09 and that's what the the council gold strategic meeting ought to have been considering later on um the because of the the purpose of of a council gold strategic group is to look at
02:29:21 look at what are the bigger issues what are the resourcing needs and if at that point that assessment had been made they would have been able to trigger those points my job in my last bits that morning were
02:29:33 my job in my last bits that morning were to give those last bits of advice
02:29:38 it was a quite short meeting i think i don't think i had much to say because mr priestley would have been saying most of anything else my bit really was a last ask before i go
02:29:49 my bit really was a last ask before i go look this is bigger than we can deal with there are some particular areas and at that point that was my professional advice the london sorry the council gold
02:30:01 the london sorry the council gold meeting had the ability to consider just how much more might be needed and from there there were the roots if they needed it or wanted to do so now those are commands
02:30:12 wanted to do so now those are commands decisions that were taken after i was there and above my level my levels to give the advice i gave i'm clear i did give that advice i didn't say activate london gold because i didn't think in
02:30:24 london gold because i didn't think in those terms at that point and frankly that wasn't for me to think at that level anyway that was for mr holgate to do so now you identified a number of names you gave
02:30:35 names you gave uh and they're listed in your lot yes john baradel who was the chief executive of the city of london corporate and chair of the lap yep
02:30:46 and chair of the lap yep kelly who was chief executive at southwark and uh andrew meek who you've described already who was of haringey what was your res what was the response you received to your advice that this incident was
02:30:57 your advice that this incident was bigger than any one local authority in london could manage and considerations should be given to seeking mutual aid i don't have ever any recollection of what was said i'm aware that mr priestly did lock a
02:31:09 i'm aware that mr priestly did lock a response
02:31:10 response i i don't have a recollection of what the response was right
02:31:15 right did you form the impression that senior management nicholas hillgate himself was was reluctant to seek mutual aid at that point i don't have any opinion about that i think those were
02:31:26 opinion about that i think those were literally my last words and i think at that point i left um i'm not even sure that the rest of the meeting had finished but certainly i think that was literally my last i'm out of the door here and that's the last thing i'm
02:31:37 here and that's the last thing i'm saying right sorry
02:31:40 sorry let's um let's look at rbk3013318
02:31:46 this is stuart priestley's log again
02:31:56 and if we go to page two
02:32:08 oh sorry paige we need to stop it it is on page two but i think we need to pick it up at page one at the foot but this this goes back earlier
02:32:19 earlier in the morning to 6 30 and the and the meeting in the back that you described earlier uh and um if you
02:32:30 you go to the very foot of the page he says robert that robert black reported he had attended the site and it was very serious indeed you see that and then over the page to page two
02:32:42 and then over the page to page two very serious indeed and then he says nicholas advises he has spoken with the leader who has agreed to fund anything necessary for the relief of effort david advised nicholas
02:32:53 advised nicholas of the mutual aid arrangements available via llag and our neighboring borough so just pausing there did you give that advice at that time
02:33:04 did you give that advice at that time or was it at the 10 o'clock meeting or both
02:33:07 both i certainly gave the very clear statement i gave at the 10 o'clock meeting right and i remember that because that was my last before i left
02:33:18 because that was my last before i left i
02:33:19 i this is one of these bits of this amorphous stuff in the back and all the rest of it when it says a meeting if it happened at all which i'm sure it did it would have been us standing around not a sats down meeting
02:33:30 sats down meeting uh this is one of those ones i absolutely don't recall i accept somebody else's statement of that if they were there but i i don't have a recollection of talking to nicholas and robert in that room
02:33:42 to nicholas and robert in that room i can remember very clearly robert black looking absolutely shattered at the 10 o'clock meeting um i'm not saying i didn't i'm not saying i didn't say these words i'm sorry this is this that part of my brain that's just not remembering
02:33:56 of my brain that's just not remembering things at that point it goes on um nicholas um it goes on uh david advised nicholas of the mutual aid arrangements available via lng in our
02:34:07 arrangements available via lng in our neighboring boroughs nicholas stated that looks like we can't cope do you remember that absolutely no recollection of that the conversation on mutual aid at that point ceased is that
02:34:18 mutual aid at that point ceased is that right i i i have an absolutely no recollection of this discussion i'm not saying it didn't take place i i just don't have a recollection of this discussion do you have a recollection of an impression at the very least that in
02:34:29 an impression at the very least that in those early hours the concern of the most senior levels within rbkc was that to seek outside help would look like a sign of weakness i don't have anything of that i know i was talking about mutual aid i don't have any remembered
02:34:42 mutual aid i don't have any remembered impression of negativity well i i suspect i'll get the same answer but let me keep trying can you think of any justifiable reason at the time or any advantage for our bkc in not seeking mutual aid i either at 6
02:34:55 in not seeking mutual aid i either at 6 30 or six o'clock a.m or or at ten o'clock no it was an absolute given in my mind that we were at the point where this is a massive disaster and we need mutual aid and that's what the mutual
02:35:07 mutual aid and that's what the mutual aid arrangements are for uh that so that's that's why i would have been giving that advice from word go
02:35:16 and
02:35:19 you don't recall any pushback on that from nicholas holgate on the basis that it might look like like be casey couldn't i don't recall the meeting at all that took place in the back here i don't recall the outcome of what i s
02:35:31 don't recall the outcome of what i s after what i said in the ten o'clock meeting i mean i think i literally said it and i think i was sort of up and out um i
02:35:38 um i i don't recall that i'm not saying it didn't happen but you'll have to ask mr priestley and others about it um i i don't recall very well i'm desperately sorry about that but i just don't
02:35:50 but i just don't now let's turn to a different topic which is the the deployment of rbkc's staff to rest centers we've heard that the british red cross stuff was sent to belushi's bar and then the harrow club
02:36:01 belushi's bar and then the harrow club if we could turn to the emergency log the brc maintained this is that brc605
02:36:10 if we go please to page four
02:36:13 four which is the 530 time mark at the very foot of your screen very foot of the page we've seen it before um
02:36:22 um asked
02:36:26 if if you go over the page to page five last line in the entry asked where rc managers were but did not get an answer and then 645 contacted beck
02:36:41 you could see last item contacted back trying to locate rbkc ayalo that must be lelo i'd have thought is that right i don't think i've heard of a yellow i'm
02:36:52 i don't think i've heard of a yellow i'm sorry which line are we on the last one 6 45 contacted back i'm sorry i'm trying to locate rbkc oh i would imagine that would be yeah or rc staff and then 740 if you look down just to
02:37:04 and then 740 if you look down just to the foot of your screen can we scroll down a bit more please just have that there 740
02:37:10 there 740 it says um uh rwlpt trust as rc lead still no rbkc staff
02:37:19 staff and then at 8 15 if we turn please
02:37:24 please to the foot of the screen i chased housing and social care advised on way and then at 9 15 uh chased housing and social care advised on way and last ever leaf if you
02:37:36 advised on way and last ever leaf if you go please to page 6 10 30 chase housing and social care advised on way
02:37:43 way airwave terminals and efa kit on site it looks from this at least that from 5 30 a.m as i've just shown you the british red cross made
02:37:54 british red cross made a number of requests to to the council spanning some five hours for updates about when our bkc staff would attend the rest centers to provide support
02:38:05 support that's what the log shows do you accept that that is what happened i accept that log um i will repeat that i was not there
02:38:16 i was not there after 10 20 at all i was not in the back very much from the time i arrived i was mainly out of the back in other rooms during other matters i wasn't running the bag i'm aware that
02:38:28 i wasn't running the bag i'm aware that we had
02:38:30 we had people from social care and manage and housing management were in the back my assumption is from these logs that clearly they would have been involved in resourcing staffing but i wasn't there
02:38:42 resourcing staffing but i wasn't there it's not something that i can answer for the simple reason i don't have that knowledge
02:38:47 knowledge right who was the person continuously in the back
02:38:52 the back who was fielding and all responsible for receiving this information and acting on it i don't know if that was one individual person i know there were several people in the back i no idea
02:39:03 several people in the back i no idea because i wasn't there to say how that was actually being handled right who ought it to have been according to the structures and systems you had in place um i would have expected from the
02:39:15 um i would have expected from the systems and structures we had in place that any bec staff sitting at their terminals and with their phones would received calls and or received emails and then would have given that information to any others in the room
02:39:26 information to any others in the room that might have been involved in those operations do you know when rbk staff were eventually deployed to rest centers i don't myself no now rebecca blackburn tells us in her
02:39:38 now rebecca blackburn tells us in her statement that rbk staff from the housing department from adult social care and children's services were deployed by her to rest centers at about 10 a.m can you help with that or will you
02:39:50 can you help with that or will you no it sounds like the sort of thing that might well have happened and and sounds appropriate but i don't know that because i wasn't there that's what she says but you've got no reason to disagree i've got no reason to disagree but as i say i wasn't there are
02:40:02 disagree but as i say i wasn't there are you able to explain why our bkc staff were not deployed to rest centers earlier
02:40:06 earlier no
02:40:09 do you agree that they should have been deployed earlier for example at 6am i think in hindsight yes absolutely they should have been yes i mean as a category one responder and a local authority responsible for opening
02:40:20 local authority responsible for opening and operating rest centers are you able to account for the delay in sending rbkc to personal personnel to rest centers so late
02:40:27 late i think a combination of the lack of trained staff in that role ourselves the
02:40:34 the lack of getting in the mutual aid at that point which we'd already recognized that we could have done um and i think probably a little bit overwhelmed by the overall speed and the circumstances
02:40:45 circumstances is not satisfactory now we've heard so far in this module evidence from family members desperate to find information about their loved ones with homes
02:40:55 homes in the tower that in the centers that they visited in the early hours and into the day of the 14th of june they saw nobody nobody from our bkc are
02:41:06 they saw nobody nobody from our bkc are you able to explain why not i can't i am aware from a list that was compiled afterwards that we had at least 340 named staff working in the air in the day
02:41:16 the day i'm aware that there's a lot of criticism that they weren't visible as such
02:41:23 such but i
02:41:24 but i look
02:41:25 look i keep coming back to the fact that by that time in the morning i was no longer running this matter and i was out i wasn't there during the daytime there were all sorts of activities that i'm sure other people reported that were
02:41:36 sure other people reported that were taking place during the course of that day
02:41:39 day um
02:41:41 um i i can't answer you i'm sorry i was not there
02:41:45 there from what you do know did the delay in deployment of rbkc staff to rest centers or centers whatever they were cause a vacuum of support which the local
02:41:56 vacuum of support which the local community and voluntary organizations stepped in to fill the local community organizations and modest organizations certainly provided support and sucker for people at that particular point in terms of information
02:42:08 particular point in terms of information about loved ones in the tower i find it difficult to believe that anybody would have been able to assemble that sort of information in that time scale with any certainty given the nature of what was going on
02:42:19 going on um
02:42:20 um certainly
02:42:22 certainly it would have helped had we had some senior managers earlier at those rest centres to be able to feed back and start to strategize the consolidation later on
02:42:31 later on but i am aware that from having seen other people's things subsequent to the events that an awful lot of work was done during that day whether there was visibility or not but i think others i'm sure you will be
02:42:43 but i think others i'm sure you will be questioning in the course of this inquiry about those activities i would feel much more comfortable about them representing what they did and when those happened than me trying to make some guesses here at this point let me show you what rebecca blackburn
02:42:55 let me show you what rebecca blackburn says in her in her statement please can we get back to it it's derby k3035364
02:43:02 page five
02:43:08 if we go to paragraph 22
02:43:14 she says
02:43:17 uh
02:43:20 there
02:43:27 indeed it's the whole paragraph but picking it up in the middle she says although i did not have decision-making capacity i felt someone needed to take the lead in the end i decided to let the teams go around ten o'clock i think they should have
02:43:38 ten o'clock i think they should have been sent earlier maybe around six after the teams left i received an email about deployments sue harris told us that the westway centre had opened as a rest center it turned out that the other rest
02:43:49 center it turned out that the other rest centers were not set up by the borough but by third parties david left at around 10 40 a.m but leaving aside the point of your departure are you do you have a comment to make or
02:44:00 are you do you have a comment to make or do you agree or disagree with what she says in the rest of the paragraph i've read to you well i wasn't there so i can't agree or disagree with that it i can understand the sense of that it certainly says there were senior
02:44:11 certainly says there were senior managers from housing and social care and children's services involved these are the sorts of level of people that you would expect to be taking decisions about finding and deploying staff of those roles
02:44:24 and she says above that that nobody in the back could tell her which rest center had the most people that made it difficult to match resources to need was that a problem that you were aware of
02:44:35 that a problem that you were aware of um i think i'm generically aware that that was an issue a lot of community centers opening up very difficult to know who was in them at that particular time i believe that later in the day
02:44:46 time i believe that later in the day much more information was coming in and that enables the consolidation at the westway center let's then turn to office of assistance and go back to andrew meek
02:44:58 and go back to andrew meek who we've touched on earlier and whose name was in the list of the names that you gave nicholas holgate at the 10 o'clock meeting and he in fact he was also referred to at the 6 30 scg meeting as we saw that
02:45:10 at the 6 30 scg meeting as we saw that yesterday
02:45:11 yesterday or earlier this morning and earlier this morning
02:45:14 morning um
02:45:15 um can we go please first then in that context to gol401055
02:45:24 this is an email
02:45:29 sent by toby gould
02:45:33 gould if you look halfway down the email run to
02:45:40 to andrew meek at 7 11 on the 14th of june toby gould is london fire and he says andrew thank you for your email
02:45:49 email i know that you're on leave this week david kerry was going to call you re-advice on humanitarian assistance arrangements for the ongoing incident in k and c
02:45:57 k and c read the southwark h a s g i'll be there this morning numbers and attendees have been limited so far as possible by the chair uh toby now i'm not sure that the southern ahasg has got much to do with
02:46:09 southern ahasg has got much to do with it but um can you help with what that is relevant to ah was that a difference was that a different incident oh sorry the southwark uh humanitarian syrian group i think were they still dealing with the
02:46:20 think were they still dealing with the aftermath of the incident on london bridge so i think that i think that was a
02:46:26 a the ongoing humanitarian assistance center from that right uh now um it's not clear to us whether you were copied into toby gould's email to andrew meek but you are copied into andrew
02:46:37 meek but you are copied into andrew meek's response just above that as you can see yes yes and that comes at 8 54 on that morning toby david yes on leave but we'll take a call
02:46:46 call i think i
02:46:47 i think i might have missed one but didn't recognize the number andrew
02:46:53 andrew uh
02:46:56 how had you attempted to contact andrew meek at that time i don't have any recollection of doing so i don't i mean i don't recollect this email again it's obviously there um at
02:47:09 email again it's obviously there um at that point i don't recollect it certainly i don't have any memory and i have no log i don't think of of of attempting to phone andrew me it's not in your log and it's not in your notebook no so i'm i'm quite happy to
02:47:20 notebook no so i'm i'm quite happy to say that i i didn't realize given that it's tony gould who's writing to him first can you help whether it was he who had had contacted andrew meek
02:47:33 who had had contacted andrew meek um reading that email below
02:47:37 below that infers that
02:47:39 that toby and i must have had some contact with each other about that um
02:47:44 um i mean i don't record it but that clearly suggests that we had had so clearly i was still talking about that mutual aid um whether or not i said at that point i'll make the call i don't know i
02:47:55 i'll make the call i don't know i imagine that i simply got swamps thereafter and probably left it that i had given the advice to gold about the mutual aid well um there's just piecing this together
02:48:06 together in the second line there it says david kerry was going to call you re-advice on humanitarian assistance arrangements for the ongoing incident in knc
02:48:15 knc do you remember having a conversation with toby gould uh deputy head of london resilience before 7 11 on the morning of the 14th uh i don't have a specific memory of
02:48:27 uh i don't have a specific memory of this conversation about this matter i was that morning fielding calls left right and center it's entirely absolutely probable that toby gold at some point might have had a chat with me
02:48:39 some point might have had a chat with me i regret that this is you know we're in that stage where i was doing stuff and i can't remember after the event now
02:48:54 now andrew meek tells us in his um statement that he didn't get in touch well you didn't get in touch by the time of um
02:49:05 um his 854 email uh
02:49:09 uh all the later emails um let's look at the next one at gol401052
02:49:18 we have another email this time from andrew meek to toby gould copying you in and setting out his immediate recommendations as you can see now just just pausing that did you have
02:49:31 now just just pausing that did you have a conversation between
02:49:34 between with that with either toby gould or andrew meek by this point and i say at this point this is as as i say at 10 23. at 10 20 excuse me
02:49:48 at 10 23 i either i had either just left or was in the process of leaving the town hall
02:49:57 and the immediate recommendations are ffrc as soon as poss bbc reporting people wandering from center to center looking for loved ones best to keep these people in one place with support
02:50:08 with support two appoint halo and plan first hasg for the pm
02:50:12 the pm three prepare for an assistance center assume many practical and emotional needs some very complex four use housing lists as basis for assessing individual needs appoint an information officer to maintain the
02:50:24 information officer to maintain the record of who is affected and how five mutual aid question mark andrew now um the email was copied to you but as you say you are in the process of leaving i think according to you you've
02:50:35 leaving i think according to you you've already left do you remember seeing this email at the time
02:50:40 time i don't recall seeing that email i do recall this i think some of these issues had been were on the gold group meeting later that day and i think some of those actions may have been taken that's that's me seeing stuff after the event
02:50:51 that's me seeing stuff after the event um i i don't have a recollection of this clearly that will have been in my email box along with hundreds of other emails but i i don't have today a recollection of that now andrew meek tells us in his
02:51:03 of that now andrew meek tells us in his statement it's paragraph um when it's page two of his statement it's unparagraphed but he says he received an automatic reply stating that you were no longer on duty for this incident i've got that at 10
02:51:14 for this incident i've got that at 10 23. i did something right then well um the question that follows from that is did you share this information with anybody
02:51:23 anybody um
02:51:24 um it sounds like i did the sensible thing by putting it out of office when i finished duty and that would have been so that people didn't email me expecting people to pick me up i can't remember i expect but i can't remember if that
02:51:36 i expect but i can't remember if that out of office then said forward your emails to the back which were doing a sensible thing certainly if toby gold got a email from me saying i was now off duty i would have expected him to make other contact
02:51:48 have expected him to make other contact with the borough right do you know what steps were taken by you with respect to the recommendations andrew meek made here
02:51:55 here i think it's likely that i didn't receive that as such i had finished i had certain way out of office so that i would have left that for wherever it then went but where
02:52:10 well to the back i would have expected but when you let's just work this through when you put your out of office on did that tell the recipient to send their email to somebody else and
02:52:22 send their email to somebody else and provide the email address or did that happen automatically well it was not an automatic i would have set manually that out of office message um and i think no recollection of what that writer was
02:52:33 no recollection of what that writer was out of office message was at this point i'd be delighted to see it my practice would have been i hope i followed my practice would have been to say where they should reroute the the
02:52:46 say where they should reroute the the email
02:52:48 email well i was going to ask you when you left to go did you
02:52:54 tell stewart priestley or rebecca blackburn
02:52:57 blackburn to pick up your email so that you could collect any incoming information or advice such as this no they wouldn't have been able to collect emails from my email box um i would have asked people to resend their email to the back at
02:53:09 to resend their email to the back at rbkc and and the beck would have picked that up right now
02:53:15 now we've heard evidence from kyrie musahi and his sam chuker who were wandering around london desperately seeking information about their loved ones at this time
02:53:26 about their loved ones at this time why was no ffrc already established to help people in their position i don't know
02:53:32 know they should have been shouldn't there would you accept that again
02:53:37 again in the guidance and the plans and the context was they put an ffrc wouldn't normally have been something immediately it would have emerged later in the day
02:53:49 in the day if a need for that emerged we're talking here about an incredibly complex and compressed situation um i also at an ffrc by the way it is very unlikely that the frc would have
02:54:01 very unlikely that the frc would have any information to give to a family or friend or a loved one their role for the police is actually to gather information which they can collate with the casualty bureau as part of the identification
02:54:14 bureau as part of the identification um so so so people will turn up in the other incidents at an ffrc hoping to be told something in actual fact they were being asked information it was very rare for an ffrc to actually have that
02:54:27 for an ffrc to actually have that information at that stage but wouldn't it be the case that if an ffrc was was established and that information was broadcast then at least people
02:54:38 at least people in the position of carry musal he or he sam chuker or nabil shuket would know where to go there'd be a central point where they would know where to go rather than wandering around london
02:54:50 rather than wandering around london checking from hospital to hospital and going in and out of the west way
02:54:57 yes is the answer i i mean i'm sorry my hesitation was because i'm thinking of the circumstances of the time and and and and the time running all that through absolutely yes if somebody does
02:55:08 through absolutely yes if somebody does come in and if there's an ffl rc there there would have been a person for those people to go to and it clearly there wasn't at that particular point and it came later in the afternoon the question is why i mean you've got you've got large numbers of desperate people
02:55:20 large numbers of desperate people terribly worried about their family looking at the building burning and having absolutely no means of knowing where to get any information let alone get the information itself
02:55:31 information itself information about casualties would always come from the metropolitan police as per the leslip major incident management procedures and the local authority would never be a disseminator of information about casualties
02:55:44 of information about casualties so in that respect i think that's why the ffrc has a met police-led matter again it's a support by the local authority to support the police in dealing with that but it's a met police-led matter because they have the
02:55:57 police-led matter because they have the primary responsibility for giving casualty information absolutely not the local authority so by that protocol i think the question ought to be redirected to the met police as to why they didn't open one at that point well
02:56:09 they didn't open one at that point well that's a slightly different answer to a slightly different question my question is directed at you the council
02:56:15 council and
02:56:17 and the question is how come
02:56:20 how come people in those positions were left with not only no information about their loved ones but no information about the system for getting it the place to go wandering around in the streets which
02:56:31 wandering around in the streets which were chaotic with no means of obtaining any information and the impression that they got and you've heard their evidence is that the system that was supposed to be there to protect them and to inform them had simply disappeared
02:56:43 them had simply disappeared are you able to account for for that
02:56:48 for that no i think the best i can say is with the sheer scale of what we were dealing with at that point there wasn't nice neat
02:57:00 nice neat do this do that do the other i'm afraid we were grasping at that i accept that the authority at large did not provide some of the facilities as early as it would have been good too
02:57:12 as early as it would have been good too and on behalf of the authority i again extend an apology for that that leads on to another question which and whether this is our bkc or whether this is london wide or whether this is national
02:57:24 national it sounds from what you're saying that the scale of grenfell was too large and too
02:57:30 and too multifaceted to be to be catered for by the existing contingency arrangements yes i think that's a fair statement i think this was beyond a single borough a set of
02:57:41 beyond a single borough a set of arrangements to deal with and i think i made preference earlier you were kind enough to give me some space to say that you know this is something that i hope the inquiry will look at about scale and about how the capital city
02:57:54 about how the capital city makes a response not just a 133rd sliver but that gives rise to another question forgive me which is how come the contingency arrangements in london weren't
02:58:05 weren't equipped
02:58:06 equipped for
02:58:07 for an incident of this scale i don't think an incident this scales in the risk register i think over the years the development of london's local authority and other emergency arrangements were all based on evidence
02:58:18 arrangements were all based on evidence sorry on the experience year by year of incidents as they came through
02:58:22 through and i believe that we all thought at that time that the arrangements that we were continually across the agencies uh enhancing uh via way of experience and
02:58:33 enhancing uh via way of experience and through exercises had the structures in place for that i think this grenfell tower incident has exposed uh an area of weakness there and london needs to
02:58:44 weakness there and london needs to address that going back to the andrew meek advice was that not a missed opportunity to use his experience and put those recommendations immediately into effect oh absolutely
02:58:55 immediately into effect oh absolutely which is why i was advising that the authority seek mutual aid and why i named the individuals that i named i knew these were people who would have good advice
02:59:06 good advice can you account for why it was the case that the halo and indeed the first hasg the
02:59:12 the humanitarian assistance support group meeting did not take place until the following day the 15th of june i can't because i wasn't involved in those commands decision making or the practical decision-making of that
02:59:24 practical decision-making of that i would simply not have an excuse or anything but simply say that certainly the planning assumptions within those documents and plans were always referred to an hsg sorry
02:59:35 sorry a humanitarian assistance center being established about 48 hours after the incident so within that this was certainly within the time scale
02:59:46 this was certainly within the time scale of the existing planning assumptions for that facility
02:59:52 yes thank you mr german is that a convenient moment yes it is thank you very much well mr kerry it's time we all had a break to get some lunch so we'll stop there we'll resume please at two o'clock
03:00:02 o'clock and as before please don't discuss your evidence with anyone while you're out of the room thank you thank you very much
03:00:16 thank you very much mr millet two o'clock please
03:00:25 you