Laura Johnson, former RBKC Director of Housing, gives evidence about emergency planning failures and the chaotic aftermath response. Reveals housing contingency plans were not updated or exercised, staff were unaware of procedures, and the department struggled to accommodate displaced residents.
00:00:28 hmm good morning everyone welcome to today's theory today we're going to hear another witness from the rbkc yes mr keaton good morning mr chairman
00:00:39 yes mr keaton good morning mr chairman good morning members of the panel could i call laura johnson please thank you
00:00:53 good morning ms johnson you're going to affirm i think is that right that's correct uh the words should be on the screen in front of you would you read them out please i do solemnly sincerely and truly declare and affirm that the evidence i
00:01:05 declare and affirm that the evidence i shall give shall be the truth the whole truth and nothing but the truth thank you very much please sit down and make yourself comfortable
00:01:17 yes mr keating thank you ms johnson welcome back to the inquiry thank you again for attending the inquiry and to assist with our investigations and by giving evidence
00:01:28 investigations and by giving evidence just a few introductory matters and matters which i'm no doubt you're familiar with from your last attendance at the inquiry but firstly could i invite you to keep your voice up so the transcriber who sits to your rights can
00:01:39 transcriber who sits to your rights can capture what you say also in that vein if you could avoid nodding or shaking your head that will be picked up by the transcript and if you have difficulty in
00:01:50 and if you have difficulty in answering or understanding any of my questions just let me know and i'm sure it's my fault and i can rephrase it and lastly at any stage if you need a break do let us know we will take a break mid-morning and mid-afternoon is
00:02:02 break mid-morning and mid-afternoon is that okay that's fine a few formal matters you've provided a number of statements to this inquiry and specifically in relation to the aftermath module you've provided two statements which we're just going to
00:02:13 statements which we're just going to look at and identify if we could turn to or bk triple zero three five five nine two please we see the front page that's your first statement and if you could turn to page
00:02:25 statement and if you could turn to page 26 please
00:02:30 and it's dated the 26th of january 2019 and could you confirm that to your signature yes i can thank you and your second statement is at obk zero 57957
00:02:48 that's the front page of your second witness statement and if you could turn to page six please
00:02:54 it's dated the 12th of march 2020 and again could you confirm that is your statement please and signature yes i can and you've had the opportunity i understand to read those statements
00:03:05 understand to read those statements recently is that correct that's correct and can you confirm that the contents of those statements are true to the best of your beliefs yes understanding thank you and background if we could deal with that briefly ms johnson
00:03:18 that briefly ms johnson can you confirm that you've worked in housing for local authorities and housing associations for over 20 years and a significant proportion that time has been working in london for a number of local authorities that's correct
00:03:31 of local authorities that's correct is it right that you joined or bkc in february 2009 initially as a sikhandi and you became a permanent employee as director of housing in 2010. that's correct and you held
00:03:44 in 2010. that's correct and you held that that position up until june 2017 as of june 2017 as of july 2017. thank you and you no longer are with or bkc is that correct that's correct
00:03:56 that correct that's correct so
00:03:57 so during that period over seven years you're working at rbkc that's eight years
00:04:02 years as a role as director of housing could you assist us what that role entailed yes
00:04:08 yes my responsibilities covered homelessness and housing advice housing finance housing regeneration and housing development um and the relationship managing the
00:04:19 um and the relationship managing the relationship with rbk with k c tmo okay so you mentioned four departments which you um were responsible for managing and is it right that you had a team of
00:04:30 is it right that you had a team of around 120 people that's correct and as of june 2017 was your line manager nicholas holgate that's correct the town clerk slash chief executive for
00:04:41 the town clerk slash chief executive for vkc that's correct i'm going to turn to the role your role in an emergency okay and let's deal with plans first were you
00:04:53 and let's deal with plans first were you familiar with the rbkc emergency plan which is known as the contingency management plan yes i had read that plan and i wonder if you could assist us in clarifying some matters around other
00:05:04 clarifying some matters around other possible plans please which you touch upon your statement if you could turn to your second witness statement that's obk triple zero five seven nine five seven please at page one
00:05:18 and if we focus at the bottom of page one there's a question there that you were asked by the inquiry please provide a copy of the housing resilience plan referred to a paragraph 10 of your first statement
00:05:29 statement and we could see the answer overleaf at the top of page 2. and your answer is this i gave an incorrect name in paragraph 10 my first statement the resilience plan
00:05:40 my first statement the resilience plan as refer as referenced was actually called a business continuity plan this was updated electronically we reviewed the escalations for instance with the kensington and chelsea tmo
00:05:52 with the kensington and chelsea tmo following the dare fire and the plan was updated accordingly and you were unable to obtain a paper copy of this plan i'll return to adair and the lessons in
00:06:03 i'll return to adair and the lessons in relation to that in a moment but can you assist how did the business and continuity plan interact if at all with the contingency management plan in an emergency so it's my understanding
00:06:15 in an emergency so it's my understanding that we had a business continuity plan that was asked to be produced by um corporately by the emergency planning team
00:06:25 team i cannot to be honest with you remember how often we updated it or how regularly it was updated but it was a corporate request that the housing department and indeed all departments of the council have a
00:06:37 departments of the council have a continuity plan um and therefore it would interact with the with the central emergency plan and was that an internal plan in other words internally how you would
00:06:49 words internally how you would operate in an emergency if there was some difficulty or was it external it was an internal plan it was a plan produced by the housing department that set out
00:06:58 set out how we would respond in the case of an emergency
00:07:03 emergency the second area of clarification relates to the existence of a housing contingency plan and your former colleague venice augustine she was an obkc homelessness team manager refers to this in statement
00:07:15 team manager refers to this in statement should inquiry and perhaps we could look at that as obk triple zero three five four one one at paragraph seven please
00:07:31 okay so this is her statement and she's asked a question about policies procedures and plans and she says this during emergencies the borrower responses coordinated to the borough emergency control center
00:07:44 borough emergency control center there's a specific written policy setting out what to do in emergency for several departments including the housing department and she produces a copy this document is the housing contingency plan date of
00:07:55 the housing contingency plan date of issue july 2012.
00:07:59 we've got a reference to that of assist you to look at it but was there such a document in place as of june 2017 housing contingency plan um
00:08:10 um if it was the one from july 2012 that would have been the one that was in place but i don't remember doing one more recently up until june 2017. well let's assist you by opening that
00:08:21 well let's assist you by opening that document up it's obk triple zero three four
00:08:27 four please
00:08:33 so we can identify from page 1 housing contingency plan for emergencies and business continuity disruptions page one
00:08:43 page one if we scroll down to page two we can see the date at the bottom issue number one and that's july 2012 and perhaps we could go to page five
00:08:55 and perhaps we could go to page five please
00:09:01 and paragraph 1.2 aim the aim of the housing agency plan is to support and expand on the or bkc contingency management plan
00:09:12 contingency management plan if you look at 1.4 please which is at the bottom of that page training and exercising this plan will be exercised at least once annually to ensure it delivers an efficient and effective response to
00:09:23 an efficient and effective response to emergencies from housing department and it mentions introduction to contingency management training is available through the council student centre
00:09:31 centre training shall be offered for key staff with managerial responsibilities and employment of this plan all new staff inductions will include an explanation of housing contingency plan
00:09:44 just in relation to that at the moment does this assist your recollection was this
00:09:49 this plan or this type plan in existence in the housing department as of june 2017 if there was one in existence then um and if there isn't an updated copy from
00:10:00 and if there isn't an updated copy from july
00:10:01 july 2012 then it was likely that this copy was the one that was in existence at the time of june 2017. and do you recall exercising a plan like this once annually to ensure it delivers an
00:10:13 once annually to ensure it delivers an efficient and effective response to emergencies from the housing department no and how comfortable or confident are you now looking back as to whether this sort of
00:10:24 looking back as to whether this sort of plan was being utilized or there was awareness of this back in june 2017. i'm not confident that it was utilized and or that the wider housing staff team were aware of it in june 2017. and can
00:10:37 were aware of it in june 2017. and can you say why that was that it wasn't being utilized or there wasn't that knowledge in relation to it it was something that we were asked to do corporately um
00:10:50 do corporately um it would be my expectation that there would be a corporate directive that it was updated on an annual basis that doesn't excuse the fact as director of housing that i also should have prompted to have it updated on an annual
00:11:01 prompted to have it updated on an annual basis
00:11:02 basis and i didn't so um emergency planning i viewed at that time as being as part of a large corporate organization that was something that i would be asked to do or instructed to do
00:11:13 would be asked to do or instructed to do by the corporate center and therefore i would then organize it uh on a department-based departmental basis but i did not take responsibility myself for ensuring that was in place on an annual
00:11:24 ensuring that was in place on an annual basis
00:11:25 basis so we talked about the internal housing department plan
00:11:31 plan in relation to the wider or bkc contingency management plan you said that you were aware of that yes it was
00:11:38 it was in relation to your staff what was your view as to awareness of the contingency management plan back in june 2017 um
00:11:49 um i don't know if my staff are aware of it i am
00:11:52 i am it would have been available on the council's intranet um and there would have been advice and information available um about it but i am not aware of the event of the information that my
00:12:03 of the event of the information that my staff would have had about the contingency plan can you just help me with this um were you yourself conscious of what said in paragraph one four
00:12:17 um not at june 2017 no well i'm thinking of the years leading up to june 2017 what i really welcome your help on is whether you were aware that there was this plan which included
00:12:30 this plan which included a provision that it should be exercised annually
00:12:34 annually i was aware of the plan but
00:12:37 but i wasn't familiar enough with it to know that there was a provision in there at 1.4 that this needed to be exercised annually so it was drafted i read it um and then i didn't revisit it so no i
00:12:49 um and then i didn't revisit it so no i didn't take it on board that there was something that i needed to do on an annual basis in order to keep this plan and the training of my team up to date on that basis well that's very helpful thank you very much thank you thank you and just following
00:13:01 thank you thank you and just following on from the question from the chairman in relation to 1.4 it says training shall be offered for key staff with managerial responsibilities and employment of this plan
00:13:12 employment of this plan in relation to training and perhaps we could you could assist with your training
00:13:17 training um in relation to contingent management plan did you have any specific training um i had
00:13:24 um i had attended a training event in 2015 that was put on by the emergency planning team but i didn't have any other formal training on contingency management planning
00:13:38 if we once we have this document open let's deal with 1.7 please which is um the following page page seven in fact it's not page six page seven
00:13:49 seven and it says this relationship with other partners
00:13:54 talks about housing department delivering frontline services this covers the following the tmo registered providers formerly known as housing associations moving on to the next sentence all of these partners have their own emergency
00:14:06 these partners have their own emergency planning procedures in place but may call upon the council for further assistance and housing staff should consult this document in responding to any requests for assistance i'm just going to move on to two point
00:14:18 i'm just going to move on to two point page seven two point one two please it's actually overleaf forgive me i paid seven
00:14:26 the following type of scenario imagine a major emergency may occur in housing requires staff to implement contingency planning that talks about local residents needing to
00:14:37 talks about local residents needing to be decanted on an emergency basis due to fire gas leak major service failure in this type of scenario registered providers supportive housing providers and tmo will be expected to follow their
00:14:48 and tmo will be expected to follow their own emergency procedures which include the following types of responses and it sets out the responses there attending the site alerts the council's contingency planning team
00:14:59 planning team and where tenants service users need to be decanted people should be advised to stay with families and friends b b
00:15:06 b b b b's hotels can be booked and emergency residents can be made available was that your understanding of the position as of june 2017 yes it was
00:15:20 you mentioned your first statement which we don't need to look at paragraph 13 that the housing department learned a great deal from what had and had not worked
00:15:29 worked with regard to emergency planning as a result of a dare house fire which took their tower fire which took place on the 31st of october 2015. is that correct yes it is
00:15:40 yes it is and you say your department led by amanda johnson had a meeting with david curry and a tmo to review procedure and improve practice in april 2016. is that correct that's correct
00:15:52 correct that's correct and a couple of aspects of the minutes that meeting which perhaps you could assist us upon and they're at obk quadruple zero four six six zero
00:16:07 so this is the meeting on the 11th of april
00:16:10 april 2016.
00:16:12 2016. follow up on the adair tower fire you're not an intendee firstly in relation to that so you weren't at this meeting but it may be that you were made aware of the contents of this minute in due
00:16:24 of the contents of this minute in due course and perhaps if we look at this it may assist your recollection if we look at page two please
00:16:33 and under call out of the housing department in the middle of the page second bullet point we've agreed that any significant incident involving or bkc
00:16:44 incident involving or bkc tmo managed properties will include an alert to directly to housing senior management in other words that housing will be alerted straight away
00:16:55 alerted straight away and we turn to page the second bullet point page three please
00:17:04 confirms that they can liaise with tmo to get full details of vulnerable evacuated
00:17:09 evacuated tenants
00:17:11 tenants so in relation to first point you mentioned that your statement that was alert lessons learned that housing needs to be informed if there's a major incident yes and there's people who have been
00:17:22 been um displaced or decanted to use the phraseology we've heard from from the properties is that correct that's correct in relation to this matter we just looked at about getting details of vulnerable evacuated tenants from the
00:17:34 vulnerable evacuated tenants from the tml was that the case was that what would happen yes because the tmo where the organization that had the information about the tenants who lived in any particular property we didn't have that
00:17:46 particular property we didn't have that information at the council so they would be our first port of call to ask who lived in the property and did they have any additional information on them about whether they were they were
00:17:57 about whether they were they were vulnerable or not the tma may not have that information because obviously it's up to tenants what information they share with their landlord but if they did then that would be very helpful so in in a situation such as perhaps
00:18:08 so in in a situation such as perhaps grenville or adair if housing were there they would attend and speak to a counterpart in a tmo and ask for information that's correct and what would be your understanding as
00:18:20 and what would be your understanding as to the source of the information that tmo would have um it would be based on their property database
00:18:26 database so they have a list of all the properties um that they rent and all the tenants um and they have a housing management system and on that housing management system
00:18:36 system uh which are common to all housing organizations they would have may or may not have additional information on those tenants
00:18:44 tenants and how
00:18:46 and how if at all would or bkc's adult social care department fit into this process about getting information regarding vulnerable residents in a in an
00:18:57 residents in a in an incident where people have been decanted from a property
00:19:01 property so uh adult social care um if they have involvement with the tenant living in that particular property would have their own information which would uh
00:19:12 their own information which would uh which would provide them with information about anybody that they had been
00:19:15 been they had
00:19:16 they had provided services to or had involvement with
00:19:20 with if adult social care wanted information from the housing department or from the tmo then they would ask myself or a member of my team directly if we had information on that particular
00:19:32 if we had information on that particular individual so two potential sources of information regarding vulnerable residents that's correct
00:19:44 if we move down please to the next action
00:19:47 action on the document which is front of us it says this in a future incident involving more than a couple of or bkc tmo dwellings the lelo that's the local authority liaison officer our
00:19:58 authority liaison officer our contingency planning team that's mr curry's department will attend the site and form a scene incident management group along with housing and tmo representatives
00:20:11 tmo representatives that's something which um was discussed as a process that would assist were you aware of that yes and do you think that would be something that would assist and improve the nature of any response
00:20:22 of any response yes because there would be then a collective place where information uh could be uh ascertained about the people who are impacted by the uh disaster
00:20:33 disaster and then collectively decisions made about how it was best to manage the needs of the people who needed to be re-housed we understand that that was not implemented as a new process by june
00:20:46 implemented as a new process by june 2017 do you know why that was um
00:20:51 um implemented in what way as in their procedure note being drafted and or it wasn't in place um or documented that this was going to be a process in an event of an emergency
00:21:02 event of an emergency um no i don't know why there wasn't a formal uh process map and or addition made to the uh council's contingency plan uh which updated it in this respect
00:21:13 plan uh which updated it in this respect and from your experiences of the 14th of june and someone who attended as we will hear in a moment very early on the 14th of june do you think a scene incident management group would have assisted the
00:21:25 management group would have assisted the response
00:21:28 um i think on the 14th of june it was such it was such an enormous incident of such overwhelming scale that i'm not sure a scene incident management group would
00:21:40 scene incident management group would have made
00:21:41 have made a great deal of difference because what happened in reality was that the the tmo did provide information based from people on site they did provide it to myself and to my colleagues who were at
00:21:52 myself and to my colleagues who were at the back um and so that happened but it just didn't happen on site at grenfell tower okay i'll return to that comment a little bit later but i just want to deal with a
00:22:04 later but i just want to deal with a little bit more in relation to pre-fire documentation by way of assistance if possible risk registers
00:22:14 registers you refer to maintaining a risk register for housing your first statement a paragraph 11 we don't need to look at it but is it right that the housing risk register was not a risk register within the meaning
00:22:25 not a risk register within the meaning of the civil contingency act um i don't know what a risk register is to be honest with you in the context of the civil contingency act it was a risk register that we were asked to complete
00:22:36 register that we were asked to complete corporately on a quarterly basis and perhaps we could have a maybe we don't need to look at it but i can deal with a little bit shorter so it
00:22:47 can deal with a little bit shorter so it dealt with internal housing department risks in relation to matters which you had to be alive to and try to address as best you
00:22:58 alive to and try to address as best you could is that correct that's correct and one matter to note from this register which as you described was reviewed and updated on a regular basis was a risk in relation to the capacity of temporary accommodation is that
00:23:11 of temporary accommodation is that correct that's correct and you say at paragraph 11 of your statements that you had we the department had significant problems procuring temporary accommodation or how we would re-house
00:23:22 accommodation or how we would re-house significant numbers of people in the event of a fire flood or natural disaster
00:23:29 disaster that's correct can you just give us some idea what was on the risk register i think it might help
00:23:35 help us and others i mean it's quite a short document which just had um very high level risks it didn't go into a huge amount of detail which it didn't uh
00:23:47 which it didn't uh with a more detailed risk register you would expect significant description of controls and mitigations and target scores
00:23:54 scores there was some scoring and there was some description of the risk and there was a limited description of the mitigations that would take place so it was um it was contained normally on one to two pages with high level risks
00:24:06 one to two pages with high level risks uh and a descriptor of the risk and a descriptor of the mitigations and can you give us an example of the sort of risk we're talking about uh so oh uh so other risks on the risk
00:24:18 uh so oh uh so other risks on the risk register would have been around key features of the department such as um temporary accommodation which was a large part of what we did um and about the financial risk of not being able to
00:24:31 the financial risk of not being able to you know procure enough temporary accommodation at the right price and we'll be able to house homeless applicants in sufficient time or to meet our
00:24:40 our requirement um with regard to moving people out of b b all of you know kind of quite high level stuff well we were doing regeneration at the time we're looking at significant estate regeneration and there would
00:24:52 estate regeneration and there would there may well have been highlights about
00:24:54 about um if we couldn't proceed with that and yeah thank you very much thank you so you've mentioned the sort of general high-level risks which you as a department um
00:25:06 department um kept track of and sought to mitigate were possible and one of the identifying risks i drew out was that one in relation to the significant problem procuring temporary accommodation where a number of people
00:25:18 accommodation where a number of people significant number of people were displaced
00:25:20 displaced perhaps we could turn to your statement at paragraph 14 of your first statement please
00:25:31 it's obk triple zero we have there thank you
00:25:36 and picking that up it says discussions did take place about what action we would need to take if we needed to house a significant number of residents in an emergency situation the
00:25:47 residents in an emergency situation the reality however however is that the options for short medium and longer term housing is limited as the majority of the council's housing stock is occupied and rented a residence
00:25:58 and rented a residence the type of combination a council had available for a temporary combination of homeless families would not in all likely be suitable or in the right location
00:26:06 location in an emergency situation we'd use hotels in around the borough following a dare fire in the event of another fire taking place we would brackets depending on the scale follow the same procedure
00:26:20 on the scale follow the same procedure is that correct that's correct so in relation to this plan to respond to the disidentified risk as of june 2017
00:26:28 2017 were there agreements with local hotels or providers accommodation to cater for this event no there was not was there a documented plan as to how to
00:26:39 was there a documented plan as to how to secure hotel accommodation in the event of a mass displacement of residents or was this sort of a general statement of intent there's a general statement of intent
00:26:48 intent [Applause] do you think in hindsight it would have assisted having a plan and some pre-agreement with hotels and other providers of
00:26:59 hotels and other providers of accommodation in this sort of situation i think in hindsight it would have been helpful if we had been able to have an agreement in place with the major hotel groups
00:27:10 major hotel groups about
00:27:10 about how they would assist us in case of emergency
00:27:13 emergency but in reality it depended on the vacancy rate that they had at any one time and it was the summer of june 2017 and occupancy rate was extremely high at that point
00:27:26 extremely high at that point so yes in hindsight i think that would have been a good thing for us to do to speak to the major hotel groups in the borough and talk to them about how we may manage in that scenario and how we may pay for hotel rooms in that
00:27:37 we may pay for hotel rooms in that scenario because that was a particularly difficulty in the early days we'll touch upon that a little bit later this morning and see where situations arose
00:27:49 situations arose and in terms of training and we've touched upon that already in some of your answers this morning perhaps i could lead deal with that quite briefly in terms of your training you say this in your evidence at paragraph eight i
00:28:01 in your evidence at paragraph eight i was not a trained bec officer nor was i assigned a defined role as a bronze silver or gold operative in the event of an emergency and i did not know the rationale used to
00:28:12 and i did not know the rationale used to decide on who did or who did not receive emergency planning training by the contingency planning team was that the position that's correct and you mentioned that you did have
00:28:23 and you mentioned that you did have training in september 2015 in relation to
00:28:27 to that was a goal group contingency training session is that correct that's correct and we heard that was a two-hour session that's correct do you recall attending any other training sessions
00:28:39 training sessions um in the lead up to june 2017 or during your time at or bkc no i do not um do you recall scenario testing exercises
00:28:49 exercises such as an exercise in november 2016 known as exercise poldark i do not recall that exercise it may have been that other members of my
00:29:00 have been that other members of my department attended but i do not remember attending i said perhaps a memorable name let me assist you a little bit more with the the events a joint training exercise with all bkc housing the tmo and octavia
00:29:14 with all bkc housing the tmo and octavia held at burgess field on the first november 2016. i did not attend
00:29:21 this was again just from completeness perhaps to assist everybody this was a three-hour exercise which relates to a gas leak leading to immediate evacuation of residents being unable to return
00:29:33 of residents being unable to return overnight
00:29:35 overnight doesn't assist your recollection no i did not attend her finally in relation to training exercise babel and this was a desktop exercise in
00:29:46 and this was a desktop exercise in november 2015 which concerned a fire and a tower block and its evacuation was that something that you were aware of
00:29:54 of um no
00:29:56 um no um
00:29:59 i think as a matter of record that housing team were not invited and did not participate in that exercise i can uh i can only take your word for it because i'm not i don't have no
00:30:10 it because i'm not i don't have no recollection of it well from your answer is that you weren't aware of it which may probably explain that you weren't invited that's that's yes i think you can infer that yes move on now to um now we've dealt with
00:30:21 move on now to um now we've dealt with plans and risk registers and and move on to the
00:30:25 to the the heart of your evidence which deals with the response to grenville tower fire
00:30:30 fire and we're gonna go through certain aspects in some detail but before doing so
00:30:34 so is it fair that from the 14th of june over the next seven days and thereafter that you and your department um were deployed in significant numbers
00:30:45 um were deployed in significant numbers and worked really long hours over those days trying to
00:30:50 to assist and provide support to those people who were displaced after the greenville terror fire yes my department worked tirelessly over that time and were deployed in all areas
00:31:03 that time and were deployed in all areas of supporting uh
00:31:05 uh the the residents who had been impacted by the uh dreadful events of june 2014
00:31:13 june 2014 sorry june 2017 and we're on the front line of helping people in order to be able to secure accommodation attending rest centers you know visiting visiting people in
00:31:25 you know visiting visiting people in hotels um answering calls booking hotel rooms yes the full suite of actions that were required in order to try and find people somewhere to live or somewhere to stay that was safe and warm
00:31:37 somewhere to stay that was safe and warm were undertaken by members of my team and we've got a number of statements from your colleagues you're the the one live witness from the housing department but in general terms
00:31:48 housing department but in general terms staff
00:31:49 staff got in very early worked very late some stayed in the office some stayed in hotels and some traveled back some distances to where they lived during that period of time
00:32:01 during that period of time that's correct people worked very long hours
00:32:04 hours and
00:32:05 and worked tirelessly in order to be able to provide the support and services that they thought were required
00:32:11 required for the people who are impacted by the disaster and worked very hard so within that context and not forgetting that so i want to examine certain aspects of the response if that's okay let's deal with first of
00:32:23 if that's okay let's deal with first of all
00:32:23 all your
00:32:25 your how you learned of the response and in your first statement of paragraph 15 you said that you became aware of the fire via a phone call from david curry at 02 34.
00:32:36 at 02 34. is that correct that's correct just after a half past two in the morning and at that stage what was your understanding of the scale of the fire at grenville tower when you were contacted by david curry that early in
00:32:48 contacted by david curry that early in the morning uh david kerry contacted me um and advised me that there was a fire in grenfell tower i um
00:32:57 i um i didn't get any sense from that phone call of the scale of the fire at that time
00:33:02 time um
00:33:04 um and
00:33:05 and and he said he would contact him i believe he said he would contact me again um you know kind of if there was further assistance needed so um at that point at that call at 2 30 in the morning i knew there was a fire but from
00:33:17 morning i knew there was a fire but from the phone call i didn't get a sentiment of the scale of it um so what i did was i got up turned on the tv news turned on the internet um in order to be able to
00:33:28 the internet um in order to be able to assess to see if there was anything that i could see you know kind of that was happening yes and from those initial actions and turning on the television is it fair to suggest by o2
00:33:41 television is it fair to suggest by o2 53 and your first email notification to your housing team you were dealing in your words with a quote massive fire yes that's correct i was watching videos
00:33:53 yes that's correct i was watching videos on youtube of the fire starting to take hold at grenfell um it was just awful and you were aware that stage that there was rest centers open and you say in this email to your team there's likely
00:34:05 this email to your team there's likely to be a need to find a considerable amount of emergency accommodation that's correct
00:34:11 correct your next update is at 0.403 and perhaps we could look at that that's obk quadruple 0-2747
00:34:28 thank you so this is an email from you the time is set out there 14 june 0 403 sent to your team and it says to all follow on from my
00:34:39 and it says to all follow on from my earlier report that's the one i summarized a moment ago fire at grenville is very serious and the building is destroyed and the residents are very unlikely to be able to return we shall need to mobilize this morning to ensure we can assess those
00:34:50 morning to ensure we can assess those affected by the fire and find emergency accommodation as likely to be available both short and medium term people have no possessions and limit access to funds so we need to be aware
00:35:01 access to funds so we need to be aware of this
00:35:02 of this when assessing our response i'm going up there now
00:35:08 how soon did you anticipate this mobilization would take place of your housing staff um straight away really
00:35:20 straight away really it depends on who would see the email i also did make some phone calls to
00:35:25 calls to key members of my management team as well to make them aware so there was an email there was phone calls
00:35:32 calls and
00:35:33 and then you know kind of i um i lived some distance from rbkc and decided to travel in straight away before
00:35:43 before to drive in and and went straight to the town hall and then
00:35:47 then i knew that the my colleagues from the housing department management team would be in very soon you sent your statement at paragraph 25 i'm going to summarize the rest centers were not within my remit but i knew i
00:35:59 were not within my remit but i knew i would need to send my team to the rest centers as soon as possible to speak to people about emergency rehousing is that correct that's correct
00:36:10 and would you need any information before mobilizing your housing officers to those rest centers well i would need to know where they were
00:36:20 were and what facilities were available at those rest centers because my role uh
00:36:27 uh as i understood it was to ensure that people who were coming into those rest centers who would be utterly in shock and traumatized
00:36:38 and traumatized were to be met by someone from uh would
00:36:41 would would very quickly need to know where they were going to stay if they couldn't stay in short term with friends or relatives so it would be my responsibility to make sure that my team were able to assess what people's needs
00:36:53 were able to assess what people's needs were and then find somewhere for them to go
00:36:57 go and at that stage of the morning did you know where to deploy all bkc housing officers to at four o'clock in the morning no i'll try and stick in a sort of
00:37:09 no i'll try and stick in a sort of uh chronological narrative and we'll return to that question in a moment but we know from your statement at paragraph 18 that you spoke again with david curry at 0349
00:37:20 david curry at 0349 and
00:37:22 and confirmed to him that the tmo were on site including robert black what did you consider the role of the tmo to be that morning on the grenville
00:37:33 tmo to be that morning on the grenville tower
00:37:34 tower site um so i knew that the tmo would be there um and i knew that robert was there already i knew that robert would probably arranging for other members of his team
00:37:46 arranging for other members of his team to be there at the time as well and at that point depending on you know kind of how serious the incident was they'd be providing information and advice
00:37:56 advice possibly to the emergency services what they could do at an in in in an incident of that scale i don't know to be honest
00:38:08 was there any discussion between you and robert black or anybody else at tmo that morning as to their role um
00:38:17 um i probably wouldn't describe it in in those terms i just i talked to robert black and other members of the uh of the tmo a number of times over the course of that morning and it was uh
00:38:29 course of that morning and it was uh it was a case of gathering information about what was taking place at grenfell tower at the time i didn't go to the tower i went to the town hall i went to the beck as i considered that to be the most useful place for me to go in order to be able
00:38:41 place for me to go in order to be able to coordinate events from the housing department but i knew the tmo were on site so they were providing a very useful information back to me into other colleagues to tell me what was taking
00:38:52 colleagues to tell me what was taking place at the time and who was evacuated and the scale of the fire and what was taking place and in terms of the scale of the fire at that stage from the information that you were receiving how would you assess
00:39:05 you were receiving how would you assess the scale of the fire has been fed back to you
00:39:08 to you at four o'clock in the morning um as it sets out in my email i had seen pictures on the internet um that the the fire was extremely serious so it was my expectation that no one would be no one
00:39:20 expectation that no one would be no one would be returning to grenfell okay
00:39:24 okay you've touched upon already but you travel from your home to the town hall you arrived at 0 5 15 which is set out in your statement of power of 25 and you go on a power of 22 21 forgive
00:39:35 and you go on a power of 22 21 forgive me then you go on a paragraph 22 to state that you were in the back the borough emergency command center coordinating information coming from the site
00:39:45 site you mentioned that's where robert black was based
00:39:47 was based as was nicholas holgate at that stage of the morning is that correct that's correct
00:39:59 i wonder if you're going to have a look at your statement at paragraph 24 please of your first statement
00:40:07 is that an early state part of your statement when you're describing the incident
00:40:11 incident which i've just summarized that you're in the back a power of 23 you say this a paragraph 24 or bkc was not sufficiently prepared to deal with a
00:40:23 not sufficiently prepared to deal with a fire that was so devastating and have such a significant impact
00:40:29 impact is that correct in my opinion yes
00:40:34 and when did you form that view that all bkc was not sufficiently prepared to deal with a fire that was so devastating and of such a significant impact
00:40:47 i can't say with any certainty when i formed that view but it wasn't possibly right at the time because i was just dealing with the incident at the time it was probably
00:40:58 the incident at the time it was probably subsequently when i had time to reflect so this was more an opinion which you arrived at after events looking back rather than as you're in the back that
00:41:09 rather than as you're in the back that morning that's correct um but whilst i was in the back that morning i was just extremely busy um and so i don't think i had the time to form uh to form a view
00:41:21 had the time to form uh to form a view i was just taking actions and instructing my team accordingly and they were
00:41:26 were acting on their own initiative as well in order to be able to provide and find as much accommodation as we could
00:41:32 could for the people who were affected by the fire
00:41:35 fire and
00:41:36 and that morning early morning in the back from five o'clock true to perhaps eight nine ten o'clock in the morning how would you describe how the beck was operating um
00:41:49 operating um i didn't know i have never been to uh no never been in a back in full operation before so
00:41:55 before so i had no
00:41:57 i had no concept or expectations of what a beck would do to be honest there was a lot of people in the back there were people taking notes there were people answering calls
00:42:09 were people answering calls it was a very it was a very busy environment but i would say my perception at that time um and subsequently when thinking about it was there was nobody leading the back
00:42:21 was there was nobody leading the back from those very early hours of the morning and providing instruction to colleagues you say at paragraph 23 which is just in front of you it was not chaotic at the back but equally was not very well
00:42:32 back but equally was not very well organized either as there was a lack of direction over tasks that needed to be undertaken because holgate was in meetings constantly but it's not his role to lead the beck
00:42:43 the beck do you still stand by those comments or is there anything else you wanted to add no i stand by those comments you mentioned stuart priestley took charge of the beck as the morning progressed he worked tirelessly to try to
00:42:54 he worked tirelessly to try to coordinate events from the back assisted by rebecca blackburn is that correct that's correct um yes stuart came in and and started to you know kind of take
00:43:06 and started to you know kind of take charge of events that needed to take place from the back and rebecca blackburn who worked in the emergency planning team uh very ably assisted him and understood the role of
00:43:17 assisted him and understood the role of the beck very clearly we could scroll back up to paragraph 22 again to assist you i'm going to move on to a topic of discussions or a meeting with nicholas
00:43:28 discussions or a meeting with nicholas holgate
00:43:29 holgate and we see at paragraph 22 that you had arrived and it says that it's members of the council so about four lines down of the council's management team started
00:43:40 of the council's management team started to arrive at the back by six o'clock as a management team we discussed what resources were needed to support survivors
00:43:48 survivors we all had an input on what was required and we discussed what services were needed
00:43:53 needed my primary role was to provide rehousing services
00:44:00 i'm just going to move on to paragraph 28 so keep that in mind so the six o'clock management team discussion and we move on to paragraph 28.
00:44:11 at around 0-6 30 there was an informal meeting in holland room in kent kensington town hall between nicholas holgate stuart priestley david curry and myself well
00:44:23 priestley david curry and myself well the holland room is the beck isn't that correct
00:44:26 correct i believe it is yeah yes so we've got a reference there in the first paragraph a per at paragraph 20.
00:44:38 two to a discussion as a management team and then i just showed you a moment ago a meeting an informal meeting at 6 30 between yourself stuart priestley david
00:44:49 between yourself stuart priestley david curry and nicholas holgate were they separate or were they the same event um i believe they were separate although to be honest with you it's five years ago and i can't remember in that level
00:45:01 ago and i can't remember in that level of detail but for the people who were arriving in the back who were senior members of the rbkc management team i believe what i'm referring to is an informal discussion amongst people who
00:45:13 informal discussion amongst people who were there at the time about what people's roles and responsibilities would be in order to help the uh the survivors of the fire and in relation to the first discussion as people arrived was that with nicholas
00:45:24 as people arrived was that with nicholas holgate or was the latter informal meeting at 6 30 when he arrived i don't remember whether nicholas was there at six o'clock or whether he was part of that informal discussion uh
00:45:36 part of that informal discussion uh the second one at 6 30 clearly references nicholas okay well let's focus on the second more
00:45:43 more formal informal meeting as you described at paragraph 28 and
00:45:49 and in relation to what was discussed so you mentioned david curry was present and he was the manager as we know of the contingency planning team and the specialist in that field did he give any
00:46:01 specialist in that field did he give any advice to nicholas holgate about the incident at that stage i really don't remember to be honest do you remember anything about this informal meeting at 0613 i do not
00:46:18 david curry in a statement perhaps we could
00:46:21 could look at his statement please his first statement or bk triple zero 33579 please
00:46:29 we open that up that's a statement there and at page 18 paragraph 81
00:46:40 he describes um and logs and meeting which you attended that day at a later time at 10 o'clock and perhaps i could ask you about that
00:46:51 and perhaps i could ask you about that and see if this assists your
00:46:55 at recollection am i attended a meeting with laura johnson robert black of the tmo nicholas holgate stuart priestley at the town hall
00:47:02 hall nicholas hogan said he was going to convene the council gold group this was effectively a handover meeting for me and a pre-meeting before the council gold meeting i gave advice at this point that this
00:47:13 i gave advice at this point that this incident was bigger than any one local authority in london could manage consideration should be given to seeking mutual aid so in relation to that meeting at 10
00:47:25 so in relation to that meeting at 10 o'clock or any other discussion when david curry and you
00:47:30 and you and nicholas holgate together on that morning do you recall that advice been given i do not
00:47:40 do you accept that it would be a significant statement if
00:47:45 if the specialist in the field was saying that this incident was bigger than any one local authority in london could manage and consideration should be given to seeking mutual aid
00:47:57 to seeking mutual aid yes
00:48:00 do you recall any discussions that morning about the magnitude of the incident and
00:48:09 and advice are the needs to get external help
00:48:13 help i don't
00:48:16 i mean should we understand that you don't have a very good recollection of that meeting and that what's being said here might have occurred but you don't remember or is it
00:48:27 occurred but you don't remember or is it a case of your remembering that it didn't occur um i don't remember i don't remember the the detail of the meeting so it may have that may have been the advice that was given but i don't remember in that level of detail i was
00:48:39 remember in that level of detail i was very focused at that time on my own tasks in hand thank you that's helpful [Music]
00:48:49 we could look at one of the documents which perhaps may assist your recollection of events please
00:49:06 [Applause] and that's stuart priestley's log please that's all bk triple zero one three three one eight please
00:49:20 so this is a log which stuart priestley has given evidence about it was prepared a couple of days after the incident so not contemporaneous but close to contemporaneous you scroll down to the bottom of this
00:49:31 you scroll down to the bottom of this page please he notes
00:49:34 he notes at 6 30 it's at the same time that you gave as this informal meeting with nicholas holgate he was
00:49:42 he was at that time are soon to be council silver so the person who was responsible for the tactical operation
00:49:51 meeting with robert black laura johnson nicholas holgate david curry david provided an update as he had feedback to him by the on-site laylo and gathered from the meeting he dialed into that was likely to be the scg
00:50:04 into that was likely to be the scg dk david kerry advised at the scale of the tragedy robert black reported he attended the site and was very serious indeed nicholas holgate advised he spoke with
00:50:15 nicholas holgate advised he spoke with the leaders agreed to fund anything necessary for relief efforts david advised nicholas holgate of the mutual aid arrangements available via london local authority gold and our neighboring boroughs
00:50:27 neighboring boroughs supposing there this is another record of a meeting which you are an attendee
00:50:33 attendee where it states that advice was given regarding
00:50:37 regarding seeking mutual aid or external assistance does that assist your recollection to be honest with you no i don't remember the details of that meeting
00:50:48 remember the details of that meeting do you remember that your
00:50:53 your superior your line manager the town clerk of the local authority is saying that looks like we can cope when there was that offer of assistance
00:51:04 when there was that offer of assistance discussed
00:51:06 discussed if i remembered it i would say but i quite honestly i can't remember the details of that meeting at 6 30 that morning
00:51:13 morning and the last part in relation to that note the conversation on mutual aid at that point ceased
00:51:22 so your evidence is that you've got no recollection of this i don't have a recollection of the detail of that meeting i know it took place but i couldn't tell you quite honestly what was said in that meeting
00:51:35 honestly what was said in that meeting do you have any recollection of how mr holgate was that morning when you saw him come into the back
00:51:41 the back and during this informal meeting you noted in your statement at 6 30. extremely worried it was a terrible terrible incident
00:51:53 it was a terrible terrible incident and
00:51:55 and you know extremely worried is probably the only way i could put it and in relation to this topic not going behind your evidence but this topic of seeking external assistance
00:52:06 external assistance you've described the magnitude of the incident
00:52:09 incident did you think at that stage there was the need for all bkc to get external assistance
00:52:17 i don't remember considering that at that point in time um as i said i was very at that point just very focused on making sure that the housing department were
00:52:28 were doing everything they possibly could in order to book as many hotel rooms as we could possibly could and to think about how we could then get up to the grenfell tower area in order to be able to provide people
00:52:39 in order to be able to provide people with that information and move people on i don't remember consciously thinking about
00:52:44 about what else or who else should be helping us at that point in time
00:52:50 so the final point really in relation to this is that you acknowledge and aware that this was a an instant of magnitude absolutely from your email
00:53:01 absolutely from your email you describe a substantial number of displaced people whose homes were destroyed in the most traumatic circumstances that's correct and on any basis is it the case that there was
00:53:13 is it the case that there was a huge challenge that you as a housing department faced that morning by 6 30. that's correct
00:53:21 let's move on to the next topic which is deployment of housing staff before we do i'm sorry i keep interrupting no please just help me with this um
00:53:32 um there obviously was a meeting at half past six but yes don't have much of a recollection of it at that stage uh
00:53:39 uh did it cross your mind whether you had enough
00:53:43 enough people in your department to carry out all the functions which were going to have to be performed over the next let's say 12 hours
00:53:52 hours no it didn't cross my mind at that point i wasn't thinking i've got 120 people how am i going to divide them up i was thinking i have got a team of
00:54:04 i was thinking i have got a team of homelessness and housing advice officers who are
00:54:07 who are well equipped because that's that's what they do day to day is fine people accommodation how do we
00:54:14 how do we um how do we deploy them and how do we book as many rooms as we can how do we find as much accommodation as we can and how do i get those people on site in order to provide that link to get people
00:54:25 order to provide that link to get people into the hotels that was as far reaching as my thinking was going at that point in time right now i asked the question because had it had you thought at that stage that you were going to be short-handed
00:54:37 were going to be short-handed questions about mutual aid would have had more significance but if it wasn't present to your mind i had no concept at that time having never been involved in a in an emergency of this scale or this
00:54:48 a in an emergency of this scale or this type before you know how long this was going to go on for and how wide it was going to be all i could see were the pictures on the news in the back about that tower
00:54:59 news in the back about that tower and
00:55:01 and so in subsequent days we did ask for help and said we needed more people but at that point in time it was just about how we could deploy our resources to help i wasn't thinking more broadly at that point in
00:55:12 thinking more broadly at that point in time i wasn't thinking strategically i was thinking in terms of a series of actions that needed to be taken in the moment
00:55:18 moment thank you very much yes just really following on for that answer you were quite candid in saying that you were focusing on actions but you weren't thinking strategically
00:55:30 strategically and you also said earlier on that this was such an enormous instant of an overwhelming scale was it the position that you and perhaps some of your colleagues were just overwhelmed by the magnitude
00:55:43 were just overwhelmed by the magnitude of the incident at that stage um
00:55:47 um i don't think i was overwhelmed by it i was aware of the scale of it um and was breaking it down into a series of tasks that the housing department could undertake in order to be able to help
00:55:58 undertake in order to be able to help manage
00:55:59 manage the outcome from that um but i
00:56:03 but i i didn't uh freeze or stop or you know kind of decide that i i couldn't manage i decided that there were a number of actions that needed to be taken at that
00:56:14 actions that needed to be taken at that time in that moment in order to be able to provide assistance immediately to the people who were affected by the fire but i wouldn't say i was overwhelmed by it i said i was
00:56:26 it i said i was responded in a very practical fashion but what i consider to be the best way to help what's the final point in this is is that you didn't freeze or stop
00:56:38 that you didn't freeze or stop as you described it but did you stop to think strategically at that stage i didn't stop to think i at 6 30 in the morning i didn't stop
00:56:49 i at 6 30 in the morning i didn't stop to think strategically i did subsequently as the day went on but at 6 30 in the morning it was about corralling the resources available to me in the housing department in order to be able to provide that response as the day wore on
00:57:01 provide that response as the day wore on and indeed on the next day then i definitely started to think about how to manage
00:57:06 manage in the broader sense for the short medium and long term for the people who needed to be rehoused if we could look at your an email please which you sent at 0.741
00:57:19 an email please which you sent at 0.741 that's rbk quadruple
00:57:21 quadruple 0-1026 and we're now dealing with a topic of deployment of housing staff
00:57:29 and we see that
00:57:32 second email is from you it's 0.741 to robert shull in your department copying other members of staff regarding what is needed
00:57:43 regarding what is needed we should be organizing a team to send it to two rest centers to assess the displaced people's housing needs and arrange alternative accommodation for them amanda phoning around commercial hotels
00:57:54 amanda phoning around commercial hotels now to find vacancies we are setting up a protocol for those people and hospital will be discharged and need to be re-housed does that summarize the role of the
00:58:05 does that summarize the role of the housing officers who attended the rest centers at that stage that they were going to attend to assess the needs of those as termed here displaced peoples and arrange alternative accommodation
00:58:16 and arrange alternative accommodation for them
00:58:17 for them yes
00:58:20 and when were they deployed on your account
00:58:23 account um
00:58:23 um i don't i i think there's a record that they were deployed sometime later in the morning um at around 10 o'clock and made it up to the rest centers at around 10 30 because they needed to
00:58:34 at around 10 30 because they needed to walk
00:58:35 walk from the town hall up to
00:58:38 up to the clement james center and rugby portobello trust because of the uh you know obviously because of the limitations of being able to get public transport or a taxi so in a region of 10 o'clock they were
00:58:49 so in a region of 10 o'clock they were deployed that's correct and then because of the transport difficulties they they went on foot that's correct
00:58:57 we saw earlier on that email at 0-403 where you recognized the need to mobilize members of the housing team to get to the rest center and i asked you questions about that
00:59:08 you questions about that and
00:59:09 and why was there a delay of about six hours for their actual deployment to the rest centers um i didn't know which breast centers to send them to so i didn't know
00:59:21 so i didn't know which centers were being used which particular community facilities in that location were the best two centers to send them to between four o'clock and
00:59:32 between four o'clock and uh seven o'clock eight o'clock nine o'clock staff were still arriving in the town hall so it wasn't until a point in time um in the early morning that i had sufficient staff in order to be able to
00:59:43 sufficient staff in order to be able to send
00:59:44 send uh two groups of sufficient numbers in order to be able to go to those rest centers and i think i was waiting for clarification um
00:59:52 um in terms of numbers we could send and where was the best place to send them to
00:59:57 them to so two reasons summarizing your evidence one clarification regarding rest centers or knowing where they were and secondly sufficient staff arriving yes in relation to
01:00:09 relation to the location of the rest centers on your account you're in contact with a tmo that morning that's kind of a deck did not become apparent from your arrival around half past five
01:00:20 from your arrival around half past five quart past five up until 10 o'clock where those rest centers were at that time there was a number of different locations where the local community
01:00:31 community um had opened their doors as they would um and helped people so it was my understanding that there were a number of different places where
01:00:42 places where the community were providing assistance from into but at that time i wasn't aware of what was a formal rest center that was being operated that would provide that focus about
01:00:53 that would provide that focus about where everybody would go or be able to tell people to go to that location so it was a very very fluid situation and i was
01:01:02 and i was reacting to the information that was being provided to me
01:01:07 you say paragraph 33 of your statements which i can summarize amanda gill took two teams about 10 apiece to saint clemens james center and rugby portobello trust
01:01:18 and rugby portobello trust is that correct that's correct yes did you consider that deploying two teams of 10 members at that point was sufficient in light of their mountains displaced people
01:01:29 people from the tower and the surrounding areas
01:01:34 that was the staff i had available to me and those were the two rest centers that i understood were in operation and then i sent a further team to the west way when i understood that that sports centre became available and was
01:01:45 sports centre became available and was also considered to be a rest center so a third team was then made available at that point i didn't really have a obviously i knew how many people lived in grenfell tower
01:01:56 in grenfell tower and i was familiar with how many people lived in the local in the locality but
01:02:02 but i went with the resources that i had available to me at that time that's all i had yes do you think bearing in mind the numbers involved whether that was sufficient at that stage um
01:02:13 um based on the information that came back later in the day then there was clearly a need for for more at that time but that's that's what we had at the time and that's what we sent up and believed
01:02:24 and that's what we sent up and believed and in order to be able to provide information to people and place them into accommodation and at that stage in the morning was there was a case that was a real lack of
01:02:35 there was a case that was a real lack of information regarding the number of people who were at the various rest centers yes there was no central there was no collation of information that was saying there's 40 people at
01:02:46 that was saying there's 40 people at this church and there's 10 people at this center and there's there's 20 people over there there was no coordination of that event and of course it was extremely fluid people were coming out of the tower or
01:02:58 people were coming out of the tower or coming out of the local estates and some people were obviously heading straight to a rest center because they needed that kind of advice and information and or just to kind of process what was happening to
01:03:10 kind of process what was happening to them whereas other people may well have gotten to stay with friends or neighbors or relatives on the estate and you know found somewhere else so it was a very a very fluid situation in terms of the
01:03:21 very fluid situation in terms of the number of people who i believe were accessing the support on the lancaster west estate at that time
01:03:28 time but i wasn't there so it's very difficult for me to say but that was my understanding what was the process of how those who were displaced by the fire were able to access
01:03:39 access emergency accommodation so if someone's at a rest center what would happen um so they would when my two teams went up to meet them then the teams they would take their
01:03:51 then the teams they would take their names take their information ask them for details of their family composition and then
01:03:59 and then there was a team in the town hall that were booking hotels and arranging arranging accommodation and then the team in the town hall would let the team at the rest centers know what was
01:04:10 at the rest centers know what was available give them the names of the hotel that they needed to send them to and then arrange arranged for transport to take them to those hotels
01:04:21 those hotels and relate in relation to taking details at the at the scene at those rest centers we've got the benefit of many guilds statement as well but is it the case that there wasn't internet access and those needs were
01:04:35 internet access and those needs were written down on placement forms rather than electronically that's correct it wasn't done on the internet or on a sharepoint site it was done via offices writing down
01:04:46 offices writing down people's names understanding trying to understand how many rooms or how many beds they needed taking down phone numbers taking down information from them and then phoning that through to the town hall in order
01:04:57 that through to the town hall in order to be able to match what we had available to us to their family's needs so go to the information would then go to the individual in the town hall who was the team in a town hall which
01:05:09 who was the team in a town hall which was
01:05:10 was booking accommodation yes and how would the town hall part of the housing department communicate the accommodation to the person who's displaced how would
01:05:21 to the person who's displaced how would they know so they were phoning phoning or emailing the team on site letting them know what accommodation we had available
01:05:29 available they were keeping a team in the town hall we're keeping a spreadsheet of all of the
01:05:33 of the hotels rooms that we were booked and the size of the hotel rooms and where they were
01:05:39 were and then when they were notified by the team at the rest centres of the of the requirements they matched them to those rooms they phoned them or emailed them and let them know and then the team
01:05:51 them and let them know and then the team at the town at the team at the rest centre then let the let the person know where they were going we'll explore this the outcome in relation that process a little bit later
01:06:03 relation that process a little bit later in the morning but in relation to other rest centers he mentioned that staff later went to the west way when that became that's correct known to you is that correct that's correct housing
01:06:14 is that correct that's correct housing staff
01:06:15 staff and were you aware that the tmo staff were at rest centers other than the clement james center rugby portobello trust and the west way i don't recollect to be honest
01:06:27 i don't recollect to be honest a tmo staff list which we have shows that from
01:06:31 that from 5 30 to 2 o'clock on the 14th of june that tmo staffed five rest centers and that includes two which we haven't mentioned this morning the methodist church and latimer christian center
01:06:44 church and latimer christian center so there's tmo officers at those rest centers but is it the case that no housing officers were deployed to those rest centers that's correct and how was it anticipated that those
01:06:57 and how was it anticipated that those displaced people who came from the tower and surrounding areas who went to those rest centers how would they receive assistance with emergency accommodation
01:07:08 emergency accommodation um to be honest i don't know we were sending available staff to the rest centers that we had been made aware of which were the i suppose designated as the official
01:07:20 i suppose designated as the official rest centers there was a fairly uh good line of communication between the tmo and rbkc housing and it may well have been that officers from the tmo were alerted to
01:07:32 officers from the tmo were alerted to the fact that uh rbkc housing officers were going to the clement james and to the rugby portobello and then could pass information onto them at that time to be honest i wasn't aware of all the
01:07:43 honest i wasn't aware of all the different rest centers that were available
01:07:45 available i knew there was two these seem to be the most centrally organized ones i'm going to send people there because that seems the most logical place to send people in order to provide advice and assistance
01:07:57 provide advice and assistance and you mentioned the number of staff you had and that was perhaps is it fair to say a factor as well that there's available staff to you that morning to deploy to these various rest
01:08:09 morning to deploy to these various rest centers
01:08:11 centers um
01:08:14 i i don't know availability of staff to be honest was a limiting factor in the where i sent people because there was eventually three teams um i think it was to be honest with you
01:08:27 um i think it was to be honest with you more where the rest centre was identified which then targeted the resources uh accordingly rather than sending people to lots of centers in terms of this theme of capacity of
01:08:40 in terms of this theme of capacity of staff and numbers of those who are displaced
01:08:43 displaced and you indicate in your statement by 1748 so nearly six o'clock that afternoon on the 14th of june evening the number of potential residents evacuated in accordance area was 845
01:08:57 evacuated in accordance area was 845 that was communicated to you by that stage did you consider you had sufficient housing officers present at the rest centers in light of the number of people we're discussing
01:09:08 of people we're discussing um i don't remember consciously thinking um
01:09:12 um of the number of staff at the rest centers and correlating it with the 845 people that were inside outside of the cordon
01:09:20 cordon okay
01:09:21 okay and move on to um hotel bookings which you've touched upon and how there was somebody back at the town hall who was undertaking those bookings
01:09:31 bookings and you mentioned in your statement it was recognized at an earlier stage that there would be a need for a substantial number of hotel bookings and that set out in your statement at paragraph 25 that
01:09:42 paragraph 25 that when your team arrived at a town hall they started to book hotels immediately is that correct that's correct and was there a criteria for selecting hotels booked at that stage
01:09:54 hotels booked at that stage we were looking for hotels that were three star and above and we were aiming for them to be in the borough or in boroughs that had joined rbkc because the intention was that if people
01:10:05 that if people were displaced and had to be placed into a hotel that they needed to be as close as possible to
01:10:13 to to rbkc as possible because people needed to need needed to be near their support network so they would need to be near doctors schools
01:10:24 near doctors schools you know advice and information and the intention was not to place them at a distance which would cause them significant disadvantage in being able to get back and get back to our bkc so that was the status attention at that
01:10:36 that was the status attention at that early stage yes you mentioned a paragraph 27 of your statement we initially just googled old hotels in the area and started calling around firstly in all vkc within the local authority
01:10:48 in all vkc within the local authority and then moving out into other central london boroughs is that correct that's correct
01:10:53 correct and was it the case that it was difficult to block book accommodation on the scale needed on the 14th of june that's correct and you used the phrase preemptive
01:11:04 and you used the phrase preemptive booking in your statements but was it really just a scramble to book as many rooms as you could that morning that's correct
01:11:13 correct and again something which you mentioned a little bit earlier this morning but i just want to explore now in a bit more detail was there issues in relation to processing payments for those hotels booked on the
01:11:26 payments for those hotels booked on the 14th of june and thereafter yes
01:11:30 yes perhaps we could have a look at paragraph 87 which may assist you of your statements please
01:11:48 the payment of hotels was difficult we didn't have sufficient credit using the payment methods we had there was initial raising of credit limits on the corporate cards as
01:11:59 limits on the corporate cards as at on the morning at 14th just pausing there
01:12:03 there even in those early hours before the initial raising of the credit limits of corporate cards was it the case that there was problems at the outset in terms of booking the number of
01:12:14 outset in terms of booking the number of rooms you required
01:12:17 um to be honest with you i don't remember in that level of detail and i wasn't doing the phoning around but i've clearly said in my statement that there were some hotels that wanted payment in
01:12:28 were some hotels that wanted payment in advance
01:12:29 advance um and it became more difficult as time went by so we were phoning we were asking for room availability um we uh
01:12:41 we uh we were we thought that you know as a local authority phoning around uh with our corporate um you know kind of corporate financial strength that um it wouldn't be queried
01:12:52 strength that um it wouldn't be queried with us um about payment but it was yes you say here however some hotels want a payment in advance and as the week went on we were maxing out the payment cards
01:13:03 on we were maxing out the payment cards and not able to guarantee payments some hotels and start refusing to take people in relation to that problem which
01:13:14 problem which developed
01:13:15 developed as you say as the week went on and was that difficulty with payment confined to making new bookings or did it lead to determination of any existing bookings
01:13:27 determination of any existing bookings that you were perhaps seeking to extend or roll over i don't know that level of detail to be honest with you or i don't remember it now
01:13:37 now the hotels had existing bookings it was a very busy period in in london at that time as it usually is in the summer so hotels had bookings and could only take
01:13:48 hotels had bookings and could only take only take bookings for a certain period of time
01:13:52 of time and then some hotels i said wanted wanted payment up front
01:13:59 and it just not all hotels operate in the same way but i couldn't say with certainty that it caused the termination of some rooms because of the payment difficulties i don't have that level of detail or if i
01:14:11 don't have that level of detail or if i did i don't remember it now five years later
01:14:13 later and the final point in relation to this topic is it took until the following week
01:14:19 week to speak to the chief executives at some of the hotels to agree to take people again
01:14:23 again that causes considerable difficulties some members of the team went as far as paying on their personal bank accounts to secure rooms is that correct that's correct
01:14:34 is that correct that's correct so the position was during the 14th june and thereafter because of payment difficulties members of your team were using their own credit cards on occasion to pay for rooms that's correct
01:14:46 that's correct i
01:14:47 i was staggered to be honest with you that anybody watching the news and seeing the dreadful events unfolding could
01:14:56 could question
01:14:57 question uh
01:14:58 uh whether
01:14:59 whether we
01:15:00 we the payment for rooms for survivors of the grenfell tower fire but um it did take intervention at the highest level in order to be able to secure that agreement by hotels in the capital in
01:15:11 agreement by hotels in the capital in order to be able to take people so there was two aspects to this is one the hotels and their various approaches yes but also the rbkc processes was the
01:15:23 yes but also the rbkc processes was the reference internally to try to extend the credit cards yes yes so this uh the matter was raised about the difficulty with hotel bookings
01:15:35 about the difficulty with hotel bookings um
01:15:37 um and there was extension there were extensions on corporate credit card limits um
01:15:42 limits um and asked i remember distinctly asking on the saturday after the fire when uh at westminster that there needed to be intervention raised at the highest level with
01:15:53 raised at the highest level with senior people in hotel groups in order to be able to lift this blockage because it was a very very unnecessary problem i in my view that you know could be resolved by just some
01:16:04 you know could be resolved by just some common sense to be honest with you no but no hotel was not going to get paid
01:16:11 paid and
01:16:12 and i understand it was not their problem and it was our problem to resolve but with their help and i would have hoped that basic humanity would have said that they would have said yes these are the rooms we'll
01:16:23 have said yes these are the rooms we'll sort out payment with you and we'll keep a log but that wasn't the case in all cases
01:16:29 cases and in terms of a lesson learned having a perhaps an agreement in advance with hotels and a plan in relation to that may perhaps have avoided such a a problem it may well
01:16:41 avoided such a a problem it may well have helped if we had had an agreement in advance with somebody um like the hilton group um that there could be you know kind of there was a process in place for that i do understand that hotels have their own payment processes
01:16:53 hotels have their own payment processes and systems and the managers of individual hotels probably can't deviate from that without very senior management intervention so yes it probably would have helped in advance to have those payment systems
01:17:05 advance to have those payment systems set up in advance but i think the scale of this issue meant you could have had that arrangement with a large copthorn hotel just off kensington high street you could have made that arrangement with one hotel uh
01:17:17 made that arrangement with one hotel uh but actually the scale of this meant we were booking multiple rooms in multiple hotels across the capital so it probably wouldn't have been possible to have that arrangement in place with the sheer scale of hotel rooms and the sheer number of hotels that we were booking
01:17:29 number of hotels that we were booking thank you mr chairman is that a convenient moment yes thank you very much
01:17:34 much well we said we'd have a break during the morning and where you know the way we work so we're going to stop there we're going to resume please at 25 to 12 and i have to ask you please don't talk
01:17:45 and i have to ask you please don't talk to anyone about your evidence or anything relating to it while you're out of the room all right thank you very much
01:18:00 thank you very much 25-12
01:36:12 would you ask ms johnson to come back in please
01:36:26 good ready to carry on mr johnson yes thank you yes yes mister mr chairman i want to stay with this um theme of hotel accommodation
01:36:37 hotel accommodation if we can for a moment and deal with the topic of length of bookings and is it right that there were particular issues during those seven days with the length of bookings that could be made at hotels
01:36:48 of bookings that could be made at hotels yes
01:36:49 yes you've touched upon that in your statement which we have or had in front of us at paragraph 88 please
01:36:57 and it's touched upon at the top of paragraph 88 about the sheer volume of rooms the fact it was this summer and
01:37:05 and other events which were happening in west london and central london is that correct
01:37:10 correct yes
01:37:10 yes and it was difficult trying to keep each family in the same room when hotels already pre-booked those rooms for future dates yes
01:37:20 yes no residents were told it would have to leave for any other reason than pre-booking on their rooms we didn't know how long they would or could be there for that's correct you raised the issue of families moving rooms with the beck at
01:37:32 families moving rooms with the beck at goal meetings out with nicholas holgate yes and what was the response when you raised the issue of families having to move rooms because of lack of availability
01:37:44 um i don't remember to be honest
01:37:52 you mentioned in your statement here that you raised it at gold meetings and with nicholas holgates can you recall whether there's a specific response when you raise the issues in relation to
01:38:03 issues in relation to hotel accommodation i think there was a desire to speak to more senior people in the hotel groups to see if there could be any latitude extended
01:38:14 extended to rbkc in order to be able to secure the rooms and arrange for payment to be made and that not to be a problem so issues with payments issues with
01:38:26 so issues with payments issues with availability and issues with the length of a booking due to availability were alternative accommodation such as service accommodation considered to meet
01:38:37 service accommodation considered to meet the different needs of those requiring accommodation such perhaps as families we were looking at all types of accommodation that were available to us so
01:38:47 so some hotels have apartments rather than just rooms we were receiving a huge numbers of offers from different organizations and we were logging all of those offers and
01:38:58 we were logging all of those offers and having a look at whether they were reasonable or suitable or available for any period of time in order to be able to accommodate people who were needed to be housed in an
01:39:09 who were needed to be housed in an emergency
01:39:10 emergency scenario so dealing with those offers accommodation and we perhaps turned out in a short while but was it the case that a decision was made really to
01:39:20 to focus on hotel accommodation yes we were stuck with hotel accommodation as being something that was readily available and in the locality
01:39:33 we have your statement open now i wonder if you could go back please to page 10 and paragraph 39.2 please this is where you summarize the 11 o'clock or bkc gold group meeting
01:39:46 o'clock or bkc gold group meeting you'd mentioned when we were at paragraph 88 raising issues regarding hotel accommodation let's deal with this please
01:39:54 please and it's at 39.2 block bookings of hotels have been made until monday as a short-term solution
01:40:04 what's the effect of booking hotels that wednesday the 14th of june up until monday as a short-term solution was the fact that there was a cycle
01:40:15 was the fact that there was a cycle having to rebook rooms and again and again yes and as a result of that because of the issues we've mentioned in a number of cases significant number
01:40:27 in a number of cases significant number of cases
01:40:28 of cases displaced residents who were in hotels would then have to move to another hotel yes i mean depending on the availability of the rooms in that hotel who would
01:40:39 of the rooms in that hotel who would obviously have received a number of advanced bookings for their hotel room if they had availability then we could continue to extend the resident's stay in that hotel but if
01:40:50 the resident's stay in that hotel but if they did not have availability then we needed to find them alternative accommodation well let's look at that a little bit more please if we turn to rbk triple zero two seven seven three five
01:41:02 zero two seven seven three five and this is uh an internal document it's called the grenville residence action plan did the 15th of june a document created by your team and it's the action points from the a
01:41:14 and it's the action points from the a nine o'clock briefing meeting on the 15th of june involving your team is that correct
01:41:20 correct that's correct and we focus on accommodation and we see 77
01:41:27 77 households currently placed in commercial hotels and four need to be moved today alternative accommodation already found more expected to approach
01:41:38 more expected to approach and we move to the third point some bookings cannot be carried over to the weekend
01:41:43 weekend i did a monday and need to find alternative accommodation for 24 households
01:41:51 about a third of the amount of people who had been placed at that stage so as we said a significant amount of those initially placed had to be replaced in other hotels isn't that
01:42:03 replaced in other hotels isn't that correct that's correct and would you accept that this was highly disruptive and negatively impacted those had been placed in those hotels initially yes
01:42:15 placed in those hotels initially yes did the housing team clearly communicate to residents that there was uncertainty about the length of their current bookings
01:42:24 bookings um it would depend on whether we had telephone numbers for the people who were in those particular accommodation it was a very fluid situation so we were
01:42:35 it was a very fluid situation so we were talking to the hotels all the time obviously people who left the tower some left with phones some left with absolutely nothing we did visit we did attempt to visit everybody in the hotels who we placed on
01:42:47 everybody in the hotels who we placed on the thursday to talk to them about the placement and the uh
01:42:52 the uh and what was going to happen over the next few days but obviously people weren't in and so
01:42:59 and so we uh you know kind of we weren't able to speak to everybody on those visits that we undertook on that on that thursday so it's a number of factors it's
01:43:08 it's the recognition that those who left the tower lost everything and may not had a telephone number a recognition that attempts are made to visit but no one was there
01:43:20 but no one was there and using a the hotel as a go-between do you accept within that context that a number of those affected who were placed in hotels were unsure of how long their bookings were due to last yes
01:43:33 bookings were due to last yes perhaps we could have a look at orbk triple zero two double zero three seven please
01:43:46 if we could scroll down please
01:43:49 to the bottom of that page and we see an email at 06.49
01:43:58 so we need to scroll down a little bit more forgive me thank you very much second page and this is from counselor judith blechmann
01:44:06 blechmann it's since in the morning the 15th of june to the beck
01:44:10 beck copied to mr holgates and it says this i've received an inquiry from a grenville tower fire tower family currently housed in a hotel in earl's court they tell me they have
01:44:21 in earl's court they tell me they have no idea if there's still
01:44:23 still if they will still be there tonight they have nowhere else to go are very worried and need some reassurance can you please let me know what is to happen to families currently in the hotels i suspect this will not be the
01:44:36 hotels i suspect this will not be the only inquiry we will receive unless they are given information as soon as they get up
01:44:44 get up and if we scroll up it was confirmed in the emails if we scroll a little bit further i'll give you a reference to the top of the page
01:44:56 an email you sent to your colleague and the contact information for someone who would like a call about what happening that was william thompson is that correct yes
01:45:10 and do you accept there were occasions where the first time a placed person or family in a hotel would learn that the need to check out was when the hotel informed them and there wouldn't be information from or bkc
01:45:21 information from or bkc yes that may well have been the case that the hotel spoke to the family and advice and that they wouldn't be able to stay
01:45:29 another way of phrasing is that they were told they need to leave rather than account stay isn't that correct um i don't know what the hotels said to the people who were in the hotels yes
01:45:40 the people who were in the hotels yes but you would accept it's it's not ideal that somebody in that situation is informed that their accommodation is no longer there and they need to leave or they cannot stay
01:45:51 they cannot stay absolutely which was why we attempted to visit everybody on the thursday because they were being placed there in an emergency situation on the wednesday when we were just trying to
01:46:02 wednesday when we were just trying to make sure that those people had somewhere safe to stay overnight on the wednesday night and so the intention was to go out and knock on everybody's door um or to
01:46:13 knock on everybody's door um or to contact people by phone if we had their numbers in order to be able to let them know what the situation was and to give them information about how they could contact the housing department for more information an example we
01:46:25 an example we looked at was on the night of the 14th of june let's go to obk quadruple zero two seven three five please
01:46:34 please and at page two there's an email at oh six twenty seven which looks like page one
01:46:44 so this is from andrew carter is the head of service housing option services
01:46:51 and this is an email to you on that saturday
01:46:55 saturday urgent booking extension needed as a subject
01:46:58 subject dear all this man told us he has to check out of the metropole hilton edger wrote tomorrow he wants to know if it will be extended as mr farshit cafeteri hopefully i pronounced that correctly
01:47:09 hopefully i pronounced that correctly and this is somebody from grenville tower
01:47:17 can you explain why it seems to be those who were in residence an example here who were in the hotels were either been told by the hotel or contacting the housing department asking them about
01:47:30 the housing department asking them about their booking and the facts that they've been told to check out
01:47:35 um i don't know why the hotels were informing them that they needed to check out
01:47:39 out um
01:47:40 um what we were doing um in our bkc was to book as many rooms um for as long as possible um and then we were probably reviewing the information about how long
01:47:51 reviewing the information about how long we had those rooms for at the time but we were both placing people and managing the placement of people at the same time yes let's scroll up the net thread please the next email and probably follows from
01:48:03 the next email and probably follows from your answer this is your email that evening on saturday at 7 19 and you say to your colleagues i'm afraid i don't know who's on bookings but whoever whoever it is would you mind
01:48:16 but whoever whoever it is would you mind contacting the hotel and extending the hotel room booking and get the hotel to let him
01:48:23 let him know
01:48:25 why would someone not try to ring this person
01:48:30 individually and explain a position having some direct contact rather than going via the hotel
01:48:38 hotel um i
01:48:40 um i don't know if that person actually had a phone we were still lots of people as you can imagine lost everything and we were in the process process
01:48:48 process of arranging um mobile to give mobile phones to everyone who was affected by the fire um and in all we didn't have even if people did come out and did have their phone we didn't necessarily have an up-to-date
01:49:00 didn't necessarily have an up-to-date number for them so the information that we took on the day of placing someone in the fire may or may not have included their phone number if they had one we may or may not have had contact
01:49:11 we may or may not have had contact details
01:49:12 details from the tmos database but they may or may not have been up to date because people either didn't have their phones or they changed their phone number or we hadn't got an emergency phone to them
01:49:23 hadn't got an emergency phone to them so
01:49:24 so um
01:49:25 um i had made the assumption there that i'd asked my team if they could extend the hotel booking um and it i had made the assumption that it was probably the quickest and most efficient way to let to
01:49:37 efficient way to let to to ask the hotel to update that particular person that his um
01:49:42 um his room was going to be extended in general terms would have been better to say at the outset we booked this room for three nights and we'll try to extend it was that the information that was
01:49:53 it was that the information that was going out or was it this is your room and it was uncertainty that followed um
01:50:02 i'm not entirely sure because i wasn't speaking to the residents directly about what information exactly we were giving people but we were booking hotel rooms continuing to book
01:50:14 booking hotel rooms continuing to book hotel rooms and then trying our very best to maintain people in those same hotel rooms for as long as possible whether we could contact each one of
01:50:25 whether we could contact each one of those persons in those hotel rooms individually in order to let them know what we were doing that's something that we did do on the thursday we'll try to do on thursday um but uh
01:50:38 we'll try to do on thursday um but uh whether we had that information to hand to constantly have that rolling conversation with somebody i suspect we did not
01:50:47 we discussed a lot of the circumstances which you were operating in and was it the real position actually that you your department specifically your
01:50:58 you your department specifically your department were overwhelmed with the volume of bookings and rebookings that had to be made in those first few days i would say it was it was overwhelming yes
01:51:10 i want to move on to the provision of accommodation emergency accommodation of course we're focusing upon and the eligibility criteria and what was in place and
01:51:21 criteria and what was in place and arrived at on the 14th of june and
01:51:25 and you set out this at paragraph 47 of your first statement and perhaps we could open that up please
01:51:38 this is what you say in your statement paragraph 47 and then perhaps we can examine this a little bit further by the night of
01:51:44 night of 14th into 15 to june all grenville tower residents from the council were made aware needed emergency accommodation or found hotel rooms 72 households were placed in 102 hotel
01:51:55 72 households were placed in 102 hotel rooms that night anybody from grenville tower asked for places offered hotels immediately and without question and you mentioned 20 or so people stayed overnight at the westway sports centre
01:52:06 overnight at the westway sports centre as far as i was aware they had all been offered hotel accommodation but wanted to stay
01:52:13 to stay and
01:52:14 and is that the correct position that was my understanding and does it remain your understanding yes
01:52:23 you may be aware that ob casey and your opening submissions this module have said that council acknowledges that there's evidence of a small number of grenville tower residents not being told about this option i.e hotel
01:52:34 about this option i.e hotel accommodation in circumstances where there should have been and do you accept that concession which all bksc have made yes
01:52:46 we mentioned already the number of displaced residents generally from the evacuated properties within the police cordon
01:52:53 cordon and we know that by the afternoon at the 14th a number of 845 residents were on unable to return to their homes we've heard that those properties amongst others were known as the
01:53:04 amongst others were known as the walkways comprising of hearst way walk buried and walk and tested and walk is that correct what had what was advice given to that group of residents those within the
01:53:17 group of residents those within the umbrella of the walkways not the tower and what advice were they given in relation to the provision of emergency accommodation on the 14th of june um i don't remember but i in but i
01:53:30 um i don't remember but i in but i believe they were told if they asked them if they could stay with friends and family in the first instance that would be very helpful
01:53:42 i'm just going to summarize what you say it in fact we've got a statement here let's scroll down please to paragraph 49.
01:53:55 and overleaf please the last
01:53:59 the last four lines we said in the first instance that those living in the finger blocks should try to stay with friends and families
01:54:05 families if they didn't have anywhere to go we offered them hotels most of them did go to friends and family until the situation became clear just going to examine that a little bit more closer and assist you with some
01:54:16 more closer and assist you with some documentation
01:54:22 do you recall by the afternoon of the 14th of june that a position that displaced residents from the wide accord the walkways would be provided emergency hotel accommodation only if their elderly are vulnerable
01:54:35 elderly are vulnerable i think we were trying to prioritize people in order to be able to um to find them accommodation um i don't i can't remember exactly how many flats were in the three finger blocks
01:54:48 the three finger blocks but in terms of our priority it was for people who had nowhere to go and those residents whose homes had been destroyed by the fire um
01:54:57 um so
01:54:58 so in terms of order of priority we were looking to house those people who were vulnerable or had nowhere else to go
01:55:05 to go let's assist your recollection with rbk triple zero one eight eight nine eights please
01:55:12 please this is an email sent by you on the 14th of june at 1346
01:55:19 this is to emma strugnel who was in the media communications team accommodation we were directing people who were affected by the fire to the three emergency rest centers
01:55:31 emergency rest centers we are providing emergency combination of people impacted in grenville tower
01:55:36 and then in the third paragraph the fourth line we are advising people to go to the emergency rest center advise the housing staff who they are if they are old or vulnerable in any way will seek to
01:55:48 vulnerable in any way will seek to provide you with emergency housing for everyone else we are waiting to see if they will be allowed to return to their homes our emergency rest center accommodation will be
01:55:58 will be needed
01:56:02 does that assist in terms of the history timing of of the advice given to your members of staff yes it was yes it was the advice given to the members of staff when trying to find
01:56:14 when trying to find a
01:56:15 a considerable number of properties in a very short period of time we put in place a system whereby we sought to help those who were most vulnerable
01:56:27 vulnerable in order to be able to provide them with accommodation and do you consider that advice to your s
01:56:33 s to your staff to cascade do you think that decision and advice was clearly communicated to residents in the wider cordon on the 14th of june um i don't believe there was any mechanism to
01:56:45 was any mechanism to advise residents in the wide accordance of that advice i believe if people approached us we were able to advise them of that but there wasn't a mechanism in order to be able to disseminate that event information more
01:56:57 disseminate that event information more widely
01:56:59 widely well one mechanism would be using social media and channels such as facebook or twitter and putting messages out there do you know if that was done
01:57:10 know if that was done i don't
01:57:14 you talked about prioritization of offering accommodation but was it actually the other way around that there was a decision to limit the offer of hotel accommodation really because of the number of displaced people
01:57:27 um the sheer volume of people that that may require accommodation there's a necessity in order to be able to prioritize them in order to be able to
01:57:38 prioritize them in order to be able to target at those that are the most vulnerable or unable to find anywhere else to stay and it's touched upon their in your email which we just read out that
01:57:49 email which we just read out that you were waiting to see if those who were in the wider cordon would be allowed to return their homes or emergency rest center yeah return to their homes so at that stage there was
01:58:00 their homes so at that stage there was there was there a hope
01:58:02 hope or expectation that those who were displaced in the wider cordon would be allowed to return to their homes in the night of the 14th of june yes i didn't know the condition of their
01:58:13 i didn't know the condition of their properties at that time and i didn't know how long the police would have that cordon in place so it would appear from the email sent at quarter to two on the 14th that it was my hope that
01:58:26 two on the 14th that it was my hope that the cordon would be would be lifted and those people would be able to go home this is a cordon which is operated by the metropolitan police service can you tell us what was done in relation to obtaining advice
01:58:37 done in relation to obtaining advice from the metropolitan police service regarding the relaxation of the court um
01:58:43 i wouldn't have been responsible for contacting the metropolitan police myself i believe that would have been information that would have come through the back or through through other channels within the local authority
01:58:58 i would have waited to have heard advice from the metropolitan police about what their decision was on the cordon that was not my decision and i did not have a an open channel of communication with
01:59:10 a an open channel of communication with uh the metropolitan police if we could turn to rbk triple zero three one two nine eight please
01:59:20 this is a a long email chain
01:59:25 we could go to page three of this document please
01:59:30 to 1450. there's an email at 1450. thank you very much and that's an email from robert scholl it's to you and other people in your department who we are
01:59:41 in your department who we are accommodating latest 14th june 1450 and it says this we're aware that resins and surrounding blocks have been evacuated attached as a map of the area
01:59:54 evacuated attached as a map of the area includes the addresses which i've summarized some of those already if we scroll down if residents of the cordon area remain evacuated it is likely to be accommodated in a rest
02:00:05 likely to be accommodated in a rest center as it's likely to be only for one night unless they are older vulnerable etc we will accommodate these this is your information only this stage
02:00:16 this is your information only this stage i'll update you as to any changes
02:00:21 then if a further email within this thread if we move up to 1551 please in the email thread please you scroll up the next email above
02:00:33 you scroll up the next email above it's on page two this is mr shaw again
02:00:41 1551 you're copied in hello and updates will accommodate the following who live in the coordinator families or children older persons vulnerable persons
02:00:52 persons if you're at one of the rest centers and identifying people for placement please make sure you identify their vulnerability along with all the other info
02:01:01 info thanks rob
02:01:04 so it appears from this by that stage that the eligibility criteria had been extended to include families with children is that correct yes was there any reason why they were not included in the initial eligibility
02:01:17 included in the initial eligibility criteria i don't remember you can't remember whether it was an omission or a deliberate decision by prioritization not to include them um i
02:01:28 prioritization not to include them um i don't remember but my uh i would expect it was an omission rather than something that was a deliberate uh decision not to place people with families and children in that fierce
02:01:39 families and children in that fierce cohort and what rob was doing was making that clearer so this email we're looking at is 1551 so they're near four o'clock in the afternoon were there efforts by rbkc to
02:01:51 afternoon were there efforts by rbkc to updos update those who were affected who may have been in contact with housing officers
02:01:57 officers prior to that time about the change in eligibility criteria for accommodation um
02:02:05 um i'm sorry i don't really understand your question so we got this i'll rephrase it i'm sure it's my fault so it's 1551 the criteria has been extended to include families with children yes this is
02:02:17 families with children yes this is mid-afternoon in relation to those displaced people who had families who may have been in contact with a housing officer at any time up until that change in policy
02:02:28 in policy was there contact made with them to say well things have changed there now is accommodation available not to my knowledge no
02:02:38 if we follow this thread up please to the bottom of page one back to this email
02:02:47 thank you very much we see
02:02:50 we see the bottom of page 1 1621
02:02:57 from ryan bird wednesday 14th to june 1621
02:03:02 1621 it's that's the email and the thread we're looking at at the bottom page one and if we turn over to page two
02:03:09 and it says hello
02:03:11 hello do ta
02:03:13 do ta is that temporary combination yes no that we are placing no
02:03:20 no none tower does that mean non-tower i presume so so i'm going to read that again so that makes some sense does temporary accommodation know that we're placing non-tower
02:03:32 we're placing non-tower they temporary accommodation are telling our team not please clarify
02:03:41 and then if we go back to page one and follow this thread
02:03:47 thread we see that's 1623 amanda gill your colleague
02:03:53 yes i spoke to rachel west is going to be the overnight rest center
02:04:00 and the last thread that i want to focus on is if you just scroll up a little bit more please ryan bird again at 1632
02:04:13 please ryan bird again at 1632 thanks
02:04:15 thanks many helpful but confused folk here lots of information but little of it is entirely
02:04:22 entirely accurate
02:04:25 accurate was it the case as a as a result of confusion internally about the eligibility criteria that a number of those who met that criteria were initially not provided with a temporary accommodation emergency
02:04:37 with a temporary accommodation emergency accommodation on the 14th of june it was a very fluid situation with two teams who had been sent up to two rest centers and a third team
02:04:50 two rest centers and a third team then sent to the west way in order to be able to manage the numbers of people that were approaching we were dealing with the police cordon which in the town hall we weren't aware
02:05:01 which in the town hall we weren't aware of where it was and how it was impacting on people so in the first instance the message was to the people placing place the people from the tower as it became more obvious as the day went on that where the police cordon was and who was
02:05:13 where the police cordon was and who was impacted by it then we adjusted and meant that we were then placed people who were affected by the wide according because we did not know when that cordon was going to come down but it may be the
02:05:24 was going to come down but it may be the case that some people who had approached earlier in the day may have been given information that meant that by later in the day we had changed our stance but it was a very very fluid situation of not
02:05:36 was a very very fluid situation of not knowing who was going to be able to stay out of their home and who was going to be able to go back and i think it's entirely reasonable to expect changes in decision to taken place over the course of that
02:05:48 to taken place over the course of that day as the situation became crystallized so a lot in there he gave you reasons why
02:05:56 why matters developed as the as the did but is it right that you accept that that was that did occur that there may have been people who were not informed there may have been some people who
02:06:07 there may have been some people who initially were informed that they would not have been placed but by later in the day then that would be in the decision that they would have been placed you said it's entirely reasonable to expect changes in decision to have taken
02:06:18 expect changes in decision to have taken place over the course of the day as the situation became crystallized would you also accept it it's entirely reasonable to expect that the council communicates those changes of decisions
02:06:29 communicates those changes of decisions so that people understand that matters have developed yes i would accept that there was a need to communicate to the people who were impacted by
02:06:40 to the people who were impacted by the fire and the events about who we were going to place um and and for how long how we were going to communicate with them is uh is somewhat more difficult you mentioned social media
02:06:52 you mentioned social media but as you'll be aware lots of people left the tower or left their accommodation with absolutely nothing so access to social media i should imagine wasn't as perhaps as prevalent as it is
02:07:03 wasn't as perhaps as prevalent as it is as it is if you were leaving your home and had and had the ability to take things that you wanted to take with you i'm just going to touch upon a couple of examples of the confusion in the
02:07:16 examples of the confusion in the circumstances which you've explained to us existed at that time and there's something called a crisis support team which was operating for or bkc you're aware of that part of the department is that correct
02:07:28 part of the department is that correct yes
02:07:29 yes and perhaps you'll accept from me um is that there was a report that there was an 84 year old man who had been evacuated
02:07:38 evacuated and
02:07:39 and was from the walkways but notwithstanding his contact with housing he was considered at that stage not eligible for accommodation would you accept that there was occasions where people were simply given
02:07:51 occasions where people were simply given the wrong information yes the third example was hisham shubika who was a resident from grenville walk lived there with his wife and three children
02:08:02 children and he states this i'm going to summarize but paragraph 33 of his statement iws quadruple zero one three zero five
02:08:10 zero five at two pm i went back to the tower and i started hearing that the west way was open and they were providing emergency shelter and support i went there to westmead but at first they did not let me in because i was not
02:08:21 they did not let me in because i was not from the tower they did not know that grenville walked residents had been affected by the fire too
02:08:27 too i explained that i lived in granville walk and that i had lost my house and everything inside we'd evacuate and cut in return i told them all i wanted was some powder milk for our baby son
02:08:38 milk for our baby son he added that two days later he contacted the council again and nobody from the council contacted us to tell us about the hotel accommodation until we contacted them so an occasion where somebody who had a
02:08:50 so an occasion where somebody who had a family who was from the surrounding area although very close to grenfell tower who
02:08:57 tower who wasn't
02:08:58 wasn't provided accommodation and do you accept that he should have been contacted yes
02:09:07 and was the approach
02:09:10 approach of or bkc because of the circumstances you were operating in that those who needed assistance really had to come to the rest center or come to you
02:09:21 come to you as an organization to get assistance yes they needed to make themselves aware that
02:09:28 that uh to uh they needed to make themselves aware to us that they needed assistance on that first day particularly
02:09:44 and there is we've heard something called the project athena interview an account which an internal interview provided by or bkc and you touch upon this but perhaps summarize it you say it wasn't
02:09:55 wasn't the question was this in fact let's let's open it up so age or recollection or bk triple zero two nine zero one two please we've gotta turn to page eight on the last question
02:10:06 page eight on the last question thank you
02:10:10 we see that the the person who's asking questions says it wasn't you your responsibility to speak with everyone and make sure they have somewhere rather rather it was for them to come to you
02:10:21 rather it was for them to come to you and then if you could turn over leaf please
02:10:27 you say yes reactive not proactive but tmo had called around everyone see where everyone was in their list of tenants the scale of who needed what only became clear over the next few
02:10:40 clear over the next few days
02:10:41 days and you accept reactive not proactive at that stage as perhaps a fair description of what you had to do is that correct yes that's correct
02:11:02 i wonder if you could turn please to rbk triple zero one nine seven seven eight please
02:11:13 and this is in relation to information and key messages and communicating with those who were displaced and affected by the fire
02:11:26 this was circulated this was drafted i could summarize information we have around two o'clock on the 14th of june and circulated to obkcc staff tmo staff and staff from the
02:11:38 obkcc staff tmo staff and staff from the west way
02:11:39 west way we could tell from emails that circulate between 1443 and 1512. are you familiar with this document key messages
02:11:48 messages yes
02:11:49 yes and if we look at the bottom of the document under paragraph six housing plan
02:12:00 if you're a grenville tower resident please go to one of the above rest centers or the town hall we provide you with emergency accommodation if you're a resident of any of the other blocks that have been evacuated you could fire them please also go to the rest center make yourself known
02:12:12 rest center make yourself known we're awaiting an update if any residents have evacuated blocks or vulnerable or elderly will seek to divide you with emergency accommodation however we would encourage people to stay with friends and family in the
02:12:25 stay with friends and family in the first instance until we have further information
02:12:31 so that was the the information key messages and internal documents shared amongst or bkc tmo and those at the west way
02:12:43 tmo and those at the west way do you know you probably touch upon us already whether that information was circulated elsewhere to those who were affected using social media channels or the websites or bkc i
02:12:55 media channels or the websites or bkc i don't know and abe are you able to say that those displaced residents who may be vulnerable or where english was not their first language do you know whether there was any
02:13:07 there was any consideration regarding their needs and communicating with them i don't know
02:13:14 i want to deal with a topic of um
02:13:19 um reports that those in the walkways where
02:13:23 where certain residents were sleeping rough i having nowhere to sleep and were you aware that there was reports late on the 14th of june of displaced residents sleeping rough i wasn't aware that anyone was sleeping
02:13:35 i wasn't aware that anyone was sleeping rough
02:13:37 rough there was no need for anybody to sleep rough because the west way was open and available for people to stay there so you weren't aware at the time no and you said that there's no need
02:13:48 no and you said that there's no need that's right and let's
02:13:51 and let's in relation to that from your perspective somebody who's worked for many years in the housing department someone who's very senior at rbkc would it cause you concern to hear in
02:14:03 would it cause you concern to hear in the wake of such a serious incident that there was people who were displaced affected by the fire sleeping rough of course
02:14:13 of course if we could turn to um obk triple zero two nine four one three this is the back log it's in a spreadsheet so it may take a little bit of time to open up
02:14:25 we're going to go to row two two eight and between us we're going to navigate through this that might take a little bit of time
02:14:39 so far left please it'll be scroll down to row two to
02:14:52 eight okay
02:15:01 so at column a we see the log number and this is log 58 that records on the 14th of june at 23 13.
02:15:10 13. red cross contacted to say that red cross staff were walking from orbeez sea rugby portobello one assumes the westway center have been have seen people
02:15:21 center have been have seen people sleeping on the streets who don't appear to know about westway being a relief center overnight jack duncan has asked red cross to share more precise information relocation and flag it with david carey
02:15:36 and that's the reference there at 2340 that volunteers have spotted rough sleepers sleepers on verti close i'm just going to follow that through because as you said that you weren't aware of that at the time see if any of
02:15:48 aware of that at the time see if any of us assist your recollection we move up to the next row which is row 227 log 59.
02:15:55 log 59. this is jack duncton again do you know who jack duncan is no contacted unseen lelo local authority lays an officer to let police know that there are potentially people sleeping out on very close are you familiar with
02:16:07 out on very close are you familiar with verity close yes and i've asked police to go and check the area and go to the westway sports center
02:16:16 if we turn to row 222 which is log 64 please
02:16:21 please this is that zero zero 45 from guy column layla item two he has spoken to a police officer in accordance regarding people
02:16:32 officer in accordance regarding people sleeping outside versus close the police say they don't have the capacity to send an officer the police are winding down officers have been sent home
02:16:43 home finally in relation to this rule 213 please
02:16:46 please log 73
02:16:51 thank you so this is oh 130. 15 to june so overnight guy column layla has been in touch to say that they've not come across people sleeping on the streets
02:17:01 streets streets around very close the police are standing down their day shift
02:17:06 shift david curry contacted suez there is a cleaning part of the organization is that correct i believe so to inform them about anti-cancer
02:17:17 so to inform them about anti-cancer feeling
02:17:18 feeling and other matters which don't relate to this topic
02:17:25 you mentioned that you weren't aware of these reports at the time correct yes
02:17:34 it appears that the report on the back wasn't isolated and a tmo who were as you mentioned making contact with residents and and indeed walkway residents also
02:17:45 and and indeed walkway residents also recorded the following on the 15th of june
02:17:49 june and in relation to that what i'm going to do is i'm going to summarize their log perhaps you'll accept it from me this is what came back from their information a named individual from barred and walk
02:18:01 a named individual from barred and walk was sleeping in the park with his dog and appears the reason why was the concern for where his pets would go were you aware of that no another named individual from burden
02:18:12 another named individual from burden walk was recorded sleeping under the flyover
02:18:15 flyover he stated he required accommodation and it was noted by the tmo officer that his mother will assist him to call or bkc
02:18:23 bkc maybe a suggestion of vulnerability again were you aware of that no and the last example i'd like to refer to is a named female resident from tested and walk who had two sons
02:18:35 tested and walk who had two sons who were not adults she was recorded to have stayed in her car
02:18:40 car on the 14th of june then and over to the night of the 15th and was advised to go to the west way again it probably flows from your previous answers that you weren't aware of this no i wasn't aware of those
02:18:52 of this no i wasn't aware of those individual cases so regular contact with the tmo this if there was reports of homelessness would be a something of a real concern but it wasn't brought to your attention it wasn't brought to my
02:19:03 your attention it wasn't brought to my individual attention in relation to this ring around for one of a better word that the tmo work we're doing on the 15th of june
02:19:14 15th of june some of that contact also referred to a named resin not having much luck with the temporary accommodation number which must be a reference to the housing
02:19:25 which must be a reference to the housing line is that correct that's correct was that housing line operating in 24 hours or was it limited
02:19:33 i don't remember we did put a shift system in place quite quickly but i don't
02:19:37 don't know from the 14th of june um to the 15th of june we did have it manned from i believe 8 o'clock in the morning till 10 o'clock at night but i don't believe it was monday overnight
02:19:51 there was also entries when this
02:19:53 when this call around was made where other tenants were staying with friends and was indicated that they required accommodation as they could at least stay there for the short term
02:20:04 so drawing that together from that information would you now accept that there was a number of displaced walkway residents some with families some potentially vulnerable who would know where to stay for that first night
02:20:15 know where to stay for that first night on the 14th of june and perhaps some of the later nights yes
02:20:24 and he accepts that that was in part a consequence of this passive approach by rbkc and poor communication regarding the eligibility criteria both
02:20:37 regarding the eligibility criteria both internally and externally regarding temporary accommodation i don't accept that it was our passive approach because we were
02:20:46 we were being extremely active at that time by saying it was passive you give the indication that we weren't actually doing anything in order to be able to house as many people as possible
02:20:58 house as many people as possible uh but we were we were doing a great deal in order to be able to to uh to house people who approached us i do accept from the evidence that you put before me that there were people who
02:21:10 put before me that there were people who unfortunately did not uh did not receive the level of care that they should have done on that night of the 14th of june and therefore unnecessarily slept in their car or who slept out
02:21:23 their car or who slept out but should have if they could have known about it
02:21:26 about it being housed in the west way overnight and then subsequently received the offer of emergency accommodation
02:21:37 i just want to say i do not know though based on the evidence that you provided as to whether any of those three people that you provided as evidence had the ability for us to contact them
02:21:49 had the ability for us to contact them so i don't know whether even if we had been
02:21:51 been proactive that we would have had the ability to phone all of those people in order to be able to let them know what was available for them and
02:22:00 and proactive is perhaps a better word and passive and fairness to you but in terms of being proactive we know that
02:22:07 that from the information i provided to you it was a ring around so all these people who were contacted were content by telephone
02:22:14 telephone so these were perhaps people who were contactable well in any housing management scenario you have telephone numbers for people who live in your accommodation
02:22:25 your accommodation whether those telephone numbers are up to date and whether you are able to get hold of people as part of that ring around as i believe there's a subsequent entry is that it's not always possible to get hold of
02:22:36 it's not always possible to get hold of people or have up-to-date numbers and or email addresses for them because tenants are not obliged to give you their personal information and nor should they if they don't want to
02:22:47 should they if they don't want to move on to another topic please which is a consideration given to allow those walkway residents who were displaced in the wide accordance to return to their
02:22:58 the wide accordance to return to their homes
02:23:00 homes and you indicate in your statement paragraph 60 that's
02:23:05 that's on the 15th of june you had no idea as the day wore on whether 850 people in the wider cordon could go home or whether we may need emergency accommodation too it was not until quite
02:23:16 accommodation too it was not until quite late in the day that people could start returning to their homes in the wider court
02:23:22 court is that correct yes and can you recall how it was decided that those in the wider cordon such as the walkers we've discussed could return to their home
02:23:33 could return to their home it was not my decision so i do not know what decision was taken by the metropolitan police on lifting the cordon to allow people to return home well there's probably two two factors there number one is the cordon if if
02:23:45 there number one is the cordon if if there is a cordon where people aren't allowed to enter that's beyond your control right and then is when the cordon is is lifted or relaxed or reduced
02:23:57 or relaxed or reduced is then the decision whether it's appropriate or suitable for those people to return to the combination isn't that correct yes so the appropriateness would have been based on the information received from the people
02:24:09 the information received from the people who were on the ground about the condition of those blocks and who were those people so the tmo yes uh we're on the ground and assessing the condition of the three finger blocks
02:24:21 finger blocks and you
02:24:22 and you mentioned it paragraph 61 of your statement is that the tmo were on site and they were doing assessments on the 14th 15th and 16th of june of the accommodation and you state a paragraph 61 of of
02:24:35 and you state a paragraph 61 of of your statement that it was their responsibility to check the accommodation that's correct that was your understanding that's correct and did the tmo express any concerns to you
02:24:47 you as head of housing or bkc gold regarding safety concerns or wider reservations at that time regarding allowing residents to return to their homes in the walkways during those first three
02:24:58 the walkways during those first three days
02:25:00 days i don't remember perhaps assist you with your recollection if we could turn to tmo
02:25:09 nine 0086999 zero please we've seen this before it's a statement from theresa brown who i'm sure you know very well i knew very well at the time yesterday
02:25:21 well at the time yesterday good working relationship with her yes she's an excellent officer and she was director of housing for tmo and if we turn to paragraph 45 please which is page 9.
02:25:34 which is page 9. i'm just going to read it out recall on the 15th of june having discussions with stuart priestley from orbkc beck who had advised a consideration was being given at the time to return residents evacuated in
02:25:46 time to return residents evacuated in the surrounding areas of the tower i recall discussing the possible impact on residents if this went ahead advising if residents returned home they would have no gas boiler and consequently no
02:25:58 have no gas boiler and consequently no hot water or cooking facilities as the surrounding areas ran off the towers heating hot water services we also needed to repair damaged doors where the police had forced entry
02:26:10 where the police had forced entry and i theresa brown suggested that returning residents should not be rushed back until we could assure proper provision of services and she gives examples
02:26:21 and she gives examples how the door entry system also needed to be re-routed
02:26:26 were you informed of that advice by teresa brown that returning residents on the 15th of june should not be rushed back
02:26:36 i don't recall whether i received
02:26:39 received that
02:26:40 that information but i do
02:26:44 but i do but i do recall receiving information about the condition of the finger blocks and about the work that needed to be undertaken in order to be able to make those uh the accommodation
02:26:57 those uh the accommodation to fix the doors to fix the door entry system
02:27:00 system to check for smoke damage to check for flood damage um and to and to affect the repairs that needed to take place and i was also very aware that the
02:27:11 and i was also very aware that the boiler for the uh the finger blocks was in the basement of grenfell tower and therefore there would need to be an emergency or an alternative boiler system put in place in order to be able
02:27:22 system put in place in order to be able to allow people to return so on the 15th of june you had an awareness of these factors in relation to heating hot water yes and in relation to
02:27:33 yes and in relation to um likely damage to some of the properties within the cordon and yes if you scroll down please paragraph 48 of our statement please
02:27:46 so she mentioned earlier on speaking of stuart priestley and miss brown from tmo says this at approximately 8 p.m on the 15th of june i was contacted by the beck and asked to meet police inspector bean at the kensington leisure
02:27:58 inspector bean at the kensington leisure center
02:27:59 center this was to inspect the finger block area to examine whether all the areas that needed boarding up for residents were secure and skip a little bit i was advised on that inspection that the intention of
02:28:10 that inspection that the intention of gold group that being all bkc gold group was that the finger block resin should be returned as soon as possible pausing there were you aware of that as the advice from or bkc gold
02:28:23 the advice from or bkc gold was that finger slash wink walkway residents should be returned as soon as possible on the 15th of june and the evening yes because i was hopeful that we wouldn't have to uh that there was
02:28:37 wouldn't have to uh that there was that we would want to try and have people to be able to go home again as soon as they possibly could miss brown continues at paragraph 48 i repeated my concerns
02:28:49 repeated my concerns about it being premature due to lack of gas heating doors needed securing fire exits from the 300 blocks provide access directly in the groundville walk and you get a number of
02:29:01 groundville walk and you get a number of other
02:29:02 other reasons why
02:29:05 she telephoned sasha jevons who is also from the tmo isn't that correct yes that's correct from sites from the location who had the same reservations
02:29:16 location who had the same reservations she said
02:29:17 she said sasha jevens would call laura johnson and i'm going to read the rest of the sentence sasha gevins called me back shortly after and said that laura said we had to go with the gold group
02:29:29 said we had to go with the gold group decision
02:29:31 decision so in relation to that did you have a conversation with sasha jevens where she relayed the reservations of the tmo and specifically theresa brown at the scene that was premature because of the
02:29:42 that was premature because of the condition of the property for residents to be returned back to the walkways i don't recall the conversation but if sasha and teresa said the conversation took place then it will
02:29:53 conversation took place then it will have done
02:29:55 have done and and finally we had to go with the goal group decision specifically you call saying that no
02:30:03 no but if i if sasha says that i said that that i'm quite sure that i did
02:30:17 if concerns were expressed by the tmo regarding the state of the accommodation and had been premature do you think those concerns should have been taken into account and heeded
02:30:29 been taken into account and heeded um yes and i'm sure they were in the context of set in the context of trying to find the sheer volume of accommodation for people that was required in london at that time
02:30:42 that was required in london at that time so
02:30:43 so the alternative is either people can go home and realize that it's it's far from perfect and there are faults with it or that they can stay in an emergency
02:30:54 it or that they can stay in an emergency rest center and
02:30:57 and i think you know kind of it's very difficult decision to take when you're looking for hundreds and hundreds of units of accommodation in a very busy capital city where there isn't hundreds and hundreds of empty units of
02:31:08 hundreds and hundreds of empty units of accommodation to provide people with that
02:31:12 that sometimes you have to make very difficult decisions which is about are people going to be able to go home even though the accommodation is is not as perfect as we would like it to be
02:31:23 as perfect as we would like it to be and on the description we've heard you use a phrase not as perfect but it was issues regarding its but it was habitable really isn't that correct yes in terms of um if it was if
02:31:35 correct yes in terms of um if it was if it was not habitable then uh and if the feedback was that it's just not habitable flood damage fire damage then nobody would have been made to go back but if there was an issue of
02:31:47 back but if there was an issue of unfortunately not having hot water heating being less of an issue because it was june then it may be well being considered that it was reasonable for people to return home until that hot water provision could have been put in
02:31:58 water provision could have been put in place
02:31:59 place and i know that the tmo worked over the weekend of that weekend to ensure that all the doors were fixed and the door entry was fixed and then there was a period of time over
02:32:10 and then there was a period of time over the following few days where an emergency boiler provision was put in place
02:32:15 place in relation to this phrase gold group decisions or bkc gold group decision and we know that that's group met
02:32:25 group met and twice on the 15th of june and we'll see the minutes in due course but it's a decision which doesn't appear to be minuted within that those meetings
02:32:38 to be minuted within that those meetings do you recall and i know you may have get this answer already but you recall at any stage outside those meetings any contact with members of all bkc gold
02:32:49 contact with members of all bkc gold regarding this decision no
02:32:53 no would you expect as director of housing to participate in such a decision yes
02:33:00 yes so is it likely actually doing logically that you probably did participate in that decision but don't recollect it now
02:33:08 i think it highly likely that there was a discussion that took place about what would happen if a further 300 people could not be returned to their properties or could not go home
02:33:20 properties or could not go home and what we sought to do in order to make
02:33:23 make in order to try to
02:33:28 try to make those property available for people if they wanted to go back it may well be that lots of people and i it's my understanding that lots of people didn't go back um but it was about being able to lift
02:33:39 um but it was about being able to lift the cordon and enable people to go home should they want to and people would make that choice some people would decide to go back and some people would decide not to go back
02:33:50 people would decide not to go back you mentioned 300 and i don't want to mislead you when it refers to the 300s i think it's it's like one of the walkways yes it is numbers which is attributed to
02:34:01 yes it is numbers which is attributed to them and for short is a reference to the 300s or perhaps the 400s yes i understand that and i think we'll we'll touch upon in a moment the numbers of displaced people so i don't want you to be misled about that figure no no i
02:34:13 be misled about that figure no no i understand that there was around 845 people families who were in that wider area
02:34:22 let's look at that last or bkc gold meeting on the 15th at 15 30 which is all bk triple zero two zero four four eight
02:34:31 eight look at page one
02:34:37 and we're in attendance we see there on a second line of attendees
02:34:44 attendees and response priorities and we say see that 49 people in commercial accommodation from grenville tower on the 15th of june placed 103 people in total
02:34:56 placed 103 people in total maybe placing more as a further request comes in
02:35:01 at this stage this is before the telephone contact with sasha jevons later on on the 15th of june at 8 o'clock and it says this if the corner is not lifted then have over 800 people
02:35:13 is not lifted then have over 800 people find places we'll need to seek help from government can you help in relation to what that means we'll need to seek help from government
02:35:25 government well if there's uh
02:35:28 there would be no way that the borough would be able to source accommodation uh for 800 people that is an enormous amount of people who live in a very small geographic area who would need
02:35:40 small geographic area who would need either a rest center or somewhere to stay overnight and there's just no way that rbkc would have that capacity and or i believe that probably a number of units were available in london on
02:35:51 of units were available in london on that night so it would become something that we would need help from government in order to be able to do and
02:35:58 and understand the reasons as you set them out
02:36:01 out but what sort of help do you think was envisaged the government could provide central government could provide um i think in that statement i mean we would need to contact government and
02:36:13 would need to contact government and make them aware that it wasn't just the people from grenfell tower who needed to be rehoused but there was a wider and bigger problem with the people in the wider estate who needed to be found accommodation
02:36:24 who needed to be found accommodation either for a short period of time or a medium period of time and what assistance could they offer i don't work in government so i'm not sure what they could have said to me [Music]
02:36:34 [Music] and your director of housing as we've mentioned a number of times it's
02:36:41 it's the second day of the rbkc response there is
02:36:45 there is a lot of
02:36:47 a lot of negative
02:36:49 negative coverage after response which you touch upon and which is mentioned under statements and criticisms of the council at that stage isn't that correct yes um you mentioned how hard your team is
02:37:01 um you mentioned how hard your team is working but looking at the scale of the task you faced
02:37:08 did you not think that or bkc needed more assistance
02:37:17 looking at it in hindsight after the event then clearly
02:37:22 clearly more assistance would have been extremely helpful at that time um i would say it was very much in the housing department head down
02:37:31 head down let's just keep going we need to be booking hotels rebooking hotels placing people as they approach logging all of the offers that we're receiving seeing how useful they are
02:37:43 useful they are and then seeing how we can help the people who are approaching us
02:37:50 you were asked questions earlier this morning regarding the morning of the 14th of june and any advice which david curry gave to the chief executive town clark for bkc
02:38:01 clark for bkc that this was too big effectively for all bkc and to seek external help which i have summarized were you aware on the 14th or 15th of june of
02:38:13 on the 14th or 15th of june of the assistance that could be provided to or bkc such as the london local authority gold resolution no i wasn't do you recall any discussions
02:38:25 do you recall any discussions with nicholas holgater at these meetings amongst all bkc leaders as to activating the london local authority gold on the 15th of june no i don't
02:38:36 gold on the 15th of june no i don't recall a discussion about that
02:38:42 if we could so we've just been looking at the afternoon at the 15th of june and just perhaps to track the numbers of those who are being placed
02:38:51 placed to use a clinical term hopefully not an insensitive term we could turn to or bkc 00020703
02:39:08 so this is highlighted and that's the way it's provided it's not highlighted by us so ignore the highlighting and these are the minutes of the group meeting ten o'clock that day you are there we can see from page one
02:39:20 there we can see from page one and obviously at the top of page two under paragraph four strategic priorities looking after those immediately affected
02:39:31 immediately affected 109 families being placed in commercial accommodation 30 families are from the finger blocks
02:39:40 and then it says looking after those immediately affected
02:39:46 the third bullet point some families did return to their homes last night there's no hot water and heating in the reoccupied blocks the tmo were looking to install temporary boilers there were broken doors debris
02:39:58 boilers there were broken doors debris and flooding which tmo are working on resolving
02:40:01 resolving orbee
02:40:03 orbee robert black is that correct yes to advise the beck once the temporary boiler is in place lj you just supplied a number of families evacuated from grenville walk
02:40:15 families evacuated from grenville walk is that correct
02:40:18 yes and then if we go down please to the seventh bullet point which says lg confirmed so still in that section
02:40:29 in that section have you got that lg confirmed yes i do she has sufficient hotels to accommodate up to 20 families she will house the vulnerable or those or children without hot water
02:40:40 or children without hot water but others will have to manage is that correct yes
02:40:50 was that the view that you're doing the best you can but other people will just have to get on with it they'll have to manage
02:40:56 manage yes
02:41:03 what was the timeline for installing these temporary boilers
02:41:09 um the uh i don't know to be honest with you i don't remember is it fair to say that it took a significant period of time
02:41:21 a significant period of time probably more weeks than days to install temporary boilers i think it did take longer
02:41:26 longer it was first spoken about as the situation became apparent about the lack of hot water
02:41:34 water in the in the finger blocks and then um an assessment needed to be made of how in engineering terms how difficult or how easy it was in order to
02:41:47 how easy it was in order to hook up a temporary solution and that situation again was quite fluid as the tmo and westminster who were assisting worked out what the solution was
02:42:00 worked out what the solution was fluid situation a complex situation very complex and one which perhaps in fairness was envisaged to last a considerable period of time even at
02:42:11 a considerable period of time even at that stage i couldn't say with any certainty that there was a timeline placed on how long it would take to put the temporary boiler solution in place i had no
02:42:24 boiler solution in place i had no view at that point whether it would take hours
02:42:28 hours or days or weeks and in relation to those who were returned to their homes in the walkways who didn't have hot water or heating
02:42:39 who didn't have hot water or heating or gas
02:42:40 or gas to cook
02:42:42 to cook putting aside at june had been being warm but just actually to be able to cook
02:42:46 cook what alternative provisions were made for those people so we were looking to put in place providing people with financial assistance i believe in order to be able so that they could go and um
02:42:58 so that they could go and um get food elsewhere and i believe there were showers available in the uh sports centre does that be in the west way uh the westway and or they um
02:43:10 they um the kensington academy leisure center but i believe actually at that time it was still being used by the police yes probably probably the west way probably the worst way yes okay let's move on to another topic
02:43:22 okay let's move on to another topic actually probably staying in the same theme about the numbers of households and people being accommodated and
02:43:29 and if we i'm going to summarize what you say at paragraph 50 of your statements saying that we still had many people approaching us on day two and three thursday and friday 15-16
02:43:41 thursday and friday 15-16 which included grenville tower residents as well as people from the finger blocks walkways who required re-housing and as those numbers increased
02:43:52 and as those numbers increased and was it the case that it was a real struggle to keep up with the with the increase in demand yes
02:44:03 so we've heard already that by the end of the 14th of june 77 households were provided hotel accommodation 20s stayed in the rest center we've touched on that already but by the
02:44:14 we've touched on that already but by the 20th of june the 12 o'clock rbkc gold group meeting minutes which i can summarize as all bkc0017570
02:44:25 reported a total of 250 households have been placed 125 from grenville tower and grenville walk and 112 from the broader
02:44:36 broader cordoned
02:44:37 cordoned area
02:44:39 area so lots of numbers there but really from the first day 77 households and by day six approximately day seven it increases to 250 households
02:44:51 it increases to 250 households and amongst those 112 from the broader cordon area does that sound correct yes so a significant amount of people in the wider coordinator
02:45:03 wider coordinator in the end were placed in temporary accommodation that's correct and by temporary accommodation we mean hotels that's correct
02:45:13 got time to deal with offers of accommodation which you've mentioned upon
02:45:17 upon um earlier on this morning receiving offers of accommodation perhaps i can deal with that in short
02:45:25 in short is it correct that from the 14th of june onwards
02:45:28 onwards or bkc received a substantial number of officers accommodation from members of the public other local authorities housing associations charities businesses and indeed hotels
02:45:40 businesses and indeed hotels yes
02:45:43 yes was it the view of rbkc's housing team led by you that hotel accommodation was the most appropriate option in terms of location and compliance in terms of cleanliness
02:45:55 and compliance in terms of cleanliness fire safety and other standards yes the accommodation that was being offered very generously i have to say by lots of people
02:46:04 people who obviously had seen the news and were horrified by what was taking place um was you know kind of overwhelming in terms of people's kindness and i must
02:46:15 terms of people's kindness and i must say that that it was you know kind of uh it was you are quite humbled by what people offer in those kind of circumstances but in to stay to have someone who's
02:46:26 but in to stay to have someone who's highly traumatized to come and stay in your house in a spare bedroom didn't really feel like the right solution for me when what people probably needed was a self-contained room in their own
02:46:37 self-contained room in their own bathroom and the ability to you know kind of try to think about what what had just happened in the case of accommodation that was offered by other registered providers and or by
02:46:48 other registered providers and or by other councils these would be accommodation that was unfinished in existing social housing blocks um and so it wasn't just a case of being able to say to somebody
02:47:00 able to say to somebody you can go and we've got a flat few in uh
02:47:03 uh on the 10th floor of a block in wundsworth that really didn't feel like the right solution either because they would be unfinished accommodation maybe or may not be the right size for that family may not be where that family
02:47:15 that family may not be where that family wanted to be and so that was very much accommodation that needed to be considered in the medium team as an alternative but not in the short term where people needed clean bedding
02:47:26 bedding a warm place to stay their own bathroom and the ability to be as close as possible as they could to our bkc so you set out in your statement and your answer the rationale and
02:47:37 your answer the rationale and why the decision was made and focusing on hotel accommodation you also mentioned humbling and overwhelming um
02:47:47 um response from members of the public people are very very kind and those offers is it right for members of public were made by both phone and email to or bkc that's correct
02:47:58 email to or bkc that's correct was there an issue with the volume of offers with managing those offers and those receipts of offers
02:48:08 there was a huge number of offers and i believe that we acknowledged every single offer that was received maybe not on the same day or the next day but we did have a process in place whereby myself or my colleague acknowledged the
02:48:20 myself or my colleague acknowledged the very kind offers that people had given us
02:48:22 us and we started to log all of those offers on the second on the 15th we had a separate team who were looking at logging all of the offers and the suitability of those
02:48:33 the offers and the suitability of those offers
02:48:34 offers in the context of people won't be able to stay in hotels for longer term and we need to start thinking about where people are going to move to in the medium team i'm also aware
02:48:45 in the medium team i'm also aware because as you've mentioned i was the director of housing at rbkc for eight and a half years the very low number of vacancies or voids that we get in our housing stock on an annual basis
02:48:56 on an annual basis so
02:48:57 so k and c used to do around 400 lettings a year on average and 60 of those were bed sits and one beds now i'm aware of that situation when i'm receiving offers from
02:49:08 situation when i'm receiving offers from other
02:49:08 other providers
02:49:10 providers i'm also aware of the mix of families and the different family types that people will need to be accommodated and i know that we just won't be able to accommodate everybody who's been displaced by grenfell fire
02:49:21 displaced by grenfell fire within rbkc so as kind as those offers were in particular from members of the public they were never going to be utilized for the reasons you've experienced they won't be suitable it was they were
02:49:32 won't be suitable it was they were extremely kind and extremely well meant um and
02:49:36 um and in perhaps in different circumstances we would have been able to use them but in this instance it was my belief and it's still my belief that hotel accommodation was probably the best place to put people in this scenario
02:49:48 scenario and in relation to that decision about offers of accommodation from the public was this decision communicated to the public via the media communications team
02:49:59 public via the media communications team or an automated message perhaps on
02:50:02 on the housing line that thank you but we don't require any offers of temporary accommodation uh i don't think there was a message sent out i'd if there was there's a fine
02:50:13 sent out i'd if there was there's a fine balance to strike in that situation isn't there of of being very grateful for people's very kind offers and then appearing not to want them you know there's a there's a balance to be struck
02:50:24 there's a there's a balance to be struck between being grateful for those offers um and some of them could have been extremely useful and then turning those offers away so there's a balance to be struck about how you how you receive people's
02:50:37 how you how you receive people's uh how you receive people's offers i'm going to move on and make a start on a new section which is really the adequacy of the emergency
02:50:48 really the adequacy of the emergency accommodation which was provided to those affected in those first seven days which is the framework for the immediate aftermath we are exploring you mentioned that rachel dalton who was
02:51:01 you mentioned that rachel dalton who was part of housing team was in charge of the team which matched the needs of those requiring accommodation with available accommodation yes on your account there was an effort to
02:51:13 on your account there was an effort to match needs with what was available yes that's correct we were looking at family composition and type and hotel and people were making us aware of any
02:51:24 and people were making us aware of any disabilities or vulnerabilities and trying our best to to try and match that i
02:51:30 that i admit that we we probably did not get it right in every circumstance but as i said there was a lot of people coming in and we were booking a lot of rooms and trying to get people into somewhere as quickly as possible to
02:51:43 into somewhere as quickly as possible to make sure that they were safe and were accommodated
02:51:47 was any consideration in those early days given to the floor the accommodation would be on placing somebody for instance in a high floor in a hotel
02:51:59 floor in a hotel i don't think probably in the first few days that that was a consideration but i think that became a consideration as it went on as it became more apparent to us how traumatized people were and how
02:52:11 how traumatized people were and how quite rightly just couldn't face being you know kind of in a flat or in a higher floor forward accommodation balanced against
02:52:22 this is what we've got available yes you know
02:52:25 know and in those first few days you accept that it became apparent some residents were placed in the upper floors of high-rise hotels and there was feedback that that was traumatizing yes and and quite
02:52:37 traumatizing yes and and quite understandably so as well
02:52:49 and at what stage do you think there was this recognition and change in the
02:52:57 the placing of those who were understandably traumatized in lower and floor hotel accommodation can you say no not with any great
02:53:09 can you say no not with any great certainty um i would say that we started to receive feedback from people and then started to uh to react to that i wouldn't say in the first instance it was a consideration that we said we are not
02:53:21 consideration that we said we are not booking any towers hotel towers but as it became aware of we became aware of it then we started to adjust our our booking policy in fairness you said in the first few days it wasn't a consideration and
02:53:33 consideration and perhaps consistent with an email which i can summarize 18th of june so the weekend oh 948 rachel dalton i'm just going to give the reference rbkc or bk triple
02:53:44 give the reference rbkc or bk triple zero 31672 to members of the housing team setting out a number of tasks and says this quick thoughts that you're all probably working on we need to go through all extensions today and move those on the
02:53:56 extensions today and move those on the higher level floors so as you say first few days not a consideration and then thereafter efforts made to move those affected yes
02:54:08 move those affected yes were possible yes
02:54:14 in the first seven days did those assigning
02:54:18 assigning hotel rooms such as rachel dalton's team take into account the specific needs of those affected such as adaptations from mobility issues or facilities for cooking
02:54:29 cooking or the provision of appropriate sleeping facilities for those with young children i think we tried to i'm not sure that we got it right on every occasion and i know there were families who
02:54:41 know there were families who subsequently came back to us and said there weren't sufficient beds in the room when we were made aware of it we moved people but we were certainly trying in the first instance to provide people with the appropriate size of
02:54:52 people with the appropriate size of accommodation that they needed so your evidence in in summary is yes we
02:54:59 yes we we tried but we probably didn't get it right in every in every scenario and perhaps
02:55:04 perhaps a bit more than that perhaps an acceptance that you didn't get at rights and to assist you just going to refer to some examples in general terms because the inquiries heard extensive oral and written evidence of the
02:55:17 oral and written evidence of the experience of those who were placed in hotel accommodation in those first few days
02:55:21 days references to families placed in one room which was far too small for a number of family members allocations that did not take into account that there was an infant child including one family placed in a room
02:55:33 including one family placed in a room with no cot or other baby facilities and the needs of those with disabilities such as a family of mohammed razool we've heard live evidence from and his elderly father who on his account had
02:55:44 elderly father who on his account had not been taken into account or sufficiently catered for and
02:55:49 and with those examples which
02:55:52 which do you accept that in those first seven days that there's actually a significant number of those placed who did not have their needs sufficiently or properly catered for
02:56:03 catered for um i couldn't say whether they pray this phrase significantly but there were certainly a number of families who who would have had the correct size of room and or had the facilities available
02:56:15 room and or had the facilities available to them
02:56:16 to them and we amended that over the coming days and weeks as the situation changed but um we did our very best to try and place people somewhere in a very difficult situation and we
02:56:28 in a very difficult situation and we didn't get it right in every occasion and for that i can only apologize because it certainly wasn't the intent
02:56:36 and really on the last part of this section and then perhaps pause
02:56:42 pause is that
02:56:44 is that do you accept that a number of people who were placed in hotels in those early days were actually not provided transport
02:56:52 transport to the hotels and had to make their own way
02:56:57 way um i'm not to be honest with you i don't remember what the transport situation was on the first day
02:57:03 first day we
02:57:04 we attempted to get taxis to take people from the site to their hotels this was extremely difficult to do because there was obviously an enormous number of
02:57:14 number of emergency vehicles but there was also a huge media scrum which was preventing us from getting taxis through and a huge number of representatives from the media who were desperate to
02:57:26 from the media who were desperate to speak to people who were bereaved and had been through that awful experience and we were also trying to protect people
02:57:31 people from having to undergo that interrogation so on the first day i know we attempted to get taxis i can't honestly say that i remember on subsequent days what provision we made
02:57:42 subsequent days what provision we made for people to be able to to go to the hotels
02:57:45 hotels but those difficulties we've heard evidence from mr al carrad who
02:57:51 who on the 15th of june he attended the the west way to seek temporary accommodation he received a phone call and he had to rely on the kite and kindness
02:58:02 he had to rely on the kite and kindness of a stranger to get a lift to a hotel in earl's court for example you accept that there was situations where people didn't get transporter range by all bkc i can accept that i'm
02:58:14 range by all bkc i can accept that i'm sure that my team if they could have arranged a taxi would have arranged a taxi but that probably didn't happen in all cases
02:58:20 all cases mr chairman is that a suitable moment yes thank you very much well they are it's time we stop now for a break for lunch so we'll as i say we'll stop there we'll resume
02:58:31 as i say we'll stop there we'll resume keys at two o'clock and as before please don't talk to anyone about your evidence when you're out of the room all right thank you very much
02:58:49 thank you very much two o'clock and please